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This thesis examines the mapping of eighteenth-century Scotland in relation to the British 
state’s imperatives to know the spaces of the nation. It examines the idea of the ‘military 
landscape’—that conjunction of forts, roads, and barracks—represented and constructed by 
the military engineers, surveyors, and draughtsmen of the Board of Ordnance between 1689 
and 1815. In total, 940 maps constitute the Board of Ordnance ‘archive’ housed mainly in 
the National Library of Scotland, the British Library, the National Archives (Kew), and the 
Royal Library at Windsor. 
The study of the Board of Ordnance military maps of Scotland is considered in 
relation to the epistemological foundations of map making in the Enlightenment, particular 
focus being paid to the relations between government institutions and military cartography. 
The thesis considers how political and military power was embodied in the engineers’ maps 
and plans. It explores the extent to which the Scottish landscape—especially the 
Highlands—was an unknown territory demanding intellectual and material civilisation in 
cartographic form.  
In its main chapters on forts, movement, and battles, the thesis is organised to reflect 
the purpose behind the creation of military maps. It includes representations of military 
activities that consistently had recourse to mapping—fortifying, intelligence, reconnaissance, 
marching, encamping, and battle—and explains why military maps were conceived thus and 
how they were used. Fortification cartography dominates the representation of Scottish 
military landscapes: 73% of the archive constitutes maps, plans, sections, and views of forts, 
barracks, and coastal batteries; 22% maps associated with military movement; and 5% battle 
maps. By examining the different genres of military mapping, the thesis offers an evaluation 
of the Board’s endeavours to rationalise and to codify military cartography in order to bring 
it in line with wider European practices. This review of the nature and extent of military 
mapping of eighteenth-century Scotland reveals the practice to be a result of institutional 
imperatives to assert territorial control rather than simply a cartographic enterprise. In 
(re)constructing the military landscape, the thesis extends current knowledge of military 
mapping in eighteenth-century Scotland and provides for the first time a substantive 
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A Note on Referencing, Spellings, and Use of Dates 
 
Three notes concerning the thesis are important to state. The first is in reference to my 
referencing. Primary unpublished sources relating to written documents rather than to maps 
are provided with some contextual detail if this has not already been supplied in the text. The 
parent document is then to be found in the bibliography. Secondary sources are by author 
and date only, and are to be found in full in the bibliography. Map references, where they 
relate to the re-assembled archive, are to be found in full in Volume 2 of this thesis. The 
second note concerns spellings. Where I have taken a quote from a primary source, I have 
retained the original spelling and only used sic in the first instance of misspelling in relation 
to current, accepted forms. Thirdly, dates: pre-1752, the civil or legal year began on 25 
March and some of the Board of Ordnance documents—maps and texts—record both the 
Old Style and New Style years, for example, 1714/15. In such cases, I have rectified the 




A Note on Volume 2 
 
Volume 2, an “Index of Maps and Supplementary Appendices”, individually references the 
maps that have formed the basis of this study. The volume provides a full bibliography of the 
maps. The pagination of volume 2 starts from one rather than following on from this volume 
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Constructing the Military Landscape: the Board of Ordnance Maps  
and Plans of Scotland, 1689–1815 
 
The Plan’s describ’d, the Seas and Shores survey’d; 
Let’s now the Treasures of the Land Invade; 
Traverse their Hills, and all their Vales descry, 





This thesis examines the military mapping of Scotland in the ‘long’ eighteenth century. 
Specifically, the thesis provides an in-depth study of the maps and plans produced by the 
engineers and draughtsmen of the Board of Ordnance and several associated surveyors. The 
manuscript maps and associated material relating to their production in the work of the 
Board are a legacy of state activities in Scotland, when map makers were charged with 
planning, constructing, and recording landscapes of and for military action—a conjunction of 
forts, barracks, batteries, roads, and battlefields. The maps particularly represent the state’s 
endeavours to control internal unrest, to defend against external attack, and to plan for a 
future Scotland.   
 Discussion and examination of these maps—their place in the Enlightenment, their 
role as representations of military landscapes, and their role in government—is here 
considered in relation to recent work in the history of cartography on mapping in the 
Enlightenment and with reference to events in Scotland which underlie the maps and their 
related documents and which help explain their production at all and their nature, 
chronology, and type. It is my contention that the maps be understood as documents of 
power, authority, and access, and were used, in the period in question, as tools of national 
political administration.  
 To place this study in context, it is important to consider the place of mapping in the 
Enlightenment. Mapping was one of the primary means (the others being measurement and 
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text) by which geographers and state authorities sought to understand the world through 
reasoned description in the ‘Age of Reason’. Eighteenth-century geography has been 
described by one modern scholar of the history of cartography as ‘essentially cartography or 
nothing if not mapping’.
2
 Geography was a way of ‘seeing and knowing the world’ which 
sought ‘to represent, to classify and to order’ that world. Mapping as a related ordered 
practice would lead to the expansion of geographical and political knowledge.
3
 Knowledge 
enshrined in the map was power—‘to govern territories, one must know them’.
4
  
 The rhetorical and persuasive power of maps and of mapping in the eighteenth 
century owed partly to their increased scientific status with their claims of accuracy. The 
map was perceived as a rational construction, an intellectual and discursive space ruled by 
geometry, symmetry, and the requirements of territorial knowledge.
5
 Geographers and others 
saw the map as an ‘intellectual tool’ by which large and disparate masses of information 
could be amalgamated into coherent and comprehensive texts.
6
 In the same sense as books, 
maps and, often, their associated memoirs, offered an ‘enlightening potential’:
7
 ‘Geography 
was to the earth what the Encyclopédie was to human knowledge. Just as the Encyclopédie 
sought to define and describe all human knowledge in an orderly textual manner and then to 
express this in graphic form as a tree of understanding, geography sought in text and map to 
define and describe the world’.
8
  
Another reason for the authority of maps lay in their status as an image: an opaque 
medium that materialised the landscape of a particular place or social world. Because maps 
are images with historically specific codes, images bound by rules which govern their modes 
of social production, exchange, and use, maps have a political power in the social worlds in 
which they are produced and so require interpretation that is mindful of that context.
9
  
 This study considers the ‘scientistic rhetoric’ of the Board of Ordnance map makers, 
their ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ forms of knowledge creation, and the epistemological 
foundations to their map making in the Enlightenment. The study is not solely concerned 
with the technological aspects of map production and the ideals of mapping. I also explore 
the cultural and social significance of military mapping since ‘even ‘scientific’ maps are a 
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 3 
product not only of “the rules of the order of geometry and reason” but also of the “norms 
and values of the order of social […] tradition”’.
10
 To do this, the study allies examination of 
the maps of the Board of Ordnance with interrogation of the related manuscript and primary 
published sources. In combination, this allows us to understand why the state should seek to 
map the country as a military space in the ways it did but also to highlight how, by whom, 
and with what variations in type of map and in type of cartographic activity these processes 
were undertaken. 
 Through the Board of Ordnance, Scotland offers an important opportunity for 
considering the place of military mapping as a form of geographical knowledge in the 
Enlightenment given the significant archive of material on the militarised landscape and the 
social, intellectual and practical networks that directed the making of these landscape 
sources. As I hope to show, eighteenth-century Scotland was, in military mapping terms, 
distinguished by cartographic practices that resulted in different constructions of space. 
Fortification cartography reflected the British state’s need to secure its medieval defences, to 
establish a military presence, and to provide accommodation for its troops in the Highlands 
engaged in dealing with the threat of Jacobite insurgency. Topographic and route surveys 
reflected substantial military developments: in the strategic location of new barracks in touch 
one with the other with the construction of a military road system through the Highlands. 
The map-based and artistic representation of battles and campaign maps also forms an 
important part of the archive under consideration here, not least because it illustrates ‘lost 
landscapes’ and helps illustrate the political consequences of military action.  
 By examining different genres of military mapping, the thesis offers an evaluation of 
the Board of Ordnance’s endeavours to rationalise and to codify military cartography. The 
work in Scotland is discussed in relation to wider European practices. Overall, it is my 
contention that the nature and extent of military mapping of eighteenth-century Scotland 
may be seen as the result of institutional imperatives to assert territorial control rather than 
be seen simply as a singular cartographic enterprise. By examining sources which help us to 
construct the military landscape, the thesis extends current knowledge of military mapping in 
eighteenth-century Scotland and provides for the first time a substantive examination of the 
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The Board of Ordnance and the Military Mapping of Scotland, 1689–1815 
The Board of Ordnance was constituted in 1597 as a ministry of defence responsible for 
supplying the Army and Navy with armaments and munitions and the maintenance of 
sovereign forts and castles. In 1683, the Board—formed by a Lieutenant-General, Surveyor-
General, Clerk of Deliveries, and Storekeeper with the support of a Clerk of the Ordnance all 
presided over by the Master-General—and its Office of Ordnance were reconstituted as a 
civilian department. From this date, the power of the Board increased greatly and the Office 
grew substantially. The construction and maintenance of fortifications and barracks, the 
control of armament factories, the supply of munitions and subsistence stores, and land 
surveying all came under the jurisdiction of the Board of Ordnance. The technical and 
military establishments of the Artillery, Engineers, and Ordnance Field Trains were 
commanded by the Master-General and administrated by the Board of Ordnance. 
Furthermore, an Academy founded in 1741 for the military education and instruction of 
these specialist officers was supervised by the Board. By the beginning of the nineteenth 




 With the growth of the Office of Ordnance in the late seventeenth century, clearer 
distinction was made between the functions of the civil officers and the military officers of 
the Ordnance. Responsibilities and developments in specialist roles, for example, in civilian 
draughtsmanship and military engineering, became more acute as cartography emerged as a 
particular tool of government. Although cartographic concerns represented a small sector of 
the Board’s total responsibilities, they nevertheless were important in advancing the map-
mindedness of the military and the military nature of mapping in eighteenth-century Britain. 
My analysis of the Board of Ordnance is focused on its cartographic authority and involves, 
for the first time, a combined study of how this department of state structured the military 
establishment of engineers, rationalised their working methods in relation to mapping, and 
recognised the importance of a central repository for military maps and cartographic 
reproduction that was only accessible to state personnel. Military maps and plans of 
eighteenth-century Scotland form the basis of my study to examine the cartographic scope of 
the Board of Ordnance. 
 The extant archive is substantial, numbering 940 manuscript maps, plans, and views 
of the military landscapes of Scotland compiled between 1689 and 1815. The archive is 
today divided among several repositories: the National Library of Scotland with 402 maps, 
the British Library (288 divided between the map library (219) and manuscripts (69)), the 
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(British) National Archives at Kew (177), the Royal Library at Windsor Castle (40), the 
Admiralty Library at Portsmouth (19), and the National Archives of Scotland (14). 
 The collection of military maps at the National Archives at Kew was passed on, and 
continues to be so, by the War Office. The principal collection at the National Library of 
Scotland was a donation which came to the Library in the 1930s from a government 
department descended from the Board of Ordnance.
12
 The Wade Collection (17 plans on 14 
sheets) was purchased from the Royal Scottish Geographical Society in 1992 and relates to 
the building of forts, barracks, and roads in the Highlands during Field-Marshal George 
Wade’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief in Scotland from 1724 to 1740.  
 In the 60 years of his reign (1760–1820), George III built-up ‘one of the finest 
libraries ever created by one man’.
13
 In addition to the collections of paintings, drawings, 
scientific instruments and the ‘King’s Library’ of printed books, the library also included an 
extensive geographical collection. This comprised manuscript and printed maps and views, a 
few estate maps, military plans, maritime charts, and ‘topographical ephemera’. The entire 
geographical collection was divided into three constituent parts after 1811, divisions that 
remain today: the King’s Topographical Collection—the largest element of the assembled 
geographical collection—now held in the British Library; the King’s Military Collection, 
now known as the ‘Cumberland Collection’, in the Royal Library, Windsor Castle; and the 




 The incorporation of the Duke of Cumberland’s library into George III’s 
geographical collection and their subsequent separation into the three collections of 
topographical, military, and maritime, resulted in Cumberland’s Scottish collection being 
split. When the maps were divided between military and general interest, for example, some 
works of William Roy including his ‘Plan of Culloden House and the adjacent country’ 
remained with the King’s Topographical Collection presented to the British Museum.
15
 
Other holdings retained in the Topographical Collection reflect Cumberland’s appreciation 
of landscape art and his status as an amateur antiquarian: for example, Scottish landscapes by 
Paul and Thomas Sandby and views of Scottish castles by John Elphinstone,
16
 and plans of 
Roman antiquities in Britain by William Roy.
17
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  This study has involved re-assembling all the cartographic material to form a 
conceptually united archive—a union-archive—that has collective significance as a ‘centre 
of interpretation’.
18
 In practical terms, it has involved interrogating across different holdings 
in order to deconstruct the archive. Deconstruction can reveal how map makers conceived 
the military landscapes of eighteenth-century Scotland and what those landscapes were—
today, some are lost and some were never built. Deconstruction is also reflexive and allows 
for an exploration of why the maps were made, who co-ordinated their making, and 
consequently the authority of institutions and sites of power through the process of acquiring 
geographical knowledge. Deconstruction relies on context—historical, political, social, 
economic, and so on—and knowing the provenance of the union-archive is part of the 
context.  
 Despite the size of today’s map archive, it is possible that numbers of manuscript 
maps have been lost. It is impossible to know how many. Attempts to rationalise the Office 
of Ordnance included setting up a log book—a ‘Register of Draughts’—in the Tower of 
London Drawing Room to record maps deposited by engineers stationed at divisional 
outposts.
19
 Although not authorised until 1752, many entries relate to records from the first 
half of the eighteenth century; thereafter, the register was intermittently maintained until 
1812.
20
 A comparison of the ‘Register’ with today’s archive indicates that maps are missing 
and, also, that several extant maps were never recorded. This question of ‘losses’ is 
considered in chapter 4.  
 Evidence suggests that maps were sometimes kept by their compilers or military-
political recipients and may, today, remain in private collections or be lost if they were not 
later deposited with either the War Department or the British Library. In the course of this 
PhD, I made several attempts to include private collections in my search of military maps 
and met with mixed success. Enquiries made at the Goodwood Estate, the seat of the Duke 
of Richmond and former Master-Generals of the Ordnance, drew a blank, as did an enquiry 
                                                                                                                                          
K.Top.48.22. (Edinburgh, Dumbarton, Stirling and Blackness Castles), Maps K.Top.49.23.a.3–6 
(Glamis Castle), Maps K.Top. 49.74.c. and K.Top.49.73. (Edinburgh Castle), Maps K.Top.49.86. 
(Palace of Falkland), Maps K.Top.50.37.1.a–e (Fort William environs), and Maps K.Top.50.96.f.1. 
(Stirling Castle).  
17
 BL Maps K.Top.49.54.2–3, Maps K.Top.50.79.2.a–b, Maps K.Top.50.79.3. and Maps 
K.Top.50.83.3. A complete set of antiquarian plans was presented as a volume to George III in 1774 
by William Roy, now BL King’s MS 247–248. See also National Library of Scotland: 
http://www.nls.uk/maps/roy/antiquities/index.html  
18
 Osborne 1999, p. 52. 
19
 TNA WO 55/2281. 
20
 Marshall 1980, p. 22. 
 7 
to the Duke of Buccleuch (the Earl of Dalkeith).
21
 A plan and a narrative of the Duke of 
Argyll’s command of the army at the Battle of Sheriffmuir on 13 November 1715 in the 
Douglas Home papers have gone missing.
22
 Papers from Raynham Hall, the seat of the 
Marquess of Townshend, are now at the British Library, and include plans of the Shetlands, 
Firth of Forth, Leith and Edinburgh Castle.
23
 The Hardwicke Papers in the British Library 
also include maps of the Battle of Culloden sketched by Joseph Yorke, Aide-de-Camp to the 
Duke of Cumberland.
24
 The papers belonging to the Dundas family of Arniston include a 
plan of south-east Midlothian, centred on Arniston, by General William Roy, 1755 and 
presented then to ‘Lord President Dundas’.
25
 In addition to the national repositories listed 
above, I have also made enquiries at the Highland Council Archives at Inverness, the Cairns 
Mitchell Collection at Glasgow City Archives, and at the Department of Maps and Plans at 
the National Library of France without being able to add to today’s archive.  
 This map archive is supported by textual correlates, the majority of which are 
housed in the National Archives at Kew. These are mainly the work of the Board of 
Ordnance and include minutes, correspondence, reports, estimates, warrants, bills, personnel 
lists, and establishment structures. Many original items’ references for the eighteenth century 
are incomplete, as we shall see. But interrogation of these papers in association with the 
maps allows detailed insight into the activities of the Board of Ordnance and explication of 
the cartographic ‘production’ of military landscapes in eighteenth-century Scotland. 
 It is important, too, to state what this thesis is not. It is not, primarily, a study of the 
‘Military Survey’, that work of military cartography in eighteenth-century Scotland which 
has to date been the main focus of research on military mapping in that country. The 
‘Military Survey’ was never the main concern of the Board of Ordnance. For this reason, it 
forms a minor part of this study. 
 The dates of my study—1689 to 1815—are significant for several reasons. 1689 
marked the beginning of Jacobitism in Scotland, when John Graham of Claverhouse, 
Viscount of Dundee, raised James Stuart’s standard at Dundee Law and the clans gathered in 
an attempt, the first of many, to restore James VII of Scotland and II of England, and 
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descendants of the House of Stuart, to the throne. This rising prompted a concern to map 
Scotland in an attempt to know the nation, the better to govern it. The Act of Union between 
England and Scotland in 1707 placed the Scottish Ordnance Office under the Board of 
Ordnance’s jurisdiction. In 1708, when the London government were alerted to a planned 
French invasion, the Board confessed that ‘We beg leave to inform Your Majesty that Wee 
[sic] have as yet no Draughts of the Castles of Edenburgh, Sterling and Inverlocky, nor any 
Estimates of the Charge of putting them in a posture of Defence’. The Board conceived that 
such work ‘may be perform’d in less time, and at less charge, under the Direction and 
Conduct of ye Master and Officers of the Ordnance there, who Wee presume are already 
apprized of what is needfull [sic] to be done, to put those Castles in a posture of Defence, 
and can soon make Estimates what the Charge thereof will amount to’.
26
 Thereafter, maps 
and plans produced by John Slezer and Theodore Dury—principal engineers in Scotland—
were sent to London for consideration by the Board, many pre-dating the Union. The 
Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 and 1745, the rising of 1719, and the abortive invasions of 1708 
and 1744 only heightened the government’s anxiety over Scotland and led to a renewal of 
the Board of Ordnance’s mission to map the military landscape. This near continuous state of 
warfare produced ‘the first improvements in [Scotland’s] geography’ in the mapping of 
fortifications, their environs, roads, and route ways throughout the Highlands.
27
 
 Wars with America and France towards the end of the eighteenth and the start of the 
nineteenth centuries caused a reawakening of cartographic interest in Scotland after a period 
of relative quiet in military and mapping terms. With the main threat no longer from the 
Highlands, cartographic attention turned away from the interior and was directed, instead, to 
the eastern seaboard, Shetland and Orkney Islands, and to the Firth of Clyde where the 
engineers sought to erect gun-batteries to protect shipping and Scotland’s harbours. With the 
threat to Scotland subsiding with Napoleon’s defeat and abdication in 1815 and the signing 
of the Treaty of Paris—a peace treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, 
and France—the Board’s focus on Scotland subsided and the principal role of the Chief 
Engineer there was to recruit troops for the Corp of Military Artificers at Woolwich. The 
gradual decline in military activity from the early nineteenth century seemed an obvious 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
This study is divided into six main chapters and offers a thematic examination of ‘the 
archive’ rather than a chronological one. In undertaking a study of these maps that was 
sympathetic to their social and political context, there were opportunities to organise the 
material in several ways: biographically by map maker, geographically by place, and 
chronologically by date. But by looking at the nature of the social dimensions of maps, their 
use as well as their making becomes important. In Scotland, the use of military maps was 
both pragmatic from the point of view of engineering works—the (re)construction and 
recording of landscapes of military activity—and politically symbolic, that is, the maps were 
deeply invested in conceptions of power. To thus treat them thematically reveals their 
functions in a range of military activities, principally fortification, movement, and battle. The 
use of these maps in the representation, construction, and contestation of military landscapes 
reveals relationships between the maps themselves, the institution and its conception of 
cartographic practise, the changing technologies of warfare and mapping, and the changing 
spatial and temporal patterns of state engagement with questions of defensible territory.    
 In chapter 2, “Maps and Mapping in the Enlightenment”, the study begins by 
reviewing the historiography of map making in the Enlightenment and the methodologies 
used by modern scholars for examining the cartography of this period. The chapter begins by 
reviewing changing traditions of scholarship in the history of cartography. As documents in 
the wider history of human thought, maps need to be considered as a social product: ‘the 
principal concern of the history of cartography is the study of the map in human terms’.
28
 
Studies have shown that cartography’s progress is not simply chronological and technical 
improvement is not the sole measurement of map’s betterment. Neither is the map a 
surrogate of space nor a mirror to nature. The chapter reviews how Enlightenment 
contemporaries understood their work and its relationship to that of earlier cartographers. 
The premise of some modern scholars that the history of cartography can be explained as 
essentially a ‘progressive trajectory’ of objectivity, technical advancement, and scientific 
development since the Renaissance, is ‘rooted in the project of Enlightenment’.
29
 More 
recent modern scholars, who now place maps in their time, read mapping not as a linear 
paradigm, but as complex, social, and uneven. Modern analyses of maps look at the 
constructive and communicative processes at work in a map within its cultural and political 
context. Using deconstructist approaches, scholarship has addressed the internal and external 
power of the map and its expression as an instrument of aid for state and military activity. I 
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draw upon these notions in situating my study, contextually, conceptually, and 
methodologically. The final part of chapter 2 considers Brian Harley’s classification of the 
maps of the American Revolutionary War as a model by which to look at the functions of 
military maps in eighteenth-century Scotland.  
 Chapter 3, “The Board of Ordnance”, analyses the relations between the institution 
and its procedures for cartographic practice. The focus is the Board of Ordnance’s 
rationalisation of state cartography as a response to the increasing ‘map mindedness’ of 
military and political commanders. This process began with the development of distinct civil 
and military branches of the Ordnance which, in turn, prompted cartographic roles: that of 
the civilian draughtsmen based in the Tower of London Drawing Room and the military 
engineers posted to divisions in Britain and to her overseas dependencies. The cartographic 
duties of the engineers were defined in 1683 in ‘Rules Orders and Instruction for the future 
Government of the Office of the Ordnance’ and remained largely unaltered for this period of 
study.
30
 In recognition of the importance of military science in matters of warfare, the Royal 
Military Academy was established in 1741 at Woolwich. The Academy provided junior 
cadets with the necessary instruction in geometry, measurement, and art to be able to 
represent and to construct (and destroy) military landscapes. Chapter 3 further discusses how 
the professional education and instruction of the engineers and draughtsmen helped fix 
mapping as the embodiment of European military science and the map as one conceptual 
basis of Enlightenment ideology towards effective management of space. 
 Chapter 4 describes “The Chronology and Geography of the Military Maps of 
Scotland, 1689–1815”. Of particular concern are the characteristics of the archive rather than 
the detailed map content per se. In the first part of the chapter, the purpose of the maps in 
relation to state imperatives is explored. General William Roy remarked that ‘accurate 
surveys of a country are universally admitted to be […] the best means of forming judicious 
plans of defence […]. Hence it happens, that if a country has not actually been surveyed, or 
is but little known, a state of warfare generally produces the first improvements in its 
geography’.
31
 Reliable information about the geography of Scotland was essential for the 
British state to exercise territorial control and to counter insurgency incited by Jacobite 
rebellions. Board of Ordnance maps provided data useful for the defence of the nation and 
represented territorial features of political and military importance.
32
 The maps compiled by 
the Ordnance engineers and draughtsmen represented a highly iconic rendition of Scottish 
territory, as a theatre of war and a space of military manoeuvre. Part of this chapter explores 
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what the Enlightenment archive of Scotland’s military landscape might have looked like and 
tries to account for map losses. 
 The second part of chapter 4 looks at how the maps were produced, at methods of 
survey and the technologies available to the engineers in Scotland. Triangulation had yet to 
play a major part in the mapping of Scotland but its principles of mathematical measurement 
and sketching by eye were common to the surveying methodologies employed. The question 
that follows map construction is map use and who found these maps of Scotland’s military 
landscape useful. Because military maps were concerned with the imperatives of the state—
state secrets for the eyes of governing authorities—they were not concerned with 
communicating information of general interest. Their focus was well-defined, their audience 
likewise. The nature of the distribution of these maps is explained here. In commissioning 
maps, the state was acknowledging the value of an enlightenment way of seeing the nation, 
one based on measurement and survey.    
 The fifth chapter, “Fortification Cartography: The Art of Design”, examines one of 
the best defined genres of military cartography for Scotland in this period. Where chapter 3 
outlines the institutional rationalisation of cartography, this chapter firstly examines how 
fortification cartography was further rationalised at compilation and design stages to produce 
conventions of design, scale, and colour that were recognised by the agencies and institutions 
who made and used the maps. This codification of military mapping is looked at in detail in 
order to understand the military mapping of Scotland in light of European military culture, 
and contemporary educational theory and operational practice in cartography.
33
 The second 
and third parts of this chapter describe the changing spatial and temporal variations in the 
mapping of fortified places. What is revealed is an adaptation of fortification type by time in 
relation to different political threats. Different political and military imperatives at different 
times gave rise to different constructions and representations of fortified space. In some 
cases, moreover, where the fortifications were planned but not built, we are left with 
intended spaces of military order. 
 Chapter 6, “The Cartography of Military Movement”, describes the changes in 
mapping technologies coincident with the changing nature of warfare and the government’s 
evolving approach to the problem of Jacobite insurrection. The initial building of barracks 
and garrison forts failed to subdue outbreaks of disaffection and Jacobite dissent and, in the 
process, exposed the static nature of military planning in Scotland. New measures to police 
the Highlands, to more effectively connect the Highland forts with each other and the 
lowland castles, and to speed up the movement of munitions and stores generated a need for 
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different, more explicit, cartographical materials—for surveys and descriptions—of 
Scotland. This prompted extensive surveys of route ways through the Highlands—of roads, 
lochs, and rivers—as well as the construction and detailed mapping of military roads. This is 
the background to the Military Survey, 1747–1755. Having been exposed to ‘the daily want 
of proper maps of North Britain’, William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, 
commissioned a Military Survey of Scotland.
34
 In its making, ‘the courses of all the Rivers 
and their Branches; of all the principal Roads; and of the Lakes, Sea and Fresh were 
followed, and measured; as well as such other intermediate and cross Lines as were found 
necessary for the filling up of the Country’.
35
 The Survey, however, was never put to military 
use (unless by David Watson, its director).  
As important as land routes were to the army, Scotland’s extensive coastline and 
inland waterways also offered opportunities for the rapid movement of troops and supplies, 
and strategic sites for establishing fortifications to which building materials could be 
transported by boat. Maps to facilitate military movement in whatever form—coastal charts 
and inland waterways, military roads, and topographical maps—provided political and 
military commanders with access to parts of Scotland that were otherwise known only 
locally.  
 Despite attempts to establish order and bring submission to the Highlands through 
fortification and road construction, the threat of Jacobitism continued throughout the period. 
The Williamite and Hanoverian governments were faced with risings in Scotland in 1689 
and 1719, rebellion in 1715 and 1745, and aborted foreign invasions in 1708 and 1744. The 
operations mounted by supporters of the exiled Stuarts culminated in a number of battles 
with these sovereign armies, namely, Sheriffmuir in 1715, Glenshiel (1719), Prestonpans 
(1745), and Falkirk and Culloden (1746).  
 Chapter 7 looks at “The Cartography of Conflict”. The maps illustrate events before, 
during, and after battle. By considering each battle in turn, we can observe the emergence of 
a style of battle cartography that became commonplace during the eighteenth century, one 
that created abstract formation-maps depicting the order of battle of the opposing armies 
within or without the context of battlefield topography. I also contend that the use of 
pictorial as well as abstract symbols on any one map was a deliberate ploy by the map maker 
to inject a greater sense of ordered victory and disordered defeat than it was a reflection of 
battle cartography in transition. This prompts me to consider the attendant purpose of battle 
maps and to project the meaning of their cartographic illustration beyond the battle action 
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itself. Battle maps were a form of propaganda in the eighteenth century. Popular with both 
Jacobite and Hanoverian authorities, battle maps were one genre of military mapping the 
public was privileged to see. Manuscript maps were produced to report on events and then 
published as news maps accompanied by written narratives of events. Map illustrations with 
texts were a successful means of imparting information that had other uses beyond 
propaganda. Battle maps were used as evidence in court-marshals, as pedagogic devices in 
military academies, as the basis of official military reports, and as commemorations of heroic 
leadership with dedications made to military commanders. Most of these uses are considered 
in this chapter.     
 A final concluding chapter summarises the arguments advanced in this thesis. The 
chapter begins with a summary of each chapter and an overview of today’s union-archive: its 
scope and value in reconstructing the military landscape of a Scotland long past. Through 
this archive, a greater understanding of cartographic processes and the undeniable influence 
of a cartographic authority on national mapping has been reached. A rationalisation of state 
cartography accentuated the usefulness of mapping in specific military and political 
objectives directed towards Scotland in the eighteenth century. Political situations in 
Scotland were the primary cause of changing cartographic modes. As the government 
responded to the nature of internal warfare and its changes over time and space, the map-
minded military engineers reflected and represented these in their maps and plans of 
Scotland’s changing military landscape. The chapter concludes with a review of the 
limitations of the study and, in identifying these, makes suggestions for further research. 
 The second volume provides a union-archive listing of the maps, essentially an index 
of the military maps and plans of eighteenth-century Scotland. It is organised to provide 
multiple search routes for viewing the maps and plans through a descriptive index, a 
chronological index, an alphabetical index of map makers, and concordances. A summary 
chapter and introduction offers a rationalisation of the union-archive including principles of 
















This chapter reviews the epistemological foundations of map making in the Enlightenment. 
My concern is to examine how maps were seen in the Enlightenment in order to provide a 
background to the more detailed scrutiny of the Board of Ordnance maps of Scotland. To do 
this, I review something of how eighteenth-century figures understood the map and how 
modern scholars have interpreted Enlightenment mapping.  
In order to place Enlightenment mapping in wider context the chapter begins by 
reviewing changing traditions of scholarship in the history of cartography. In adopting new 
approaches, the history of cartography has progressed from studying the technical and 
practical history of the map artefact to a ‘principal concern’, that of ‘the study of the map in 
human terms’.
36
 Three universal lines of enquiry summarise the foci of modern studies: the 
role of a map within the social group that produced it; the ways in which the map reflects the 
specific historical period to which it belongs; and the policies or projects that may have been 
behind its creation.
37
 When we turn to cartography in the European Enlightenment and apply 
these lines of enquiry, the distinction may be made between the history of cartography in the 
Enlightenment as contemporaries then understood their work and its relationship to that of 
earlier cartographers, and the work of modern scholars looking at Enlightenment cartography 
as one episode of cartographic history.
38
  
Enlightenment scholars’ conceptions of maps and the process of map making are 
considered in the second section of this chapter. Geography, in the eighteenth century, was 
concerned with classifying and ordering the world and knowledge of the world.
39
 Thus, 
Enlightenment map making was fundamentally a practical affair concerned with expanding 
geographical knowledge about the world and its representation in graphical and textual 
form.
40
 Geographical data was accumulated through practices of reconnaissance and 
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mapping, resulting in a comprehensive archive deemed to be Enlightenment scholars’ most 
successful form of knowledge creation whereby the geographical complexity of the world 
was put to order through the map.
41
 Although the map was widely regarded as the ‘epitome 
of encyclopaedic knowledge’ and the idea of mapping as a metaphor appeared throughout 
the Enlightenment—Diderot and d’Alembert, for example, referred to their Encyclopédie as 
a ‘map of the world’—both were more widely understood in association with mathematical 
accuracy and scientific representation.
42
 Map making was considered by Enlightenment 
scholars as ‘an empirical, objective, and unproblematic science’ and maps, therefore, as true 
and accurate representations of geographical reality—mirrors of the world.
43
 ‘Scientific 
maps’, as a progressive, measurable, repeatable, and objective process of knowledge 
building were assumed to be synonymous with the growth of science itself.
44
 Early maps 
were studied primarily as historical documents to reconstruct geographies of the past and to 
allow scholars to make claims of technological progress. Such intellectual predications set 
the study of early maps apart from the social implications of their making and firmly 
established an empiricist conception of maps.  
The last section in this chapter returns to the work of modern scholars of cartography 
and the methods they have employed to consider the purpose of mapping and maps not as 
mimetic devices but rather ideological expressions and symbols of political power.
45
 By 
studying maps in their historical context it becomes easier to identify cultural and 
sociological influences on map making.
46
 Changing methodologies since the 1970s now 
allows for a more holistic approach to the interpretation of maps and their social role in a 
particular period of history. By moving beyond the positivist, technical aspects of map 
construction and notions of objectivity it becomes possible to reconsider the purpose of maps 
as visual communicators of geographical knowledge within a cultural and political context.
47
 
The dual nature of a map—as a social product and as a means of communication (both a 
medium and an image)—thus provides an epistemological framework for the study of its 
historical significance. Three approaches are discussed in this chapter: semiotics; 
iconography; and deconstruction.  
By conducting a semiological analysis of the military maps of the Board of 
Ordnance the purpose behind the creation of the maps rather than just their content can be 
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explored. A theory of cartographic semiosis on its own, however, is not sufficient to interpret 
fully the military maps of eighteenth-century Scotland. Cartographic semiosis can show that 
maps can convey complex information, but this information is the product of iconization. 
‘Icon’, in this case, refers to a semiotic figure (a sign) that is capable of producing 
information and processing it in a communicative sense. Although iconology is challenged 
by semiotics, a semiotic analysis of the ‘iconography’ can show that the concepts they 
represent acquire meaning through context.
48
 Brian Harley in particular was concerned with 
‘deconstructing’ the map as a ‘text’.
49
 He argued that social factors influence the production 
of maps and that these factors can be read within the finished map. Through analysis of a 
map’s cartographic language using semiotics and iconography and deconstruction, it is 
possible, I suggest, to explore the social discourse of military maps in the context of political 
power in the eighteenth century. 
In the final section, I consider a taxonomic model—Harley’s classification of the 
maps of the American Revolutionary War—as an approach to collating and analysing the 





Themes in the History of Cartography  
‘Since the 1930s the history of cartography has been slowly emerging as a subject with its 
own scholarly identity’.
51
 Scholars have published general histories of cartography; the 
international journal Imago Mundi was founded by Leo Bagrow in 1935 with the aim of 
devoting itself to the history of cartography; and there has been a growth in the autonomy of 
cartography with concomitant repercussions on the history of cartography: 
The distinction must be made between cartography as the ancient art and 
science of making maps in a practical sense (and its products) and 




 In considering the development of the history of cartography as a distinct subject 
area, traditional studies have been dominated by an empiricism that assumes maps are 
accurate, objective statements of geographical fact.
53
 Blakemore and Harley identified a 
number of dominant ideas that channelled scholarly and specialised contributions to the 
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history of cartography, in particular the ‘Darwinian paradigm’.
54
 Its basic premise was a 
linear progression of cartographic history: ‘as civilization improves so map-making also 
progresses’.
55
 This concept encouraged a view that cartography’s progress was simply 
chronological and, furthermore, technical improvement was the sole measurement of maps’ 
betterment. Goode, for example, wrote about ‘the map as a record of progress in 
geography’.
56
 Bagrow’s History of Cartography drew a clear distinction between what he 
perceived as cartography’s supposed ‘artistic phase’ and its progression to a ‘scientific 
phase’. His narrative ended in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the point he saw 
as ‘where maps ceased to be works of art, the products of individual minds, and where 
craftsmanship was finally superseded by specialised science and the machine’.
57
 Crone 
subsequently wrote that ‘the history of cartography is largely that of the increase in the 
accuracy with which […] elements of distance and direction are determined and […] the 
comprehensiveness of the map content’ remains satisfactory’.
58
  
Whilst the scientific development of mapping was one fundamental theme in the 
history of cartography, another was the presumed association between the map and its 
mimetic capacity. Robinson and Petchenik stated ‘that the map is actually a diminutive 
reproduction of the real space to which it refers’ and, as such, a surrogate of space or a 
mirror of nature.
59
 Harley placed the responsibility for promoting this illusion of 
cartographic objectivity—the mirroring accurately some aspect of ‘reality’—down to two 
influences. The first, that of the attitude of scholars towards cartography and the second, that 
of the cartographers’ view of the nature of their own craft. In the first instance, scholars 
‘failed to question the inner logic, the rhetoric, and the style of the map in the same way 
[they] would question the syntax of the written word’ and thus failed to see mapping as a 
discourse in its own right. In the second, cartographers convinced us that maps were 
objective and truthful, a technological solution to the representation of territory. ‘The result 
was an elevation of the map so that we were often mesmerised by its mimetic power’.
60
   
Neither the study of the scientific development of mapping nor the map’s mimetic 
capacity fully addressed the importance of maps in human terms. As documents in the wider 
history of human thought, maps needed to be considered as a social product. Harley stated 
that ‘by 1980 the history of cartography was at a crossroads. The divergence […] was also 
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between its traditional work in the interpretation of the content of early maps as documents 
and its more recently clarified aims to study maps as artefacts in their own right and as a 
graphic language that has functioned as a force for change in history’.
61
 The traditional, 
descriptive practices of map analysis that focused on accuracy and the truthful or objective 
depiction of geographical knowledge were challenged by a critical and analytical approach 
to the study of the ‘new’ nature of maps. Modern studies in the history of cartography began 
to look at the nature of the social dimensions of maps which depended as much upon their 
use as their making.
62
 Edney has referred to this as a way to ‘de-naturalise’ the map, ‘to 
break through the shell of objectivity with which our culture has surrounded the map in order 
to expose and then study the map for what it is: a human practice’.
63
 Theoretical 
contributions were a way of accessing not only the map artefacts, but the culture within 
which they were produced and used—a complex of economic, social, political, intellectual, 
and artistic contexts, as well as the established scientific context.
64
 
 Cartographic scholars’ engagement with alternative theoretical approaches in the 
history of cartography recognised that a ‘general theory of cartography’ was an essential aid 
to understanding the history of maps: ‘we must have a deeper understanding of the 
characteristics and processes by which the map acquires meaning from its maker and evokes 
meaning in its user’.
65
 One such theoretical approach—geosophy—identified maps as 
sources for exploring forms and structures of geographical knowledge in past societies that 
are culturally, historically, and socially distinct, and thus essential tools for the modern 
reconstruction of past geographical knowledge. Central to this theory was the meaning that 
cartographic information had for contemporary viewers—the nature of the message being 
communicated through maps to a receptive audience.
66
 The centrality of meaning led 
cartographic scholars to question how geographical conceptions were not only created in 
maps, but also to explore the ways in which they were interpreted—how the contemporary 
user read the map:  
Maps are a graphic language to be decoded. They are a construction of 
reality, images laden with intentions and consequences that can be studied in 
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the societies of their time. Like books, they are also the products of both 
individual minds and the wider cultural values in particular societies.
67
 
 The focus in the study of the history of cartography began to move away from the 
positivist approach of analysing the physical characteristics of the map—the forms and 
content of maps that allows them to be ‘surrogates of space’—and the technical aspects of 
their construction. The focus turned, rather, to include consideration of the map as the 
‘medium of communication’ between the map maker and the map user: ‘theories of mapping 
as a cognitive science that involves communication from mapmaker to map user’, thus 
‘stressing the nature of cartography as a process rather than maps as a product’.
68
 
 Analytical emphasis was placed on the characteristics of the communication process: 
how people look at, read, and use maps.
69
 Cartographic communication was initially 
perceived as a ‘general communication system’ where the source message is encoded, 
transmitted, received and decoded back into the same meaning as the original message. The 
efficiency of the message transmission is modified and information loss occurs due to 
various interferences: by processes of selection and interpretation in both the source (the map 
maker) and the destination (the map user); by ‘noise’ in the general system; by varying 
conceptions of the ‘real world’ by the maker and by the user; and by methods of coding the 
message—encoding by the maker, decoding by the user.
70
 The fundamental aim of 
cartography was to reduce any loss of information at each stage in the communication 
process: ‘the proper purpose of cartography was to impart geographical information to a 
reader in as effective and as correct a manner as possible’.
71
  
 Harley was a leading advocate of exploring the discourse of maps by alternative 
epistemologies. He continued to assert the need for ‘appropriate theory’ for reconfiguring the 
historical study and practice of cartography. Influenced both by the ‘geosophical’ tradition 
and the cartographic communication model, he looked beyond geography and cartography 
and turned to language instead.
72
 ‘Maps as language offers the most appropriate underlying 
structure for the history of cartography. It is a structure which lies beneath both the form and 
content of maps, and deeper than the tangible artefact and visible image’.
73
 By combining 
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elements of cartography’s communication models, the speech model of structural linguistics, 
and semiotics, Harley presented an underlying theoretical structure for cartographic history, 
the ‘linguistic model’ or maps as language, whereby map reading is an active activity and 
that map making and map use take place within a shared cultural context.
74
  
 This move towards the study of a map as a social product laid the foundations for a 
new discourse, that of a social theory: ‘[o]ur task is to search for the social forces that have 
structured cartography and to locate the presence of power—and its effects—in all map 
knowledge’.
75
 Harley adopted a metaphorical technique, the ‘deconstruction’ of the map as a 
‘text’ (rather than its earlier metaphor as a ‘mirror’), drawing upon the idea of discourse and 
the work of social theorists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida to emphasise how 
maps work in society as a form of power-knowledge.
76
 In considering the interpretive act of 
deconstructing the map, Harley aimed to revise the way maps are viewed in geographical 
culture: ‘to challenge the epistemological myth (created by cartographers) of the cumulative 
progress of an objective science always producing better delineations of reality; to redefine 
the social importance of maps [and] the power of cartographic representation [in] building 
order into our world; [finally,] a deconstructive turn of mind may allow geographical 
cartography to take a fuller place in the interdisciplinary study of text and knowledge’.
77
 As a 
socially constructed form of knowledge linked to the interrogation of power, Harley applied 
three concepts to trace the connection between cartography and ideology: maps as a kind of 
language, an approach derived indirectly from the semiotics of graphics; another from Erwin 
Panofsky’s art-historical methodology of iconography to provide analysis of the cultural 
meanings read into maps; and a third perspective gained from the sociology of knowledge.
78
 
These will be considered in more detail in the third section of this chapter. 
 Since Harley’s call for recognition of the textuality of maps and a rethinking of past 
cartographic practices, other cartographic scholars have applied several new approaches to 
the history of cartography. Christian Jacob has been concerned, firstly, with the map artefact, 
its various elements of cartographic composition—‘the topographical, geographical and 
cosmographical outlines’ seen as ‘lines and forms of a map, its toponyms, its title and frame, 
its architectural setting’—and the various ways the map’s function can be seen and read. The 
map’s functions vary from one historical period to the next and from one society to another. 
This variation highlighted for Jacob a second objective in the history of cartography: to 
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explore the sociological aspects of maps by researching the social and professional status of 
map makers, their links to institutions, and the state authority concerned with co-ordinating 
mapping projects and using maps. The sociology of maps redefined the focus from map 
accuracy to map efficiency.
79
 In this way, the map is less an object than a function—‘an 
instance of social mediation that lends itself to numerous interactive situations’, for example, 
construction work, project design, operations upon terrain, teaching, and conversation.
80
 A 
map, in this case, provides an image of how the world might be, and even when its 




 To address the substance of this thesis for a moment, there are many instances in the 
mapping by military engineers of eighteenth-century Scotland where, on the one hand, maps 
conveyed a pragmatic function of construction and, on the other, a political function for 
establishing social order. George Wade’s construction of military roads from the mid-1720s, 
for example, generated linear maps of route ways, from Stirling to Fort William and to 
Inverness. In addition to representing the modernising of Scotland through the expansion of 
its communication network, to military and political elites, the maps were primarily tools of 
access for sending soldiers into the Highlands in order to police them. Duncan Forbes, the 
Lord Advocate of Scotland, wrote: 
In coming from Perth I chose the Highland road, By Blair in Atholl, […] 
and in my journey had great Relief […] I was not a little surprised at the 
Regularity and success of the work [… the road is] now as Smooth as the 
Road from London to Hampstead, and in a little time will be passable by an 
Army with its Artillery, notwithstanding the abrupt Declivity of some of the 
Mountains. […] In short this Project which compleats [sic] the intention of 
Disarming the Highlands is so far from being ill Received … by the Wisest 
of them [Highlanders], it is looked upon as a sort of satisfaction for the Loss 
of their Weapons, since it gives the Troops access to come wherever there is 
Occasion to Defend them, So well has Mr Wade known how to Guile the 
Pill that Deprives them of the power of hurting the Government.
82
 
Edney has been similarly concerned with examining a map’s form and function as a 
manifestation of the requirements of different social organisations for graphic 
representations of the world. Maps are, accordingly, ‘artifactual manifestations of different 
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 Edney defined ‘modes’ as cultural, social, and technological relations, 
each thoroughly enmeshed with the specificity of these relations determining a particular 
cartographic practice. Cultural relations play a central role in the construction of human 
knowledge spaces, in our perception and reading of space, and thus govern cartographic 
conventions: ‘[w]e see the earth’s surface in terms of the cartographic convention we are 
familiar with: [the discourse] constitutes its own object’.
84
 Social relations reside within a 
given culture and equate to sociological aspects of cartography. The various social 
requirements for geographic information define map scale.
85
 Technological relations govern 
the creation of the map artefact and include methods of survey and compilation. 
 The cartographic mode is therefore a combination of a map’s form and function, the 
manipulation and representation of geographical information, and the reason for the map in 
the first place.
86
 A study of the map artefact is one aspect of the ‘history of communication 
about space’ that can reveal the cultural, social, and technological relations of its mode.
87
 
Drawing upon Rundstrom, Edney considered that ‘process cartography situates the map 
artefact within the mapmaking process, and it places [all] mapmaking process[es] within the 
context of intracultural and intercultural dialogues’.
88
 The importance of this concept is 
evident, for example, in the established mode of ‘mathematical cosmography’ which 
dominated eighteenth-century European cartography, in the subsequent ‘cartographisation of 
the military’, and in the military mapping of Scotland.
89
 The ‘Military Survey of Scotland’ 
(1747–1755), for example, was an act of political and military surveillance by the Board of 
Ordnance and its military engineers, extending from the limited disciplinary units of the 
garrisons and forts in parts of Scotland to the Gaelic-speaking Highlands and, eventually, to 
the physical extent of the nation.
90
 Seeing cartography in light of Rundstrom’s ‘process’ thus 
‘allows us to see that acts empower artifacts’, and that the practice itself (the process) is 
encompassed by the various cultural, social, and technological relations of its mode.
91
 
 If we turn now to cartography in the European Enlightenment and apply these lines 
of enquiry, it is possible to consider how Enlightenment contemporaries understood their 
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work and its relationship to that of earlier cartographers as distinct from the work of modern 






In Europe, by the mid-seventeenth century, maps were essential to a wide variety of 
professions. Amounting to what may be considered a ‘revolution in the European way of 
“seeing” the world’, there were several causes for this new map consciousness.
93
 In the first 
instance, the Renaissance gave rise to an admiration for antiquity, perhaps akin to Blakemore 
and Harley’s relatively modern review of scholarships of the ‘old-is-beautiful’ paradigm, 
where popular interest in early maps was directly proportional to their age.
94
 The 
Renaissance was itself distinguished by new and different maps. Artistic developments 
encouraged delineations of rural and urban scenes and, consequently, maps of country and 
town. Landowners began commissioning estate plans. The rise of the modern territorial state 
encouraged an appreciation of the possible role of maps. The advent of the printing press 
greatly increased the numbers of printed maps. Not least, the establishment of mercantile 
classes and a quickening of economic activity created a demand for maps.
95
  
Three formal cartographic modes had evolved: maritime charting, small-scale 
mapping of the world and its regions (chorography), and large-scale land surveying. Each 
mode was distinct in terms of its scale of inquiry, cartographic conventions, social 
institutions, technologies, and content.
96
 Four interrelated groups of practitioners engaged in 
these modes: mariners, intellectual geographers, commercial publishers, and land measurers. 
As new generations of European state bureaucrats became more cartographically literate than 
the previous one, large-scale surveying of their territories for the acquisition of basic 
geographical information became an increasing practice, such as Christopher Saxton’s 
mapping of England completed in 1579 and Jean Dominique Cassini’s national map survey 
of France started in 1681. From about 1660, a fifth group of professional geographer-
cartographers—military and state surveyors—was established in many European states, 
earlier in some. These military specialists—‘engineers’—began to emerge in the 1530s in 
England, and later in France, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Spain. Initially concerned with 
constructing new fortifications and drawing plans, they increasingly became involved in 
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more extensive state mapping projects. In France, for example, large-scale regional surveys 
were made of Picardy, Champagne, Provence and Brittany by 1610, later to be engraved by 
the map-publisher Christophe Tassin in the 1630s.
97
 From the seventeenth to the early 
twentieth centuries, property mapping extended from private realms to state-sponsored 
surveys. Cadastral mapping was used by the state to generate revenue from property taxes 
and to record information relating to individual land parcels.
98
  
 A fourth mode—geodesy—evolved as a cartographic practice from the merging of 
the scales of chorography and the techniques of land surveying or topography. In its use in 
determining the shape of the earth, geodesy was linked to astronomy, mathematics, and 
natural philosophy, and practiced by natural philosophers increasingly in touch one with 
another as part of developing narratives of cosmopolitan exchange.
99
 Although geodetic 
surveys rarely produced maps other than abstract triangulation diagrams, geodesy had 
intellectual and scientific significance for the European Enlightenment.
100
 By the early 
eighteenth century, these four modes had gradually converged into one, unified 
‘mathematical cosmography’—the conceptual fusion of astronomy, geography, and 
geodesy.
101
 The map was the point of fusion for mathematical cosmography; it became a 
‘technology of relative spatial knowledge’, whereby the geographical complexity of the 
world was, in its representation, put to order.
102
 
Mathematical cosmography’s intellectual foundations can be demonstrated, in part, 
by the search for longitude at sea and the linking of Paris and Greenwich geodetically. 
Solutions proposed for determining longitude, a terrestrial phenomena, required astronomical 
methods for its determination, thus unifying two sub-divisions of mathematical 
cosmography: terrestrial astronomy and celestial astronomy. Between 1784 and 1790, with 
the collaboration of the British and French governments, and the construction of high-quality 
chronometers to measure time differences directly rather than indirectly through 
astronomical events, longitude was finally established. The effort to link Greenwich and 
Paris geodetically required more extensive preparation and intensive collaboration than any 
previous bilateral scientific or cartographic venture.
103
 The measurement of longitude set a 
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new standard for accuracy by increasing the efficiency and reliability of surveying, 
underpinning the Enlightenment’s move to a ‘universal science of measurement and 
order’.
104
 By adhering to the Enlightenment epistemology that accurate measurement was 
necessary for factual descriptions of space, mathematical cosmography was firmly 
established as part of the broader geographical realm of knowledge.
105
 In this context, a 
French proposal in about 1790 for a cartographie universelle, presents, perhaps for the first 




French geodesists and astronomers of the Académie Royale des Sciences were 
credited with one of the most important and distinct innovations in cartography in 
eighteenth-century Europe, the completion of the first geodetic matrix in 1744. Data was 
fixed to this mathematical frame in order to construct a reliable survey of France—the first 
‘Cassini survey’—from which detailed maps of small areas could be made.
107
 The Cassini 
survey reconciled geographical observations by using triangulation: a distance of about 5 
miles (British) was measured from which, using a theodolite, a third point visible from both 
ends of the base line was sited and distances measured using trigonometry. This process was 
repeated across the ground to be mapped, producing a series of triangles of known 
dimensions within which the topography was determined by eye and sketched in. 
Triangulation and topographic “in-filling”—‘the mathematization and artistic depiction of 
space’—is a definitive feature of Enlightenment mapping.
108
 
The premise then that the history of cartography had essentially been the history of 
scientific development was aptly described by Harley as ‘rooted in the project of the 
Enlightenment’: 
The dominant view of modern Western cartography since the Renaissance 
has been that of a technological discipline set on a progressive trajectory. 
Claiming to produce a correct relational model of terrain, maps are seen as 
the epitome of representational modernism, rooted in the project of the 
Enlightenment, and offering to banish subjectivity from the image. 
Cartographers have thus promoted a standard scientific model of their 
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discipline, one in which it is claimed that a mirror of nature can be projected 
through geometry and measurement.
109
   
At the same time as offering this historiographical review of the history of cartography, 
Harley proposed several reasons why early maps were examined in the eighteenth century.
110
 
Maps were valued as useful contemporary tools by lawyers, politicians and others as sources 
of information as well as ‘monuments of antiquity’; consequently, throughout the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, preserving and collecting maps of earlier periods was 
a widespread practice.
111
 Map and chart makers used early maps to compare the state of 
geographical knowledge and science in their own age with that of the past. In the 
Enlightenment, this engendered a belief in the accuracy of measurement as the ‘sine qua non 
of cartographic progress’.
112
 In the practice of map making, emphasis was placed on the 
‘instrumentality of knowledge’: on mathematical accuracy, original survey, and increased 
attention to precise and accurate scientific instruments, especially at sea.
113
 The result was to 
be more detailed cartographic representation and evidence of explorations and discoveries 
and, at an academic level, a resource for the study of history and classical geography. The 
increase in geographic knowledge represented in cartography from the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries meant that by the eighteenth century there were fewer ‘blank spots’ to 
fill in on the map of the world. Consequently, the focus shifted from discovery and 
description to accuracy and precision.
114
 
Yet maps were seldom contemplated and analysed as artefacts. The methods by 
which they were constructed and drawn were not considered, and study of their form and 
cartographic expression as a mode of communication had not come into being: ‘the history 
of cartography had yet to be born as a subject we would recognize today’.
115
 The 
Enlightenment concern was with acquiring national knowledge through geography and 
mapping, and the Enlightenment view of the cartographic past was influenced by a self-
imposed emphasis on more precise and accurate representations of geographical reality. 
Even at the start of the long eighteenth century, geographers were criticising the cartographic 
works of their predecessors. In Scotland, for example, Sir Robert Sibbald, Geographer Royal 
to Charles II in 1682, was instructed to produce a geographical description of Scotland that 
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combined historical data with the results of contemporary survey. Historical data, in this 
instance, was to come from earlier works by the Dutch map makers Willem and Joan Blaeu. 
Sibbald was dismissive of their work, despite the ‘great uses of Geographical Descriptions’: 
many complained that there was so little done, as to the Description of our 
Countrey: For the theater of Scotland published by Blaeu, for all its bulk 
(except it be the Description of some few shires by the learned Gordon of 
Straloch, and some sheets of his of the Scotia Antiqua) containeth little more 
than what Buchanan wrote, and some few Scrapes out of Cambden, who is 
no friend to us in what he writeth. 
Sibbald was keen to have new maps for his national enterprise.
116
 
Although there was an emphasis placed on precision, accuracy and original survey, 
Enlightenment geographers could still be critical of contemporary mapping endeavours. The 
antiquarian-topographer Richard Gough in his British Topography (1780), for example, was 
highly critical of ‘modern makers’ of maps despite their assertions that ‘their maps are 
framed from actual new surveys’.
117
 Claims made by Enlightenment geographers as to their 
maps’ accuracy were often rhetorical, denied by the maps themselves, and were made for 
reasons to do with market competition and to attain greater credibility and social status.
118
 
According to Gough, ‘there is scarce a single one which does not abound with faults: and a 
set of correct maps remains to be hoped for from the undertakers of surveys of counties’. 
Gough followed this criticism of British county mapping with a judgment on contemporary 
national surveys in which he accorded England primacy: ‘if England did not teach other 
nations the art of making or engraving maps, she is preceded by very few’.
119
  
Enlightenment cartographers, as well as being dismissive of their predecessors with 
claims that their maps were unreliable, and critical of their contemporaries, both local and 
national, were equally dependent upon science and direct observation to confirm progress. 
John Blair, in his dissertation on the Rise and Progress of Geography (1768), for example, 
considered improvements in geography synonymous with mapping: ‘early Geographers 
being destitute of mathematical instruments and of astronomical Observations’ created maps 
that were ‘little more than rude Outlines and topographical Sketches’.
120
 Although his 
narrative invoked a linear progression—a ‘Darwinian paradigm’
121
—of geographic and 
                                                 
116
 Withers 2002, p. 49.  
117
 Gough 1780, p. 108. 
118
 Withers forthcoming. 
119
 Gough 1780, p. 108. 
120
 Blair 1784, pp. 4 and 39. This work was published originally as the preliminary dissertation in the 
1768 edition of the author’s ‘Chronology and history of the world’. 
121
 See Blakemore and Harley 1980, pp. 17–23. 
 28 
cartographic history, Blair’s conclusion is more circumspect than many and, in addition, 




I must, however, observe upon the whole, that Geography is a Science even 
still many Stages removed from Perfection. The Maps of America, and the 
Eastern Parts of Asia, though they have been of late two of the great 
Theatres of War and Commerce, are perhaps more unfinished than any of 
the rest. Every new Map that is published of these countries, seems to blast 
all those that went before them, and it will require perhaps the Experience of 
half a Century to come, before a sufficient Number of Observations shall be 
made to verify the Situations of their most considerable Towns, Coasts and 
Rivers, so as to approach the Accuracy with which the Maps of the different 
Kingdoms of Europe are now executed.
123
  
 By the end of the Enlightenment, recognition of the progress of geographical, and in 
particular national, knowledge was directly associated with the improved nature of mapping. 
In introduction to his Atlas of Scotland (1832), John Thomson acknowledged the maps of 
predecessors, notably Timothy Pont, Joan Blaeu, John Adair and Sir Robert Sibbald in the 
seventeenth century, who he believed were responsible for the improved understanding of 
the mapping of Scotland.
124
 Thomson also acknowledged the benefits of the work of a host 
of map makers in the eighteenth century, including Murdoch Mackenzie, Alexander Bryce, 
military engineers including John Elphinstone, and David Watson, William Roy and junior 
engineers assigned to the Military Survey of Scotland, John Ainslie, numerous county 
surveyors and Aaron Arrowsmith and his 1807 Map of Scotland. Using the ‘Military Survey 
of Scotland’ and other material, Arrowsmith, according to Thomson ‘constructed one of the 
best Maps of Scotland extant’ which was ‘justly celebrated’.
125
  
‘Enlightenment map makers and geographers thus understood theirs to be a period in 
which cartography (and geography) was an advance upon their predecessors’’.
126
 
Geographers were developing the tools, the ‘information systems’, and the vocabulary to 
describe the earth with increasing accuracy, precision and consistency.
127
 The science of 
mapping was advancing: in solution to the longitude problem; in the confirmation of the 
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(Newtonian) shape of the earth; in the increasingly accurate measurement of the earth; and in 
the technology and the scope of surveying.
128
 Allied with improved instruments of survey 
and techniques of mapping, was the assumption that the world could be accurately measured 
and described. In its representation, the geographer’s essential task was to reveal the earth 
through a ‘pseudo-landscape of a map or text’.
129
  
Certainty and faith in a map’s representation could only come from knowing the 
character and quality of its data and the circumstances of its construction. Geographical 
memoirs were published in order to validate geographical knowledge and the skill of the 
cartographer, to distinguish between simply unambiguous and certain geographical 
knowledge.
130
 The increasing quality and comprehensiveness of geographical data were held 
by contemporaries to epitomise the progress of human knowledge.
131
   
Understanding why the map became a dominant archetype of human knowledge and 
the focus of state patronage in the eighteenth century thus becomes easier when its 
‘enlightenment’ attributes are considered together. European Enlightenment maps, according 
to Burnett, ‘constitute[d] a distinctive system for apprehending the lineaments of the natural 
world’: a map was ‘a field for the collation of diverse measurements, a framework for 
ordering nature, a means of nesting multiple scales of representation, an intersection of 
mathematics, astronomy, chronometry, precision instruments, and a host of craft 
practices’.
132
 State patronage was essential to mapping, to initiate and to fund state surveys. 
As the power of European Enlightenment states intensified and as they increasingly sought 
to exert control over territories, those states sought to intensify the coverage and detail of 
their regional mapping. As Edney has it, ‘to govern territories, one must know them’.
133
 By 
the end of the eighteenth century, maps as a corpus of geographical knowledge were integral 
to the hegemony of Europe’s ruling elites—the key to disciplinary power and the primary 
instrument of the social, economic, political, and physical restructuring of a country.
134
  
With this summary context in mind, let me turn to those questions of method by 
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Questions of Method 
As the first section on map history noted, modern investigation of the map has moved 
beyond the positivist histories of cartography—of exploring the technical aspects and the so-
called ‘reality’ of maps—to embrace a whole range of interpretative approaches that aim to 
look at both the constructive and communicative processes at work in a map. In turning to 
methods of language, literature, and art, the focus, according to Casti, has shifted from ‘how 
much reality is reproduced’ to ‘what the map communicates with regard to the significance 
and meaning of territory’.
135
  
My aim in this section is to consider the methods available to analyse the military 
maps of eighteenth-century Scotland. Three interpretative approaches—semiotics, 
iconography, and deconstruction—are outlined below. To differing degrees, each has 
contributed to a holistic method of critical interpretation. Semiotic studies—of signs or 
symbols comprising systems of communication (pragmatics, semantics, syntactics)—argue 
for meaning to be understood in the context of the map itself. Iconography—the analysis of 
the themes and subjects associated with specific symbols (icons, emblems)—attempts to 
explain the meanings inherent within maps from the signs used and, in its broadest context, 
considers the sociological aspects of a map’s production—map maker, institution, and 
government. Post-modernist deconstruction extends the application of semiotics and, 
drawing on Harley’s approach, argues that social factors influencing the production of maps 
can be read within the finished map. Each method has some limitations in scope, hence the 
need to follow more than one approach and to combine them. In addition, each approach 
relies on another to draw out the purpose of particular maps within their specific cultural and 
political context.  
 At the end of this section, I consider a taxonomic model—Harley’s classification of 
the maps of the American Revolutionary War—as an approach to collate and to analyse a 
large archive of military mapping cartographic records. As a heuristic device, the model 
suggests categories and terms to describe a group of maps that are united in purpose, time, 
and place.
136
 Harley’s theoretical framework included five themes: map availability; how 
contemporaries viewed maps; the education of users; the operational suitability of particular 
maps for specific purposes; and documented cases of maps being used in decisions related to 
geographical questions. The military mapping of Scotland, although not fitting entirely into 
this framework, does display some similarities to it due to ‘one remarkable general 
characteristic of military cartography[:] the extent to which different armies took a common 
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approach to the making and use of maps [thus] maps reflected not differences in national 
origins but affinities in eighteenth-century military organization and practice’.
137
 As I show, 
my framework also includes five themes: the role of the institution in cartographic practice; 
the education of map makers and map users; the codification of military maps; the particular 
function of military maps; and their use. My approach examines how political and military 
power was embodied in the engineers’ maps and plans in the process of satisfying 




The application of a linguistic model relies on two assumptions: (1) that language possesses 
a definable structure; and (2) through the mechanism of that structure, language plays a 
functional role in society. Harley defined three different kinds of studies for interpreting 
geographical knowledge in past societies: static, genetic, and dynamic. When applied to 
evidentiary sources, the studies equated to map content, map making, and map use 
respectively.
138
 In order to establish fully the historical significance, Harley turned to the 




 Semiology, the general science of signs, was first postulated by Ferdinand de 
Saussure in his posthumous Course in General Linguistics (1916). The ‘sign’ always 
consists of two parts: the signified which is the meaning, significance, concept or the object; 
and the signifier—the sound, image, or gesture attached to the signified. These are always 
integrated into each other and only distinguishable at the analytical level. In order to create a 
sign, the signifier has to be assigned to the signified by a ‘code’—‘a set of conventionalized 
ways of making meaning that are specific to particular groups of people’—and related to an 
object, the sign’s referent; in our case, a map.
140
 The sign is thus an event that occurs in a 
specific historical and social circumstance and is defined by a finite number of cultural 
codes.  
Every map is at once a synthesis of signs and a sign in itself: an instrument 
of depiction—of objects, events, places—and an instrument of persuasion—
about these, its makers and itself. Like any other sign, it is the product of 
codes: conventions that prescribe relations of content and expression in a 
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given semiotic circumstance. The codes that underwrite the map are as 
numerous as its motives, and as thoroughly naturalized within the culture 
that generates and exploits them.
141
 
Semiotics is centrally concerned with reception, and it is the selection and combination of 
these codes that leads to specific interpretations.
142
 Roland Barthes claimed that a semiotic 
investigation ‘will not teach us what meaning must be definitively attributed to a work; it 




Different social groups establish symbolic control of physical space through 
denomination. Denominational analysis addresses two issues: the symbolisation of a given 
place, and suggestions as to how that place should be perceived and experienced in society. 
The meaning and significance of any denominational analysis depends on the type of 
designator (code) being used. It is the designators of denomination that imbue the map with 
the two fundamental needs implicit in the intellectual appropriation of the world: description 
and conceptualisation. In describing the world, a map is a practical representation of physical 
space through the action of direct observation of reality; a map recounts the world applying 
categories of representation/interpretation to indicate how the world functions. What 
distinguishes cartography, however, from all other textual and visual means of 
communication is the fact that the map is a denominative projection—it conveys the 
meaning(s) enclosed within the designator.
144
 In this respect, the map is itself a denotative 
(factual) sign, ‘a sign in itself’ as noted by Wood and Fels.
145
 The signified and the signifier 
conjoin at the first-order semiological system; the sign can then be appropriated by ‘myth’ to 
be the signifier in the second-order semiological system.  
‘Myth is not defined by the object of its message, but by the way in which it utters 
this message: there are no formal limits to myth, there are no ‘substantial’ ones’.
146
 The map 
is therefore defined by its intention rather than its content where ‘myth’ constitutes, in 
Barthes’ words, ‘the naturalization of the cultural’: 
This is why myth is experienced as innocent speech: not because its 
intentions are hidden—if they were hidden they could not be efficacious—
but because they are naturalized. In fact, what allows the reader to consume 
myth innocently is that he does not see it as a semiological system but as an 
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inductive one. Where there is only an equivalence, he sees a kind of causal 
process: the signifier and the signified have, in his eyes, a natural 
relationship. This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any semiological 
system is a system of values; now the myth consumer takes the signification 




As such, myth is a form of ideology. This serves the purpose of highlighting the importance 
of the role of the map within the process of territorialisation: “seized’ by myth to be the 






How valuable a good map is, in which one views the world as 
from another world thanks to the art of drawing.
149
 
In Landscape and Power, Mitchell urged that we consider landscape not as an object to be 
seen, ‘but as a process by which social and subjective identities are formed’; landscape, he 
writes, must be understood as a physical and ‘multisensory’ medium ‘in which cultural 
meanings and values are encoded’.
150
 Daniels and Cosgrove remarked that ‘a landscape is a 
cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings’.
151
 
When interpreting landscape as a ‘cultural image’ or cultural symbol through linguistic or 
structuralist approaches, the landscape can be likened to a text and, therefore, its 
interpretation to ‘reading’. A map, as a medium that materialises landscape, is classed as a 
graphic image.
152
 In its materialisation, the map re-constructs the space it represents and thus 
becomes an instrument of communication. By deconstructing the cartographical image using 
Erwin Panofsky’s concepts of iconography and iconology, for example, the literal and 
intrinsic levels of meaning in maps can be communicated. Iconography/ology is thus 
concerned with the meaning of an image rather than its form, by setting it in its historical and 
spatial context, and by analysing the ideas implicated in its imagery.
153
  
Panofsky distinguished three levels of meaning in art (specifically, Renaissance art) 
which he presented through an analogy with three phases of the interpretation of an instance 
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of communicative behaviour. The first two levels are iconographic in nature, where 
iconography is ‘that branch of the history of art which concerns itself with the subject matter 
or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form’.
154
 The primary or natural level 
recognises factual or expressional meaning by identifying pure forms: the identification of 
certain configurations with objects known from experience (factual); and awareness of 
psychological nuances of these facts (expressional). ‘Pure forms’ can be known as motifs 
and, in the practice of interpretation, are recognised as pre-iconographic descriptions. The 
secondary or conventional level has intelligible meaning, established by connecting motifs, 
and their composites, with themes or concepts. ‘Motifs’ recognised as carriers of a secondary 
or conventional meaning are defined as images. This second level of interpretation becomes 
the iconographic description. Both natural and conventional meanings are observable; 
historically they reflect styles (conventions) and types (constructions) respectively.  
The third level, the intrinsic meaning or content, can often highlight the influence of 
social and political power in the hidden rules of the image. Panofsky used the term 
‘iconology’ for such a study, where the meaning of a work of art is discerned by 
‘ascertaining those underlying principles which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, 
a class, a religious or philosophical persuasion—qualified by one personality and condensed 
into one work’. Panofsky imposed a methodological distinction between iconography and 
iconology: pre-iconography and iconography are descriptive processes, and iconology is a 
matter of synthesis.
155
 Unlike the first two levels of meaning, the intrinsic meaning is 
‘essential’ rather than ‘phenomenal’ and calls for a hermeneutic approach.
156
 A 
hermeneutical approach thus elaborates on the idea of the map as a tool of intervention 
between society and territory and, as such, the map plays a crucial role. Maps are therefore 
taken as agents of society, representing geographical knowledge as cartographic knowledge 




Semiotic analysis and map iconography 
‘Humans do not reflect on the world, they construct it by means of symbols’.
158
 The history 
of cartography, through its progressive study of cartography as a process of communication, 
maps as language, and its modern interpretive approach of semiotics has gone beyond the 
traditional division between art and science. Studying the map as an image gives rise to the 
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question: ‘what role does the graphic signifier play in the production of a ‘semiotic effect’ 
that will ultimately allow the geographical identification of a set of drawn lines?’
159
 
Aesthetics and semiotics work towards a theory that aims to satisfy both the need to 
discriminate artistic signs and to identify the principles that unite them.
160
 A map usually 
reflects the aesthetic conventions—‘its codes of figuration, its repertory of motifs, and its 
chromatic palette’—of a specific time and of a specific cultural environment. Tony Campbell 
when looking at Early Maps, for example, explained that ‘just as the design of maps 
developed with time, so did the style in which the colouring was applied to them by hand. 
The distinctive palettes of each age and country help interpret the engraving beneath’.
161
 At 
the same time, the map appears to be a specific production on account of its different 




The map is a means of organising and codifying knowledge: ‘the map is an icon of 
knowledge’.
163
 It is in the process of reading a map that the map acts as an iconic sign—an 
image, a denotative sign—in this process the map user can imagine the terrain shown on the 
map. On a comparative level, the iconographic ‘image’ has many characteristics of the 
semiotic ‘sign’, and the meanings articulated in the ‘image’ behave much like the messages 
conveyed through the use of the linguistic ‘code’. Iconography, then, has a generally 
‘semiotic’ character, is restricted to that which is knowable—‘every culture weaves its world 
out of image and symbol’—and is an invaluable method for the establishment of dates, 
provenance and, occasionally, authenticity.
164
 Iconology, on the other hand, parallels 
semiology not by methods and concepts but by assumptions—it is conceived as an 
‘iconography turned interpretative’—and is a method of interpretation which arises from 
synthesis, or ‘synthetic intuition’, rather than analysis. Iconology shares with semiotics both 
a concern for the intrinsic meaning in a cultural image, and a conviction that it is accessible 
to analysis by searching out analogies between social, cultural, and political experiences of 
an era.
165
 As a language sign, the map is first of all a symbol—a symbol of the work of the 
map-maker, a symbol of geographic knowledge, a symbol of a social and cultural era. It is 
the interpretation of all these elements that imbues the map with symbolical values, that is, 
changing modes of perceiving and representing space, not just conventions—the ‘iconology’ 
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as opposed to the ‘iconography’.
166
 ‘It is often on this symbolic level that political power is 





A map is deconstructed ‘in order to follow the logic of each of its levels or representation’.
168
 
In promoting a deconstructionist approach, Harley was advocating an exploration of varying, 
often conflicting, discourses in cartography to search for alternative meanings. He did not 
reject the importance of map production techniques, only the idea that cartography could be 
reduced to the study of these techniques without considering the influence of social factors 
on them.
169
 Harley called for scholars to ‘read between the lines of the map […] and through 
its tropes to discover the silences and contradictions that challenge the apparent honesty of 
the image’.
170
 In the eighteenth century, the rhetoric of maps was their ‘scientific’ nature and 
their capacity to ‘order and classify’ the world. Advances in instrumentation and technology 
increasingly improved the detail and planimetric accuracy of map content. Accuracy became 
a metaphor for utility and ruling elites adopted the map as an effective tool with which to 
impose social order. The metaphor thus changed. Precision and accuracy in rendition became 
the new talismans of power and its exercise.
171
  
Power, it is argued, is manifest as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to cartography. External 
power comes from the ruling elites, the monarch or minister of the Crown, and state 
institutions who employ power to initiate national surveys and mapping programmes for 
administrative or military purposes. A power external to cartography is thus a centralised, 
legitimised tool in the formulation of policy and in the process of social order. Internal 
power is strongly linked to knowledge and to the process of making a map and 
standardisation—compilation, generalisation, classification, formation into hierarchies and 
so on—which a specific society accepts as ‘normal’.
172
 Maps are therefore subject to and 
become a source of power gained by geographical knowledge:  
Both in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of 
representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring 
the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence 
upon particular sets of social relations. By accepting such premises it 
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A Taxonomic Model 
What characterised Scotland’s military mapping between 1689 and 1815 is, I suggest, typical 
of wider practices in European nations and their overseas colonies. The work of the 
ingénieurs géographes, for example, in France and then Egypt where mapping was used as a 
form of intellectual conquest and reproduced as part of the Description de l'Egypte, has been 
well documented by Anne Godlewska.
174
 David Buisseret and Émilie d’Orgeix have likewise 
described the provincial practices and theories of the French military engineers in the late 
seventeenth century.
175
 Josef Konvitz and Matthew Edney, in turn, have identified the 
development of triangulation and mapping in France and India as a form of national 
knowledge and imperial conquest.
176
 Themes that reflect national similarities include the 
instruction and education of military engineers and draughtsmen and, to an extent, the move 
towards a rationalisation and standardisation of cartographic procedures in the process of 
serving the state.  
 In considering the spread of cartographical ideas between the armies of the 
American Revolution, Brian Harley described how the maps reflected ‘affinities in 
eighteenth-century military organization and practice’ and that ‘whoever the participants, 
there were important similarities in the roles maps played in the various engagements of the 
war’.
177
 Harley’s approach to the study of Revolutionary-era mapping and the environment 
of the map user can offer a methodological model for a preliminary study of the archive of 
the maps and plans of Scotland. 
Harley constructed an analytical classification of the Revolutionary maps which 
related to their contemporary uses rather than to their cartographic or internal characteristics; 
the latter are often observed and measured in evaluations of historical maps.
178
 His objective 
was to study the similarities between maps of a particular period but of different 
geographical provenance, a practice he considered a form of ‘comparative cartography’.
179
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But unlike traditional methods of comparing variations in a series of related maps (carto-
bibliography) or a comparative analysis of outlines or place names (toponymy), this was an 
analytical taxonomy that allowed statistical and other generalisations to be made about a 
considerable number and diversity of military maps.
180
 As a ‘basic taxonomic principle’, he 
recognised that ‘sub-division must be designed with a specific purpose in mind’.
181
 The 
objective classification he devised therefore aimed to ‘penetrate and sub-divide the particular 
historical process with which we assume certain maps were associated and, in which process, 
it is hoped to diagnose their role’.
182
 It looked at the relationship between map forms and 
attributes with the range of military activities associated with the same maps. It thus 
considered the function of different maps in association with the principal realms of 
eighteenth-century military activity: fortification, movement, and battle.
183
 Figure 2.1 




         I  N  P  U  T  S 
Figure 2.1 The connections between the attributes and uses of three major classes of military maps.
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By examining the scope of military cartography overall, Harley proposed a study of 
a whole ‘map culture’ (practiced by British, French, American, and German map makers). 
His taxonomic model provides a template by which to study this European—British, French, 
German, and Dutch—‘map culture’ at work in Scotland. My purpose, however, is not to 
establish the character of the similarities in map making among different nations. It is, rather, 
to establish the character of the military mapping of Scotland. My concern is to study the 
production, purpose, and operational use of maps in military context in eighteenth-century 
Scotland. Three arguments present themselves. The first, that military map making in and of 
Scotland reflected a national standard, one that was achieved, in part, by field experience but 
increasingly through instruction and education. Secondly, that changing state imperatives in 
Scotland demanded distinct cartographic practices (modes) that created different kinds of 
spatial knowledge at different times and that these reflected changing technologies and social 
purposes. Finally, that the maps played a role in military and in political enterprises in 
Scotland. 
 The application of Harley’s schema to the manuscript maps of Scotland is an 
entryway to their further study, a preliminary means to rationalise the archive as a whole. 
Such organisation provides an opportunity to explore the ‘sociological aspect’ of military 
mapping, where ‘the focus is on the production of maps and the use of maps’ and allows for 
‘a shift from concern with map accuracy to map efficiency’.
185
 In classifying the maps, the 
use of content analysis is a way of understanding the symbolic quality of the map itself. In 
this sense, the map remains part of the wider cultural context in which it was made and 
used.
186
 The reliability of analysing and classifying cartographic records according to their 
assumed usage is, however, difficult. The same map—especially an eighteenth-century 
topographical map—was most probably used for more than one purpose. It then becomes 




Maps are no longer what they were once assumed to be: ‘accurate, transparent media through 
which reality may be represented and understood’.
187
 Modern studies in the history of 
cartography are examining the map as a visual language. Instead of providing a ‘transparent 
window on the world’, a map is now regarded as an opaque device, a sign that presents a 
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deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence. As such, map historians are looking at 
maps as artefacts, as constructions, as a complex language, and as a process of ideological 
mystification founded in a society’s visual culture.
188
 This review has considered a range of 
works that show map history to be now more concerned with the social, human, and political 
context of maps than with their form and the idea of the map as a window on the past. 
 This chapter has also outlined several methodological approaches that focus on the 
concept of social power and its representation. Referring back to historiographies of current 
popular debate amongst scholars in the history of cartography, namely the role of a map, the 
ways in which it reflects an historical period and the external influences on its creation—all 
associated with a particular cultural and social group—this study addresses each of these 
lines of enquiry.
189
 My research will examine how the structure of social power in the Board 
of Ordnance influenced the production of knowledge, its mode of representation in military 
maps of Scotland, and ultimately the appropriation of maps by the state for establishing its 
social order in eighteenth-century Scotland. Adopting Campbell’s call to ‘rid ourselves of 
false expectations about the maps of earlier centuries’ brought about by their comparison 
with maps of today, this study attempts to understand the military maps of Scotland as 
Enlightenment contemporaries understood military mapping.
190
 In chapter three I review the 
Board of Ordnance and its conceptions of cartography before turning to the military maps of 
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CHAPTER 3  
 




The nature of relations between institutions and cartographic practice vary. They can be 
enabling and constraining and they can define the social ideology of mapping.
191
 My concern 
here is to review the nature of the relations between the Board of Ordnance, a British 
department of state, and cartography during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
Britain, this was a period significant for the expansion of military map making, when 
military engineers, surveyors, and draughtsmen employed by the Board of Ordnance were 
responsible for mapping the country and its overseas dependencies. It was, for Skelton, a 
time when ‘the extent to which the mapping of the land surface of the globe was accelerated 
and enriched by the military surveyor’.
192
  
 Britain offers a particular opportunity to explore the general trend in the European 
expansion of military cartography during the eighteenth century. Just as changes in the art of 
war—the so-called ‘military revolution’—influenced military tactics in continental Europe, 
Britain’s involvement in overseas wars caused a profound change in its militaristic practices 
and education at home. Four distinctive features characterised the changes in modern 
European warfare. There was a revolution in tactics as weaponry evolved to become more 
mobile, quicker-firing, and more accurate at longer range. There was a growth in the size of 
armies. New strategies were devised to train—or drill—these armies and to bring them into 
action. Finally, war had a noticeable impact on different societies, on their economies and 
political structures in particular.
193
 For Buisseret and Widmalm, the impact of these changes 
produced changes in the nature of mapping.
194
 Advances in firepower transformed the 
conduct of both offensive and defensive operations, modified the art of fortification and, 
initially, slowed the pace of warfare. In response, armies acquired new specialists: the 
artillery emerged as a separate unit to the cavalry and infantry; engineers emerged to design 
and to construct new types of fortifications and siege works. With the transition in the 
seventeenth century to more mobile strategies, battles overcame sieges as the decisive 
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element in war and every place became a potential theatre of warfare. Only then did the 
fortificateur develop into the ingénieur-géographe as European states demanded ‘knowledge 
of the whole geography’ and began to sponsor large-scale topographical maps of territories 
and military surveys in preparation for battle.
195
 
Military officers in the field were increasingly expected to be cartographically 
literate, to understand the use of maps for military purposes and eventually to provide the 
necessary expertise to lead state mapping projects.
196
 Surveyors marched alongside soldiers, 
initially mapping for reconnaissance, a well-founded practice of the geographical engineers 
of the armies of France (les ingénieurs géographes). With the establishment of state 
institutions and military academies, the responsibilities of these men expanded along with 
their education to include the surveying and construction of fortifications, towns and 
barracks, the building of roads and bridges, the depiction of military action, and the 
systematic surveying of national territories.
197
 The outcome was the growing domination of 
map making by military personnel, a move Edney calls less the ‘militarisation of 
cartography’ and more the ‘cartographisation of the military’, the increasing ‘map-
mindedness’ of senior army officials that allowed the use of maps and the practice of 
mapping for military purposes.
198
  
My concern in this chapter is to understand the Board of Ordnance’s conception of 
cartography and to outline why it constructed maps of Scotland. This chapter reviews the 
institutional structure of the Board of Ordnance in relation to its cartographic responsibilities 
in the period 1683 to 1800 in order to gauge the nature and extent of military mapping not 
just as a cartographic enterprise but as the result of institutional imperatives and 
organisational structure. My aim is to situate military maps contextually by examining how 
the Board of Ordnance worked, to look at the evolution of the Board’s operational practices 
in relation to map making and related tasks, and to consider the place of theoretical teachings 
of ‘military science’. Particular attention is paid to the civil and military branches of the 
Board of Ordnance associated with map making: respectively, the draughtsmen in the 
Drawing Room at the Tower of London and the military engineers either based at Divisional 
outposts or in the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. 
 I begin by describing the central agency—the Board of Ordnance—that 
comprehensively co-ordinated and controlled British military mapping in the eighteenth 
century. The description outlines the cartographic responsibilities of the engineers and the 
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expansion of the Corps of Engineers in response to territorial imperatives and, increasingly, 
the cartographisation of the British military. As more maps were generated for state 
purposes, the need arose for a secure repository, one that offered the Board and military 
personnel access to maps as well as a means to produce them. The evolution of a Drawing 
Room at the Tower of London (headquarters of the Board and the Office of Ordnance) as a 
centre for carto-reproduction is described. In both establishments—the military engineering 
corps and the civil Drawing Room—emphasis was placed on training in the military sciences 
and draughtsmanship to make the highly detailed maps necessary for military operations. 
The remainder of the chapter considers the professional education and instruction of the 
engineers and the draughtsmen, portraying mapping as the embodiment of European military 
science and the map as the conceptual basis of Enlightenment ideology.  
 
 
The Board of Ordnance 
The origins of the Board of Ordnance can be traced to the fourteenth century when the Privy 
Wardrobe began to act as an itinerant armoury for the royal forces campaigning in Wales. By 
1485, an Office of Ordnance was established; distinct and separate from the Wardrobe, it 
grew substantially during the reign of Henry VIII. In 1597, a Board of Ordnance was 
constituted and endowed with the responsibility for the upkeep and repair of forts and castles 
in addition to armaments and munitions. By 1683, the Board assumed the form which was to 
be preserved, largely unaltered, into the nineteenth century. The Master-General presided 
over a Board consisting of himself, four Principal Officers—the Lieutenant-General, 
Surveyor-General, Clerk of Deliveries, and Storekeeper—and a Clerk of the Ordnance (see 
Fig 3.1). The Board, together with its clerks and the staff of the Ordnance Office in the 
Tower of London (the headquarters), was a civil establishment but was depended upon by 
the Army and Navy for the supply of munitions and other stores. It additionally supplied 
technical assistance in artillery and engineering, including the organisation of artillery trains 
and the maintenance of garrisons and coastal defences, and was responsible for providing 
military officers to staff these services.
199
  
 The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw an unprecedented growth in 
British military forces, a consequence of two prolonged wars—the Nine Years War under 
William III (1689–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713)—and a failed 
insurrection in Scotland to restore the exiled Stuart line in 1715–1716. The Office of 
Ordnance experienced corresponding growth, causing the Board to instigate clearer  
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Figure 3.1. Structure of the Board of Ordnance in the eighteenth century. 
 
definition between the functions of its civil and military officers. By the early eighteenth 
century, distinct military and civil branches of the service had emerged.
200
 The increased 
responsibilities and developments in specialist roles and activities among the personnel of 
the Office provide a link to the military’s increasing awareness and practical use of maps in 
the eighteenth century. Cartographic concerns came to represent a small, but nevertheless 
important, sector of the Board’s total responsibilities in the defence of the realm, the most 




The Military Establishment: the Engineers 
The need for an efficient office to supply and support the Army and Navy gave rise, in 1683, 
to the issuing of a warrant ‘Rules Orders and Instructions for the future Government of the 
Office of the Ordnance’.
202
 Before then, the responsibility of the Ordnance Office for the 
construction of military works had never been clearly defined. From 1683, these 
responsibilities were laid out in detail and the establishment of engineers, their salaries and 
duties was fixed. The establishment at this time comprised a Principal, Second, and Third 
Engineer, and two Ordinary Engineers to be ‘bred up in the Art and Knowledge of 
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The Surveyor-General, in addition to a duty to ‘survey all Stores and Provisions of 
War’, was charged with moderating labourers, artificers and workmen, and with examining 
the qualifications and abilities of all prospective engineers who were expected to be ‘well 
skilled in all Parts of the Mathematicks [sic], more particularly in Stereometry, Altemetry 
and Geodasia, […] in all manner of Foundations, in the Scantlings of all Timber and Stone, 
and of their several Natures’.
205
 When any new building work, or reconstruction and 
restoration of existing fortifications was required, the Surveyor-General was ‘to compute and 
calculate the Charge thereof,’ taking proposals to the Master-General of the Ordnance or the 
Principal Officer of the Crown for approval and payment.
206
  
The duties of the ‘under Ministers’ were equally well-defined. The Principal 
Engineer was charged with the role of map making—a new prerequisite of Ordnance 
administration. He was to take ‘Surveys of Land, […] to draw and design the Situation of 
any Place in their due Prospects, Uprights and Perspective’. He was to have a thorough 
knowledge of both civil and military architecture in order ‘to keep perfect Draughts of every 
the Fortifications, Forts and Fortresses of Our Kingdoms, their Situation, Figure and Profile, 
and to know the Importance of every one of them, where their Strength or Weakness lyes 
[sic]’. The Principal and subordinate engineers were to represent to the Board the necessary 
materials to be used, to instruct the ‘Overseer or Clerk of the Cheque’ and the master 
workmen in their respective jobs, to supervise the building and design of fortifications, and 
to conduct sieging operations:  
In time of Action or when there is Intention of forming or laying a Siege 
against any Place, he is to have a Draught or ground Plot of the Place, if 
possible, if not to take a careful View of its Situation as near as he can, and 
thereof to make a Draught and to see where the Attack or Attacks are most 
advantagiously [sic] to be made, how the Circumvalation and the 
Contravalation (if need be) is to be laid out and designed, and to direct and 
see the breaking of the Ground, planting of Batteries, making of Platforms, 
conducting of Trenches and Mines, and to leave such Engineers and 
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Conductors as will be necessary to see them carryed on and executed; to be 




The engineers were to visit existing fortifications and their maps, when sent to the 
Board, were to be accompanied by written reports which included descriptions of the state 
and the situation of the military establishments, validations of the geographical knowledge 
represented in the maps with explanations of how the data was arranged, or detailed 
descriptions of the materials and their costs for any new works proposed to be done. Talbot 
Edwards’ 1710 ‘Report of Fort William in North Brittain [sic] Conserning the Place it 
Stands’, for example, raised concerns for the fort’s situation, defined its military utility, and 
described its state of disrepair.  
Its situation as appears by the Plan [see Fig 3.2],
208
 is not the moste 
advantageous, being at the foot of a Mountaine, which (as Capt oBryen 
sayes) Discovers within less than Musquett Shott, Every part in the Forte, 
and therefore he proposes an other Place about a Myle from this. In answer 
to which Capt Dure has wrott a Large Memorial shewing whey this present 
Forte was built where it now is. 
 [A]s to its use, I finde by the aforesaid Report is for keeping a 
Garrison there to awe the Highlanders, who besides riseing in Armes or 
triviall Quarrells amonge them selves often make incursion and Roberies on 
the lowe lands, as makes it necessary to keep some Dissiplined Men at hand 
there. This Forte for defending it self is indeed but a very ill figure and 
whats proposed to Help is by those Engineers who have been there is to 
strengthen the out side with a Counterscarpe Pallizadoes, Mynes Redoubts 
Places of Armes and Coffers, which in their proper Place are good things to 
lengthen time in taking a Fortress. 
A subsequent report by Theodore Dury estimated the cost of each of these structural works, 
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Figure 3.2 Part of a ‘Plan of Fort William with the country adjacent’, by Robert Johnson in 1710. The 
fort is at a scale of 1: 2,400 (200 feet to an inch) and the adjacent country at 1: 63,360 (1 mile to an 
inch). Although the focus of the plan was clearly Fort William where Johnson was ‘Overseer of 
Works’, the surrounding topography is crudely executed but locationally relatively correct. Ms 1646 
Z.02/24a (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). 
 
Although the ‘Rules’ were amended in 1686 by James II (VII of Scotland), the 
duties of the engineers remained largely unaltered and, thereafter, were approved by every 
sovereign from William III to George II.
210
 One significant change, however, was the size of 
the military establishment. Overseas wars, localinsurrection, and concerns for the defence of 
the country gave rise to several episodes of expansion among the Ordnance military 
personnel, in particular the engineers. In 1699, William III approved a permanent addition to 
the military establishment of six Ordinary Engineers and four Sub Engineers.
211
 After the 
Union of England and Scotland in 1707, the Scottish Ordnance Office, known as the ‘North 
Britain Establishment’,
212
 came under the administration and financial moderation of the 
London Office of Ordnance—Scotland was now considered ‘a Charge properly belonging to 
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 Scotland already had its own engineers—John Slezer and Theodore Dury—
but the Board chose to ignore their status of ‘chief engineers’ and did little to encourage their 
service.
214
 Dury’s work, for example, was referred to Second Engineer Talbot Edwards and 
Brigadier Lewis Petit.
215
 Dury’s treatment by the Board was an example of eighteenth-
century social order and scientific elitism.
216
 As a ‘military’ engineer, let alone ‘Their 
Majesties Cheef Ingeneer in Scotland’,
217
 he was discriminated against in rank and pay after 
the Union. By royal warrant dated 3 December 1727, Dury was eventually awarded the rank 
of ‘Engineer’ and an annual allowance of £77.15s.
218
 His salary was little more than a Sub 
Engineer’s pay of £73, much less than the Third Engineer’s pay of £200, and still less than 
those of equivalent rank who received £100.
219
 
In 1714, Brigadier Michael Richards was promoted to Surveyor-General of the 
Ordnance which paved the way for further expansion of military personnel and ultimately to 
the founding of the Corps of Engineers.
220
 In the February before his promotion, whilst Chief 
Engineer of Britain, Richards described the state of the Establishments of Gunners, Artillery 
and Engineers as ‘defective and require[d] to be new modelled’: 
The Old or present Establishment is of very long Standing when Towns 
were not so strong as they now are, nor were the artillerys [sic] in any 
comparison like to what are now in use, either for attack or deffence of 
Places so that few people were ever employed and those did not only make a 
great mistry of their proffesion but were encouraged to it by the Princes that 
employed them insomuch that the Engeneers, Firemasters, and Gunners, 
were independent of each other, and as their Artillerys were so small, no 
wonder their sieges were so tedious.
221
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The timely expansion of the Office of Ordnance in parallel with increased army activities 
during the Jacobite uprisings of 1715, prompted the Master-General of the Ordnance, the 
Duke of Marlborough,
222
 to reconsider Richards’ proposals for rationalising the military 
establishment. His aim was to adopt a regimental structure akin to those of the continental 
European armies: 
Wherefore the great acquirements of France obliged them to break through 
their old inactive Establishments and to form a Regimentall one, and so has 
many other nations as Prussia, Saxony, Venice etc. This also put the 
Hollanders on reforming, whose necessitys obliged them to hire people at 
any rate from other countrys, untill the creditt of Monsr. Coehorn, had 
influence to put them on the present foot which has so deservedly got them 
such reputation no[t] withstanding the loss of great numbers, the which 
nothing could have supplyed but a vigorous and communicative discipline, 




On 26 May 1716 a ‘Regimental Establishment of 4 Companys [sic] of Gunners with proper 
Officers, Consisting of 379 persons & 29 Engineers’ was implemented by royal warrant.
224
 




The abandonment of the Old and its substitution with a New Establishment was a 
slow process. An old post could only be abolished on the death of the incumbent or his 
employment elsewhere. In 1741, for example, the number of military engineers in the new 
establishment totalled seventeen with four still in the old establishment waiting to be 
“sunk”.
226
 A full complement of twenty-nine engineers was finally achieved in 1745.
227
 By 
this time, Engineers in Ordinary were stationed at various fortifications around Britain, 
employed in making ‘actual Surveys, Planns [sic] etc.’, and in advising on building work. 
Practitioner Engineers were distributed amongst the garrisons to acquire a general military 
education and to apply their knowledge of engineering on works in-progress. Such had been 
Richards’ recommendation as early as 1714: 
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                                                                                        Per Annum 
       £ s d 
1 Chief Engineer     501 17 6 
2 Directors at £365 each   730 00 0 
2 Sub Directors at £273.15s each   547 10 0 
6 Engineers in Ordinary at £182.10s each               1095 00 0 
6 Engineers Extraordinary at £109.10s each  657 00 0 
6 Sub Engineers at £73 each    438 00 0 
6 Practitioner Engineers at £54.15s each  328 10 0  
          29           £   4297 17 0 
 
 
Table 3.1 The ‘Establishment of 29 Engineers’, Office of Ordnance 1717. In ‘Miscellaneous accounts 
and financial papers: relative to Ordnance Establishments’, TNA WO 49/228 
 
They [continental European armies] also preserve the same discipline and in 
the same manner in time of peace, by distributing their companys in their 
severall Guarrisons, […] whereby employing them in their Magazines and 




The whole of Scotland was treated as if one garrison. In 1750, for example, with the 
exception of the engineers involved in the Military Survey of Scotland, William Skinner and 
John Hardesty were responsible for engineering works at all the Scottish forts.
229
  
From 1 January 1756, by warrant of George III, the establishment was increased by 
eight Practitioner Engineers, twenty-nine being ‘much to[o] small to answer the Several 
Purposes Our Service doth, and may, from time to time, require’.
230
 In 1756, a third 
engineer—Thomas Walker—was stationed in Scotland but the number of overseers reduced 
from six to four.
231
 Between 1756 and 1759, the establishment of engineers increased to 
forty-nine and, in 1759, to sixty-one to cope with demands in the foreign garrisons (Minorca, 
Gibraltar, Annapolis, Rattan, Jamaica, India, and West Africa), home fortifications, and new 
enterprises in America (Newfoundland, Georgia, South Carolina, and Louisburg). A 
‘scheme’ was submitted to regulate these dispersed establishments into one ‘Corps of 
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Engineers’ and to bring their pay in line with officers of equivalent rank in the army.
232
 On 
25 April 1787, the Corps was distinguished with the name of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 
of similar status to that of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.
233
  
One further change to the Corps of Royal Engineers needs to be mentioned here. In 
1802, the office and title of ‘Chief Engineer’ was discontinued. A senior officer in the Corps, 
however, was still to perform the duties previously entrusted to the Chief Engineer, to be 
performed under ‘the Style & Title of Inspector General of Fortifications & Works’. Maps in 
the surviving archive that have descended from the Board of Ordnance are distinguished by a 
‘broad arrow’ stamped in red on the face of the map.
234
 Accompanying this logo is either the 
Board of Ordnance’s stamp (B.O) or the Inspector General of Fortifications’ stamp (I.G.F.).   
 
The Civil Establishment: the Draughtsmen of the Tower of London 
The Duke of Marlborough’s tenure as Master-General of the Ordnance (1714–1722) was a 
period of substantial reform for the Ordnance. The resulting measures saw the creation of the 
Royal Regiment of Artillery by royal warrant dated 26 May 1716, a new establishment of 
Engineers (22 August 1717), and the emergence of a new Ordnance establishment—the 
Drawing Room—at the Tower of London.
235
 
 The origin of the Drawing Room is obscure. It may have been in existence as a 
repository and storage depot for fortification plans since 1683. Crucial in its ensuing 
evolution was the instruction in the 1683 ‘Rules’ to ‘cause the Draughts or Designs thereof 
to be left in the Office of Our Ordnance, there to remain for the Use and Information of Our 
said Master General and Principal Officers of Our Ordnance as Occasion shall require’.
236
 In 
January 1694, the Ordnance engaged its first permanent draughtsman. Lucas Boitout was 
charged with the sole task of ‘Making, Draughting, and preparing such Plans, or Draughts 
[…] as shall bee Required and Directed By the Master General […] or Principal Officers’. 
Where Boitout worked and where the draughts and designs were stored in the Tower of 
London at this time is not clear, although in March 1687, a joiner—William Damsell— was 
paid £34 for two large walnut map cases which were placed in the Withdrawing Room of the 
Office of Ordnance in Cold Harbour (see Fig 3.3).
237
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Figure 3.3 ‘The Tower of London’, by Joseph Heath, c.1750, in a bound volume of ‘Plans of 
Fortifications’. Add. MS 22875, folio 69 (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library). 
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Michael Richards was again a primary instigator of reforms within the civil 
establishment. In November 1711, in his role as Chief Engineer, Richards submitted to the 
Board a lengthy proposal for ‘making a Collection of all plans, Projects, Profiles, Estimates 
etc. of all the Fortifications in great Brittain [sic] or any other [of] her Majesty’s Dominions’. 
Richards’ document contained his ideas for ‘methodiscing the same’: 
Firstly That there be a Book to paste all plans, profiles, &c into, whether 
projects or surveys. 
2
dly
 Another Book wherein shal be entered, ye Explanations of all 
Planns, & Profiles, whether projected or otherwise with all 
Estimates, orders and Journals, referring to ye forementioned 
Draughts &c.  
3
dly
 That where the planns &c are too large to be placd in a Book, that 
they be placed in Roles with Labels to em. 
4
thly
 That there shal be such Books for every particular Capital 
Fortification & ye dependances thereon or for every District as shal 
be assertaind or appointed. 
5
ly
 In order to put this work on such a foot as it may go on regularly, & 
be as completely usefull as the nature of it will admitt of, 
considering this is the first beginning. It is proposd to have two setts 
of the foregoing Books to each District. 
6
ly
 That one sett contains all that may be collected from the beginning 
of Her Majesty’s Reign to this time, with what can be gatherd of 
sertianty from the persons that have been in ye performance of ye 
several workes with in their time.  
7
ly
 And the other sett to contain all that can be recoverd or collected 
from the Books & Records in the Office ever since the Restoration 
to ye beginning of Her Majesty’s Reigne. 
8
ly
 For making ye first […] mentond sett as perfect as it may be that all 
Draughts of Planns, Profiles &c in ye Office of any Fort, 
Fortification, Worke &c, done or proposd to be done be 
 forthwith carefully looked out & laid apart by themselves, & that if 
any such Draughts remaine with his G. ye D of Marlborough, ye Rt 
hon
bl
 ye Ld Gen
l.
 Or any other of ye Principal Officers of Her 
Majesty’s Ordnance that they be descord to lett the same be coppyd 




 For recovery of such Draughts as may compose the last sett proposd, 
containing as that can be recoverd, beside what is in ye Office, from 
ye Restoration to the beginning of Her Majesty’s Reigne, Whether it 
may not be proper to offer a valuable consideration in ye publick 
News papers, for all such Draughts as shal be producd & appear to 
be authentick, or whether ye particular Heirs or Executors of such as 
have bore Office in ye Ordnance should be sent to, either to desire 
ye favour of Copying such Draughts or buying ye Same. 
10
ly
 For keeping ye Journal. That wherever any worke from hence 
forward shal be carried on, ye person having ye care these of, shal 
keep a Journal to ye Purport following import, shewing ye Nature of 
ye soil found from place to place. How the foundation is securd. Of 
what materials every worke is erected upon such foundations […] 
the whole to have References both to ye proper Plans & Profiles, 
that thereby the difference & alterations may be seen between the 
execution & ye projected Planns & Profiles. That copys of such 
Journals […] be transmitted to the Office. 
 Richards recommended that one person be appointed to record and document all 
these activities associated with the Ordnance’s building programme, that he be attended by a 
permanent draughtsman and assisted by engineers awaiting active duty at a Divisional 
outpost.
238
 Richards continued by outlining the advantages of adopting such methods: 
organising plans and profiles in relation to written reports and estimates would make them 
easily accessible, more comprehensive and, with time and frequent use, the system more 
rational; by archiving surveys the need to make new ones could be avoided; and engineers 
could quickly access information on any defects or difficulties that had occurred in previous 
construction work. Richards was an experienced engineer who had seen active service in 
Flanders, Newfoundland, and Spain.
239
 His proposal concluded that ‘in some foreign parts 
[…] this method is said to be used, Such Registers are kept in every Garrison, & is intended 
for the better information of the Governour [sic], the use of every worke is explained’.
240
 In 
response, on 15 April 1712, the Board appointed Robert Whitehand as ‘Draughtsman […] 
Constantly to attend the Office’.
241
 It may have been Whitehand’s appointment and 
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Richards’s ‘methodiscing’ that truly marked the first stage in the evolution of a Drawing 
Room. 
Andrews Jelfe, a masonry contractor and architect, assisted and subsequently 
replaced Whitehand. Between 1 July 1716 and 29 March 1719, Jelfe was employed by the 
Ordnance to make several ‘Draughts for the use of the Office’.
242
 On 16 June 1719, he was 
appointed Architect to the Civil Establishment by order of the Board, almost a year after his 
appointment was first placed before the King in Council, on 1 July 1718.
243
 In conjunction 
with his architectural role, Jelfe was made ‘Clerk of the Works and Director for building the 
barracks’ in Scotland in place of James Smith. In this capacity, he was supported by the civil 
and military officers of the Ordnance as well as the Army.
244
 Clement Lemprière was the 
next draughtsman to be engaged by the Office of Ordnance. An Ordnance minute of 16 April 
1717 indicates that Lemprière was paid £17.4s.0d for the sixteen weeks he was employed in 
‘drawing planns [sic] etc. at the Tower’, between 23 December 1716 and 13 April 1717, ‘at a 
Guinea a week’.
245
 One of his earliest surviving plans is that of the annexed building along 
the east wall of the White Tower, the ‘Store House’ (shown on Fig 3.3). A north-south 
section of the annex shows the upper floor set out as a Drawing Room with presses and 
shelves, and a Record Office in the southern third.
246
 The Drawing Room can therefore be 
confirmed as an ‘active force in military cartography’ from at least 1717.
247
  
Lemprière’s talent for map making was exemplary. His obituary in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine justly described him as ‘an ingenious gentleman, draughtsman to the office of 
Ordnance, and Capt. Of a marching Reg. of foot’.
248
 He continued as senior draughtsman at 
the Tower on £100 a year until at least 1743.
249
 From about 1727 he was assisted by John 
Peter Desmaretz who succeeded him as senior draughtsman.
250
 In this early period, 
draughtsmen working for the civil branch as clerks to the Surveyor-General were able to 
obtain commissions in the military; Desmaretz, for example, was promoted to Chief 
Engineer in Ordinary in 1743, on £60 a year.
251
 By Order of the Board dated 23 November 
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1750, Desmaretz was henceforth ‘stiled [sic] Clerk of the Fortifications’.
252
 Under Lemprière 
and Desmaretz, the Drawing Room gained a reputation as a source of skilled military 
cartographers, establishing a cartographic style through the predominant practice of copying 
maps and plans. 
The Drawing Room was always a centre of carto-reproduction. On 13 April 1721, 
Richard Barton was employed to begin ‘Copying, Contracting, and Reducing Draughts’ on a 
salary of 2s a day.
253
 Lieutenant John Henri Bastide, part of the Military Establishment, was 
paid 4s a day for ‘Copping [sic] of Plans etc. in the Drawing Room in the White Tower’ 
from 22 June 1725 to 8 March 1726.
254
 Copying was the most important part of a 
draughtsman’s training, as well as an official requirement of the Ordnance, and was 
fundamental in establishing a consistent cartographic style founded on Lemprière’s and the 
early Drawing Room draughtsmen. Drawing Room apprentices were instructed in drawing, 
drafting, and copying of fortification plans and topographic maps by the senior draughtsman 
and drawing master and elementary mathematics by the mathematics master. The art of 




The speed of copying varied with the draughtsman’s experience and the complexity 
of the map he was using. There are very few records of reproduction speeds with which to 
make comparisons. James Miller made a copy of William Skinner’s ‘Plan of Fort Augustus’ 
in 1776 (original survey 1747), and noted that it was ‘begun & finished in 8 Days’.
256
 A 
treatise translated by J. Dinsdale describes several ‘Methods to copy all Sorts of Designs’; 
the second method was certainly used by Ordnance draughtsmen: 
The First is to apply to the Glass that Design we would copy, and fix on it 
for this Purpose the white Paper with fine Pins, or Sliding-pincers; then the 
Light passing through the Glass, shews all the Traits of the Original, which 
are drawn upon the white Paper with a Black-lead Pencil, by bearing very 
lightly, to the end that when the Copy is finished we may rub out the Traces 
of the Pencil […] This Method is better for Charts; for the Appendage of a 
Plan […] and for the Plans and Profiles of Works.  
 The second Method is, to prick the Original, with a fine Needle, 
after fixing it up-on the white Paper with proper Pins, or Sliding-pincers. 
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You are to understand you must prick the Extremities of the Lines of the 
Plan; afterwards they apply the black-lead Pencil to the Copy, but very 
lightly, for the Reason mentioned before; lastly, they draw these Lines with 
Carmine, or China Ink as is most convenient; but to facilitate our perceiving 
the Points, we must redden one of the Sides of the Paper, on which we 
design, with fine red Chalk. 
 This second Method is very exact, and proper for Plans, Profiles, 
Sections, etc. But it is not proper for Charts […] Besides, it is pretty difficult 
to prick all the Points, as well as to examine or put the Plan or Profile to the 
Pencil: notwithstanding those who have the Practice of pricking, spare 
themselves sometimes the Trouble of applying the Design to black Lead, by 
drawing at once all the Lines with Carmine, or China Ink, as is agreeable, 
without mistaking one Point for another, excepting very rarely; but the most 
sure way is always to use the Pencil.
257
 
In 1752, the Drawing Room was formally established as a department of the 
Ordnance and regulated by fixing the number of draughtsmen—a Master Draughtsman, an 
Assistant, and fourteen subordinate draughtsmen organised into five classes—as well as their 
pay, conduct, and means of promotion. When a vacancy arose, the most deserving 
draughtsman was promoted with a corresponding increase in salary, and a new draughtsman 




 Attendance was six days a week, from 9–1 and 3–
6 between 1 April and 30 September, and 10–3 for the remainder of the year, with the hours 
extended when the work load required it.  
The Master Draughtsman or his Assistant kept a daily register of the maps, plans, 
and drawings belonging to the Drawing Room.
259
 Items sent to the Drawing Room were 
classified according to geographical area and listed in a large folio volume, the ‘Register of 
Draughts’.
260
 The ‘Register’ was not authorised until the enactment of regulations in 1752 
although, until then, cartographic material appears to have been systematically recorded.
261
 
John Lambertus Romer, for example, when principal engineer in Scotland from 1720 ‘laid a 
list of the Planns [sic] & Estimates and other papers relating [to North Britain], being 20 in 
number, which the Board ordered to be entered in the Book for that Division’.
262
 Thereafter, 
the register was intermittently maintained until about 1812. In the Master-General’s 1758 
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orders regulating the Corps of Engineers, it was stipulated that the Chief Engineer was to 
have ‘free Access to all Plans Surveys and Estimates on Designs lodged in the Drawing 
Room’. He was further empowered to remove such items as he required in exchange of a 
receipt, although any copies that he wished made had to be authorised by the Master-General 
or Board of Ordnance.
263
  
The demand for skilled map makers greatly increased during wartime. The Seven 
Years’ War (1756–1763) saw the number of draughtsmen entering the Drawing Room 
increase to twenty-eight. In the second year of the American Revolutionary War (1775–
1783) the number rose to thirty-six. To meet the demand for trained surveyors, George 
Townshend, Master-General of the Ordnance, created a technical school at the Drawing 
Room in 1775 believing it more capable of supplying superior training to officers. The 
school was in direct competition with the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich; a 
consequence of Townshend’s disillusionment with the Academy ‘to furnish the supply of 
officers we want’.
264
 Reuben Burrow (1747–1792) was appointed mathematical master in 
1776 having previously been mathematics teacher at the Royal Military Academy.
265
 His 
resignation six years later was instigated by the demise of the Tower school when a warrant 
was issued on the 4 September 1782 ‘for reducing the Establishment of the Drawing-Room’ 
on the grounds that it seemed ‘ill calculated for instruction, and might be considerably 
reduced without any inconvenience to our service’. The establishment was reduced to a 
Chief Draughtsman, an assistant, and five draughtsmen ‘to attend the Drawing-Room […] 
and never to be employed elsewhere except upon very extraordinary occasions’. Six 
draughtsmen were to be attached to foreign stations, a further six to attend engineers on 
service in Britain, and four to join the cadets for instruction at the Royal Military Academy. 
Of the eight remaining draughtsmen, two were to attend upon the King, one the Master-
General, one the Lieutenant-General, one the Chief Engineer, then one each to Portsmouth, 




In 1787, a new position was created in the Drawing Room—that of Chief Surveying 
Draughtsman—to introduce field survey methods, only to be suppressed in 1794 when the 
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Master-General decided that there should be only one ‘Chief’ in the Drawing Room.
267
 The 
introduction of field surveying methods did, however, add a new dimension to the skills of 
the draughtsmen, to the extent that a draughtsman in the 1
st
 Class was despatched 
periodically to the Woolwich Academy to teach Gentlemen Cadets surveying and plan 
drawing.
268
 On 3 December 1800, the personnel of the Tower of London Drawing Room 
were given military commissions in the newly established ‘Corps of Royal Military 
Surveyors and Draughtsmen’.
269
 Table 3.2 shows the composition of the Corps in 1801. The 
Tower of London Drawing Room was the headquarters of the Corps, which was under the 
command of the Chief Engineer. In addition, the draughtsmen wore a uniform resembling 
the one worn by the Engineers and Royal Military Artificers (see Fig 3.4). 
                         
                                                                                    Per Diem 
        s d 
Chief Surveyor & Draftsman    15 0 
First Assistant Surveyor & Draftsman  12 0 
Second Assistant Surveyor & Draftsman  10 0 
First Class – 8 Surveyors & Draftsmen                   7 6 
Second Class 16 Surveyors & Draftsmen    5 0 
Third Class 8 Surveyors & Draftsmen    4 0 
Besides 6 Cadet Surveyors & Draftsmen    2 0  
 
 
    
  Table 3.2 The new ‘Establishment of the Corps of Royal Military Surveyors &  
           Draftsmen’, 1801. In ‘Ordnance Regulations’: BL Additional Ms. 41994. 
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Figure 3.4. ‘A Tower Draughtsman and a Gentleman Attendant’, by Thomas Strange Seccombe 
(1840–1899), in an ‘Album of Drawings of the Royal Military Academy,Woolwich’. 
(The Royal Collection © 2009 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II). 
 
 
Military Education and Enlightenment Ideology 
In 1779, Charles Vallancey, Director of Engineers in Ireland, wrote an essay on military 
surveys that advocated a topographical education for military officers.
270
 His argument 
centred on ‘the great advantages attending a knowledge in this branch of the military 
science’. Maps were the means by which a General became ‘acquainted with the nature of 
the ground he [was] to march through’ and chose the most suitable sites for encampments 
and for engagements with the enemy. Map making was ‘military art’ or, more precisely, the 
‘art of depicting with a soldier’s eye’ to provide the necessary topographical information. 
Vallancey reiterated, however, that: 
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It must not be imagined (says Folard) that this art can be acquired by length 
of service alone; the capacity of most military men is erroneously judged on 
this false evidence. Length of service will indeed perfect the soldier, but 
service without a thorough knowledge of the principles of his business will 
be of little use to him. War is a science and like all other sciences can only 
be acquired by the study of its principles and theorems.
271
 
 Vallancey was a one-time pupil of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich where 
he received an education in ‘military science’. In An universal military dictionary, the 
author—Captain George Smith, an Inspector of the Royal Military Academy—observed that 
‘[m]ost artists may join practice to theory, and make one perfect by the help of the other. 
[…] Of learning of every kind, theory is the completion; in the study of the military science, 
[however,] it is only the introduction’.
272
 For an engineer to provide topographical 
information affecting the movement and subsistence of troops and military tactics, he had to 
be expert in the art of sketching and reconnoitring a country. He had to know geography and 
history in order to locate military structures; arithmetic, geometry, and perspective to know 
how to design and build fortifications; and ballistics and hydraulics to ensure their protection 
and adequate supply of water.
273
 The instruction offered by the Academy was aimed at 
providing an engineer with all these skills. A principal aim behind the training was to 
develop an engineer’s ability to analyse the landscape geographically and to give structure to 
his thinking; to survey territories and to produce maps. This was an Enlightenment 
intellectual ideology based on rational thought in the form of experience, observation, and 
measurement with the specific aim of ordering and systemising the physical and human 
worlds.
274
 Surveying enabled the application of these rational methods and the map provided 
the medium on which to put to order the geographical complexity of the world.
275
 A review 
of the instruction at the Royal Military Academy gives some insight into the place of 
cartography in ‘military science’. 
 
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich 
The value of a military education, one based on formal training rather than experience 
acquired through length of service, was officially recognised by the British state in 1741 with 
the establishment of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich (see Fig 3.5). 
                                                 
271
 Vallancey 1779 quoted in Marshall 1981, pp. 5–7. 
272
 Smith 1779, p. i. 
273
 Bousquet-Bressolier 2008. 
274
 Edney 1994a. 
275




Figure 3.5 ‘Tower Place at Woolwich’ [The Warren], by Joseph Heath, c.1750, in a bound volume of  
‘Plans of Fortifications’. ‘This Place is also the head Quarters of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, and 
where a Royal Academy is established’. Add. MS 22875, folio 88. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the 
British Library). 
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It would conduce to the good of Our Service, if an Academy or School was 
Instituted, Endowed, and Supported for Instructing the raw and 
unexperienced [sic] People belonging to the Military Branch of this Office, 
in the several parts of Mathematicks necessary to qualify them for the 
Service of the Artillery, and the business of Engineers.
276
 
Until then many military map makers gained cartographic experience through years of active 
service, either as engineers of the state, overseers to works, or as land stewards. Others were 
foreign émigrés—notably John Slezer, Theodore Dury, Lewis Petit, John Henri Bastide, 
John Dumaresq, John Lambertus Romer—engineers expert in fortifications revealing ‘that 
which had so misteriously [sic] been kept Secrett amongst a few’ in the service of the 
Ordnance and in so doing, playing key roles in  the defence of the British realm.
277
 The main 
centres of innovation in military cartography in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were in mainland Europe not in Britain.
278
 Continental cartographic practices thus travelled 
with the engineers from France and the Low Countries to be worked out in the theoretical 
teachings of the Masters of the Drawing Room and the Academy. 
The Academy, under the inspection of the Board of Ordnance, was attended by 
young gentlemen—sons of the nobility and military officers—twelve years and older 
although not admitted over the age of sixteen.
279
 To qualify for admission, a prospective 
cadet had to understand ‘not only reading and writing, but should be likewise advanced in 
Arithmetic as far as the Rule of Three’.
280
 The curriculum, revised and extended as each new 
Master-General of the Ordnance took office, was principally concerned with a broad military 
training, and surveying and map making were often taught as integral parts of other subjects. 
Nevertheless, the Academy did much to entrench drawing and to promote map making as 
part of military culture. From the outset, a strong emphasis was placed on mathematics. 
The purpose of the Academy was to formally introduce European ‘military science’ 
to ‘young Gentlemen Cadets’ in Great Britain, ‘to qualify them for Officers of Artillery & 
Engineers’.
281
 To this end, John Muller, a German mathematician and engineer, was 
transferred from the Drawing Room in the Tower of London where he was a mathematical 
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instructor, to the Academy.
282
 Although Muller was appointed Deputy Head,
283
 he was in 
effect, the Chief Master, performing all Martin Folkes’s teaching and administrative duties 
until he officially became Chief Master upon Folkes’s death in 1754.
284
 In 1764, ‘Chief 
Master’ was re-designated ‘Professor of Fortification and Artillery’.
285
 
Muller was not the only foreign teacher to be employed at the Academy. On 6 
December 1744, Gamaliel Massiot was appointed Drawing-Master, and in November 1777, 
Isaac Landmann, an experienced French staff officer, private tutor to French nobility, and 
formerly of the Ecole Royale Militaire in Paris where he taught projectiles and fortifications, 
was appointed Professor of Fortification and Artillery.
286
 Following the end of the Seven 
Years’ War in 1763, British-French relations improved to the extent that in 1766, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Academy, James Pattison went to visit the School of Artillery at 
La Terre and the Ecole Royale Militaire at Paris ‘in Order to be informed concerning its 
Government, Regulations and Police’. Pattison reported to the Board how he had made 
himself ‘master of the whole establishment, civil and military’ and in executing his 
commission, had procured and collated a ‘Collection of all the Rules & Orders in force 
relative to the Education, Discipline, and Aconomy [sic] of that Academy’ which were to be 




 Changes in the syllabus and structure of the Academy would suggest that some of 
these continental European practices were adopted. In the original 1741 ‘Rules and Orders’ 
for the Academy’s educational practice, the Chief Master, in addition to lectures in theory, 
instructed in pure and applied mathematics—trigonometry, conic sections, practical 
geometry and mechanics—‘applied to raising and transporting great burthens’; mensuration 
and levelling, and its application to ‘the bringing of water or the draining of morasses’; and 
lastly, ‘Fortification in all its parts, with the manner of attacking and defending places, the 
use, conduct, and direction of Mines, with the doctrine of Projectiles so as to apply them to 
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Gunnery’. The second Master taught arithmetic, the principles of algebra, and geometry. 
This theoretical instruction was put to practical use during the summer months. A mock 
fortification or polygon, built near the Academy at Woolwich, was ‘attacked every other 
Summer […] with all the form and regularity that is used in a real siege; […] the whole 
attack to be traced by the Engineers’. During the summer when there was no attack, the 
fortification was to be repaired by the engineer and artillery cadets. They were employed in 
‘first tracing out, erecting, and preparing the front of the Polygon, in order to their becoming 
expert and perfect in all matters relating to the practice both of Defensive and Offensive 
Fortification’.
288
 Surveying and map drawing were not specified as part of the educational 
requirements of the gentlemen cadets in these formative years although, by ‘first tracing out’ 
the mock fortification, the military engineers were learning the art of geometric surveying, 
an integral part of fortification cartography. 
In a subsequent series of ‘Rules and Orders’ by John Manners, Marquis of Granby, 
who acceded to the post of Master-General of the Ordnance by patent on 30 April 1763,
289
 
the curriculum was itemised in detail, specifying both subjects and books to be used to teach 
‘the Principles of the Art of War, and the Sciences on which they are founded’.
290
 The 
curriculum’s similarity to the principles established in 1697 by Vauban for future engineers 
is a further testament to the continental European influences in the instruction of British 
engineers.
291
 Vauban expected engineers to be proficient and examined ‘not only about 
Geometry and measuring but also on all the other essential aspects of Mathematics such as 
Trigonometry, Mechanics, Arithmetic, Geography, Civil Architecture and even drawing’.
292
 
Manners’s specifications specifically itemised training in cartographic practices—in 
surveying and drawing. The cadets were instructed in French, the international language of 
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military science ‘both as to speaking it fluently and writing it with accuracy’ and four groups 
of interrelated subjects: fortification and artillery; mathematics and geography; drawing; 
classics, writing, and common arithmetic. The Professor of Fortification and Artillery taught 
‘Practical Geometry and Mathematicks’ and the ‘Arts of Surveying and Levelling’, in 
addition to the ‘Science of Fortification in all its Parts’ which included the rudiments of 
Military Architecture and ‘particularly the Method of making Plans, Elevations and Sections 
of Powder Magazines, Guard Rooms, Barracks, Storehouses, and other Buildings that may 
be necessary in fortified Towns’. The Professor of Mathematics taught pure and applied 
mathematics, specifically trigonometry and geometry, and the theory of perspective.
293
 These 
subjects were fundamental to the understanding of fortification and all its parts—in plan and 
profile or vertical section—and to land surveying and topographical mapping. He also 
instructed in ‘Geography, and the Use of the Globes’, for which John Lodge Cowley, 
Professor of Mathematics, found himself in ‘great want of a good Geographical Atlas, as 
likewise a pair of Globes of about 1 [foot] or 16 Inches Diameter’.
294
 
Muller’s treatises on fortification did much to introduce continental European 
practices in theory to the Academy cadets, in both military architecture and cartography. His 
publications included: A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification (‘for the 
Use of the Royal Academy of Artillery at Woolwich’, second edition, 1756), The Attac [sic] 
and Defence of Fortified Places (for ‘all concerned in the Art of War, by Land or Sea’, 
1747), A Treatise of Artillery (1757), and a translation of M. le Chevalier de Clairac’s The 
Field Engineer (1759). As a man of the Enlightenment, Muller (and other engineers) made 
use of publishing to promote himself within his area of specialty as well as offering a 
valuable learning resource. He was lauded by a contemporary as ‘the scholastic father of all 
the great engineers which this country employed for forty years’.
295
 His texts included 
translations and remarks on ‘the Construction of the most celebrated Authors, particularly of 
Marshal de Vauban and Baron Coehorn’, and outlined in detail the various parts of 
fortification structures.
296
 In his section on ‘regular Fortification’, Muller distinguished the 
two parts of the ‘art of fortification’. The first—theoretical—was concerned with ‘tracing the 
plans and profiles of a fortification on paper, with scales and compasses’; the second part 
considered the practical process of ‘forming a project of a fortification, according to the 
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nature of the ground, […] to trace it on the ground, […] together with all the military 
buildings, such as magazines, storehouses, bridges, etc.’
297
  
The Drawing Master was required to teach the artistic depiction of space—the 
topographic ‘in-filling’ of the mathematical framework taught by the Professors of 
Fortifications and Mathematics. His duty, in part, was to teach the cadets the skill of taking 
views through which they would be able ‘to break ground, and forms the eye to the 
knowledge of it’.
298
 On 22 August 1768, the same year that he became a Royal Academician, 
Paul Sandby was appointed Chief Drawing Master at the Academy in place of Gamaliel 
Massiot who was made his junior.
299
 Sandby had been one of the principal draughtsmen on 
the ‘Military Survey of Scotland’ (1747–1755), a role that fully qualified him for teaching 
cadets to sketch the military landscape and understand topography for military action.
300
 
Cadets took classes on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday mornings in ‘Landscapes and 
Perspectives’.
301
 During these classes, Sandby taught the methods of ‘Sketching Ground, the 
Taking of Views, the Drawing of Civil Architecture, and the Practice of Perspective’, 
highlighting the importance of the process of drawing as much as the usefulness of the final 
image.
302
 Such lessons taught the cadets that when drawing from nature to observe the ‘effect 




By teaching the ‘best Method of describing the various Kinds of Ground, with its 
Inequalities, as necessary for the drawing of Plans; [and] the taking of Views from Nature’, 
Sandby was inculcating the coup d’œil militaire—a French term adopted by military 
personnel to describe ‘the art of depicting with a soldier’s eye’ the nature of the ground for 
military operations: marches, encampments, and battles.
304
 It was, when combined with their 
skills in surveying, the process in which observation and measurement came together—the 
art and science of topographic mapping.  
In 1772, the structure of the Academy was regulated into an Upper and a Lower or 
Under Academy, each comprising four classes, the 4
th
 Class being the most advanced.
305
 The 
second Drawing Master taught the Under Academy the ‘first Rudiments of Drawing, in 
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black Lead and Indian Ink; copying Landscapes; military Embellishments, and the Elements 
of Perspective’.
306
 Sandby instructed the Upper Academy. He taught landscape drawing in 
Indian Ink and colour, introducing into his designs ‘every kind of Military Buildings, such as 
old Castles, Square and Round Towers’ and taught the art of representing these and modern 
fortifications in perspective.
307
 It was in such lessons that the theory and practice of 
surveying and drawing came together. In taking views around Woolwich and elsewhere, 
Sandby taught the cadets the experiential act of drawing—‘to break ground’—thus forming 
‘the eye to the knowledge of it’.
308
  
The Academy Masters recognised that drawing was ‘an accomplishment which 
depends in great measure upon genius’ and it was not expected that every cadet would 
become ‘an expert draftsman’.
309
 Vallancey in his Essay on Military-Surveys was quick to 
point out that ‘few surveyors are masters of the art of drawing’.
310
 Progression from the 
Under to the Upper Academy was, however, dependent on prowess, itself as much 
determined by attentiveness to classes as to ability. Sandby reported that several of the cadets 
were ‘not sufficiently instructed, or attentive enough to profit by his lessons’; since they 
were liable to hold back the more diligent students, they were to remain in the Under 
Academy on the mornings that he taught.
311
 Drawing was not the only subject to experience 
academic challenges. ‘Historical Geography, with the use of the Globes’, was to be taught to 
cadets who were ‘not very conversant in Geometry’.
312
  
 The study of Historical Geography, or the ‘Science of Geography’, was a means to 
teach the cadets how to read maps: ‘What would be the science of war, unassisted by plans? 
[…] the graphic descriptions of the Historian, would be almost useless in the study of the art 
of war, if the narrations of the latter were not illustrated by plans’.
313
 It brought together a 
study of the theatres of warfare and the nature of the ground. In the introduction to his 
Military Antiquities, William Roy suggested that ‘The nature of a country will always, in a 
great degree, determine the general principles upon which every war there must be 
conducted. […] Hence it will appear evident, that what, with regard to situation, was an 
advantageous post when the Romans were carrying on their military operations in Britain, 
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must, in all essential respects, continue to be a good one now’.
314
 In 1699, the Chevalier de 
Villemain wrote in The Perfect Warrior that ‘young gentlemen destined for war’, in addition 
to studying geometry, fortification, and geography, should ‘above all’ study history: ‘The 
latter will furnish a thousand pieces of information and will provide them with the means of 





 translation of a Prussian officer’s Essay on 
Field Fortification became a key text at the Academy, and was concerned with the study of 
maps and plans in order to understand ‘such draughts perfectly’, and to access their 
usefulness in planning an army’s route of march ‘with all its different movements, positions, 
and encampments’.
317
 Geography was instructed using William Faden’s General Atlas and 
Aaron Arrowsmith’s large Map of the World on a Mercator projection.
318
 
One issue from the very conception of the Academy was discipline and attendance. 
The regulations or official descriptions of how the Academy was supposed to operate and the 
reality did not always coincide. In 1750, Muller compiled a list of the ‘Qualifications, 
Industry and Capacity of the Gentlemen Cadets’ for the Board of Ordnance. In his opening 
remarks, Muller acknowledged that ‘the Institution of the Royal Academy of Artillery for the 
Education of Military Gentlemen is of great importance to the Nation in regard to its Military 
Achievements’ but that the ‘great abuses committed and the neglect of attendance by the 
Gentlemen Cadets to the Respective Masters’ was threatening the Academy’s success. 
Muller reported some of his pupils as ‘Idle and Spoiled’, ‘Indolent’, ‘the most Idle of all and 
good for nothing at all’, ‘lunatic’, and ‘mad’. There were, however, some he described as ‘a 
good genious [sic]’, ‘a tolerable genius for Mathematicks [sic]’, ‘a good notion in drawing’, 




In order to review progress, the cadets took a general examination. The first was sat 
on 5 June 1765. Thirty-five cadets, aged between 14 and 19 years with attendances between 
4 months and 5 years, were examined on the whole syllabus (see Table 3.3).
320
 An 
examination gave the Board of Ordnance some indication of the Academy’s overall 
effectiveness in training cadets in aspects of military science. For this study, the syllabus 
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provides a neat summary of subjects considered appropriate for inclusion in the military 
sciences and finally the place of cartography within the whole.   
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Table 3.3 The earliest recorded public examination of Gentlemen Cadets of the Royal Military 
Academy took place on 5
th
 June 1765, in the presence of the Marquis of Granby, the Master-General, 




If, following Harley, ‘even ‘scientific’ maps are a product not only of “the rules of the order 
of geometry and reason” but also of the “norms and values of the order of social […] 
tradition”’,
321
 then it becomes important to look at the state institution—the Board of 
Ordnance—that structured military cartography in eighteenth-century Britain and to identify 
the operational activities employed in its rationalisation of cartography as a state enterprise. 
This chapter has provided a summary of the evolution of the civil and military 
establishments of the Board of Ordnance. Although separate establishments, their 
cartographic tasks were inter-linked in answering the state’s imperative to know the spaces 
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of the nation, in planning and in constructing the military landscape. This review has 
highlighted the growing recognition of cartography and its importance in national 
governance in the eighteenth century: in the rationalisation of institutional structure; in the 
acquisition of specialists—engineers and draughtsmen; in the importance placed on 
education and the teaching of the military sciences; in the instruction in methods of survey 
and compilation; and, finally, in the practical use of maps for military action.   
In providing an overview of the instruction and education of the Academy cadets 
and the training of the Tower draughtsmen, three overarching factors in the development of 
British military cartography in the eighteenth century have been defined. The first relates to 
the transference of continental European cartographic practices to Britain. This occurred in 
three ways: through the employment of émigré engineers (a usual practice in the seventeenth 
century), through instruction, and through engineers travelling to the continent to improve 
their knowledge of the art of fortification.
322
 Foreign Masters were employed in the Drawing 
Room and the Military Academy, and translations of theoretical treatises advocating the 
‘military science’ of engineers such as Vauban and Coehoorn were compulsory texts for the 
students. The second was the development of a style of military mapping and can best be 
seen in the use of colour, scales, and in the adoption of certain types of representations 
(plans, profiles, views and perspectives). The dissemination of this ‘cartographic 
codification’ through textbooks used in the Academy as well as on working copies of maps 
and plans did much to establish rules of practice for engineers and draughtsmen alike. This is 
explored in more detail in chapter five.  
The third and last factor relates to the standardisation of the maps and the reports 
that were expected to accompany them. Engineers employed in mapping the military 
landscape had to draw on knowledge and experience from a variety of disciplines, not least 
mathematics, architecture, landscape painting, quantitative surveying, and structural 
engineering. It was important, then, for their maps and accompanying reports to have a 
clarity of expression, to meet certain standards, and to adopt consistent specifications: to 
become a common cartographic literature, one that was ‘familiar’ to both producers and 
receivers, and could be easily read and interpreted by a distant government for developing 
strategic military and political policies.  
This last factor, in particular, may be considered the stimulus for surveying and 
drawing instruction at the Royal Military Academy and the emphasis placed on copying as a 
method of learning in the Drawing Room of the Tower of London. Cadets, entering the 
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Board of Ordnance through the Royal Military Academy and the Drawing Room, were 
taught from a young age the military sciences. As table 3.3—the examination timetable for 
Gentlemen Cadets of the Royal Military Academy— shows, methods for reading and for 
measuring the landscape through observation and surveying took precedence from the start 
of a cadet’s education. Such instructions were necessary for representing and for acting upon 
the landscape.  
Cartographic proficiency was thus based on qualities of mathematical accuracy and 
observation of the ground. It is with these ideas and practices in mind that we now turn to the 
military mapping of eighteenth-century Scotland, the engineers’ representation of the 
military landscape, and the use of the maps for military and political purposes. Chapter 4 
examines the surviving Board of Ordnance archive of military maps and plans of eighteenth-




























Having considered the relationship between the Board of Ordnance and military mapping in 
its broadest sense, this chapter examines the military cartography of eighteenth-century 
Scotland. Of particular concern here are the characteristics of the archive rather than map 
content per se. Here, I use the term ‘the archive’ to mean the 940 Board of Ordnance 
manuscript maps and plans compiled between 1689 and 1815 that survive today and that 
have been conceptually re-assembled and interrogated across different holdings to 
reconstruct the military landscape of eighteenth-century Scotland. They form the focus of 
this study. In this chapter, my aim is to describe this archive through three different but 
related perspectives.  
 In the first I explore the purpose of military maps of Scotland. This study will show 
that by commissioning maps of Scotland, the Board’s purpose in doing so was not a neutral 
or unproblematic process of geographical knowledge acquisition but rather an act of political 
territorialism. To begin with, the Board was not interested in a complete representation of 
Scotland—‘the perfect, totalizing knowledge archive’
323
—rather, its focus was to 
(re)construct and to represent discrete military landscapes, namely fortifications, route ways, 
and battlefields (see Fig 4.1). The archive includes representations of military activities that 
consistently had recourse to mapping—fortifying, reconnaissance, intelligence, marching, 
encamping, and battle. These representations reflected the Government’s military 
imperatives at a time when Jacobitism and overseas states challenged British hegemony. The 
archive is therefore a legacy of the activities of the Board of Ordnance in planning, 
constructing, and in recording the Scottish landscapes of military action. The surviving 
archive is, however, incomplete. Maps recorded in the Drawing Room’s ‘Register of 
Draughts’ are missing; either permanently lost, hidden in private collections, or 
unintentionally missed in my search of map repositories.
324
 In addition, the ‘Register’ does 
not account for all the maps made by military engineers, as evidenced by the surviving 
archive, and so the question of ‘losses’ will be addressed in the final part of this section.  
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Figure 4.1. The distribution of military landscapes in Scotland, 1689–1815 
  
The second perspective examines the maps’ construction. I begin by reviewing 
methods of survey which includes some consideration of the technologies available to the 
engineers in Scotland. While, in France, a collaboration of state and science resulted in a 
mathematically rigorous framework—a geodetic matrix—of the country and the production 
of its first national map by 1744 (the second, more detailed and more accurate, by 1788), 
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engineers in Scotland ‘carried on with instruments of the common, or even inferior kind’ to 
produce unconnected maps of Scotland’s military landscapes.
325
 This is not to imply that the 
mapping of Scotland ignored the Enlightenment’s emphasis on the ‘instrumentality of 
knowledge’: on mathematical accuracy, original survey, and increased attention to precise 
and accurate scientific instruments.
326
 The situation was quite the converse. Engineers in 
Scotland made requisitions for instruments and claims of mathematical accuracy in their 
cartographic representations. In addition, they followed the maxim that ‘in Military Maps 
nothing should ever be represented at Guess or Random, & that the space of one quarter of a 




This raises the question of which contemporary users found these maps of particular 
events ‘useful’? The final section addresses this issue by looking at the circulation of the 
military maps of Scotland; principally, the dissemination of cartographic records from field 
survey to various duplications and, occasionally, publication. 
 
 
Conflict and Cartography: Classifying the Military Maps of Scotland 
On 8 April 1689, four days after the accession of William of Orange and Mary Stuart to the 
throne of Great Britain, John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee, rode out of 
Edinburgh to begin the first Jacobite Rising and a period of political polarization in Britain 
that lasted for the next sixty years. Despite an unexpected victory for Dundee’s forces 
against the Williamite army at Killiecrankie on 27 July, the rebel army’s progress was 
checked at the ‘battle’ of Dunkeld shortly afterwards. Nevertheless, it was due to the initial 
defeat of the English army that Jacobitism took hold among the clans and thereafter, a bitter 
war of raid and counter-raid ensued in and around the Highlands.
328
  
 Counter-insurgency measures were invoked by successive Stuart and Hanoverian 
monarchs and their governments but with mixed success. Initial measures included building 
up government forces in the old fortresses of Scotland, principally at Edinburgh, Stirling, 
and Dumbarton Castles, and at hastily-built Fort William. Concerns to know the condition of 
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Scotland’s fortifications prompted the Board of Ordnance to assign engineers ‘to make 
Draughts and Estimates of what Works would be needfull [sic] to be done effectually to 
secure’ North Britain.
329
 But the Jacobite’s unconventional—guerrilla—warfare provoked a 
military expansion into the Highlands that saw not only the design and construction of more 
fortifications but methods to improve the mobility of the British army. With these came a 
change in the mapping technologies as engineers were commissioned to reconnoitre the 
Highlands, choose sites for new military establishments, and ensure effective communication 
between them and with the principal lowland garrisons. This section reviews the changing 
focus of the military engineers in mapping Scotland, providing an analysis of the chronology 
and the geography of the military maps of Scotland and the imperatives behind their making. 
 
Timeline 
Figure 4.2 provides a chronology of events relating to the military mapping of Scotland 
between 1689 and 1815. The chart shows key military mapping projects and principal 
engineers in Scotland in relation to the monarchy, the Board of Ordnance, and wars 
involving Britain which often distracted attention from Scotland. A few ‘cause and effects’ 
can be read from this chart; the first has already been mentioned, the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, the Battle of Killiecrankie in 1689, and the subsequent mapping of Scotland’s 
medieval castles. Following the 1715 rebellion and the Battle of Sheriffmuir, engineering 
attention turned to the construction of detached, enclosed, self-defensible barrack complexes 
in the Highlands. Their design was of particular concern to the engineers overseeing their 
construction and to Andrews Jelfe, Director of barrack building in Scotland.
330
 The location 
of two of the barrack forts (Kiliwhimen and Inversnaid), although chosen with some 
reference to reconnaissance and intelligence activity on the part of Brigadier Lewis Petit 
(engineer to the Board of Ordnance) and General Carpenter (Commander-in-Chief of the 
British forces in Scotland), was later challenged by George Wade who completed a thorough 
reconnaissance of the Highlands in 1724 by order of George I. 
 Wade’s arrival in Scotland in 1724 saw a change in cartographic concerns to 
coincide with changes in the Hanoverian army’s handling of Jacobite insurrection.   
Wade gathered intelligence on the Highland Clans, those for and against government, and 
described in detail ‘the greatest and most unciviliz’d parts’ of Scotland through which he  
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Figure 4.3 ‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland. The Situation of the several Clans and the 
Number of Men able to bear Arms, as also ye Forts [Fort William, Fort Augustus, and Fort George] 
lately Erected and Roads of Communication or Military Ways carried on by his Majesty's command, 
with the Seats of the most considerable Nobility in the Low Country’, by Clement Lemprière, 1731. 





 In 1731, Clement Lemprière ‘put to order’ Wade’s geographical knowledge of 
Scotland; his map—‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland’—formed an image of the 
data collected and reported to the king (see Fig 4.3).
332
 This map’s utility lay in its political-
military representation of fortifications—in locating the principal government garrisons, 
highlighted in red by Lemprière, in relation to the disposition, loyalties, and strengths of the 
various clans—and in its depiction of military roads built between them since 1725 under 
Wade’s supervision (see Fig 4.4). Wade proposed a scheme for ‘Establishing Order […] and 
reducing the Highlands to a more due Submission’ which included forming Companies of 
local Highlanders who knew the mountains, could speak ‘the Language of the Country’, and 
could enforce the Disarming Act.
333
  
Highland Companies and regular troops were to be quartered in the garrisons 
marked by Lemprière, including the medieval castles of Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton, and 
Inverness, the most recent forts—Fort William and Fort Augustus—and the barrack forts of 
Bernera, Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen, and Ruthven (see Fig 4.1). There was widespread approval 
for Wade’s scheme although one anonymous dissenter claimed the proposal was too 
concerned with defence and called for more aggressive measures to be taken by the 
government to subjugate the Highlanders: 
The General’s Scheme is in so far approved by every Person, but in the 
Memorialists humble opinion, the same being only defensive against those 
Villanous [sic] Disturbers of the Peace and no wise offensive, it will turn out 
to make a sufficient (but only a palliating) cure. It is just the same as skining 
over a flesh wound while rottenness is at the Bone the same will daly break 
out afresh, until the wound be searched to the Bottom, and the Virulent 
Distemper be eaten out by Corrosives. As this is the State of an Human 
Body, it is the very same in the Body Politic; when such in-grained villany 
and wickedness by long habit is once so deeply rooted in the Hearts (as well 
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as inclinations) of so numerous a Set of People there is an absolute necessity 






Figure 4.4 Part of ‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland [showing] ye Forts lately Erected and 
Roads of Communication or Military Ways carried on by his Majesty's command’, by Clement 
Lemprière, 1731. Maps K.Top.48.12. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library). 
 
 Wade’s activities were at a time when the London Government was concerned to 
know more about the geography of Scotland, when acts of reconnaissance resulted in 
relatively small-scale maps of the Highlands showing ‘the Several Lakes, Rivers, and 
Roads’,
335
 when linear surveys were made of proposed military roads,
336
 and when large-
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 NAS RH2/5/12 ‘Mitchell Papers’ 1724–1785: ‘Memorial anent the Thieving and Depredations in 
the Highlands of Scotland and the Countries bordering thereon’, f. 55.  
335
 For example, Joseph Avery’s ‘exact Survey […] between Inverness and Fort William’ of which 
there are three copies: survive: BL Maps K.Top.50.1, Maps K.Top.50.2, and NLS MS 1648 Z.03/21 
(BL Maps K.Top.50.1 looks to be a neat copy of NLS MS 1648 Z.03/21). Another copy drawn in 
1742 at a scale of 1: 55,440 included similar detail of the lochs but is more concerned to show the new 
roads and is more highly coloured: TNA MR 1/496.   
336
 For example, George Wade’s sketch and description of the proposed roads from Callander to Fort 
William: NLS Acc.10497 Wade.58m.; Joseph Avery’s ‘A Plan of the Country where the New 
Intended Road is to be made from the Barrack at Ruthven in Badenath to Invercall in Brae Marr’, 
1735: NLS Acc.10497 Wade.58b. 
 81 
scale maps of new fortification schemes and reconstructions of old abounded.
337
 The arrival 
in 1740 of William Caulfeild ensured schemes to improve communications, to build new and 
repair old roads, continued. Military commanders in Scotland and the Board of Ordnance 
were keen to have maps of the new route ways to plan military strategies and to supply 
munitions and provisions to the several garrisons. Fort Augustus—‘a modern fortification’—
was eventually completed in 1742 and, thereafter, fortifications were maintained, 
strengthened, and in some cases extended.
338
 
 In the wake of the 1745 Rebellion and the defeat of the Jacobite Army at the Battle 
of Culloden, the Hanoverian Army instigated a period of systematic suppression of the 
disloyal Jacobites. At the same time, military engineers and draughtsmen of the Board of 
Ordnance conducted a Military Survey of Scotland. The map, a landmark in military map 
making, was an act of political surveillance and an example of cartography’s power to exert 
territorial control.
339
 The Survey was directed by David Watson, Quarter-Master General of 
the Hanoverian Army, and his assistant, William Roy, between 1747 and 1755. Watson 
placed the inspiration for its undertaking as ‘the sole motive of restoring quiet’ in the 
Highlands.
340
 In the same context, Skelton explained that ‘the mapping of the Highlands, and 
subsequently of the Lowlands’ by the military engineers of the British state ‘was a phase or 
instrument of the military occupation’.
341
 Hodson has written that the Survey’s true purpose 
was ‘to gather geographical information, and to express it in written and cartographic form 
so that a commander could make decisions, for example, about the capacity of routes and 
adjacent terrain to carry heavy artillery. It was never intended that the map should be perfect 
in its representation of the positions of features relative to each other’.
342
  
 Roy himself described the unfinished manuscript as rather a ‘magnificent military 
sketch, than a very accurate map of a country’ but, although an ‘imperfect work’, it still 
possessed ‘considerable merit, and perfectly answered the purpose for which it was 
originally intended’.
343
 In its endeavour, it was defined by Hugh Debbeig, one of the 
Survey’s contributing engineers, as ‘the greatest work of this sort ever performed by British 
Subjects and perhaps for the fine Representations of the Country not to equal in the 
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 NLS MS 1647 Z.02/63 ‘The Plan of Fort Augustus, in the Highlands of Scotland (a modern 
fortification)’, by John Lambertus Romer, 1742. 
339
 Widmalm 1990. 
340
 NRAS 3246, Vol. 35, letter number 34 from David Watson to Robert (Robin) Dundas of Arniston, 
Fort Augustus, July 1746. 
341
 Skelton 1967, p. 5. 
342
 Hodson 2007, p. 15. 
343




 The map is a snapshot of mid-eighteenth century Scotland and was intended as a 
political tool in the civilizing of the Highlands. For the Highlands, and northern Scotland in 
particular, it is the only relatively large-scale topographical map in existence for the 
eighteenth century. But for the intervention of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) between 
Britain and France, the variable accuracy and the nature and quantity of information 
conveyed by the Military Survey would have been adjusted over time. This was not lost on 
Roy, who later remarked that ‘It would, however, have been completed, and many of its 
imperfections no doubt remedied’ because 
if a country has not actually been surveyed, or is but little known, a state of 
warfare generally produces the first improvements in its geography: for in 
the various movements of armies in the field, especially if the theatre of war 
be extensive, each individual officer has repeated opportunities of 
contributing, according to his situation, more or less towards its perfection; 
and these observations being ultimately collected, a map is sent forth into 
the world, considerably improved indeed, but which, being still defective, 
points out the necessity of something more accurate being undertaken, when 
times and circumstances may favour the design.
345
 
 The Highland fortifications which the Board of Ordnance and the Government had 
invested so much time and money in over the preceding sixty years, fell easily under 
Jacobite sieges during the ’Forty-Five. Fort William alone successfully resisted the rebel 
attack. Fort Augustus, the focal point of the military presence in the Highlands, lasted two 
days of attack before a shell fired from Kiliwhimen (an abandoned Hanoverian barrack) half-
a-mile away hit and detonated the exposed powder magazine.
346
 Before his commission on 
the Duke of Cumberland’s ‘Surveying Scheme’—the ‘Military Survey’—Watson assisted 
General William Skinner, Director of Engineers, with rebuilding the fortifications razed 
during the ’Forty-Five.
347
 Forts in remote parts of the country including Castle Duart, Castle 
Tioram, and Fort Augustus were strengthened. Outworks about the barracks of Inversnaid 
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 TNA CO 325/1, f. 199 verso, 1776; Hugh Debbeig made this comment when proposing a scheme 
for a ‘General Military Survey of the Great Ports and Harbours on the said Coast of America’. 
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new scheme. 
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 Roy 1785, pp. 385–387. 
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 TNA SP 54/29/27, ff. 219–220, a report or information relating to the siege of Fort Augustus, by 
James Hart, a soldier in General Guise’s Regiment, 26 March 1746.  
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 BL Additional Ms. 17499, pp. 130–131: a letter from David Watson to William Skinner, 7 June 
1748, in which he wrote how ‘the Surveying Scheme, […] has given me Infinite Pain’. 
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and Bernera were ‘repair’d with very little cost’ and ‘put to Immediate use’.
348
 The Crown 
purchased the lands about Corgarff and Braemar and the castles remodelled as barracks.
349
 
The Board requested that Skinner travel to Inverness to ‘make a Survey of the old Fort near 
that place called Olivers Fort […] and report to us how far they may Serve towards the 
Rebuilding the same’.
350
 After completing the survey and drawing several plans of the 
remains of Oliver’s Fort and the projected fort, Skinner rejected the site and proposed a new 
fortification—Fort George at Ardersier Point—which took over 23 years to complete, funds 
for the works stopped by the Board in September 1770.
351
 
 The military road system was greatly extended in this period to facilitate the 
increasing mobility of the army. Caulfeild and his engineers were responsible for building 
about 608 miles of roads with another 223 miles in progress. These included the roads from 
Dumbarton to Inveraray, Stirling to Fort William, and Coupar Angus to Fort George at 
Ardersier by way of Braemar and Tomintoul (see Fig 4.1). The engineers, who were 
expected to be ‘thoroughly acquainted with the Country and its several Passes & Rivers’, 
were to ‘every Season make an exact Plan of the Road carried on under their Inspection … 
Which Plan they will give only to the General Officer Comanding [sic] in North Britain & to 
the Board of Ordnance’.
352
 
 By 1770, the forts and many of the roads in Scotland had been thoroughly mapped 
by the engineers and draughtsmen of the Ordnance. These maps formed an archive of 
discrete military landscapes rather than the ‘totalizing knowledge archive’ advocated by 
Enlightenment scholars and by military commanders alike.
353
 Even the ‘Military Survey’ did 
not answer that desirable framework, its representation of space was constructed from 




 John Brewse’s tenure as Chief Engineer in Scotland (1770–1779) coincided with a 
relatively quiet period in both military and mapping terms. The most pressing surveys were 
of fortifications in need of repair due to storm damage.
355
 His successor, Andrew Frazer, 
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faced an altogether different scenario. War with America soon followed by war with France, 
raised concerns for Scotland’s security once again. The engineer’s focus and therefore 
mapping imperatives, shifted from Scotland’s interior to the coast, to the eastern seaboard, 
the Orkney and Shetland Islands, and the Firth of Clyde. Again, the hub of map commissions 
was fortification, this time in the design and construction of coastal gun batteries at Banff, 
Peterhead, Arbroath, Montrose, Dunbar, and Greenock; in the resurrection of the 
seventeenth-century citadel Fort Charlotte at Lerwick in the Shetland Isles; and finally, the 
construction of a Martello Tower at Hackness, Orkney Islands in 1813. Responsibility for 
road construction had already devolved to the Highland Commission for Roads and Bridges. 
Military reports in the early nineteenth century, however, still concerned themselves with 
planning routes for the march of the army through Scotland and with encampments. A report 
‘relative to the Routes by which the Troops may march Southwards from Inverness and Fort 
George’ written by Brigadier General Dirom, Deputy QMG, in 1808, included reference to a 
new map—‘enlarged and considerably improved’—of Scotland.
356
 This map, unfortunately, 
does not appear to have survived. Towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century, inland fortifications were merely maintained. Henry Rudyard’s (Chief 
Engineer of Scotland from 1786) principal task was to recruit troops in Scotland for the Corp 




 This analysis of the timeline for the military mapping of Scotland from 1689 to 1815 
has shown links between map making and political and military imperatives to secure and to 
govern Scotland. The maps not only functioned in Scotland, they functioned in London too. 
They allowed a distant government to visualise and to know parts of Scotland so they could 
impose remotely their social order. The timeline has placed the military mapping of Scotland 
firmly at the centre of Enlightenment scholars’ epistemological framework: to acquire 
geographical knowledge through the practices of reconnaissance and survey and to order the 
data through maps which then became tools in the act of political territorialism. What the 
timeline fails to convey is the proportion of different mapping technologies at each phase of 
Scotland’s changing military landscape and imposition of social order. Before addressing 
this, I first discuss why a particular classification of maps—fortification, movement, and 
battle—have been assigned to this study. 
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 TNA WO 30/61, f. 1 of the report, 14 June 1808; TNA WO 30/61, doc. 22, letter to accompany the 
report, 5 October 1808.  
357
 TNA WO 47/113 and 47/114, 1789. 
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Sub-divisions of military maps 
Brian Harley’s theoretical classification of maps of the American Revolutionary War was 
proposed in chapter two as a suitable methodological model for a way of classifying and 
ordering the substantive archive of maps of Scotland. In the same way as America’s 
Revolutionary maps, Scotland’s military maps can be classified according to their 
contemporary uses rather than to their cartographic or internal characteristics. My review of 
the timeline of cartographic events in Scotland during the eighteenth century necessarily 
brought about some discussion of types of military maps—namely fortification plans, route 
maps, and battle maps—because they reflected the military activities at play at the time. It is 
therefore possible to offer an analytical classification of the military maps of Scotland based 
on the role they played in the period 1689 to 1815. This is offered in figure 4.5. 
   
 
I  N  P  U  T  S 
 
Figure 4.5 An analytical classification of military maps of Scotland  
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The principal realms of eighteenth-century military activity were fortification, 
movement, and battle. At this level, Scotland was no different to other European nations, the 
period of study showing evidence of all three principal military activities and, in the process, 
revealing ‘a cartographic genre which is truly international […] the plans exhibit sufficient 
common traits of technique and design to be logically intelligible in the light of diffusion of 
a basic style by a highly mobile and professional group of map makers’.
358
 Evidence of these 
activities can be shown from three perspectives associated with the cartographic work of the 
Board of Ordnance engineers. First, the forms and attributes of maps associated with a 
particular activity are similar enough to be grouped together. Each of the principal activities 
(fortification, movement, and battle) was characterised by a method of survey, by a form of 
cartographic representation, scale, and use of conventional symbols. Second, these different 
types of map are described in Board of Ordnance minutes and other state documents relating 
to particular events and activities in Scotland. Military engineers were involved in most of if 
not all the activities that had recourse to mapping—fortifying, reconnaissance, intelligence, 
marching, encamping, and battle. Lastly, there is evidence that maps of a similar nature were 
referred to by the Board of Ordnance or an engineer in Scotland when making decisions 
pertaining to specific military actions. The last most strongly conveys both the pragmatic 
nature of these maps—their use in fortification and road construction, for example—and 
their ideological role in helping sustain power relations in Scotland. The ‘inputs’ represent 
recurrent factors that impinged on the making of military maps; some have been addressed in 
chapter three, others are discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 4.6 shows the cartographic proportion for each type of principal military 
activity in Scotland, 1689 to 1815. Copies of maps and plans made substantially later than 
the original compilations, often for training rather than territorial purposes, are not included 
here because they can distort the connection between military activities and mapping.
359
 
Figure 4.7, a series of pie charts, complement figure 4.6 by illustrating the shifting 
proportions of different categories of maps per decade. The nature of the changing 
proportions and quantities of maps is described in more detail with figure 4.8 illustrating the 
chronology of military maps of Scotland.    
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Total = 847 maps including those without a date of compilation 
Figure 4.6 Military maps of Scotland, 1689–1815, by type of principal military activity 
 
 
Fortification cartography dominates the representation of military landscapes. In 
nearly all instances, the maps, plans, and sections relating to fortifications were of value for 
showing large-scale (re)construction works of which there were four main types in Scotland: 
medieval castles, garrison forts, barrack forts, and costal gun-batteries. These cartographic 
representations and associated written commentaries provide comprehensive details of the 
attributes and form consistently associated with these four sub-divisions of fortification 
cartography. In addition, contemporary military treatises support this further sub-division 
with discussions of regular and irregular fortification. Chapter five looks at fortification 
cartography in greater detail and describes the codification of the maps.   
Maps associated with military movement are more diverse in nature and include 
route or road maps, marine charts and surveys of inland waterways, and topographic maps. 
Each of these three categories is a composite of several military activities: reconnaissance, 
intelligence, marching and encamping, and planning and recording military works—roads 
and bridges—in preparation for military action. For so many military activities, maps of 
military movement account for what seems to be a relatively small part of the archive 
considering the degree to which Scotland and, in particular, the Highlands, was an unknown 
territory at the start of the eighteenth century. Their small proportion in the archive is 
possibly due to losses or to their then contemporary distribution that saw them go to military 
commanders rather than to the Board of Ordnance, and to the fact that fewer contemporary 
copies appear to have been made. In design, they are linked more by function than by form. 
The military command and the London government needed smaller-scale maps of parts of  
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Figure 4.7 Shifting categories of military maps per decade 
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Scotland in order to form strategies to move troops quickly and with ease in times of action, 
to police the Highlands and, logistically, to provide munitions and supplies to the various 
garrisons. Chapter six looks at the cartography of military movement and the attributes of 
different types of maps and charts. 
 Battle maps account for the smallest portion of the archive despite the fact that by 
the eighteenth century, they were a well-established cartographic form of military 
narrative.
360
 Cartographers produced images that reflected the ideology of heroic victory. 
This is pertinent to Scotland; relatively few maps were made of the Jacobite victories at the 
Battles of Prestonpans and Falkirk in comparison to the multitude of maps of Culloden, a 
significant Hanoverian victory. Battle maps of Scotland include plans of the order of battle 
and record or memorial maps. The final form of the maps depended on the role they played 
in the military engagement and were often retrospective records of events. Most show formal 
troop dispositions at various stages of a campaign. Chapter seven reviews the surviving 
corpus of maps depicting battles between Hanoverian and Jacobite armies. 
Analysing and classifying cartographic records according to their assumed usage is 
not always straightforward. A modern reading of a map will not always correctly identify 
their original function. Military movement, in particular, is a difficult category to define 
given how disparate some of the material is. Another reading could as easily group coastal 
charts with coastal gun-batteries and route maps depicting an army’s march and their 
encampments with battle plans if a battle was the culmination of the troop movements. 
Chapters five, six, and seven will elaborate upon my rationale for sub-dividing the military 
maps of Scotland as shown in figure 4.5. Whilst recognising that maps could have multiple 
uses even if they were compiled with other intentions, let me here consider the major sub-
divisions of military maps of Scotland in the surviving archive. 
 
Proportional representation 
Changing technologies of European warfare and the Jacobite tendency towards a form of 
guerrilla warfare prompted changing mapping technologies in Scotland—from fortification 
plans to route maps and topographical surveys. There was not, however, a complete shift 
from one technology to another, from representations of static siege and besieging tactics in 
the late seventeenth early eighteenth centuries to more mobile strategies and the 
representation of armies on the move, of encampments and of battles in the mid to late 
eighteenth century. This is illustrated in figure 4.8. This graph shows the number of  
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Figure 4.8 The chronology of military maps of Scotland, from 1689 to 1815 
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manuscript maps compiled annually, from 1685 through 1815,
361
 including contemporary 
copies.
362
 Additionally, the graph shows further sub-division into the principal military 
activities associated with each map.  
 Figure 4.8 shows primarily, the quantitative variation in the annual output of maps 
representing Scotland’s military landscapes. What it does not show are any losses that might 
have occurred between the creation of the material and today’s extant archive. Such losses, if 
quantifiable, would modify the figure, perhaps considerably. I return to this point later in this 
chapter. For now, if figure 4.8 is considered in conjunction with figure 4.7, the shifting 
categories of maps per decade, a way of exploring the temporal variations in cartographic 
practices in Scotland in relation to different military activities is offered. What is 
immediately obvious is that maps concerned with fortification dominate the output for the 
whole period; that route maps appear to be products of exigency rather than a transition to 
more mobile strategies of warfare; and that battle maps were purely products of the event, 
records of the occasion with no demand for a continuing representation.  
 The first substantive period, from 1685 through 1718, records a low, sporadic output 
of maps, principally concerned with fortification. The maps reflect the state’s need to secure 
its medieval defences, to establish an effective military presence, and provision of 
accommodation for the increasing number of troops in the Highlands. The Scottish 
fortifications that were inherited by the Board of Ordnance comprised castles and towers 
which had either ceased to be defensively effective due to their medieval structures—notably 
Fort George at Inverness, and the castles of Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton, Blackness, 
Glengarry, Tioram, Duart, and Eilean Donan—or Cromwellian citadels lying in ruins from 
the 1660 Restoration (see Fig 4.1).
363
 The state had recourse to strengthen existing medieval 
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 1685 rather than 1689 is chosen as the ‘start’ date in order to accommodate John Adair’s county 
maps and coastal charts, manuscript copies of which form part of the Board of Ordnance and King’s 
Topographical collections. 
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 Cromwell’s New Model Army of the 1650s similarly had to counter uprisings by Scottish royalists. 
See Tait, 1965, p. 9: George Monck, first duke of Albemarle (1608–1670), was commander-in-chief 
of all the forces in Scotland between 1654 and 1659. His subjugation included sending troops into the 
Highlands and building imposing citadels at Ayr, Leith, Inverness, Inverlochy, and St. Johnston at 
Perth to be, according to Monck ‘a great deale of benefitt to your highnesse, besides the securitie of 
the place and the advantage wee may have by laying the fewer men there, if any troubles should bee’. 
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fortifications, to put them into a suitable ‘posture of defence’, whether that was a ‘project for 
Fortifying […] to resist an Attack in form with Great Artillery’ or ‘for preventing an 
Insult’.
364
 Route maps produced in 1685–1686 and 1698–1703 refer to John Adair’s charts of 
the eastern seaboard and manuscript copies of his Description of the Sea-Coast and Islands 
of Scotland, printed in 1703. The extent to which these charts were used by the Board of 
Ordnance cannot be ascertained but some carry the Ordnance stamp which either denotes 
their territorial utility or a contemporary training exercise. Terrestrial route maps were 
compiled in 1717–1718 in preparation for the four new barrack forts to be built in the 
Highlands. Engineers John Dumaresq and John Henri Bastide were concerned to gauge the 
communications between them, from Inversnaid on Loch Lomond to Ruthven of Badenoch 
via Loch Tay and Blair Atholl, Kiliwhimen at the southern end of Loch Ness to Fort 
William.
365
 Battle maps in 1715 and 1719 coincide with the battles of Sheriffmuir and 
Glenshiel respectively. 
 The first peak, in 1719, relates to the cartographic works of Andrews Jelfe in his role 
as Director of barrack building in Scotland and his design of the four new barrack forts. The 
second peak heralds Wade’s arrival in Scotland and reflects an attempt to open-up and 
dominate the Highlands on the part of the London Government through road and fortification 
construction. The following years record a low output of cartographic records as construction 
work became the main concern of the military engineers that saw two new garrison forts 
completed, Fort George at Inverness and Fort Augustus in the centre of the Great Glen. 1740 
saw the start of more concerted attempts by the political and military commanders to address 
the adoption of mobile warfare tactics and reflected a need to know Scotland as a whole. 
Initially, topographical maps were compiled but these covered the lowlands and had limited 
extension into the Highlands. This was pertinent to affairs that followed, when the 1745 
Rebellion identified how limited the state’s geographical knowledge of Scotland truly was 
and, in the wake of the Battle of Culloden in 1746, the Military Survey of Scotland was 
commissioned by the Board of Ordnance under a command issued by the Duke of 
Cumberland and a period of substantial fortification reconstruction and road building began. 
 In 1755, many of the engineers in Scotland were called away to review the defences 
of the south coast of England or sent abroad to see action in the Seven Years’ War. In 
Scotland itself, work continued on Fort George at Ardersier producing a ‘paper-trail’ of 
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 TNA WO 55/346, pp. 74–77. ‘In obedience to your Lordships Commands Wee lay before your 
Lordship a particular account of what has been done to the Fortifications in North Britain since 1708 
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plans charting its construction. The small peaks of fortification activity in 1783 and 1785 
relate to Fort Charlotte and the redirection of government defence works, not only from 
terrestrial to coastal but from the subjugation of the nation to its protection and concerted 
efforts to defend against an overseas invasion. The end of the period of study saw a host of 
east coast battery defences erected and improvements in their communications with the 
interior. This period is discussed in chapter 5. 
 In representing discrete military landscapes the engineers of the Board of Ordnance 
reflected the state’s imposition of control and governance on Scotland, less in a desire to 
unite England and Scotland but more to subjugate and impose their social order on the 
nation. In a proposal contained in a manuscript paper on ‘Some Observations concerning the 
Highlands of Scotland’, an anonymous author emphasised ‘the Benefit [which] must arise 
from protecting the Highlands by Regular Troops’ and ‘acquiring a perfect knowledge of the 
Country[:] two very essential Articles, & hitherto little knowen [sic]’.
366
 The ‘Benefit’, in the 
first instance, favoured the government: an improved geographical knowledge of Scotland 
allowed for acts of political territorialism in order to sustain power relations. In the second 
instance, the ‘Benefit’ of improved geographical knowledge aided, in addition to the 
military, also a cultural, legal, and an industrial opening-up of the Highlands. In the next 
section, I consider where gaps may have arisen in this developing geographical knowledge, 
due more to questions of loss than to the rationalisation of mapping projects.   
 
The Board of Ordnance archive: questions of loss 
However we analyse the extant archive of military maps of Scotland—by production, 
reception, application etc.—a recurring issue is the extent to which the current categories and 
proportions of military cartographies—fortification, movement, and battle—were the same 
in the eighteenth century. A re-assembling of the cartographic work of the Board of 
Ordnance, chronologically and geographically, is necessarily only partial due to the losses of 
original material over time. This section considers questions of loss. 
 In ascertaining the survival (rate) of manuscript maps, Board of Ordnance textual 
correlates offer some, although rather general, answers. In rationalising the civilian and 
military offices of the Ordnance and their cartographic practice, some attempt was made to 
log map production and acquisition. The Tower Drawing Room’s ‘Register of Draughts’ 
systematically recorded maps deposited by engineers stationed in divisional outposts, 
including North Britain.
367
 Although not authorised until 1752, many entries relate to records 
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from the first half of the eighteenth century; thereafter, the register was intermittently 
maintained until 1812.
368
 A review of this listing in relation to the current collections 
indicates that maps are now missing but, also, that several surviving maps were never 
recorded. The register logs 152 maps of Scotland between 1708 and 1786 (excluding one 
plan dated 1684 which falls outside the period of research) falling considerably short of the 
940 maps in today’s archive. Even accounting for copies made during training exercises and 
those lodged out with the Office of Ordnance (in a royal library or with the Admiralty), the 
register still fails to account for nearly 30% of the maps.
369
 Coincidently, the register lists an 
additional 32 maps which have not been found, the assumption being that they have not 
survived.  
There is some evidence to suggest that engineers retained the maps rather than 
lodged them with the Office of Ordnance. A recognised practice, especially in France 
amongst the Quarter-Master Generals, was to take possession of a predecessor’s maps when 
they took over command. Such practice indicated a continuity of service as well as the fact 
that papers were not considered the personal possessions of the officeholder.
370
 The latter 
consideration was certainly the opinion of the Board of Ordnance, who, on several occasions 
demanded the return of maps and plans. In 1758, for example, the Board ordered ‘that all the 
Books, Papers, Plans and Draughts in the possession of Mr Dugal Campbell deceased either 
as Clerk of the Works or as Engineer be demanded of his Executors’.
371
 John Adair’s son 
was sent a letter to ‘acquaint him the Board are informed that the Surveys of Scotland are in 
his possession, that the said Surveys being the property of the Crown and Ordered to be 
lodged in the Office of Ordnance, he is desired to deliver the same to the Board’.
372
 In 1771, 
Skinner presented ‘to the Board a Book containing Plans, Sections, and Elevations of the 
Works and Buildings of Fort George in North Britain’ which was logged in the ‘Office 
Records’.
373
 This is accounted for in the ‘Register’: folio 17, entry 59 ‘Book of Plans 





Additionally, Skinner collected a considerable number of maps and plans that were either 
compiled by him or were drawn by other engineers and draughtsmen including David 
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Watson, Charles Tarrant, and Paul Sandby to name but a few. These eventually descended to 




Military map making was one way for officers to be noticed and so obtain 
promotion.
376
 In 1755, for example, Tarrant obtained a commission as a Practitioner 
Engineer and, in 1759, was promoted to Sub Engineer and made a Lieutenant.
377
 Eighteenth-
century Britain’s preoccupation with social connection and patronage must allow us to 
assume that Skinner, with his colonelcy and influential position as Chief Engineer, assisted 
Tarrant in his commission and promotion. It may be that some of Tarrant’s maps found in 
Skinner’s personal collection were presented to him—copied by Tarrant as a form of 
dedication rather than as working documents. Thomas Sandby was similarly fortuitous in his 
patron—William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland. Cumberland’s appreciation of 
landscape art and his status as an amateur antiquarian was well known and reflected in his 
collections of Scottish landscapes by Paul and Thomas Sandby, views of Scottish castles by 
John Elphinstone, and his acquisition of a series of plans of Roman antiquities in Britain by 
William Roy.
378
 Although many descended into the King’s Topographical Collection and 
others remain in the Royal Collection at Windsor to be accounted for in the modern archive, 
these examples suggest that similar instances of patronage mean that military maps of 
Scotland remain in private collections. My research explored some of the obvious possible 
sources of these, such as the Goodwood Estate for the Duke of Richmond’s papers, the 
Townshend papers, and the Duke of Buccleuch, but I found no military maps of eighteenth-
century Scotland.    
Reports written by engineers and military commanders and minutes relating to 
Ordnance business make reference to maps for which no maps have been found. Lt General 
Vyse when reporting on the security of the east coast of Scotland in 1803, for example, 
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provided the Lord Advocate with two enclosures: the first, a sketch of the coast from 
Edinburgh to Dunglass ‘made out for your information’; the second, a copy of a report from 
Captain Evatt relating to his survey of the coast.
379
 There is no evidence of the sketch in the 
surviving archive. In 1808, a report ‘relative to the Routes by which Troops may march 
Southwards from Inverness and Fort George’ was written by Brigadier General Dirom, 
Deputy Quarter Master General in North Britain.
380
 With the report was a map—‘enlarged 
and considerably improved by Major Johnston [Assistant QMG], who has taken great pains 
to make it correct and satisfactory’.
381
 This has not been traced. 
The archive holds no plans or sections of bridges, yet at least 40 were built during 
Wade’s command and many more under the direction of Caulfeild.
382
 Roads, similarly, are 
relatively minimally represented. Caulfeild was responsible for overseeing over 600 miles of 
road construction. In 1766, for example, he co-ordinated the repair of  
the Road from Dumblain to Crief, thence by Tay Bridge to Dalnacardock, 
and by Blair of Atholl to Dunkield ninety three miles by Detachments from 
His Majesty’s Fifth Regiment of Foot; and from Fort William to Fort 
Augustus and Inverness and over the Coryarick to Garvamore and 
Dalnacardock One hundred and twenty two Miles by a Detachment from the 
12
th
 Regiment, and from Inverness by Ruthven to Dalwhinny 55 Miles by a 




Between 1740 and 1767, only twenty road maps survive despite his orders to keep a 
cartographic record of every season’s construction progress. Perhaps this simply proves that 
roads under repair were not mapped, although this infers a different practice to that applied 
to fortification. Alternatively, it may hint at a variable survival rate of maps since, as 
working documents, many would have been exposed to the elements during the buildings of 
forts and roads. In the next section, I look at the methods by which geographical knowledge 
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Methods of Survey 
The methods of obtaining and recording geographical knowledge—maps and written 
descriptions—varied slightly for each of the sub-divisions of military cartography, of 
fortification, movement, and battle. Each method was united, however, by the military 
engineers and their use of mathematics coupled with a sense of design and skill in drawing. 
In fortification, for example, geometry and arithmetic were needed to calculate proportions, 
quantities and costs, and design and drawing for providing plans, elevations and bird’s-eye 
views of the landscape.
384
 Together, their practical application combined methods of survey 
and compilation to produce scaled representations of geographical reality. Paul Sandby’s 
representation of Dumbarton Castle (see Fig 4.9), for example, combined a plan of the rocky, 
undulating citadel, and two topographical views on one sheet.
385
 Placed adjacent in this way, 
they provided a multiple perspective on the form and situation of the castle. The views 
provided information on the features less readily discernible from the plan above, 
particularly relief which, although indicated by Sandby’s characteristic shading and hachured 
style, failed to show relative heights. Surveyors and draughtsmen were therefore dependent 
on instruments to measure vertical heights and angular distances between features to provide 
accurate representations of military landscapes. In its construction, a map was, therefore, 
understood to be both mathematical and pictorial. 
Vision was (and still is) a privileged means of knowing the world to be mapped—‘to break 
ground’ thus forming ‘the eye to the knowledge of it’—but a demand for greater accuracy 
and objectivity in land surveying and mapping gave rise to a gradual shift towards the 
consistent use of measuring instruments to extend the scope of the human eye.
386
 
Requisitions for surveying instruments became progressively more common after 1750. In 
1758, for example, Colonel John Henri Bastide ordered ‘three Pocket Surveying Compasses 
with Sights and Staffs’ from George Adams, mathematical instrument maker to the Office of 
Ordnance.
387
 In 1764, Captain Hugh Debbeig ‘transmitted to the Board a Demand of 
Mathematical Instruments’ that included ‘a Theodolite compleat [sic] with a Spirit Level of 
10 Inches, A Protractor, A Scale of equal parts fitted as a Beam compass, two plain Tables 
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Figure 4.9 ‘Plan of the Castle of Dunbarton’, by [Paul Sandby], c.1747. MS 1649 Z.03/57  
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
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By the second half of the eighteenth century, technologies in instrument making had 
progressed significantly.
389
 The accuracy of angular measurements under field conditions 
became increasingly refined, encouraged by the demands of the surveyors, military and civil, 
and by patronage of the sciences which allowed for experimentation and testing of 
‘precision’ instruments.
390
 In 1769, for example, William Skinner and Allen Pollock, 
respectively Chief Engineer in Scotland and Professor of Fortifications and Mathematics at 
the Royal Military Academy,
391
 were involved in testing an ‘Instrument for taking Heights 
and distances’ invented by ‘Mr Page late a Gentleman Cadet’. After testing the instrument on 
Blackheath, Skinner reported to the Board that ‘it will answer the purposes he proposes to an 
exactness sufficient for any occasion in the field’.
392
  
   
Fortification surveys 
On the maps themselves, references to techniques of surveying and any practical application 
of instrumentation are rare and are equally scarce in the related correspondence between the 
engineers and the Board of Ordnance. For Harley, ‘the sparseness […] does not mean that 
the methods employed were especially esoteric: it could equally mean they were sufficiently 
commonplace to make their repetition in standard accounts, or on the face of every plan, 
largely superfluous’.
393
 Skinner’s report to the Board when ordered to ‘repair to Inverness 
with speed’ to ‘make a Survey of the old Fort near that place called Olivers Fort’, offers one 
of the very few allusions to methods of survey. On reaching Inverness, Skinner advised the 
Board that ‘As soon as the Weather permitts [sic], [I shall] begin a Survey of the old 
                                                 
388
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Remains […] in order to make my designe’s and shall Employ a few men to pen the angles 
that I may fix its present Situation, and try if any of the Remains of its former Foundations 
are to be traced’.
394
 Figure 4.10 is the outcome of Skinner’s surveying endeavours: a plan 
showing the remains of Oliver’s Fort. 
   
 
 
Figure 4.10 Olivers Fort from William Skinner’s ‘Plan of Inverness and Olivers Fort, with the 
Ground Adjacent. No.1.’, 1747. Maps K.Top.50.9.b. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
 
Surveying methods were described in detail in military treatises printed and 
distributed from the beginning of the eighteenth century. The purpose of such instructional 
texts was to standardise the working methods of the military engineers and, in the process, to 
establish rules of graphic design with the aim of obtaining a uniform representation, at 
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different scales, of the state’s military territories.
395
 They described the instruments and 
techniques to be adopted by the engineers engaged in surveying, provided instruction for the 
most useful scales, forms of representation, and colours to be applied when preparing plans 
and, overall, prescribed the codification of military mapping, one that would ‘avoid’, for 
example, ‘the confusion that haphazardly colouring plans with all sorts of colours could 
cause’.
396
 As theoretical texts, they were highly valued, and an understanding of their 
principles was a prerequisite for a prospective Ordnance engineer, one who was to be 
engaged, for example, in the practical part of fortification: 
 William Bontein having Signified by letter […] That in 1744 he applied 
to the late Master General to be a Cadet but there being no Vacancy, with 
his Graces approbation he went to Enfield where he had gone through a 
regular course of the Mathematics, The Theory of Gunnery & constructed 
M: Vauban’s different methods and read several other Books of Fortification 
and learnt the military Exercises to fit him for the Ordnance Service.
397
 
Successive professors of fortification and artillery at the Royal Military Academy 
wrote treatises on fortification that outlined to varying extents the procedures of surveying 
and drawing plans.
398
 Muller and Landmann provided instruction for ‘tracing the plans and 
profiles of a fortification on paper, with scales and compasses’ and students were given 
exercises in copying ’68 Plates’ of large-scale ‘Plans, Sections, and Geometrical Elevations’ 
contained in Landmann’s Course of Fortification.
399
 To follow, the students were instructed 
on how to implement the practical element of engineering by ‘forming a project of a 
fortification, according to the nature of the ground, […] to trace it on the ground, […] 
together with all the military buildings, such as magazines, storehouses, bridges, etc.’ using 
either a plane table or theodolite.
400
 A plane table was easier to use but in practice less 
precise: 
When a plain table is used, the plan must be drawn on a large scale, at least 
of 30 fathoms to an inch, which is fastened with sealing wax to the table, so 
as to lay quite smooth and even; then by means of a ruler with sights, the 
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angles are laid down on the ground, and the lengths of the lines measured by 
a chain and rod: But when the theodolite is used, the lines and angles must 





Topographical and route surveys 
Some of the most detailed methodologies of surveying in eighteenth-century Scotland come 
from documents relating to the ‘Military Survey’ (1747–1755). Engineers adopted a similar 
method for both route and topographical surveys: that of measured traverses with distances 
and direction recorded and then mapped. The Survey, although carried out at a time of 
relative peace in Scotland, was the work of rapid reconnaissance rather than a thoroughly 
measured topographical survey.
402
 Its production combined scientific measurement and 
aesthetic portrayal, a definitive feature of Enlightenment mapping.
403
 As with route surveys, 
the surveyors worked along sets of traverses using theodolites and chains. The theodolites 
were fairly simple (see Fig 4.11): a graduated circle of seven inches in diameter with a 
magnetic ‘needle box’ and alidade for measuring angles, made by Benjamin Cole. The iron 
chains for measuring distance were 45 or 50 feet.
404
 With these ‘common’ instruments, ‘the 
courses of all rivers and numerous streams were followed and measured; also all the roads 
and the many lakes of salt-water and fresh’.
405
 Other points were fixed by the intersections of 
bearings taken from traverse stations, and the remaining landscape features—towns and 
settlements, enclosures and woodland, and relief—were sketched in by eye.  
 Regiments under General Churchill’s command were to provide men to assist David 
Watson, Quarter-Master General to the army in Scotland, and his assistant engineers in 
carrying out the Military Survey.
406
 In an interview with the map maker Aaron Arrowsmith,  
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Figure 4.12 Part of a watercolour of a surveying party at the eastern end of Loch Rannoch, by Paul 
Sandby, 1749. Maps K.Top.50.83.2. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
 
David Dundas recalled how the surveying personnel were placed in groups, in which ‘each 
Surveyor was attended by a non Commissioned Officer and 6 Soldiers as assistants; One 
carried the Instrument; Two measured with the Chain; Two for the fore, and back stations; 
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[and] One as Batman’.
408
 Each group surveyed its ‘allotted portion’ of the country, with 
William Roy, Deputy Quarter-Master General, being ‘the principal Distributor of the 
whole’.
409
 Figure 4.12 shows a contemporary sketch by Paul Sandby of a surveying party at 
work at the eastern end of Loch Rannoch. Surveying took place during the summer months. 
In the autumn, the surveyors returned to the Ordnance Drawing Room in Edinburgh Castle 
and, through the winter, the separate traverses were collated into a single map, known as the 
‘original protraction’. 
Watson defined which landscape features were to be recorded in a military survey, 
the specifications clearly intended to provide in map form the essential information required 
by armed patrols sent out into the Highlands. In a set of ‘Orders and Instructions to be 
Observed by [his] Assistants, in Reconnaitring [sic], Examining, Describing, Representing 
and Reporting, any Country, District, or particular Spot of Ground’, Watson focused on 
military functionality from the outset.
410
 He explained that:  
As the Encampments, Marches, and every possible movement proper for an 
Army to make in the Field, entirely depend on a just and thorough 
knowledge of the Country, the greatest care & Exactness should be observed 
in Examining minutely the Face of that Country.  
It was important for a surveyor to record, for example, the land use and the nature of 
the terrain, whether it was impassable or capable of being traversed by foot or by horse; to be 
exact in describing the location and size of settlements; to mark all rivers and lakes, where 
they could be forded, how high the banks were, as ‘the nature of any River or water […] are 
allways [sic] of the greatest Consequence to Troops in Time of Service’; and to show hills or 
high ground. Watson explicitly instructed that the state of the roads, their widths and 
distances between destinations, should be recorded. An engineer was: 
Carefully to follow the Line of the principal Roads in their several 
Boundarys and Turnings, marking the Breadth, and at every half miles 
distance minutely expressing every Variation or change that happens in the 
Road, if narrow, hollow, the Depth of the hollow, broken an[d] impassible, 
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leading through or near any wood or cover, and how far it may continue 






Figure 4.13 Part of a copy of a ‘Survey of Part of the Road from Sterling to Fort William; Made by 
the Party of Genl. Pultneys Regiment in 1749’—‘Eight Miles and Forty Five Yards’—surveyed and 
drawn by George Morrison in 1749. MS 1649 Z.03/39b (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of 
the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Almost identical methods were used for route surveys and resulted in ‘long and thin’ 
images (see Fig 4.13). In his ‘Appendix containing practical observations on Surveying’, 
Roy provided explicit instructions for completing a survey of roads. In the first instance, 
                                                 
411
 TNA WO 30/115, pp. 199–204.   
 106 
three rather than six men were assigned to an engineer: two to work the chain, the third to 
carry the theodolite between stations where he was to ‘plant the instrument Horizontally so 
that the plummet hanging from the Center [sic] of the Instrument may be exactly over the 
hole where the Stick stood’. If placed correctly, this would save time for the engineer ‘as he 
then would have nothing to do when he got to the station but to make his observation’. 
‘Station Sticks’ were cut from hedges and were 5 or 6 feet long, as straight as possible. The 
bark was scraped off about a foot from the ground to allow the engineer to read the bottom 
of the stick and take observations. Roy advised that the sticks be labelled—‘Surveying the 
Roads’—to prevent people from removing them, not realising their purpose. The chain was 
checked every morning and any kinks removed. It was also important to ‘very carefully 
measure the Chain […] with the ten foot Rod laid out in a Right Line on the Ground’. The 
chain was firmly fixed at either end with 10 or 12 inch ‘Screwers’. It was left to the three 
attendees to align and fix the chains while the engineer made notes in his field book.
412
 
 Watson’s instructions advised that ‘In Reconnoitring to avoid ever trusting any to 
the memory, but constantly to sketch and mark Memorandums’.
413
 Dundas explained that 
each surveyor on the Military survey had kept a field- and sketchbook: ‘in the first he noted 
the angles and measurement of his Stations and the Intersections made from each, with 
observations. In the second […] he delineated his Stations and the face of the Country on 
each side’.
414
 Roy recommended the surveyors start on the last page of the notebook, at the 
bottom of the page and to work upwards ‘by which means your Book always runs as you go 
on in the Survey’ (see Fig 4.14).
415
 
 By 1785, instructions for carrying out small-scale topographic surveys were more 
prevalent, based on the technique of triangulation with the surveyor making use of a standard 
chain and theodolite to create a series of triangles using trigonometrical computations.
416
 Roy 
advocated that a distance of ‘not less than a [British] mile or a mile and a half’ was measured 
using a standard chain (45 or 50 feet), from which, using a ‘large theodelet [sic]’, a third 
point visible from both ends of the base line could be sited and distances measured using 
trigonometry. This process was repeated across the ground to be mapped, producing a series 
of triangles within which the ‘filling in […] the interior part of the great triangles […] may 
generally be taken by the eye’ and sketched in.
417
 By the time such instructions were 
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circulating, little if any topographical mapping of Scotland was underway, the engineers’ 
attention having turned back to fortification surveys with the advent of the American and 
French wars.  
   
 
 
Figure 4.14 An example of a surveyor’s Field Book, by William Roy, 1785. 
WO 30/115 [B] (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 
Coastal surveys 
Few detailed methods of coastal surveying are recounted in the Board of Ordnance minutes 
or state documents of the time. As with terrestrial surveys, the assumption was that the 
surveyor would already know what he was doing and so there was little need to provide 
methodological details. A ‘Survey of the Shoars [sic] & Bays on both sides of the Frith of 
Forth in North Brittain’ taken in 1714 does, however, provide some information on the 




 The surveyors measured the coastline in similar fashion to taking a route or 
linear survey, by chaining and using a sea compass to take the bearings of all the headlands 
and to determine their exact latitude. They noted ‘the severall [sic] heads, Bays, harbours, 
Rocks, & Depths of Water’ and ‘more particularly sett [them] down in a Mapp’.
419
 
Navigational hazards—submerged rocks and shoals—were vitally important to include. 
William Roy recommended that ‘Particular Sea Ports of Consequence […] will require a 
scale of about six Inches to a mile’ when mapped.
420
 In 1813, for example, Lt. Philip Skene 
of the Royal Engineers surveyed and compiled a detailed plan of the coastline of Long Hope 
Sound with soundings and rock outcrops and showing the position of the Martello Tower 
Battery at Hackness, Orkney, and two smaller towers with their gun ranges (see fig 4.15). 
   
 
 
Figure 4.15 ‘Plan of Long Hope Sound’, by Philip Skene, 1813. Scale 1: 10,560.  
MPH 1/620/12 (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 
Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, hydrographical surveying in Britain 
advanced in step with the improvement in land survey techniques. Triangulation replaced 
coastal traverses. A base was measured along the shore line and then the positions of the 
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headlands, rocks, soundings, etc. fixed by intersection; a protracted but accurate method, 
often supplemented by soundings. This technique was first employed and subsequently 
described in detail by Murdoch Mackenzie senior who began his survey of the Orkney 
Islands in 1742. After the publication of eight maps of the Orkneys and Lewis Islands, 






Battle maps and plans were probably the least scientific and most artistic cartographic 
depictions completed by the military engineers in eighteenth-century Scotland. Only plans of 
the ‘order of battle’ would have been drawn and used in the field of battle (although these 
not always). They were, generally, simple schematic drawings to show the relative positions 
of the military units, lacking topographical detail and scale, and were more often drawn by 
staff officers than by military engineers.
422
 Artistic portrayals of battles were essentially 
drawn as a commemoration of the event and were neat composites of sketches made by an 
eye-witness rather than instrumental surveys of a battlefield. Thomas Sandby entered the 
Drawing Room in 1743 and was already considered ‘a competent topographical draughtsman 
with a special bent for perspective’ by the time he joined the Duke of Cumberland’s staff in 
April 1746, in time for the Battle of Culloden.
423
 Sandby drew a plan and a sketch of the 
battle after the event, possibly with an eye to future publication.
424
 Both images portray a 
snapshot of the battle: the topography of the battlefield, the strategic positioning of the 
military units, and an impression of Hanoverian military discipline. The sketch was a more 
painterly depiction than the plan, but the plan provided a fuller geographical narrative by 
including textual information on the positioning and command of the Hanoverian Army, the 
composition of the Jacobite Army, and the number of wounded or dead from each (see fig 
4.16).  
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Figure 4.16 ‘Plan of the Battle of Culloden 16th April 1746’, by Thomas Sandby, drawn at Inverness 
on 23 April 1746. 17177 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
 
 
The Contemporary Circulation of Military Map Compilations 
In Scotland, military surveys were mostly carried out in the summer, between April and 
October, although fortification surveys could continue all year round. Major Caulfeild, 
director of road-building between 1740 and 1767, for example, caused the engineers to make 
‘an exact Plan of the Road carried on under their Inspection’ at the end of the road-building 
season which was slightly shorter, May–September.
425
 Skinner, however, was surveying 
Oliver’s Fort near Inverness between January and May 1747.
426
 Although many of the maps 
must have been compiled at various fortifications where engineers were stationed, or in 
lodgings around Scotland, as well as in the Drawing Room at the Tower of London, a 
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Drawing Room was also established at Edinburgh Castle.
427
 When and where it was 
established is unknown. It may even have been set up—informally—as early as 1671 when 
John Slezer was commissioned as Chief Engineer of Scotland.
428
 An Ordnance Drawing 
Room at Edinburgh Castle was certainly in commission by 1750 when surveyors on the 
Military Survey of Scotland returned every winter to collate their field notes and sketches 
and assist in the drawing of the original protractions.
429
 Tabraham has speculated that the 
room was located in the storekeeper’s pavilion attached to the governor’s house, built below 
Foog’s Gate in 1742. In 1811, the pavilion was converted into a new Ordnance Office which 
hints at its former part-use.
430
 Another temporary Drawing Room may have been established 
at Fort George, Ardersier, whilst it was being built. The annual abstract of works in North 
Britain and their associated costs included, for Fort George, an account ‘Reserved for 
Engineers Travelling &c Overseers Pay and Stationary [sic]’.
431
  
 One of the principal tasks of a draughtsman was to make copies of maps to be 
distributed to military and political commanders. Charles Tarrant, for example, was 
recommended by Desmaretz (senior draughtsman at the Tower Drawing Room) as ‘a proper 
person’ to fulfil the Director of Engineers for North Britain, William Skinner’s request for a 
‘Person to Assist him in Copying Plans and helping in several Surveys that are or may be 
wanted in Scotland’.
432
 Tarrant was engaged to compile original plans as well as to copy 
plans of other Scottish fortifications at the behest of Skinner: ‘I desire you will tell Mr 
Tarrant, I expect the plans and profils [sic] I order’d him of Edinburgh &c are all finish’d, 
likewise those left him to Copy as he has had Six Months to do them in’.
433
  
 Figure 4.17 is an attempt to generalise some of the stages and stemma in the 
compilation and contemporary circulation of multiple copies of military maps of eighteenth-
century Scotland. The whole stems from an original field survey during which notes and 
sketches were made. These geographical descriptions were collated either into a rough draft 
or, if the field sketches were competent enough, a fair copy. Finished copies were thereafter 
made, the original remaining with the engineer or sent to the Chief Engineer of Scotland. In 
most instances, copies were identical to the original if one allows for differences in the 
draughtsmen’s styles. Sometimes only part of the original plan was copied and then the 
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Figure 4.17 Stemma demonstrating the cartographic stages of military maps and their contemporary 
circulation. Pecked lines indicate exceptions to the rule. 
 
content modified. Maps of Corgarff Castle, for example, include plans and elevations of the 
‘Old’ layout alongside plans and elevations of its repair in 1749. The ‘old’ representations 
were probably copied from earlier plans showing the castle in 1748 ‘as it stands at 
present’.
434
 Such plans were variously circulated, but one of the recipients was the overseer 
in charge of the repairs at the fort or the artificers employed on the works.   
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 NLS MS.1649 Z.03/37d ‘Old plan of Corgarff Castle and repairs’, 1749; MS 1649 Z.03/37b Plan 
of Corgarff Castle as it stands at present, by David Watson, 1748. 
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Although copying maps and their subsequent circulation was a common event in the 
genealogy of military maps, both were strictly controlled. When Tarrant was given 
permission in 1765 to copy plans of Portsmouth, Tilbury, Sheerness Fort, Landguard Fort, 
Purfleet, Fort George and Edinburgh Castle, he was to make the copies in the Tower 
Drawing Room and warned that ‘they must not be taken from thence’.
435
 Caulfeild instructed 
the engineers surveying the roads to submit their completed plans ‘only to the General 
Officer Comanding [sic] in North Britain & to the Board of Ordnance’.
436
 Other plans were 
included in official reports sent to the Board of Ordnance. The Board, for any given event, 
reviewed all the plans and associated costs and was ultimately responsible for deciding 
whether a defence project should be proceeded with or not. David Watson, for example, sent 
plans either to Skinner as Chief Engineer or directly to the Board.
437
 Such explicit practice 
concerning the circulation of military maps reflected the territorial imperatives of the state. 
The maps were state secrets for the eyes of governing authorities alone; they were not 
concerned with communicating information of general interest to a civilian population. Only 
on very rare occasions were military maps of Scotland published. Of the few that were 
engraved and printed, almost all were maps of battles and were published to meet the 
public’s demands for cartographical journalism and news of heroic victories. Such maps 
reflected the ideology of conquest and were able to serve propagandistic purposes.
438
 
In the early 1750s, Tarrant produced a suite of plans of Scottish fortresses, drawn 
using Indian Ink and colour washes. Two sets of these plans have survived. The first appear 
in a presentation volume (the recipient not identified).
439
 It was common practice in the early 
modern period to dedicate maps of military and political importance to a monarch or military 
elite. Figure 4.18 is an elaborate frontispiece to several views of Glamis Castle drawn by 
John Elphinstone in 1746 and dedicated to the Duke of Cumberland. A significant part of 
George III’s geographical collection was received through presentations deemed appropriate 
acquisitions for a ruler’s working library. Maps were highly valued aesthetic artefacts but 
they also reflected the king’s interest in military topography. As a future king, George had  
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Figure 4.18 Frontispiece: ‘To His Royal Highness Prince William Duke of Cumberland &c. &c. The 
Drawings of the Castle of Glammiss [Glamis] &c. are humbly Dedicated By His Royal Highness's 
most obedient & most dutiful Humble Servant John Elphinstone, P. Engineer’, 1746. In the 
background, a battle is being fought [Culloden?] and to the right of the Duke’s portrait, two Highland 
noblemen beseech him. Maps K.Top.49.23.a.1. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
 
been trained in military fortification and architectural drawing, and his enduring interest in 
these areas was noted by a contemporary in about 1770: ‘topography is one of the King’s 
favourite studies: he copies every capital chart, takes models of all celebrated fortifications, 
knows the soundings of the chief harbours in Europe and the strong and weak sides of most 
of the fortified towns’.
440
 Tarrant’s plans are held in a gilt-tooled binding with silver clasps. 
Sixteen relate to Scotland. The remainder are depictions of forts in Great Britain and its 
dependencies—the British Channel, the Mediterranean, and North America—with notes of 
their establishments and armouries. Although unsigned, they can be attributed to Tarrant 
from their characteristic style. The second set of plans is encased in a plain binding that 
appears to be a reference copy for a cadet in the Drawing Room.
441
 Unlike the ‘presentation’ 
copy, all these plans are either signed or initialled by Tarrant. They may result from a 
training exercise that included reducing existing plans. 
Despite the fact that copies of maps were dispersed during the eighteenth century 
and again in their subsequent movement in and between archival collections, these 
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manuscript military maps are united in their source and their interdependent use. That use 
was, to varying degrees and at varying times, pragmatic, pedagogic, aesthetic, decisive and 
directive. And in all, copies permitted geographical information to be transmitted through 




The extant archive of Board of Ordnance maps and plans of Scotland, c.1689–1815, provides 
a vital record for the interrogation of military cartography in Scotland. Engineers were 
commissioned by the Board of Ordnance to map and report on Scotland’s military landscape, 
the precise aim of the maps being to provide data useful in defence and attack, and to 
represent territorial features that might be of political and military importance.  
 This chapter has analysed the surviving map archive and, using Harley’s 1978 
methodological model, has offered some statistical generalisations about the numbers and 
diversity of military maps. The archive has shown that, as with many European states at this 
time, the principal realms of military activity were fortification, movement, and battle. Of the 
940 surviving cartographic records of Scotland’s eighteenth-century military activities, 73% 
are maps, plans, section, elevations, and views of fortifications; 22% are concerned with 
planning or carrying out acts of military movement; and 5% record battlefield events.  
 Rather than deal with numbers alone, we need to remember the political reasons for 
the state commissioning maps in the first place. The proportions provided above, for any one 
time and in any one space, varied. At a particular time and in a particular space, the military 
and political concerns of the state determined the military activity and therefore its 
representation. I have shown, for example, that initial imperatives at the end of the 
seventeenth century were directed towards repairing the medieval castles at Edinburgh, 
Stirling, Inverness, Blackness, and Dumbarton, and for establishing a garrison in the 
Highlands, at Fort William, in order to overawe the populace. Following continued acts of 
dissent in the wake of the 1715 and 1719 uprisings, which were themselves cartographically 
depicted, George Wade’s assessment of affairs in Scotland identified the need for more 
mobile strategies of warfare. From the mid-1720s, military mapping practices in Scotland no 
longer looked solely at fortification. Instead, surveys were made and maps compiled to 
connect the forts one with the other by means of roads and by making use of Scotland’s 
many inland waterways and extensive coastline for troop movements and for distributing 
stores.  
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 Fortification cartography continued, however, to dominate military mapping 
practices throughout the eighteenth century. First, cartographic concerns were concentrated 
in Scotland’s interior and then, when the threat to British hegemony was greater from outside 
the country, engineers were redirected to the coast, the eastern seaboard especially. Although 
these imperatives sustained fortification cartography, they also prompted cartographies of 
military movement. The nation’s defence depended on the quick movement of troops and 
this required roads suitable for man and machinery to use for access to remote parts of 
Scotland. Maps were drawn to plan routes and to record the conceptual spread of military 
access. Events during and just after the 1745 Rebellion, however, emphasised the discrete 
nature, until this time, of the military mapping of Scotland. Military commanders in Scotland 
found they lacked maps at appropriate scales to plan the campaign of ’Forty-Five. In its 
wake, the first military survey of Scotland was made in an attempt to open-up the nation to 
military and political polities. Despite the Military Survey never fulfilling its intended role, 
its conception and the other military maps of Scotland signified to acts of political 
territorialism on the part of the British government. The maps represented key symbols of 
military interest: forts and castles represented defence against attack; distances marked on 
roads indicated troop movements; barracks, housing for troops posted for defence, attack, or 
subjugation.  
            In the process of surveying and mapping Scotland, this chapter has shown how the 
engineers did more than just record the landscape: they also changed the Scottish landscape. 
Through the various mathematical and technological practices of surveying, the engineers 
produced ‘blueprints’ from which they reconstructed and restored medieval fortresses, 
designed and constructed new fortifications, and planned and built roads and bridges. In this 
sense, the government of Scotland can be considered to be associated with the geometrical 
organisation of space. Mapping by state engineers made these maps of Scotland 
indispensable tools in the acquisition of national knowledge, in the formulation of military 
policy, and in the processes of military control, administration and development.  
 Military engineering and its cartographic representation for political authority and 
military domination can best be examined in the next three chapters which consider 
fortification, movement, and battle. In each of these realms of military activity, the state’s 
use of engineers to observe, to measure, and to map the military landscape was a way of 







Fortification Cartography: the Art of Design  
 
Fortification, or Military Architecture, is an Art, which teaches Men to 
fortifie [sic] themselves with Ramparts, Parapets, Moats, Covert Ways and 
Glacis’s, to the end the Enemy may not be able to attack any part without 
great loss of his Men; and that the small Number of Soldiers which defend 




The main skill then in all Military Architecture is fitting a Design to the 
Situation, with regard also to all such works as may be already built and that 
the Stronge [sic] part be made to oppose where there is most danger, else a 





Changes in the nature of warfare in early modern Europe, in particular revolutionary 
developments in attack strategy, saw a corresponding revolution in the design of 
fortifications.
444
 In Scotland, the impact of the evolution of gunpowder artillery and the use 
of mines led to a transformation in the architecture of defensive structures: in the 
strengthening of medieval castles, in the construction of bastioned fortresses, citadels and 
‘barrack forts’, and in the development of deeper defences extending into open country. 
Military engineers at work in eighteenth-century Scotland quickly learnt to mould what they 
borrowed from continental European conceptions to their own requirements in re-shaping 
and in representing the nation’s fortresses. The construction of new fortifications and the 
restoration of old ones required accurately surveyed topographical site plans. The result is 




Designs for forts, fortifications, barracks and buildings rationalised the ways in 
which works were both conceived and put into practice.
446
 Rationalisation occurred at three 
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different levels. The first was that of training: through instruction in the military sciences, 
including practices associated with cartography, taught at the Royal Military Academy. Not 
all the engineers who saw service in Scotland received formal training, particularly before 
the Academy was established in 1741. John Romer, for example, learnt the skills of an 
engineer from his father—Wolfgang William Romer—a Dutch military engineer who served 
under William, prince of Orange, and accompanied him to England in 1688. Wolfgang 
Romer was overseer of the works at Albany, New York, and Portsmouth, where he was 
assisted by his son. In 1710, John Romer served in Ireland then, from 1715, he was engineer 
at Sheerness, Tilbury, Gravesend, and Portsmouth before being posted to Scotland in 
1720.
447




The second level of rationalisation was concerned with the practical part of 
fortification: the construction of works, from conception of the architectural form to the 
realisation of building, and the quantities and costs of materials. By the eighteenth century, 
the planning and cartographic recording of fortifications was an established practice, in 
Europe especially, with designs of forts conforming to one of several regular shapes—such 
as the star, triangle, or square—or in the case of Scotland, irregular to account for variations 
in the local topography. George Wade, when considering the site for a new fort at Inverness 
in 1727, chose a hill ‘on the South-side of the River Ness, near the place where it falls into 
the East Sea’. The topography caused the new Fort George to be ‘irregular as are all the 
other Castles and Forts in Scotland, which are generally built upon Eminences incapable by 
their situation to admit of regular Works’ (see Fig 5.1).
449
  
The third level was the territory. Through surveys made using standard eighteenth-
century instruments—including the plane table and alidade, theodolite, compass, and 
chain—and designs executed at relatively large fortification scales, an engineer structured 
space. Coincidentally, he represented the territorial imperatives of the British state. For 
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Figure 5.1 Part of ‘A plan of part of the town of Inverness with a project for Barracks on Castle Hill 
Secured with lines of Defence’, by John Lambertus Romer [and George Wade], 1728, showing the 
irregularly-shaped Fort George (south is to the top of the sheet). Acc.10497 Wade.58j (Reproduced by 
permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). 
 
Mukerji, ‘The intelligence of engineering is not just pragmatic, but also deeply invested in 
social, legal, and moral conceptions of power’.
450
 State-sponsored mapping was understood 
as a legitimate tool of government. 
This chapter examines the second and third levels of rationalisation: the drawing-up 
of fortification plans, construction, and the territory. I explore the use of maps in the service 
of the government, emphasising the utility of cartography in state building projects and its 
use of the geometrical foundations of military architecture to measure and structure space.
451
 
This involves a study of the mapping process at the compilation and design stage as well as a 
study of the aesthetics and semiotics of the finished map.
452
 The chapter is in three sections. 
The first appraises the work of the military engineers and their endeavours to rationalise and 
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codify fortification cartography. A study of the conventions applied to maps and map 
making allows for a review of how the Scottish military landscape was figuratively portrayed 
in fortification maps. The second section describes the archive with reference to spatial and 
temporal variations in the mapping of fortified places. This review of the nature of the 
cartographic records reveals a changing typology in the mapping and construction of 
fortified spaces in Scotland between 1689 and 1815, the characteristics of which I describe in 
greater detail in the third section. 
 
 
A Codification of Scottish Fortification Cartography 
Conventions of cartographic design and scale 
An essential component of military cartography was the types of representation used in their 
design.
453
 Engineers had to design fortifications to consider not only their mathematical and 
scientific conception but their location and strategies of defence and attack. Certain 
‘conventions’ of design were popularised in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the 
horizontal section or plan, the vertical section or profile, and the perspective, axonometric, or 
bird’s-eye view—and were of fundamental importance to the military engineer.
454
 The 
scientific definition of plan, section, and perspective view enabled an engineer to visualise a 
fortification before building, to check its dimensions, accuracy, and strategic planning, and 
to document existing fortifications for reconstruction and restoration purposes. In 1710, for 
example, Talbot Edwards was commissioned by the Board of Ordnance to review proposals 
by Theodore Dury and John O’Bryan for fortifying Edinburgh Castle.
455
 Dury submitted 
plans for improving the security of the castle’s entrance with a hornwork (see Fig 5.2). 
O’Bryan objected to these works on the basis that the ‘designe [sic] was found too broad for 
the Hill intended to be built upon, and too Short to leave roome for standing of the old 
Countergarde to the Castle gate’.
456
 Edwards’s initial report was based on an analysis of each  
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Figure 5.2 Part of a ‘Plan of the Works proposed to be made at the Castle of Edinburgh’, by  
Theodore Dury, 1709. MS 1649 Z.03/58b (Reproduced Courtesy of the Trustees of the  
National Library of Scotland) 
 
engineer’s plans and, in justifying his modification of Dury’s designs, for example, Edwards 
explained to the Board that:  
The Hill going up Westwardly from the Town seeing by the Draughts, the 
most likely place for an Attacque [sic] against the Castle, the Dispute as I 
have before Observed to your Honours, is how the same should be fortify’d 
for better securing the Entrance. The main skill then in all Military 
Architecture is fitting a Design to the Situation, with regard also to all such 
works as may be already built and that the Stronge part be made to oppose 
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A drawing of a fortress, one based on survey and measurement, could thus resolve in 
advance a problem implicit in a design and permit the possibility of planning and executing 
fortifications on any site.
458
 
The plan was the most abstract representation—a result of the use of accurate 
scales—and responsible for placing each part of a building, fortification or settlement in 
precise relationship to the others. The practical utility of this made ‘the plan’ the most 
popular form of representation. The archive of Scotland’s fortification cartography 
comprises just over three hundred manuscripts representing the military landscape in plan 
only; a further two hundred and twenty items provide multiple perspectives, showing a 
vertical section, profile or elevation on the same sheet as a plan; and about seventy-five 
manuscripts show sections, profiles or perspective views only.
459
 The advantage of 
proportional plans and profiles, especially the latter, to an engineer was in the measurements 
they allowed to be attached to them. 
 In representing the Scottish fortifications, the military engineers adopted a practice 
similar to that used in France since the sixteenth century and extensively rationalised by 
Vauban in the seventeenth, one based on the hierarchical organisation of cartographic 
representation through the use of different scales.
460
 When Vauban established rules of 
design to be used by the engineers, he revised the scale of plans and maps. He directed that 
‘L’échelle des Plans des Places fortifiées sera d’un pouce de Roy pour cent toises [approx. 1 
inch to 100 toises or 600 feet or 1: 7,200], & pour les cartes, le mesme pounce de Roy pour 
quatre cens toises [approx. 1 inch to 400 toises or 2400 feet or 1: 28,800]’. The scale used on 
plans was further adapted for representing small fortifications:  
Lorsque les Ingénieurs leveront des Plans particuliers des grandes ou petites 
Citadelles ou Chasteaux, pour en render les measures plus sensibles ils 
donneront aux Plans des grandes Citadelles ou Chasteaux un pounce pour 
vingt cinq toises [1 inch to 25 toises or 150 feet or 1: 1,800] & aux plans des 
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Figure 5.3 ‘A Plan of Fort Augustus with the adjacent Lands, Abraham Daubant, 1750,  
at 1: 2,400 (200 feet to an inch). MS 1647 Z.02/67a  
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Engineers in Scotland did much to emulate French practice. They popularised three 
main types of fortification map. The first was a topographical plan of a fort’s situation, 
drawn at a scale between 200 and 500 feet to an inch or smaller (1: 2,400 to 1: 6,000). This 
plan was designed to show the immediate environs of the fort. Any roads, settlements, 
existing military establishments and fortifications were mapped, as well as land use 
including woodlands, scrub, morasses, and fields, soil types and land ownership (see Fig 
5.3). Often included on such plans was a ‘Red prickt line’ to circumscribe the land to be 
invested by the Crown.
463
 This was usually a distance of 2 miles surrounding the fort, ‘to be 
taken in to prevent the making of any Cover near the said fort’.
464
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 Warmoes 2008, p. 58. 
462
 Tooley 1949, p. 2. 
463
 NLS MS 1647 Z.03/06d ‘Plan of the Fort Barrack of Bernera in Glen Elg’, [by John Henri Bastide] 
in c.1719. Plans of Fort George at Ardersier, for example, show a two mile delineation: BL Maps 
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 The second was a more detailed large-scale plan of the fort itself—the trace or 
ground plan—showing the enceinte, or main perimeter of the ‘attack zone’, and the parts of 
the fortification including any long straight walls of the curtain, the angular bastions, near 
diamond-shaped ravelins, covered way, place of arms, and deep defences such as the glacis 
(see Fig 5.4).
465
 Scales of these plans fell between 40 and 100 feet to an inch (1: 480 to 1: 




Figure 5.4 ‘A Plan of the Fortification and Barracks at Fort Augustus; with a profile’, by Powell,  
[post-1742] at 1: 480 (40 feet to an inch). Maps K.Top.50.20. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British 
Library). 
                                                                                                                                          
K.Top.50.25. and Maps K.Top.50.26 ‘A Plan of the Point of Arderseer and Two Miles of Ground 
round it with ye Number of Acres Contain’d therein Expressing the Different Soils and Person’s 
Possessions’, William Skinner, 1750, at 1: 6000 (500 feet to an inch). 
464
 BL Additional Ms. 17499, p. 123, instructions from the Board of Ordnance to Skinner concerning 
the ‘purchase of a Parcel of Land’ round the projected fort at Arderseer point, 24 May 1748. 
465
 Duffy 1985.  
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The third type of map was generally at the largest scale, between 2 and 40 feet to an 
inch (1: 24 to 1: 480) and represented plans of the individual fortress buildings such as 
barracks, powder magazines, storehouses, and gun batteries. These plans were frequently 
accompanied, or even replaced, by a cross-section, vertical profile or elevation, and gave 
particular attention to the inclusion of measurements of elevation. Such measurements, when 
combined with data on distances, could inform an artillery officer of the best position for gun 
emplacements in order to command the surrounding territory. They were of equal 
importance to the engineer for designing barracks and estimating the capacity to 
accommodate soldiers in each room, storey and, ultimately, the size of the garrison, and to 
calculate the storage capacity of powder magazines and storerooms to service that garrison. 
The cross-section with the ground plan of Fort Augustus (see Fig 5.4) is at a scale of 30 feet 
to an inch (1: 360) and sets out the relationship between the outer defences: the ditches, 
covered way, parapets, palisades, and glacis. Figure 5.5 provides detailed sections and 
elevations at 20 feet to an inch (1: 240) of barrack buildings drawn in relation to the defences 
as well as showing the building foundations. In most maps, as the level of detail increased, 
an alpha-key or explanation was provided to explain the different parts of the fortification. 
   
 
 
Figure 5.5 ‘Section thro' A.B; C.D; E.F’ [Fort Augustus], [by William Skinner] between 1746 and 




 Military maps of Scotland do not conform exactly to the French model. Although 
clearly forming a representational hierarchy and offering clarity in content and presentation, 
the numerical values for their associated scales differ from equivalent French fortification 
maps. There was relatively little guidance about scales in the military treatises to regulate the 
work of the British engineers. For a plane table survey of a fort, Muller recommended a 
‘large scale, at least 30 fathoms to an inch’ (180 feet or 1: 2,160).
466
 The most explicit 
description of the hierarchical scales to be used in eighteenth-century representations was 
included in unpublished instructions to British engineers issued in about 1740: 
The following Measures for the Geometrical Scales are certainly the most 
useful, being applicable to all sorts of Practice and being aliquot parts each 
of the other, the Plans Surveyed to any one of them may be readily enlarged 
or contracted as occasion shall require:— 
1st. A Scale of 1600 Feet to an Inch [1: 19,200] for the General Map of a 
Coast or small Island, &c.  
2nd. A Scale of 800 Feet to an Inch [1: 9,600] for the Plan of a Town and 
parts adjacent.  
3rd. A Scale of 400 Feet to an Inch [1: 4,800] for a particular Plan of a 
Town or Settlement.  
4th. A Scale of 200 Feet to an Inch [1: 2,400] to Survey the same by.  
5th. A Scale of 100 Feet to an Inch [1: 1,200] for a particular Plan of a 
Fort Battery or the like.  
6th. A Scale of 10 Feet to an Inch [1: 120] for a Magazine or particular 
Building, Sections, or Profils [sic] of the same. 
7th. A Scale of 5 Feet to an Inch [1: 60] for a Draw-Bridge, Gun 
Carriage, or any other Carpenter’s Work.
467
 
As late as 1791, the Master-General of the Ordnance issued a directive to the Chief Royal 
Engineer at the various military stations, both at home and abroad. They were directed: 
to transmit to the Board Plans of the works, buildings & Lands belonging to 
the Ordnance at each Place describing the Boundaries of such Lands and the 
names of the Proprietors of the Lands adjoining thereto the Plans to be upon 
the Scale of Twenty feet to an Inch [1: 240] provided each plan can be 
contained on two large Sheets of drawing Paper but if not, the Lands or 
                                                 
466
 Muller 1755, p. 150. 
467
 Porter 1889, p. 150. These instructions were included in some notes belonging to Major William 
Eyers of the Royal Engineers. Eyres first appears in the Military Branch ‘Establishment’ records in 
1745, as a Practitioner Engineer on £54 15s (TNA WO 54/209, pp. 10–12). 
 127 
Works are to be described on such a Scale as will bring them into that 
compass and in such cases they must be accompanied with separate plans of 
the Buildings upon the Scale of 20 feet to an Inch with References to the 
General Plan whereon they are expressed upon a smaller Scale.
468
 
The extent to which the maps and plans of Scottish fortifications conformed to a 
conventional approach to scales is indicated in the histogram, figure 5.6, showing 
fortification scale incidences in the archive collections: a) before the 1740 directive on 
‘Geometrical Scales’ was issued; and b) after the directive was released.
469
 Included on this 
chart are markers for the recommended French (blue vertical lines), British (red vertical 
lines) fortification scales, and the additional 1791 directive (green vertical line). The 
similarity in the incidence of scales before and after 1740 indicates that the instructions of 
1740 manifested established practices rather than constituted new reform. Analysis reveals, 
however, a much wider scatter of scales than the seven values given in the 1740 instructions, 
with significant coincidences only occurring with the fourth (200 feet or 1: 2400), fifth (100 
feet or 1: 1200), and sixth (10 feet or 1: 120) fortification scales and with the 1791 directive. 
Likewise, correlation with French scales is minimal. In practice then, there was much greater 
variation than in theory. 
There may be many reasons why the engineers in Scotland did not consistently 
follow the 1740 instructions once they were issued. One, for example, may be explained by 
an underlying trend that conforms to Muller’s recommendation in his Treatise. He suggested 
that ‘when a plan of a fortification is to be drawn, which is to be executed, it will be 
convenient to have a scale divided into equal parts: as for example, an inch divided into 20, 
25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60 [feet]’; profiles were to be drawn on a scale of thirty feet to an 
inch (1: 360). Muller continued: ‘any other scale will do, which may be greater or less, 
according as it is thought most convenient’.
470
 This offered a choice of scale. Scales 
remained ‘aliquot parts each of the other’ and could easily be enlarged or reduced by a 
draughtsman. Another reason may relate to the instruments available to the engineers. Many 
of the scales have a direct relationship with the 50- and 100-foot chain, standard surveying 
instruments for the British engineers, and prescribed with the 1740 instructions: ‘a Chain of 
One Hundred Links, each Link one Foot in length, is the most proper to be used with the  
 
                                                 
468
 TNA WO 47/118, pp. 576–577, 6 December 1791. 
469
 105 of the 677 fortification plans in the archive have no reference to scale and are not included in 
the histogram.  
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Figure 5.6b Post-1740 
 
Figure 5.6a and b Frequency distribution chart of fortification scales of plans of Scotland. Vertical 
blue lines indicate Vauban’s fortification scales; red lines indicate the ‘Geometrical Scales’ 
recommended to be used by British engineers; and the green line refers to the 1791 directive.  
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above Scales’. If a chain was not available, scales were to be calculated in paces where 100 






Figure 5.7 ‘Outline of the East End of Fort George with References to the Estimate for Works & 
Repairs proposed for that place, in the year 1787’, by Sir Charles Shipley, at 1: 1,200 (100 feet to an 
inch). MS 1650 Z.46/57i (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of 
Scotland) 
 





fortification scales (1: 1,200 and 1: 60). A large number of fortification maps relate to the 
repair of Scotland’s military establishments (see Fig 5.7). Once a fort was designed ‘to fit the 
situation’ and built, the main responsibility of the engineer was to periodically inspect it, to 
assess its state of repair, and to maintain it in good defensive order. Maps within this scale 
range therefore represent both the construction and reconstruction of the nation’s forts. In 
1787, for example, the Board  
Ordered that four letters from Captain Rudyard Royal Engineer 






 April & 5
th
 
May inclosed [sic] several Estimates for Repairs &c in Scotland be 
transmitted to the Committee of Royal Engineers at the Tower and that they 
be desired to report their Opinion fully thereon.
472
   
The first of these letters from Rudyard concerned the repair of the North Place of Arms at 
Fort George, Ardersier, which involved forming ‘a New project and Estimate agreeable to a 
                                                 
471
 Porter 1889, p. 150. 
472
 TNA WO 47/109, p. 881, 24 May 1787. 
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Painterly presentation: colour conventions 
Colours used in the maps and plans of Scottish forts similarly suggest standardisation of 
graphic representation. Over three-quarters of the maps of fortification cartography of 
Scotland include some colour,
474
 ranging from small ‘patches’ of carmine to depict masonry 
in elevations of buildings (see, for example, the sections through the barracks at Fort 
Augustus, Fig 5.5), colour used to outline fortification and building perimeters with no 
colour in-fill (generally when a plan was unfinished),
475
 to full-colour maps. In practice, the 
fundamental colour specifications adopted by the British engineers matched those 
formulated by Vauban:  
The engineer at the end of the year will produce a plan large enough to allow 
all its elements to be clearly distinguished with all the characteristic features 
that need to go with it: on which he will be sure to give a red wash to all 
completed stone-faced structures; Indian Ink or grey if they are simply earth 
or turf; distinguishing the parapet from the terreplain by a darker layer where 
it begins. Where it does not yet exist the wash should be uniform, but note 
that as the structure progresses and nears completion, so should the wash be 
intensified to match the colour of those on finished structures. 
Vauban explained that proposed works not yet completed should be given a yellow wash, 
and that parts of the former outline of the fort encompassed within the new design should be 
represented by dots. ‘This rule must be followed exactly to avoid the confusion that 
haphazardly colouring plans with all sorts of colours could cause if the meaning of one were 
mistaken for that of another’.
476
 
                                                 
473
 TNA WO 47/109, p. 88, instruction from the Committee of Engineers to Captain Rudyard dated 19 
January 1787. 
474
 For the archive, the ratio of colour maps to maps drawn with Indian Ink only is approximately 3:1.  
475
 See, for example, BL Additional Ms. 33231 E ‘Survey of Inverness’, 1750.  
476
 Vauban 1680, quoted in Sanger 1999, pp. 50–51: ‘L’ingénieur fera à la fin de l’année un plan assez 
grand pour que toutes les pieces qui le composent y puissant être clairement distinguées avec les 
particularités qui le seront achevées si les ouvrages qu’elles représentent sont revêtus de muraille: et 
d’encre de Chine ou de grisaille si c’est simplement de terre ou de gazon; distinguant le parapet du 
terre-plein par une couche plus forte aux endroits où il sera commence. Mais là où il n’y en aura point 
encore, le lavis sera tout uni, avec cette remarque que plus l’ouvrage sera avancé et près de sa 
perfection, plus il faudra aussi fortifier ledit lavis at approcher sa couleur de celles des ouvrages 
parfaits’. ‘Ceci est une loi qu’il faudra suivre exactement pour éviter la confusion que le coloris des 
plans diversifies indifféremment de toutes sortes de couleurs pourrait causer en prenant la 
signification de l’un pour celle de l’autre’. Also see Isabelle Warmoes 2008, pp. 55–66. 
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 The basic colours on Scottish fortification maps conformed to Muller’s suggested 
conventions. ‘It is necessary’ wrote Muller ‘to use colours in order to distinguish every 
particular part, and separate, as it were, the one from the other, so as to make their 
differences more sensible. The first and most necessary thing required in drawing, is Indian 
Ink’.
477
 Indian Ink was used to draw the outlines of most works and, when colours were 
unavailable, a black wash was used to represent sections of masonry. Thereafter, six 
different colours were used to identify the different parts of a fortification (see Fig 5.8). 
Masonry constructions were represented in carmine (red), elevations in a paler red wash, and 
projected or incomplete works were washed in gamboge yellow. Turf-covered parapets and 
the glacis were represented in green. Dry ditches and the profiles of earthworks were washed 
in a pale, yellow-brown umber, while wet ditches, rivers, and seas were coloured with a 
verdigris (sea-green) wash. Indigo was used to represent iron or roofs of buildings covered 
with slate. ‘Pale’ black ink was used for hill shading. To create the impression of valleys and 
hills (3-D) in the shading, a draughtsman assumed light entered the top left hand corner of 
the plan (many plans followed Vauban’s practice of taking ‘left’ and ‘right’ to mean those 




   Indian Ink      Carmine        Gamboge         Green Umber         Verdigris         Indigo 
         
 
Figure 5.8 Colour conventions represented in fortification plans of Scotland.
479
 
(Images Courtesy of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland and the British Library) 
  
 Small-scale plans showing a fort’s immediate environs often matched the graphic 
codes of representation applied to topographic maps and route surveys, with some features 
deliberately imitating nature (see Fig 5.3 Fort Augustus): ‘to represent cultivated fields, one 
used washes of green or red finely streaked with brown; for rocks, one used Chinese ink 
mixed with carmine, although one then had to imitate the effects of erosion by adding veins 
and fissures; the representation of forests and vines, of sand and water, was equally 
realistic’.
480
 Relief was shown as “molehills”, “centipedes”, or hachured lines which, by their 
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 Muller 1756, pp. 14–15, original emphasis. 
478
 Harley 1978, p. 12. 
479
 Carmine: NLS MS 1647 Z.02/66c, MS 1649 Z.03/37d, MS 1649 Z.03/55; Gamboge: MS 1647 
Z.02/81d; Green: MS 1646 Z.02/48b; Indian Ink: MS 1646 Z.02/34b, MS 1646 Z.02/29b, MS 1649 
Z.03/57; Indigo: BL K.Top.49.73; Umber: MS 1646 Z.02/48c; Verdigris: MS 1649 Z.03/47a. 
480
 Picon 1992, p. 219. 
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thickness, closeness, and length, represented the direction and shape of slopes; their positions 
were correct even if no elevations were given.
481
 These graphic codes displayed an artistic 




Figure 5.9 ‘Plan and Prospects of the Castle of Glangary’ [Glengarry or Invergarry], by Lewis Petit 
[1714]. MS 1648 Z.03/27a. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
The extent to which the maps and plans consistently conformed to standard practices 
did vary, however, often as a consequence of the conditions under which the plans were 
commissioned and drawn. Earlier plans of the Scottish forts were often (but not always) 
drawn only in Indian Ink (see Fig 5.9). The compelling reason for their execution may have 
                                                 
481
 Crone 1978; Headrick 2000, p. 117. 
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afforded the engineers little time to draft more aesthetically pleasing plans. For example, 
Brigadier Lewis Petit, a French military engineer employed by the Board of Ordnance, was 
in Scotland for a total of 65 days.
482
 During this time, he visited and (sometime between 
c.1713–1716) completed plans and sections of a new storehouse and barracks at Fort 
William,
483
 and plans and prospects of the medieval castles posing as outposts to Fort 
William—Glengarry (see Fig 5.9), Castle Tioram, Castle Duart, and Eilean Donan.
484
 Petit’s 
plans were relatively plain, drafted in pen and ink with a grey watercolour wash, quite unlike 
some of the highly-coloured plans produced by other military engineers and draughtsmen. 
The reason for a particular drawing style being favoured at any one time is open to 
conjecture. A style could reflect the limited time at an engineer’s disposal; his lack of 
equipment; or his greater expertise as an engineer than a draughtsman—Vallancey, in his 
Essay on Military-Surveys, pointed out that ‘few surveyors are masters of the art of 
drawing’.
485
 Simple executions such as Petit’s do, however, emphasise the utilitarian nature 
of graphic representations. His use of a multi-perspective display provided essential military 
information at a glance—the establishment’s form, layout, and situation. The fort’s plan and 
profiles were keyed to each other with the use of an alpha-code. As records of the military 
landscape, the maps were designed to impart information about the state of the forts and 
what was necessary to be done for their immediate defence against a local uprising or 
invasion. 
Petit illustrates a ‘snapshot’ of existing fortifications. New proposals, works in-
progress or with more explicit promotional roles, and ‘memorial’ maps often reflected a 
greater tendency towards colour, aesthetic considerations, and landscape views, resulting in a 
greater pictorial appearance.
486
 Plans of Fort George at Ardersier, for example, were 
generally highly coloured and recorded building progress as well as the project’s conception 
(see Fig 5.10). Detailed plans and sections were drawn at least twice yearly by William  
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 TNA WO 47/28, p. 3, 4 January 1714/5 [1715]: ‘That a Bill be allowed & Debenture made out to 
Brigadier Lewis Petit Engineer for £62.10.0, being £32.10 for his travelling charges to Fort William in 
North Britain, from ye 21
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 of September 1714 to ye 24
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WO 47/20A, 4 January 1715. For a detailed account of Lewis Petit and his plans of Scottish 
fortifications, see Fleet 2007. 
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 NLS MS 1646 Z.02/25a [Plan of the Storehouse, Fort William]; MS 1646 Z.02/25b [Plans of the 
Soldiers' Barracks, Fort William]; MS 1646 Z.02/32a ‘A Draught of the long Soldjers Barrack already 
built at Fort William’.  
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 NLA MS 1648 Z.03/27a [Glengarry]; MS 1648 Z.03/25a [Tioram]; MS 1648 Z.03/28c [Duart]; 
and MS 1648 Z.03/26a (Eilean Donan]. 
485
 Vallancey 1779, quoted in Marshall 1981, p. 3. 
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Figure 5.10 ‘A Plan of Fort George, North Britain, shewing how far executed 1753’, by William 
Skinner (Engineer) and Charles Tarrant (Draughtsman). MS 1646 Z.02/48a (Courtesy of the Trustees 
of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Skinner and Charles Tarrant.
487
 With no imminent threat of attack and the advantages 
brought about by being in one location for an extended period of time, cartographic facilities 
could be established not unlike those at the Tower of London and Edinburgh Castle.
488
 
Occasionally the use of a particular colour was explained rather than inferred from 
established conventions. On the plan of Fort George (see Fig 5.10), it was noted that ‘The 
Part colourd [sic] Yellow, shews what is propos’d to be done’; the Indian Ink, carmine and 
green presented to the Board what had already been built. A plan of the town and castle of 
Stirling showing the bridge over the Forth, for example, included a statement that ‘the 
Houses Colourd [sic] Yellow, obstruct the Command of the Castle and ought to be purchas’d 
                                                 
487
 BL Add. MS 17500, p. 40, 3 May 1750; TNA WO 47/35, pp. 337–338, 5 May 1750. Tarrant was 
employed as a draughtsman on the Military Survey of Scotland before working with Skinner on plans 
of Fort George at Ardersier. See Ewart and Gallagher (forthcoming). 
488
 A drawing office was established at Edinburgh Castle, probably by the Scottish Office of Ordnance 
in the seventeenth century, although there is very limited, direct reference made to one. It is known 
that the draughtsmen involved with the Military Survey of Scotland spent the winters at the Castle 
‘where the work was laid down and finished’ (NAS RH1/2/523, p. 4), and in 1756 David Dundas, 
Practitioner Engineer, was ‘employed at Edinburgh by order of his Royal Highness the Duke in 
reducing the Survey of Scotland’ (TNA WO 47/47, 56).  
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by the Government and taken down’.
489
 It is a reminder of the purpose of these maps, 




With this codification in mind, I now turn to the representation and construction of 
Scotland’s fortifications in the eighteenth century. The review takes account of the 
pragmatics of an engineer’s design—the practical part of fortification—and also considers 
the political purpose behind a fort’s location, design, and construction. The section begins 
with a description of the archive before considering the types of fortifications in Scotland 
and their spatial and temporal relationship.   
 
 
The Archive of Fortification Cartography Described 
Between 1689 and 1815, the military engineers and draughtsmen of the Board of Ordnance 
made considerable use of horizontal plans, vertical sections, and perspective drawings to 
design and to document the Scottish fortifications. These maps represented the engineers’ 
preparations for the practical part of fortification: (re)construction.  
When a fortress is to be built, to choose such a situation as will answer the 
intent in the best manner, to adapt the works properly, and to use no more 
than are necessary, to make from their plans and profils [sic] an estimate of 
the quantity of masonry requisite, and of the earth to be removed, to trace 
the plan on the ground, to lay the foundation in any kind of soil, to compleat 
the walls, ramparts, and all the military buildings, such as draw-bridges, 
town-gates, powder-magazines, barracks, store-houses, casemates, and sally-
ports; these are the subjects of Practical Fortification.
491
  
Six hundred and seventy-seven manuscript maps of Scottish fortifications survive today 
among the deposits in the national repositories of Great Britain.
492
 Some are supplemented 
by written reports or ‘military itineraries’. Together, map and text described a fort’s situation 
and shape, detailed any associated building costs, and served to enhance the British state’s 
political authority over territory.  
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of the fortifications represented in the maps. It 
shows the eighteenth-century forts collectively—from the first Jacobite rising of 1689 to the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe in 1815—rather than a single snapshot of one  
                                                 
489
 TNA MPHH 1/204, endorsed by William Skinner in 1746 with two copies done in 1760 and 1761. 
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 Cosgrove 2008, p. 158. 
491
 Muller 1755, p. v. 
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Figure 5.11 The distribution of military fortifications in Scotland, 1689–1815 
 
moment. The government’s principal concerns during this period were twofold: first, to 
command the Highland passes to prevent Jacobite rebels from ‘descending into the 
lowlands’,
493
 and second, to secure the coastline from overseas invasion by a foreign power. 
                                                 
493
 BL Additional Ms. King’s 103, f. 18. 
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Figure 5.11 highlights the strategic location of the forts in relation to topography and to these 
political imperatives: the lowland area between the Firths of Forth and Clyde where the 
medieval castles were situated and could prevent the southerly advance of an opposing army; 
along the Great Glen where garrison forts were re-established or built from new to form a 
line of defence across the Highlands; the medieval outposts forming a west-coast guard and 
the gun-batteries an east-coast one; and the barrack forts built in the upper valleys of major 
rivers, from which regular troops could march to patrol the Highlands.  
This section is concerned with describing the mapping of these military 
establishments—in essence, a classification of the fortification cartography of Scotland—in 
order to offer further typologies of these fortifications. The meaning of such mapping lay in 
knowing—and in testing—the capacity of the state to wage a war of attrition in Scotland, to 
measure the spaces of the nation, and to accommodate troops, arms, munitions, and 
provisions for that purpose.
494
 The classification adopted in this chapter therefore addresses 
the two main concerns of the British government in establishing fortified places in Scotland: 
defence and accommodation. 
 
Types and proportions of fortification mapping of Scotland 
After the first Jacobite rising of 1689, the English government, concerned for its security and 
traditional hegemony within the British Isles, was compelled to recognise that the only way 
to put down a rebellion in the Highlands was to maintain strong garrisons in the glens 
themselves.
495
 In December 1690, Sir Martin Beckman,
496
 Chief Engineer to the Office of 
Ordnance, proposed that land-based fortifications be built to contend with ‘trouble at home’ 
and coastal fortifications to deter foreign invasion.
497
 He advised the Board that ‘no 
Monarch, Prince or State has been, nor can be, safe in their government without tenable 
fortifications for their magazines and security for their respective seaports’. Parliament and 
the people were, however, suspicious of any military establishment that could potentially 
reinforce the power of the monarch and challenge parliamentary rule. In persuading 
Parliament, and in support of Beckman, the Board endorsed the efficacy of fortifications; 
they were ‘without question to be admitted of […] especially at this time when the 
misguided multitude are so much disposed of mischief, and the malice of disloyal and 
                                                 
494
 Ogborn 1998; Dixon and Withers 2009. 
495
 Szechi 1994. 
496
 Beckman was appointed Engineer to the Ordnance in 1670, becoming Chief Engineer from 1677 
under Bernard de Gomme whom he succeeded in 1685. In April 1685 he was sent to Scotland to 
direct work on the defences of Stirling in anticipation of an uprising. 
497
 TNA WO 44/100, p. 19, 10 December 1690, quoted in Barker 1985, p. 106. 
 138 
ambitious persons so industriously contriving the disturbance of His Majesty’s 
Government’.
498
    
 From 1690, substantial developments in the military architecture of Scotland were to 
testify to the government’s political and military beliefs in the effectiveness of fortified 
places as a means of securing territory.
499
 Existing fortifications were strengthened; new forts 
and barracks were built in response to Jacobite risings; and coastal gun-batteries were 
constructed to defend against overseas attacks. Maps were drawn for the purpose of 
fortifying rather than besieging, for fitting a fort to a situation, for measuring capacities, and 
for reporting on the state of repair of a particular military establishment at a critical 
moment.
500
 Matters concerning the situation, size, strength and strategy behind the design of 
a fort, therefore, merely altered the content rather than the function of the group of maps 
associated with eighteenth-century Scottish fortifications.  
 These maps have much in common besides their function. As institutional 
prerequisites in the design and construction of fortifications, their forms of representation 
(plan, section, and perspective drawing), their styles of graphic design (colours, symbols, use 
of alphanumeric codes), and their scales took on certain common characteristics. This 
rationalisation of fortification cartography has already been discussed. The fact that the 
representation of fortifications was, more or less, standardised means that we may also think 
differently of the types of fortress depicted in the map archive. There are four main types: (a) 
medieval castles; (b) garrison forts; (c) barrack forts; and (d) coastal batteries. A fifth, rather 
ill-defined group (‘other’) can be identified which includes picturesque representations of 
fortified places, often dedicated to a monarch or military elite, drawn for their ornamental 
and antiquarian properties in addition to their contemporaneous military utility.   
 Although this comparison and classification of fortification types is formed on my 
interpretation of the map archive, a number of key eighteenth-century factors provide critical 
evidence to support it. First, the maps show some distinction in the design and form of forts 
that allows them to be grouped into these types. Second, these different typologies and their 
maps are described in Board of Ordnance minutes and other state documents relating to that 
institution’s approach to fortification and the architectural practices of the military engineers. 
Third, political imperatives at different times gave rise to different constructions of fortified 
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fortification scheme—the most notable being representations of the Jacobite retrenchments around 
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space; a direct reflection and consequence of military, economic, and political power. All 
were planned by and represented in the military engineers’ maps of Scotland, even though 
military and financial constraints may have prevented some from being built.    
Figure 5.12 shows the cartographic proportion of each type within all fortified places 
in Scotland, averaged between 1689 through 1815. What are not included in this diagram are 
copies of maps and plans made substantially later than the original compilations, often for 
training rather than territorial purposes.
501
 There is evidence, too, that contemporary 
duplicates were made to distribute geographical and military information to the government, 
the Board of Ordnance, the engineers and to the artificers contracted to work on the 
fortifications. In 1719, for example, the ‘Draughts & Particulars’ of the barracks to be built 
at Bernera and Ruthven were to be made available to any artificers wishing to tender for 
building work. James Campbell, Storekeeper at Edinburgh Castle, was sent a letter ‘with 
enclosed Draughts and Estimates of the abovesaid Buildings of which he is to give copies to 















Figure 5.12 Fortification cartography by type of fortress (including contemporary copies), 1689–1815 
 
 Figure 5.12 offers an averaged result for the entire period of study, implying that 
representations of garrison forts—Fort William, Fort Augustus, Fort George at Inverness, 
and Fort George at Ardersier (the Great Glen ‘chain’)—dominated the archive. There was, 
however, considerably more variation over time as the bar graph in figure 5.13 shows. The  
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Figure 5.13 Frequency distribution chart of the fortification cartography of Scotland, 1689–1815 
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graph illustrates the annual quantitative variation in the output of fortification cartography 
for Scotland between 1689 through 1815 and, again, only includes contemporary copies. The 
pattern demonstrates that there was an almost continuous if somewhat irregular trend in the 
output of fortification cartography. Rather than discuss the annual output of fortification 
maps, I have chosen to illustrate four phases of building activity: the later Stuart period, 
1689–1714; the early Hanoverian period, 1715–1745; the mid Hanoverian period, 1746–
1779; and the late Hanoverian period, 1780–1815. The periods relate to the underlying 
events of Jacobite rebellion in 1715, 1719, and 1745–46 and are distinguished by changing 
typologies of fortification. These are illustrated in the four charts in figure 5.14. These charts 
offer a way of exploring the temporal variations in cartographic practices in Scotland in 
relation to the different types of fortification (re)construction. Each period is dominated by a 
different type of fortification that was designed and drawn by the military engineers and 
draughtsmen, and approved by political and military commanders as suitable military 
establishments from which to overawe a dissenting Scottish population. The periods are 
further distinguished by a changing geography of fortification (re)construction. This is 
illustrated in the four maps in figure 5.15. Together, figures 5.14 and 5.15 highlight the 




































































Figure 5.14 a–d Cartographic representations of types of Scottish fortification in relation to phases of 











1689–1714 (a)              1715–1745 (b) 
   
 
 
1746–1779 (c)              1780–1815 (d) 
   
 
Figure 5.15 a–d Distribution of Scotland’s fortification cartography in relation to phases of building 
activity: (a) 1689–1714, (b) 1715–1745, (c) 1746–1779, and (d) 1780–1815. 
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The later Stuart period, 1689–1714  
The first phase, 1689 to 1714, reflected the state’s need to secure its medieval defences in the 
lowlands and to establish a military presence in the most disaffected part of the Highlands, to 
the south and west of the Great Glen (see Fig 5.14(a) and Fig 5.15(a)). The Scottish 
fortifications inherited by the Board of Ordnance comprised castles and towers which had 
ceased to be defensively effective due to their medieval structures—most notably the 
medieval castles of Inverness, Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton, and Blackness
503
—and the 
medieval military outposts—Castle Duart on Mull, Castle Tioram in Moidart, Eilean Donan 
near Skye, and Glengarry Castle in the Great Glen.
504
 During the reign of William III and the 
later Stuarts, the decision was made to keep updating the medieval castles to accommodate 
the English army rather than build new fortresses. This was as much to do with keeping costs 
down as it was in recognition of the prime locations of the castles. Stirling, for example, was 
of great military utility due to its strategic position. In his report to accompany a series of 
revised plans of the castle, Talbot Edwards remarked: 
there seems to be two great uses in Fortifying it vizt, by Comanding [sic] the 
most Considerable Pass from South to North in that part of the Kingdome 
over the River Forth, which by its turnings about the Ground near the Castle, 
makes also a very Convenient Place for a Camp of 10 or 12000 Men 
Situated in a narrow part of North Brittain between 2 Rivers the Forth and 




 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, military maps of Scotland’s forts were 
scarce. When concerns were raised for the security of North Britain in 1708, the London 
Ordnance Office realised they held no record of the defensive state of the Scottish 
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 Hereafter, with the exception of one map—NLS MS 1647 Z.02/77 ‘Inverness A Survey of the 
Castle Anno 1719’, by Andrews Jelfe—all maps of Fort George at Inverness show characteristics 
complicit with ‘Garrison Forts’. When John Romer surveyed the old castle in 1725, he found that ‘the 
Mansion House on Castle hill at Inverness, cannot conveniently be converted into Barracks, by reason 
of the insufficiency of the walls, having observed that the same are decayed’. Rather than committing 
a ‘Crazy Repair’, Romer proposed a new barrack project ‘in the nature of a Citadel’ that was 
eventually completed as a garrison fort: Fort George on Castle Hill (TNA MPHH 1/31 ‘Plan of 
Inverness with a Project for New Barracks situated on Castle Hill’, by John Romer, in 1725). 
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Z.03/25a (Castle Tioram), MS 1648 Z.03/ 26a (Eilean Donan Castle), MS 1648 Z.03/27a (Glengarry 
Castle), and MS 1648 Z.03/28a (Castle Duart)—and Paul Sandby’s draught of David Watson’s 1748 
survey of Castle Tioram and Castle Duart—NLS MS 1648 Z.03/28e—contribute to this group of 
medieval ‘outposts’ to Fort William, a ‘garrison fort’. Their orthodox form characterises them as 
‘medieval castles’ rather than ‘garrison forts’, their means of government. 
505




 The Board was forced to admit to the Privy Council ‘that Wee [sic] have as 
yet no Draughts of the Castles of Edenburgh, Sterling and Inverlocky, nor any Estimates of 
the Charge of putting them in a posture of Defence’. Maps of Scotland’s forts in the 
formative years of the Union were surveyed and compiled by engineers in the former 
Scottish Ordnance Office—by John Slezer and Theodore Dury—who, the Board ‘humbly 
conceive[d]’, could ‘in less time, and at less charge’ appraise what was needed to be done ‘to 
put those Castles in a posture of Defence, and can soon make Estimates what the Charge 
thereof will amount to’.
507
 Initial defensive works to Edinburgh and Stirling Castles, and to 
Fort William, were proposed by Dury, Chief Engineer in Scotland at this time.
508
  
 No two castles were alike: their situations made them irregular in form, different in 
size, and in various states of repair. The majority of the early maps of the medieval castles 
were drawn to reflect the state of their defences and to accompany proposals for putting the 
castles into a suitable ‘posture of defence’. Many of the initial proposals ‘for fortifying […] 
to resist an Attack in form with Great Artillery’ proved to be too expensive and proposals 
were resubmitted ‘for Fortifying […] for preventing an insult’.
509
 Maps of the medieval 
castles comprised large-scale plans and sections, centred on the fortresses themselves, parts 
of their defences, and their buildings for the purpose of augmenting the capacity of each to 
accommodate troops and stores by enlarging the barracks, storehouses and powder 
magazines. 
 Fort William was the only ‘new’ construction and accounts for 36% of the archive in 
this first phase (a 100% of garrison forts). The new fort was built at Lochaber, the centre of 
Jacobite disaffection, as a show of strength following the 1689 uprising. Built over the 
foundations of Inverlochy Citadel at the mouth of the River Nevis, it was named Fort 
William in honour of the new king and as a reminder to the populace of new government. It 
took only eleven days to build under the direction of Major General Mackay.
510
 The fort 
retained the shape of the Cromwellian citadel, an irregular pentagon with a three-pointed 
bastion at the south-east and four two-pointed demi-bastions at the other corners, but in 
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 TNA WO 55/2281. The earliest plans of Scottish fortifications recorded in the ‘Register of 
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reality was little more than an earthwork with a palisade on top. The main gateway was mid-
way along the south front protected by a detached triangular earthwork or ravelin, with 
another entrance, a sally port, through the north wall beside the north-west demi-bastion 
leading out to the River Nevis. The river and Loch Linnhe provided natural defences against 
ground attack from the north and west, and a covered way and glacis were built to protect the 
south and east flanks.
511
 Work continued on Fort William for the remainder of the 
seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth century to make it a permanent fortification. 
Once the earthen ramparts and bastions were faced with stone, attention turned to 
transforming the garrison buildings into permanent structures. Plans for barracks and 
storehouses were drawn in the first phase so that the building work could be carried out in 
the second phase. Before any of this could take place, however, the threat of rebel attacks 
caused General Maitland, Governor of Fort William, to express his concerns for the safety of 
the garrison: ‘We are in great danger of being surprised by the Highland Clans, they being all 
ready to rise and they expect the Pretender to land every day’.
512
 At the end of August, 
Maitland beseeched the Board:  
I wish some Engineer may be sent here to see this place. We are busy 
dressing the Parapetts [sic], planting Pallisadoes and doing all We can to 
make ye best of a badd bargain. I advance the money, who pays me I know 
not. Once more I intreat you gett an Engineer sent, to see this place and the 
Out Posts.
513
    
 
The early Hanoverian period, 1715–1745 
The second phase, from 1715 to 1745, represented substantial military developments, in the 
building of barrack forts in the Highlands and fortified garrisons along the Great Glen and in 
securing the medieval castles neglected by George I’s Hanoverian government (see Fig 
5.14(b) and Fig 5.15(b)). Edinburgh Castle by 1724, for example, was rendered ‘Expos’d to 
the same Attempt as was made on’t in the Year 1715, there being nothing Effectually done 
since that Time for the Security of that Important Place, on which depends not only the 
safety of the City, but all that part of the Kingdome [sic]’.
514
 Fort William, Edinburgh and 
Stirling Castles underwent near continuous repair during this period.  
 The Hanoverian accession in 1714 coincided with a time of unprecedented popular 
unrest by Jacobites. From this time, military maps of Scotland’s fortifications were produced 
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almost annually until the late 1750s (see Fig 5.13). Engineers sent to Scotland complied with 
the Board of Ordnance’s orthodox approach when planning and constructing the 
fortifications. For each fort, the engineer was ‘to consider well its situation, make proper 
plans, sections, and Elevations of the adjacent Ground within the reach of Cannon shot’ and 
was to ‘make plans and Profils [sic] for constructing the new Intended Fort together with an 
Estimate of the Expence thereof’.
515
 Maps and plans in this second phase were pragmatic 
outcomes of the state’s resolve to build fortresses spurred on by the desire to govern the 
territory.  
 Lingering occurrences of widespread and often violent demonstrations of Jacobite 
disaffection towards the Hanoverian government following the 1715 rebellion fixed a 
resolution to establish an effective military presence in the Highlands. The result was that ‘4 
Barracks should be built in Scotland, at such places as may be most proper, to prevent the 
Robberies & Depradations [sic] of the Highlanders’.
516
 The four sites—at Bernera in 
Glenelg, Kiliwhimen in the Great Glen, Ruthven in Badenoch, and Inversnaid near the 
shores of Loch Lomond—were chosen for strategic purposes, to keep a network of military 
communications open across the Highlands, and as a show of political retribution for 
transgressions made by the clans against the government.
517
 The design of these ‘barrack 
forts’ was of particular concern to the military engineers and is reflected in the number of 
large-scale ground plans made, a large number drawn by Andrews Jelfe, Director of barrack 
building in Scotland.  
 In response to a memorial written by Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, in 1724 to George I 
concerning the state of the Highlands, George Wade was sent to gather intelligence and 
reconnoitre the country.
518
 Of considerable concern to the government was news that efforts 
to disarm the clans after the rebellion in 1715 had ‘been so ill Executed, that the Clans the 
most disaffected to Your Majestys Government, remain better Arm’d than Ever, and 
Consequently more in a capacity […] to be used as Tools, or Instruments to any Foreign 
Power or Domestick [sic] Incendiarys [sic] who may attempt to disturb the Peace of Your 
Majestys Reign’.
519
 Wade’s scheme for establishing order in the Highlands included building 
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two new fortifications. The first was a new barrack at Inverness. The old castle had been 
hastily refortified in 1719 after intelligence revealed that the Jacobites were intent on taking 
the town and, if successful, opening up the east coast for their advance. Work on the castle 
made it ‘safe against any thing but Cannon’, and a battery, if supported by the building of 
another, ‘would command the bridge, the Hill & all the Roads both to the Town & Castle’. 
Money was not forthcoming to finish off the repairs, however, the Board having exceeded, 
‘in considerable sums’, the amount given to them by Parliament and had been refused more 
money for fortifications in Scotland that year.
520
 By 1724, the castle was in a state of decay 
and no longer effective as a fortification. Wade, however, recognised the strategic 
importance of having a barrack on the same site which was  
within half Musket Shot of the Bridge of Inverness, and consequently 
Commands that Pass which is the only Communication between the North 
and South Highlands for the space of near 30 English Miles as far as 
Kilihuimen; And is therefore […] a place of Importance for preventing the 




 The second fortification proposed by Wade was a redoubt at the west end of Loch 
Ness near Kiliwhimen ‘which is the Centrical part of the Highlands a Considerable Pass, 
equally distant from Fort William and Inverness, and where a Body of 1000 Men may be 
drawn together from those Garrisons in 24 hours to Suppress any Insurrection of the 
Highlands’.
522
 Instead of a redoubt, a fort and barracks were considered in its place, with a 
road linking the new fortification to the old barracks of Kiliwhimen.
523
 This was eventually 
to become Fort Augustus, named in honour of William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland. 
Responsibility for designing both fortifications was entrusted to John Lambertus Romer. In 
1720, Romer was appointed engineer responsible for ‘carrying on the Barracks & other 
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The mid Hanoverian period, 1746–1779 
A significant increase in mapping activity occurred in 1746. This marks the start of a third 
and rather disjointed phase in terms of mapping and fort (re)construction (see Fig 5.14(c) and 
Fig 5.15(c)). Between 1746 and 1755 many of the Highland forts were refortified following 
extensive damage inflicted by the Jacobite army during the rebellion of ’Forty-Five. With the 
addition of a road building programme that saw the forts linked by an extensive network of 
military roads, the Scottish mainland was in effect an occupied country. Overlapping this 
period, beginning in 1750 and continuing until 1769, a reasonably high number of maps can 
be attributed to the ‘paper-trail’ of plans charting the construction of Fort George at 
Ardersier, built as the principal garrison for the Hanoverian army in the aftermath of the 
defeat of the Jacobite’s at Culloden. 1750 was also the year that Charles Tarrant produced 
two volumes of plans of the Scottish fortifications, one as a presentation volume,
525
 the other, 
a reference copy for a cadet in the Drawing Room.
526
 
 Maps of the garrison forts—Fort William, Fort Augustus, Fort George and Oliver’s 
Fort at Inverness, and Fort George at Ardersier—dominate this third phase (58% of the 
archive). Fort William, the only Highland fort to withstand a Jacobite siege during the late 
uprising, and Fort Augustus, destroyed by an explosion when an enemy mortar hit the 
powder magazine, both underwent considerable repair and expansion to quarter more troops 
tasked with hunting down Jacobite loyalists. Lord Albemarle, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the forces in Scotland from 1746, wrote of the restoration work that: 
The scheme your Grace [the Duke of Newcastle] is pleased to send me, for 
erecting other Forts or stations in different Parts of the Country may be put 
to very good use for His Majesty’s Service, in preventing the Incursions or 
Depredations of the Highlanders, But how to carry on the building of Five, 
or Six of those Forts sufficient to contain Ten, or Twelve Companies Each at 
the same time that the Fort at Inverness is erecting and those of Fort 
Augustus & Fort William repairing with Numbers of Hands & at a vast 
Expence [sic], I am at a loss how to execute; And in my Opinion it is rather 
the Work of Years, than of one Summer. However, as this Plan may be of 
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infinite Service, as I said before, it will be proper to look out for Places, fit 
for their Erection; that their Names & Situation, may be transmitted to His 
Majesty for His approbation. 
Albemarle’s act of pacifying the Highlands provided the opportunity to reconnoitre the 
country and thus ‘to look out for Places’ to establish military garrisons. In order to 
successfully complete, on behalf of the government, punitive strategies and a longer-term 
aim to impose rule on Scotland, Albemarle felt ‘it would be proper that the Board should 
send Orders to Mr Skinner to obey such directions as may be sent to him, by the General 
Commanding in Chief here’—Albemarle himself.
527
 Reconstructions of fortifications and 
commissions for maps and plans proceeded unhindered by financial restrictions under this 
brief period of military command of the engineers. There was also an injection of 
cartographic personnel. The Quarter-Master General, David Watson, and Paul Sandby chief 
draughtsman on the Military Survey, assisted Skinner in surveying suitable locations and 
structures for establishing military detachments in the Highlands. 
 Fort Augustus, reported as ‘having been Demolished and the Guns Ammunition and 
other Stores taken away by the Rebells [sic] in 1745’, was restored and in good order by 
May 1750.
528
 Also by this time, the medieval castles of Corgarff and Braemar, ordered by 
the Duke of Cumberland to be put into ‘a Condition fitt [sic] to accommodate His Majesty’s 
Forces’, had been repaired and converted into barracks.
529
 The Office of Ordnance had 
compulsorily possessed the castles, not for crimes committed by their owners but on account 
of a report by the Duke of Montagu, Master-General of the Ordnance, stating that it was 
‘necessary for the Tranquillity of that part of the Kingdom that the said Four Castles [Tarbat 
and Tioram being the other two] should be [taken] Possession of [and to] cause them to be 
repaired, refitted, converted and supplyed [sic] Barrack Bedding, Furniture and Utensils’.
530
 
In January 1749, David Watson surveyed the grounds around Braemar and Corgarff and ‘sett 
[sic] off the Acres he thought necessary for the Service of both Garrisons’.
531
  
 Repairs were also made to the four barrack forts—Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen, Bernera, 
and Ruthven—‘at very little cost’.
532
 Work on the medieval castles during this third phase 
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comprised new plans and constructions of powder magazines, barracks, and storehouses. The 
government’s concern was to increase the capacities of the each of their garrisons to be 
effective in preventing a southerly advance should the Jacobites rise again. Although the 
output of fortification cartography became more sporadic after 1755 (see Fig 5.13), there was 
continued need for a military presence in the Highlands to counter crime by Jacobite exiles 
in the hills, and for engineers to maintain the forts and manage the road-building. Along with 
better roads and more bridges, relative stability began to pervade the Highlands. 
Improvements in agriculture, new industries, and new social relationships and ways of doing 
business with the Lowlands and beyond replaced rebellion and fortification.
533
 
 William Skinner, Chief Engineer in Scotland, surveyed the vestige of a Cromwellian 
pentagonal citadel at Inverness, Oliver’s Fort, as a possible location for a new fort. Lewis 
Marcell, an Ordnance engineer, also surveyed and compiled a set of plans for a new fort to 
be ‘Done exactly upon the Old Lines of Olivers Fort’.
534
 The fort, however, was never built. 
Instead, Skinner proposed a new site and a new design: Fort George at Ardersier Point, a 
lengthy building programme that far exceeded the original estimated cost of £92,673 19s 
1d.
535
 With the backing of the Board of Ordnance and the Duke of Cumberland, by now in 
Flanders, the Crown invested the land ‘a circumference of two miles round the Fort’ which 
would ‘prevent making any cover thereabouts’ and surveyors were sent ‘without loss of time 
to measure & value the ground’.
536
 Fort George took 23 years to build and would have taken 




The late Hanoverian period, 1780–1815  
With the decline of the Jacobite threat in the second half of the eighteenth century, Fort 
George at Ardersier became part of a chain of coastal defences. It is these coastal defences—
the gun batteries in the main along the east coast of Scotland and the fortified garrison of 
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Fort Charlotte near Lerwick in the Shetland Islands—that give rise to a fluctuating output of 
maps in the final phase between 1780 and 1815 (see Fig 5.14(d) and Fig 5.15(d)).   
Plans and profiles of coastal gun batteries—along the east coast at Dunbar, Leith, 
North Queensferry, Arbroath, Montrose, Peterhead and Banff; on the west at Campbeltown; 
and the Firth of Clyde at Greenock—account for the greatest output in fortification 
cartography for this final phase (49%). Gun batteries became the focus of attention, 
particularly after 1794, when there was heightened concern of an enemy landing on Britain’s 
coast. When reviewing the defence of Scotland in 1797, Henry Dundas remarked that the 
batteries would ‘countenance against any small predatory Landings, which may be attempted 
on any of the different extended Coasts of Scotland, and against which if they escape the 
vigilance of our Navy’.
538
 Maps were drawn to determine the best location of a battery and 
profiles to calculate the height of the seaward palisade to form an effective coastal defence 
structure. Profiles showed positions in which guns were to be mounted and so particular 
attention was accorded to measurements of elevation, of the seaward palisade and height of 
the stone platform above a powder magazine. In considering the design of a battery, the 
engineer had to ensure that the parapet was of sufficient height to protect the gunners behind 
it from being fired upon from the top of a ship’s mast. Likewise, the batteries had to be 




 Many of the plans contributing to the cartographic records of garrison forts in this 
phase relate to Fort Charlotte at Lerwick on the Shetland Islands and date from 1783. Fort 
Charlotte was repaired and re-equipped to protect the Sound of Bressay which prompted 
detailed charting of that coastline as well as designs of the fort, its barracks and powder 
magazine.
540
 The perceived threat of Napoleonic invasion occasioned the construction of a 
Martello Tower at Hackness, on Scapa Flow in Orkney, in 1813. Although few of the 
Scottish fortifications conformed to a regular design, the tower was a complete break-away 
from the bastioned fortification. The round structure, however, was resistant to cannon fire 
and sturdy enough to act as a platform for artillery pieces. Several were built along the south 
coast of England in preparation for Napoleonic invasion.  
 In describing the changing quantitative output of Scottish fortification cartography, 
there has been a coincident changing qualitative description. The four maps in figure 5.15 
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 For example, NLS MS.1649 Z.03/48a: Plan of Fort Charlotte in 1781 [with section in 1783]; NLS 
MS 1649 Z.03/43a–b. TNA WO 47/98, pp. 5–6 (entry 696), notification from the Board that ‘Fort 
Charlotte should be put in a complete state of defence’, 3 July 1781. 
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show the evolving geographical distribution of the fortifications and how the British state’s 
‘knowledge’ of Scotland shifted and expanded, albeit for very discrete areas. After the first 
phase when the lowland medieval castles and Fort William to the south of the Great Glen 
and the castles to the west were surveyed, the second phase established the Great Glen 
‘chain’ of fortifications intended to act as a barrier to Jacobite descent into the Lowlands. 
The second phase also saw the first exploration of military surveyors into the mountainous 
Highland region to the east of the Glen. This area became thoroughly described in the third 
phase through a period of reconnoitring for suitable new military establishments to act as 
garrisons for the troops establishing a new social order in the Highlands. In contrast, the 
fourth phase shows an almost complete abandonment of focus on the Highlands as political 
and military imperatives turned to the coasts of Scotland, to the east especially. Where the 
interior was concerned, the pattern of fortification had almost returned to that of the first 
phase but with the aim of defending the Scottish populace rather than subjugating it. 
 The final section of this chapter describes the main characteristics of these different 
typologies of fortification cartography but in relation to their united military functions: 
capacity and defence. In the process of analysing the maps associated with these functions, it 
becomes clear how maps can define and allow categorisation of Scotland’s forts into 
medieval castles, garrison forts, barrack forts, and coastal gun-batteries. At the same time, a 
shifting political strategy is displayed through cartographic representations that visually 
enhanced state power and authority beyond the material constructions themselves.  
 
 
Capacity to Wage War: Design, Construction, and Regulation 
The surviving archive of the fortification cartography of eighteenth-century Scotland is 
dominated by representations of six fortifications: Fort George at Ardersier, Fort George at 
Inverness, Fort Augustus, Fort William, and Stirling and Edinburgh Castles (see Fig 5.16). 
Between them, they account for nearly 60% of the archive of fortification maps. A large 
proportion of these maps is concerned with the capacity of the establishments: of barracks, 
storehouses, and powder magazines. They are also concerned with their security including 
the form and strength of the enceinte and the location of the fort, the latter at several scales. 
The first was at a regional level to establish the fort’s encompassing military utility. Fort 
Augustus, for example, was located in the centre of the Highlands, strategically positioned to 
command Fort William and Inverness; for overseeing the barrack forts of Inversnaid, 
Ruthven, Bernera, and Kiliwhimen and coordinating troop patrols; and a site from which to 




 The second was at a local level. Situating a fort took into 
consideration its proximity to a fresh water supply, how vulnerable it was to attack and, 
importantly for political reasons, its proximity to an area of government disaffection. Fort 
William, for example, was well situated in relation to the first and third factors but not the 
second. The fort, according to O’Bryan in 1710, ‘as appears by the Plan, is not the moste 
[sic] advantageous, being at the foot of a Mountaine [sic]’, and every part of the fort was 






Figure 5.16. The main foci of military fortification cartography, 1689–1815 
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on 2 February 1709/10 [1710]. 
 155 
 This section examines representations of the capacity of the state to wage a war of 
attrition in Scotland by reviewing the art of fortification: the design and construction of 
different types of defensive establishments; the regulation of barrack building; and the means 
to accommodate the expansion of military personnel, stores, and munitions. It further 
examines the ways in which cartographic knowledge and social power intersected 
ideologically.  
 
‘For preventing an insult’: maps of medieval castles 
Since the principal lowland castles—Edinburgh, Stirling, and Dumbarton—were already 
strategically situated on volcanic outcrops, the engineers’ concerns turned to updating their 
defences to contend with ‘modern’ warfare methods. For Edinburgh (taken as a 
representative of the type of work performed on these lowland castles) this involved 
strengthening the approach and entrance to the castle, considered to be the castle’s most 
vulnerable part and therefore most likely to be the focus of an enemy attack. Work included 
cutting away at the rocks on the north and south sides of Castle Hill which Talbot Edwards 
considered ‘to be a greater strengthening to the place, than a Moat, and Cover’d way […] 
Experience shewing [sic], it is easier passing over such Barriers than High Rocks and 
precipices’. By narrowing the access to the castle from the direction of town, by keeping 
some form of horn work—‘min’d within and without’—with some retrenchments, and a 40 
foot wide moat, Edwards believed ‘these advantages will much Lengthen time, and cost an 
Enemy dear, before they can come to the main Gate of the Castle where is the Last Retreat as 
my Designe [sic] shewes’.
543
 Edwards did not adopt conventional graphic codes in his design 
(see Fig 5.17). He did, however, explain his use of colours: ‘a) The Horn work b) The 
Ravelling c) The Cover’d waie, all coulored with light Green. The yellow are 
Retrenchments, cutt off from ye Horn Work’. 
Another area vulnerable to attack was the wall at the west end of the castle which 
was curved making it impossible to defend from inside the fort: 
It being a General Rule in all Fortifications that no part of a Fortress where 
accessable [sic] & may be attacked, but the same sh
d
 be discover’d from 
within the place, that the Garrison may fire upon any that may lodge under  
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 TNA WO 55/319, pp. 123–125, Talbot Edwards’ ‘Report concerning the Fortifying Edinburgh 




Figure 5.17 ‘A Designe for better Securing the Entrance into Edinburgh Castle 1710’, by Talbot 
Edwards. MS 1649 Z.03/58c (Courtesy of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 




On an inspection of the castle in 1727, Wade had found the parapet walls ‘so ruinous that the 
Soldiers after Shutting of the Gates had found a ways to ascend and descend to, and from the 
Town of Edinburgh’. As an experiment, Wade ordered ‘Four soldiers (some of them with 
their Arms on their Shoulders) […] to try if they could ascend the Rock and get over the 
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 NLS MS 1646 Z.02/23a, this observation was made concerning a design for the entrance of Stirling 
Castle ‘this Design having no Flank to clear the Gate & Entrance […] is therefore very improper’. In 
similar vein, the wall at the west end of Edinburgh Castle had no flank.  
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Wall, which they perfom’d with such Dexterity, That from the common Road they mounted 
into the Castle in less than five minutes’.
545
 Under orders from Wade, Bucknal, the Fort 
Major of Edinburgh Castle, directed the building of a new, angled wall (see Fig 5.18). The 
design included a large buttress and a sentinel box with indications of the work to be 
completed that year, including the addition of barriers and for the wall to be raised a further 
5 feet to secure the upper defences and, later, a new powder magazine. Figure 5.19 is a plan 
and profile of the wall once work was completed. These defence measures, applied to both 
Edinburgh and Stirling Castles, proved highly effective. Neither castle fell during the 1745 
rebellion despite being under intense siege from the Jacobites. Both towns, however, did. 
The cartographic focus for the previous forty years had been on the castles rather than the 
towns. The engineers’ purpose: to secure strong forts, to protect the garrison should the 




Figure 5.18 ‘A Plan of part of Edinburgh Castle’, by [John] White, c.1735. MS 1645 Z.02/09 
(Courtesy of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). Another copy at NAS RHP35772. 
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Figure 5.19 ‘A Plan of part of Edinburgh Castle’, 1735. RHP35773  
(Courtesy of the National Archives of Scotland)  
 
 Measures to counter insurgency following the 1745 uprising included increasing the 
garrison at Edinburgh Castle. The Long Storehouse was converted into barracks and then in 
1750 a new Barrack Hall for a further 270 men was designed by William Skinner.
546
 In 1748 
and 1749, a new powder magazine was built at an estimated cost of £1495 18s 10¼d in 
preparation for the increased military strength of the garrison.
547
 The magazine, built on the 
site of the old one (number 14 in figure 5.19) was commissioned after a complaint to the 
Board of Ordnance that ‘the Magazine at Edinburgh was insufficient to contain a proper  
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 BL Additional Ms. 17499, ‘correspondence of General William Skinner, Director of Engineers in 




Figure 5.20 ‘Plan & Section of the Powder Magazine with the alterations propos’d, & will 
 contain 1054 Barrils of Powder’, by David Watson, 1747. MS 1645 Z.02/07c  
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Quantity of Powder for the Service of that Garrison’.
548
 The construction of the new 
magazine increased its capacity from 684 to 1054 barrels by extending the floor area and the 
span and spring of the arch (see Fig 5.20).
549
 Lord Ker considered the location of the powder 
magazine to be ‘Dangerous’, it being ‘exposed to the Country from its very foundation from 
South to North and only two small Guns pointed that way to defend it, the Consequence of 
which might be fatal in case of Siege’.
550
 Skinner had no such doubts as the design and 
situation of powder magazines was a matter of particular importance to military engineers, 
for the powder had to be kept dry as well as protected from enemy fire.
551
 According to 
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 Duffy 1996. 
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Skinner it was situated in the best place, being clear of other buildings, on the site of the old 
magazine and protected from enemy artillery fire by the castle’s natural defences—a 
precipice ‘between 2 and 300 feet above the Levell [sic] of the Country so that any Shot fired 
from a Battery below will be at least on an Angle of 40 Degrees […] and the thickness of the 




Such displays of the pragmatics of engineering were heavily dependent on 
measurement and accurate designs. Science, however, did not have sole claim to the visual 
impact of these forms of graphic representation. Military maps often displayed an artistic 
style that had associations with landscape painting.
553
 Map making and landscape painting 
were connected in their concern with line, colour and symbolisation, in their shared problems 
of content selection and coherent representation on a plane surface, and on decisions about 
form, composition, framing, and perspective.
554
 Paul Sandby, considered ‘a pioneer, 
instrumental in the emergence of a native school of landscape painting’, was also employed 
as the chief draughtsman on the Military Survey of Scotland.
555
 In addition to work in the 
drawing room at Edinburgh Castle, Sandby accompanied survey teams into Scotland where 
he continued to represent artistically features of military importance, such as the pen, wash 
and watercolour plans and perspective views of Tioram Castle and Castle Duart (see Fig 




Sandby drew this multi-perspective map to accompany Watson’s brief report on the 
state and cost of repairing the castles. Of Castle Duart situated on the east side of Mull, 
Watson wrote: 
its situation is very strong but the Entrance of the Sound is too broad to be 
commanded from the Castle; the Walls are sufficient, but the Roof [of] the 
                                                 
552
 TNA WO 47/36, pp. 109–110, 23 August 1750. 
553
 Woodward 1987, David Woodward’s ‘Introduction’ to Art and Cartography challenged the then 
common assumption among cartographical historians that with eighteenth-century surveying methods 
and plain-style maps, cartography had progressed from art to science. A succession of historical 
essays sought to show how ‘art and science have coexisted throughout the history of mapmaking’, 
1987, p. 2. 
554
 Rees 1980; Cosgrove 2005. 
555
 Bonehill and Daniels 2009, p. 8, NRAS RH1/2/523(1b), p. 2; TNA WO 26/21, p. 364, 1749. 
556
 NLS MS 1648 Z.03/28f ‘Report of Castle Tyrrim, Castle Duirt, and the Castle in Island Stalker’, 
by David Watson (Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Ordnance) in 1748. Watson relayed to the 
Board of Ordnance that the repair of Tioram Castle to ‘hold a Party of 50 Men’ would cost at least 
£800. Castle Duart which at the time of Watson’s inspection held a Detachment of a ‘Subaltern and 20 
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Figure 5.21 ‘Plan of Castle Tyrim in Muydart; Plan of Castle Duirt in the Island of Mull’, by 
David Watson (Engineer) and Paul Sandby (Draughtsman), 1748. MS 1648 Z.03/28e. 
(Courtesy of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Barracks where the Party is lodged quite Ruinous. If This Castle was 
properly repair’d it might accommodate 150 Men, which Repairs would 
Cost 1500£. The Repairs necessary for quartering the present Detachment 
which consists of a Subaltern and 20 Men must cost 800£.
557
  
The report did not need to be any longer as Sandby’s plans and views, with their inclusion of 
dimensions, provided a comprehensive visual report. As with his earlier plan of Dumbarton 
Castle (see Fig 4.8), his use of views provided information that was harder to glean from the 
plans, particularly the site of the fortresses, their accessibility, and the surrounding relief. 
The map ‘conveyed information less easily reducible to words’.
558
 Watson’s associate, 
William Roy, argued that ‘a short description may suffice, since from a plan of this kind, 
topographically expressed, a much truer notion may be obtained […] than what, without 
such assistance, could possibly be conveyed in many words’.
559
 Roy (and Watson) complied 
with Enlightenment convictions—they placed the map at the privileged centre of the 
geographical knowledge archive.    
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Regulation of barrack building: maps of ‘new barrack forts’ 
560
 
From the late-seventeenth century and the formation of a standing army in Britain, the 
medieval castles of Scotland were adapted to accommodate soldiers. Plans of Edinburgh, 
Stirling, Blackness, and Dumbarton Castles provide evidence of some of the earliest barrack 
building or ‘lodging’ construction in the British Isles.
561
 Scotland was an exception. New 
constitutional arrangements set out in 1688 after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ established a 
standing army but an army that was to have no permanent quarters. Instead, the army was to 
rely on troops being billeted in inns and private houses. Objections to building barracks were 
founded on ideological arguments: troops quartered in barracks would become distant from 
the people, over-loyal to their commanders, and a potential threat to parliamentary rule. The 
very inconvenience of billeting meant people continued to be aware of the troops: 
a standing army in quarters will always be more troublesome to the people 
than a standing army in barracks; but for this very reason I shall always be 
for keeping our army in quarters, that the people may be sensible of the 
fetters which are preparing for them.
562
 
 In 1717, a king’s warrant ‘for regulating the Barracks & Barrack Masters’ in 
Scotland was formalised.
563
 A similar practice had been successfully implemented in Ireland 
following the suppression of the Jacobites in 1691.
564
 In Scotland, James Smith was made 
the ‘Chief Director’ of barrack building until 1719 when Andrews Jelfe was appointed as 
Architect to the Board of Ordnance and ‘Clerk of the Works and Director for building the 
barracks in Scotland’ in his place.
565
 In 1718, Robert Johnson was officially employed as 
‘Overseer & Barrack Master’ of Fort William, and Robert Douglas, Thomas Gordon, John 
Dumaresq, and John Henri Bastide were appointed overseers of four ‘new barrack forts’ to 
be built in the Highlands (see Fig 5.11).
566
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Figure 5.22 ‘Killewhiman, Inversnait, Ruthven of Badenoch, Bernera’, by Andrews Jelfe, 1719. 
MS 1648 Z.03/18a (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
   This regulation of barrack building in Scotland was a direct consequence of the 
1715 Jacobite rising. The design of these new ‘barrack forts’ was reflected in the numerous 
plans drawn by Andrews Jelfe whose basic design shows a similar—but not identical—
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architectural form to each fort (see Fig. 5.22). Each stood as a detached, enclosed, self-
defensible barrack complex with bastion-like angle towers at alternate corners from which it 
was possible to cover the whole of the exterior of the enclosure with flanking musketry 
fire.
567
 Some of the plans show that consideration was given to adding bastion-towers to the 
remaining two corners ‘if the Money Answers’, which it appears not to have done.
568
 At 
some point it was decided to reposition the towers at Bernera, some plans are annotated with 
a note that the towers were moved ‘from angle g’ although no explanation as to why this was 
done is given.
569
 They each had two piles of barracks facing across a barrack square with the 
rear walls forming part of the external defences (see Fig 5.23). As well as providing a means 
for defending the barracks, the towers accommodated the officers and, on the ground floors, 
there were guardrooms in one tower and a brew- and bake-house in the other. The barracks 
accommodated a smaller number of troops (according to Charles Tarrant, c.70 soldiers but 
this figure is much less than their design implies)
570
 than the garrison forts; the soldiers’ duty 
was to police the Highlands.  
   
 
 
Figure 5.23 ‘A prospect of Bernera Barracks in Glen Elg’ before it was built. Part of MS 1647 
Z.03/07a. (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
 The construction of the barracks took several years beginning with the protracted 
process of passing Acts of Parliament for ‘investing the ground in the Crown’ so that no 
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men (see Tabraham and Groves). 
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civilian buildings could be built within musket shot of the intended barracks.
571
 Until the 
barracks were completed, they were vulnerable to attack, and incidences of workmen being 
kidnapped were reported to the Board with an appeal for greater security: ‘on ye 8
th
 instant, 8 
Masons & Quarriers, were seized & carryed [sic] away from the Barrack building at 
Innersnaite, by a number of armed men’.
572
 Rumours of rebel attacks effectively stopped 
work on Inversnaid until soldiers were put in place to protect the workmen.
573
 Major Thomas 
Gordon, overseer of the barracks at Inversnaid, was ordered to repair there to ‘put ye same in 
as good posture of defence as you can’, by adding musket loops in the outer walls of the 
barrack blocks and to fix palisades in front of a ditch dug around the works. He was required 
to keep an ‘exact account of the expence [sic] thereof’ and to make it ‘as little as possible’.
574
  
 Three of the barracks—Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen, and Ruthven in Badenoch—were 
ready to receive their garrisons in April 1721; Bernera was still to be built.
575
 Inversnaid and 
Ruthven were single-pile barracks, with two rooms on each of the three floors, large enough 
to accommodate two companies, or about 120 men. Bernera was a double-piled barrack, 
creating an ‘M-shaped’ gable, with four rooms per floor to accommodate four companies 
totalling 240 men. Kiliwhimen was the largest of the four barracks, a double-piled structure 
with six rooms per floor for 360 men or six companies.
576
 The government’s intention was 
that the regular troops would be under the command of Highland Officers loyal to the Crown 
and that each barrack would have a company of thirty guides, again loyal Highlanders 
‘Establish’d to Conduct them through the Mountains’.  
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 The barracks were never fully garrisoned.
577
 During his reconnaissance of the 
Highlands in 1724, Wade reported that there were ‘in some but thirty men’. He was also 
scathing about the effectiveness of the barracks: ‘It is to be wish’d that during the Reign of 
Your Majesty and Your Successors, no Insurrection may ever happen to Experience whether 
the Barracks will Effectualy [sic] answer the End Propos’d’. His damning comment seems to 
be directed more at the lack of troops than the design and strength of the fortifications. He 
clarified that ‘if the Number of Troops they are built to Contain, were constantly Quarter’d 
in them […] and proper Provisions laid in for their Support during the Winter Season, They 
might be of some Use to prevent Insurrections of the Highlanders’, although they would 
never be strong enough to withstand a siege with heavy artillery.
578
 Wade felt that two of the 
barracks were built in the wrong positions; presumably one was Kiliwhimen since he 
proposed to build a new and larger fort—Fort Augustus—‘near the end of Lake Ness’ as 
well as a ship, the Highland Galley, to transport arms, munitions and general provisions to it 
from Inverness;
579
 the other may have been Inversnaid due to its external supply of fresh 
water, its distance from Loch Lomond which made it difficult to provision, and due to the 




For establishing a military presence in the Highlands: maps of garrison forts 
Garrison forts offered engineers an opportunity to apply their knowledge of the military 
sciences in order to create a defensive structure capable of both mounting and resisting a 
forceful attack. The design of garrison forts continued a practice begun in Scotland by 
Cromwell after 1652, when several citadels—Ayr, Inverness, Inverlochy, Leith, and St. 
Johnston at Perth—were erected as part of a military scheme intended to control a hostile 
civil population.
581
 Such military fortifications had offered, according to Monck, ‘a great 
deale [sic] of benefitt to your highnesse, besides the securitie of the place and the advantage 
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wee may have by laying the fewer men there, if any troubles should bee’.
582
 As garrisons, 
they were remarkably successful and although these citadels were deliberately destroyed 
after the Restoration (a consequence of their success), garrisons with extensive barrack 
buildings were re-established in Scotland during the eighteenth century in spite of continued 
and, in Wade’s opinion, misguided parliamentary objections to their construction: ‘the 
people of this kingdom have been taught to associate the idea of Barracks and Slavery so 
closely together […] though there be no manner of connection between them’.
583




Figure 5.24 An extract from ‘A description of the Highlands of Scotland’, by Clement Lemprière, 
1731. Acc.11104. Map Rol.a.42 (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the  
National Library of Scotland) 
 
 Four principal garrison forts were built in Scotland, forming a chain along the Great 
Glen. These were Fort William, Fort Augustus, Fort George at Inverness, and Fort George at 
Ardersier (see Fig 5.11). In design they were all different: three—Fort William and the two 
Fort Georges—were irregular in shape due to the pragmatics of ‘fitting a design to the 
situation’; Fort Augustus alone was regular, a square with angled bastions protruding from 
each corner (see Fig 5.24). John Romer, when reviewing the old medieval castle at Inverness 
in 1725 with the purpose of converting it into barracks, found ‘the charge will not answer the 
design, and at the best can be but a Crazy repair not much to be depended upon’. He 
proposed, instead, three ‘Projects (in the nature of a Citadel) according to the situation’ (see 
Fig 5.25). The first project was capable of quartering 400 men, the second and third, 200 
men and officers ‘with works to secure them from a Surprize, & to be a defence against the 
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Figure 5.25 (2) [Project for New Barracks situated on Castle Hill continued - Plans, profiles and 
elevations of barracks: first, second and third projects], by John Lambertus Romer, 1725. MPHH 1/31 
(Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 
With the building of more permanent barracks, their planning and architecture 
became increasingly standardised. Petit’s 1714 plan and elevation of the barracks at Fort 
William, for example, was a relatively common design and style of representation.
585
 
Soldiers were accommodated in rows of small rooms built over two or three storeys, each 
room housing between four and twelve men. The rooms had a fireplace for cooking and 
heating, a window, and an internal staircase was shared between two or four rooms. Dugal 
Campbell’s 1744 ‘Plan of the Ground Story of the Long Pile of Barracks at Fort William 
lately Repaired’ shows that this basic design did not change in the intervening thirty years.
586
 
Barrack buildings generally conformed to one of two regular designs: the first, ‘long piles’ of 
buildings, were set out in a straight line parallel to the enceinte; the second design was 
dependent on space, with barracks formally arranged around a rectilinear parade ground 
where troops were assembled and drilled in military manoeuvres (see Fig. 5.26). The latter 
was the ideal, for it was easier to maintain discipline amongst the soldiers: 
                                                 
585
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Barracks are built now-a-days in all fortified places, to keep up the 
discipline, and good order in the garrison: they have been found so useful, 
that no place is built without them; and experience shews [sic], that those 
garrisons which have them, are much more quiet, on account of the 
conveniency which non-commissioned officers have to visit the quarters 
every evening, and to see the soldiers shut up in their quarters, which cannot 
be done when they are lodged amongst the inhabitants, where they have the 
liberty of going out and in whenever they please; besides, when the governor 
has a mind to make a detachment, or send out a party, he cannot do it, 
without the knowledge of the whole town: If any alarm happens, the 
garrison cannot be assembled without great trouble and loss of time; 
whereas, when there are barracks, every thing necessary for the good of the 






Figure 5.26 ‘Plan and Elevations with Sections of the Barracks for 1600 Men and Officers Fort 
George’ [Ardersier], by William Skinner (Engineer) and Charles Tarrant (Draughtsman), 1753. 
MS 1646 Z.02/50a (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
As barrack building became more commonplace in Scotland, and officers and troops 
could be quartered within the garrison, so social structure was transposed into material 
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structure, in the representation and the rationalisation of space. In practice, this was as much 
a benefit to the regular troops as it was to the officers. Following Petit’s visit to Fort 
William, and aware that he had made recommendations to the Board for improving the fort, 
Sir Robert Pollock wrote encouragingly that  
it will be indispensably necessary That the Barracks for the officers be 
instantly Built for […] so long as they want, They’ll take the readiest which 
they have always been use to do, which reduces the private men to so 
narrow Bounds that there is no less than sixteen of them hudled [sic] up in a 
small room bed above bed which necessarily must occasion so great a 
mortality & sickness among them.
588
  
It thus became a common practice for relatively spacious quarters, or ‘pavilions’, to be built 
for the officers at either end of the soldiers’ barrack rows (see Fig 5.27); and the governor, 





Figure 5.27 ‘Section and Elevation of a Barrack, proposed to be erected at Aberdeen, to contain 360 
Men, with a Pavilion for Officers’, by Henry Rudyerd, 1792. MS 1649 Z.03/52b  
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)   
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Figure 5.28 ‘The Governors, Deputy Governor’s, Fort Major’s & Storekeeper’s Houses’ at Fort 
George (Oliver’s Fort), Inverness, by Lewis Marcell, 1746. MS 1647 Z.02/81a  
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
Fort George at Ardersier was built in the wake of the 1745 rebellion. The garrison 
was the largest in Scotland with a capacity to accommodate two regiments made up of 8 
Field Officers, 20 Captains, 52 Subalterns and Staff, 2 Quarter-Masters, and 1760 Non-
Commissioned Officers and Privates. For the security ‘of this important Fort’, from the start 
of the nineteenth century Gun Boats were stationed in the Moray Firth to be of use during 
any attack on land: 
since the Fort being situated at the extremity of an Isthmus or neck of Land 
of very limited dimension [see Fig 5.29], being only about Six Hundred 
Yards in width, at about One Hundred & Seventy from the Crest of the 
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Glacis, these Boats could always avail themselves, let the wind blow, from 
whatever Quarter it would, of enfilading and obstructing the approach of an 
Enemy on the Land side, whatever might be the Strength of that Enemy, as 
the Force of the attack must be limited by the Extent of the front of that 






Figure 5.29 ‘A Survey of the Points of Arderseer and Channary Shewing the Situation of Fort 
George’, by William Skinner and Charles Tarrant, 1752. Maps K.Top.50.23. (Courtesy of the  
Trustees of the British Library) 
  
In the process of its construction, a great many plans were drawn of the fort and its 
location. Maps of Fort George alone account for 14% of the surviving archive of fortification 
cartography (see Fig 5.16). The pattern of construction provides an indication of the 
priorities of defence.
590
 The greatest perceived threat was always from the land, from 
rebellion in Scotland. The first line of defence to be erected was the covered way and glacis 
and the ditch to the rear, protecting the landward approach to the fort. In 1754, attention 
turned to the Point Battery revealing a shift in defence priorities with the strengthening of the 
seaward batteries. Skinner, in his design of Fort George, epitomised the art of fortification 
that had evolved in Britain during the eighteenth century. Fort George was a model of 
geometric bastion architecture and this was celebrated in a cartouche drawn by Charles 
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 TNA WO 30/66, ff. 129–130, a report by Lt. Gen. Vyse on various points of defence of North 
Britain, 16 March 1803. 
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 Ewart and Gallagher forthcoming. 
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Tarrant (see Fig 5.30). Tarrant’s inclusion of a pyramid and heraldic fanfare signifies to a 
celebration of Fort George as the largest military fortification built by military engineers in 
Scotland and, also, as a point of political unity (albeit forced) under Hanoverian rule. The 
positioning of the Corps of Engineers’ crest in place of the ‘eye’ could offer masonic 
connotations or further enhancements and warning of the military and political powers 
established in Scotland: Honi soit qui mal y pense—‘Evil be to him who evil thinks’.
591
 Not 
everyone was as willing to celebrate the engineering achievement of Fort George. In light of 
European fortification constructions, by Vauban and Coehorn for example, General James 
Wolfe, with some reserve, remarked: 
When it is finished one may venture to say (without saying much) that it will 
be the most considerable fortress and the best situated in Great Britain. I 
fancy Mr Skinner, the architect, thinks it a very good fortification. I dare say 
he finds it so.
592
  
With the decline of the Jacobite threat, Fort George became part of the coastal defence 




Figure 5.30 Title cartouche from ‘A Survey of the Points of Arderseer and Channary Shewing the 
Situation of Fort George’, by William Skinner and Charles Tarrant, 1752. Maps K.Top.50.23. 
(Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
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Maps of coastal fortifications  
Following the 1715 rebellion, the Board paid some attention to the defensive state of Fort 
William’s military outposts. Government troops occupied Cairnburgh Castle, unusual in that 
its defences were split between two small islands—Cairn na Burgh More and Cairn na Burgh 
Beg—at the northern end of the Treshnish Isles to the west of Mull.
593
 In 1717, Robert 
Johnson, overseer of the works at Fort William, was charged with making repairs to ‘the 2 
Cairn burghs’ and with leaving the three–3 Pounder guns in place to control access to the 
inner western seaway.
594
 In the process of doing so, he surveyed the islands and drafted plans 
of their coastlines—surrounded by ‘Rocks 6 Ffathoms in heighth’—and the military 






Figure 5.31 ‘A Plan of the Two Carrinburghs drawen on the place’, by Robert Johnson, 1717. MS 
1648 Z.03/24a (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)   
 
 In contrast to the relative simplicity of Johnson’s charts, John Elphinstone, in 1745, 
surveyed and compiled a detailed plan of the coast in the vicinity of the harbour at 
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Burntisland, Fifeshire (see Fig 5.32).
596
 Burntisland’s strategic importance had been 
recognised in 1715 when Jacobites had held the castle only to abandon it after the British 
Navy moved into position offshore. Thereafter, a deployment of government troops from 
Edinburgh maintained a small garrison at the fort to oversee shipping access to the Firth of 
Forth.
597
 Elphinstone proposed in 1745 that ‘with a very Moderate Expence’, the 
fortifications could be reconstructed to their former defensive strength.
598
 In addition, he 
considered the harbour ‘the best […] from London to Orkney’ and that it offered ‘the finest 




Figure 5.32 ‘A New and Correct Plan of Bruntisland Toun Harbour and Fortifications’, by John 
Elphinstone, 1745. Scale 1: 2,200. Vz 11/53 (Reproduced with permission from the  
Admiralty Library, Portsmouth). 
 
 From 1780, the Board’s attention once again turned to matters of coastal rather than 
inland defences, with ‘the protection of the East Coast and principally of the Capital, and its 
                                                 
596
 Two copies exist: Admiralty Library Vz 11/53 and BL Maps K.Top.49.85.1., with names of 
headlands, soundings, roads, the layout of the harbour and town with positions of streets and 
fortifications. A dedication to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of Great Britain is contained 
in a cartouche showing mythological figures, military items, and two men-of-war. 
597
 TNA SP 54/10/139, a letter from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Townshend, 20 December 1715. 
598
 Admiralty Library Vz 11/53 with a written description of the coast and sailing directions for 
entering the harbour.  
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neighbourhood [being] the commanding object’.
599
 This time, however, the Chief Engineer, 
Andrew Frazer,
600
 worked with the townspeople of Scotland to build battery defences, united 
in protecting shipping against a common enemy: American privateers. For the defence of 
Leith, for example, the inhabitants represented that they would construct the proposed works 
at their own expense and, ‘upon the usual Conditions being complied with, & proper 
Authority’s being received, the Board see no objection to the Guns & Stores being supplied, 
which are found necessary for the Defence of the Place’.
601
 Similar agreements were made 
between the Board and the townspeople of Banff, Montrose, Queensferry, Dunbar and 
Campbeltown.
602
 In planning the batteries, Frazer produced large-scale charts of small 
sections of coastline, particularly along the Firth of Forth, to show strategic positioning of 






Figure 5.33 ‘Plan of the Lower Battery erected at the North-Queens Ferry in June 1780 to protect 
shipping above the narrow Part of the Firth’, by Andrew Frazer, 1783. Additional MS. 50008 B, 
Townshend Papers ff. 9–10. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
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 The beginning of the nineteenth century had also seen the Government’s concerns 
turning to the security of the west coast, to the unprotected state of the Firth of Clyde 
especially, the river being of ‘great importance […] to the Towns of Glasgow, Paisley, Port 
Glasgow & Greenock, as well as to the whole of the commerce carried on from those Places 
to every part of the World’.
604
 Major General Wemyss and Captain Evatt, Royal Engineers, 
made a survey of the Clyde, from its entrance up to the Port of Greenock, to accompany 
Evatt’s report on the geography of the Clyde and the best position for erecting a battery.
605
 
Wemyss and Evatt’s plan is missing but one drawn in 1813 by Major [Carmichael-] Smyth 
may provide a similar representation (see Fig 5.34). The batteries are marked in red and 
close soundings of the channel have been taken in the vicinity of each. In drawing sections of 
the battery defences (see Fig 5.35), engineers paid particular attention to vertical 
measurements: of the seaward and landward palisades to protect the battery from attack, and 
of the height of the gun platform to achieve the greatest range of fire across the water. In a 
‘Plan of part of the Firth of Forth Opposite the Queens Ferry’ by Andrew Frazer in 1785, for 
example, Frazer noted that ‘From the nearest Gun on the Ness Battery to Inch Garvie’—the 
narrowest part of the channel—was 756 yards and 2 feet.
606




Figure 5.34 ‘Sketch of the River Clyde shewing the proposed situation for a Battery of nine 26 Prs. 
for the defence of the Harbour and Anchorage at Greenock’, by Major [Carmichael-] Smyth, 1813. 
Scale c.1: 78,000. MS 1650 Z.46/19 (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland). 
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Figure 5.35 (c) ‘Section of the Battery along A.B.’ by Captain J. Carmichael-Smyth, 1812.  
MPH 1/199/4. (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 
 The construction of a Martello Tower at Hackness, Orkney, in 1813 to protect access 
to Longhope Sound and any convoys assembling offshore from French and American 
raiders, was an evolution of the battery defence and a complete move away from the 
bastioned fortification. A tower facilitated a firing arc of 360 degrees. Plans were drawn to 
show the situation of the tower with lines plotted to show gun ranges at various arcs around 
it (see Fig 4.14 for Philip Skene’s ‘Plan of Long Hope Sound’).
607
 Figure 5.36 illustrates the 
upper floor, roof or terreplein of the tower. The central pivot—‘d’—was the ‘curb’ for the 
rear trucks (wheels) of the gun to rotate 360 degrees. There were also recesses for shrapnel 
shells, case and round shot, and a drainage system for collecting water from the platform and 
the parapet to serve the tower. There were two floors below the terreplein. The floor 
immediately below was a barrack for both officers and men. The ground floor served as the 
ordnance storerooms and magazine. A foundation or basement contained the cistern and 
various waste pipes. Figure 5.37 is a section of the Hackness Tower. These towers became 
popular in several parts of Britain from the time of the Napoleonic wars. 
 
Other: ornamental maps of fortifications 
With this expansion of military map making, the state and its ruling elites gained power 
through the acquisition and control of the geographic information essential for a rapidly 
developing militarist state. This power was legitimised, in their eyes at least, by the willing 
submission of loyal servants to perform territorial surveys and compile maps. For military 
officers, making maps for the state was a means to obtain the notice of superiors and so 
attain social and economic advancement.
608
 One particular Ordnance engineer—John  
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Figure 5.36 ‘Upper [floor] Plan of a Tower built at Long Hope Sound’, copied by Robert Hoddle, 





Figure 5.37 ‘Section through A.B. of the Tower built at Long Hope Sound’, copied by Robert Hoddle 
in 1815. MPH 1/620/5 (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew). 
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Elphinstone—was prolific in his artistic portrayals of Scottish fortifications in an attempt, 
presumably, to draw attention to his cartographic and artistic skills.
609
 In 1746, Elphinstone 
produced a suite of maps of Glamis Castle dedicated to the Duke of Cumberland (see Fig 
4.17, Elphinstone’s elaborate frontispiece to these drawings). Illustrating various perspective 
views, Elphinstone combined measurement and proportion (a basic concept of aesthetics and 
of mathematics) to create visually stunning representations of the castle (see Fig 5.38).
610
 
Each part of Elphinstone’s depiction was in scale with every other object in the image due to 
the application of the laws of linear perspective, and so the image as a whole presented an 
illusion of depth relative to the viewer, clearly illustrating Glamis Castle’s ‘W-shaped’ 
plan.
611
 Glamis Castle attracted attention from other Ordnance draughtsmen, including 
Thomas Sandby who produced a ‘Prospect of the Front of Castle Glamis’ in 1746.
612
 In the 
depiction of the castle, the military engineer and draughtsman brought together the 




Figure 5.38 ‘The front of the Castle of Glammis to the South’, by John Elphinstone, 1746. Maps 
K.Top.49.23.a.5. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
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Conclusion 
The British state’s cartographic knowledge of Scotland in the eighteenth century was 
dominated by discrete representations of military establishments. Plans, views, and sections 
of fortifications, either under construction or reconstruction, were produced in multiple 
copies to distribute to military and political leaders as a resource for  
 
governing Scotland, to artificers and other engineers for the practical aspect of 
fortification—building—and to the Tower of London where the cartographic items were 
stored and copied during training exercises. Six hundred and seventy-seven manuscript maps 
of Scottish fortifications can be found in the surviving archive. This equates to 73% of the 
total remaining archive.  
 Three main themes are revealed by this study of the archive of fortification 
cartography. Firstly, that rules of graphic design were established in fortification map 
making. The maps show uniformity in representation even at different scales and even if 
compiled at different times during the eighteenth century. Rationalisation and standardisation 
of cartographic design was a European characteristic of military mapping that became 
established in the work of the Board of Ordnance during the eighteenth century. It came 
about in two ways: by the Board’s employment of émigré engineers who were well-versed in 
European practices, and by instruction in surveying, drawing, and in map making. Practical 
experience and theoretical texts combined to provide a codification of fortification 
cartography, one that developed different ways of viewing the landscape: vertically by plan; 
horizontally by section, profile or elevation; and obliquely with a ‘bird’s-eye’. Practices 
established a standard range of scales to be used for compiling plans and profiles. And a 
colour scheme was adopted that identified and separated man-made and natural structures, 
and different stages of fortification construction. In representing a fort’s immediate environs, 
the engineers often displayed the painterly nature of their work with representations 
imitating nature in colour and texture. The French engineer, Vauban’s (Louis XIV’s 
Commissioner General of Fortifications), style of fortification cartography was influential in 
providing basic design concepts and influenced the Board of Ordnance engineers’ choice of 
graphics. In representing Scotland’s military landscape, the engineers and draughtsmen 
emulated continental skills, the maps and plans showed a ‘logical treatment, brilliant design, 
and clear presentation’.
613
 Differences, however, can be detected in the military maps of 
Scotland; most notably in the choice of scales. Engineers in Scotland used a range of scales 
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that offered a greater degree of flexibility to allow for the different purposes required of the 
maps and the different styles of Scottish fortifications.  
 This last point leads into the second theme revealed by this study, that different types 
of fortifications were designed and built in Scotland. Four principal types have been 
recognised: medieval castles, garrison forts, barrack forts, and coastal gun-batteries. An 
initial response to Jacobite rebellion was to strengthen military garrisons in the main lowland 
medieval castles—Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton, Blackness, and Inverness—which 
prompted engineers to map them to determine their state of repair. Designs were also 
adapted to increase the capacities of the castles, to build new barracks and storehouses, and 
to increase the size of the powder magazines. A need to have a military presence in the 
Highlands gave rise to two further types of military establishment: garrison forts and barrack 
forts. Both types were free-standing and both were self-defensible due to their bastioned-
structures. Garrison forts were generally larger, some designed over and taking on the shape 
of ruined Cromwellian citadels, Fort William, for example. Citadels had proved to be 
militarily and strategically successful in the seventeenth century and it was believed they 
would be the same in the eighteenth. Garrison forts were built to create a strategic ‘chain’ of 
defence along the Great Glen. Fort George at Ardersier—the last and largest garrison fort to 
be built—is the subject matter of a considerable number of fortification maps in the archive; 
14% of it.  
 Barrack forts were built at four strategic sites—Inversnaid, Bernera, Killiwhimen, 
and Ruthven—with the military intention of maintaining communications and policing more 
remote parts of the Highlands and islands. They were never meant to have large garrisons 
but their usefulness was impeded by the small number of troops that were actually posted to 
each, only 30 men in some. Coastal defences were even smaller, usually garrisoned by an 
artillery unit to man the battery guns. Designs of gun-batteries were particularly focused on 
location and the structure’s form in profile. The height of the gun emplacements was 
important for extending the firing range and the heights of the fore and back palisades were 
important for protecting the establishment from both land and sea attack. 
 The final theme is still concerned with these types of Scottish fortifications. This 
study has shown that fort types changed geographically and chronologically. Political 
imperatives to quash Jacobite rebellion initially focused on existing medieval castles in the 
lowlands but with continued popular dissent, a military presence was required in the 
Highlands. Scotland witnessed an expansion of state troops into the Highlands and, 
accordingly, the construction of garrison forts to house and to defend them. Initially, this 
expansion was along the Great Glen and to the west of it. As unrest continued to mount, the 
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Hanoverian military presence moved into the central Highlands with the construction of 
barrack forts. In the wake of the 1745 Rebellion, the government resolved to build the new 
Fort George at Ardersier. In all, this fort took twenty-three years to complete. The 
subsidence of Jacobitism in the second half of the eighteenth century allowed for a period of 
consolidation and repair before a final wave of military expansion that saw political and 
military imperatives transfer from the interior to the coast of Scotland and the construction of 
gun-batteries to defend against an overseas invasion. This final geographical distribution 
brought the military and mapping focus almost full-circle, once again directed towards the 
Scottish lowlands. 
 Engineers in Scotland displayed an ability to adapt Scottish fortifications to 
changing methods of warfare (a European ‘military revolution’), to design and to construct 
architectural forms over irregular terrain. In this way, the government’s strategic engineering 
in the location and construction of fortifications gave them a place of power in Scotland, 
creating a visible political as well as military presence. The military articulation of that 
political power was represented in the maps and plans of the fortifications of eighteenth-
century Scotland.  
 As the nature of warfare changed during the eighteenth century, tactics became more 
concentrated on mobility: in the movement of troops and artillery, in the delivery of stores 
and munitions to remote parts of the country, and in the demand for more frequent 
intelligence from military outposts. The next chapter looks at the state’s response to these 
more mobile strategies of warfare and methods of connecting these discrete fortification 
landscapes more effectively. In particular, the chapter address the consequential changes in 
mapping technologies that developed to accommodate the changing strategies of the British 













The Cartography of Military Movement 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the cartography of military movement. After the 1715 rebellion, the 
main military strategy for enforcing Hanoverian rule had been to build barracks at prime 
locations in the Highlands, to augment the existing garrison forts and medieval castles. 
Continued disaffection and Highland unruliness, however, exposed a fundamental flaw in the 
nature of such a policy: it was too static. From about 1715, strategies to suppress insurrection 
and to repel foreign invasion were no longer solely dependent upon fortification; all began to 
involve troop movement.  
For the British state to deploy the army in North Britain, supply and arm the soldiers, 
and plan military campaigns in response to aggressive acts against its rule, the government 
needed more geographical information about Scotland. ‘A correct knowledge of the terrain’ 
(and thus of maps), according to Frederick the Great, ‘gives one amazing resources in time 
of adversity’.
614
 There were sufficient political and military needs, therefore, for maps and 
written descriptions of Scotland—topographical maps validated by geographical 
memoranda—to insure their making. Memorandums or reports were included to describe the 
state and situation of existing or projected military landscapes. As ‘geographical memoirs’, 
reports helped validate and clarify the geographical knowledge represented in the maps.
615
 
Whilst providing instructions for a military survey, Charles Vallancey remarked that 
‘however exact the map may be as to distances, or if ever so highly finished and coloured, 
without a military itinerary annexed to the map, no general can depend on it for his 
manouvres [sic]’.
616
 Maps were, however, acknowledged to be of equal value to ‘itineraries’ 
in that ‘a literal description without a drawing cannot give a proper idea of the ground’.
617
    
 There was also a pragmatic requirement: to improve the communications between 
fortified strongholds. In Scotland, military commanders and governors of garrisons found 
themselves isolated due to the distances between their fortified strongholds and from a lack 
of good communications. Sir Robert Pollock, governor of Fort William, for example, 
                                                 
614
 Quoted in Harley 1978, p. 30. 
615
 Edney 1999, p. 187; Godlewska 1999.  
616
 Vallancey 1779, quoted in Marshall 1981, p. 4. ‘Military itinerary’—a French term for a report 
describing the movement of an army. 
617
 Vallancey 1779, quoted in Marshall 1981, p. 4. 
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reported that the sequestered Jacobite castles of Glengarry, Tioram, and Eilean Donan on the 
west coast of Scotland were ‘useless […] That besides their not being tenable for want of 
water, the distance they were from this place [Fort William] thro a disaffected Country made 
it impossible either to have Correspondence with or intelligence from them’.
618
 Military 
engineers were thus required to construct roads and build bridges to facilitate 
communications and troop movements to further the political aims of the British state in 
eighteenth-century Scotland. In order to fulfil this duty efficiently, an engineer compiled 
precise maps of roads built or to be built, and provided descriptions of the terrain to be 
accessed by the army.   
 The British state’s ultimate objective, in theory at least, was to survey accurately the 
country so that it could ‘be thoroughly explored and laid open, by establishing military posts 
in its inmost recesses, and carrying roads of communication to its remotest parts’.
619
 To 
begin with, however, the ambition was smaller and more specific. The military engineers in 
Scotland concerned themselves with local surveys to plan route ways and to compile large-
scale maps of sections of military roads built between the Highland forts. In the Great Glen, 
for example, between Fort William, Fort Augustus and Fort George at Inverness, ‘a 
Communication [was] made for their mutual Support’ and represented in ‘An Exact Survey 
of the Several Lakes, Rivers, and Roads, between Fort William and Inverness’ completed by 
Joseph Avery between 1725 and 1727.
620
 Such roads were, primarily, to provide access and 
to facilitate the speed and ease of troop movements between military establishments.  
 Although the government resolved to improve the road network through the 
Highlands for the benefit of military movement, map evidence shows that, in practice, it was 
only in the second half of the eighteenth century that road engineering projects began in 
earnest. Such activity broadly parallels the military shift away from static siege warfare and 




 As important as land routes were to the army, Scotland’s extensive coastline and 
inland waterways also offered opportunities for the safe and rapid movement of troops and 
                                                 
618
 TNA SP 54/8/94 ‘State Papers Scotland, Series II’. In NAS GD220/5/568/5, f. 1, ‘Correspondence 
of James, 1
st
 Duke of Montrose [Fort William] 7 June to 31 December 1715’, Pollock wrote that the 
outposts to Fort William were a ‘needlesse [sic] charge on ye Government’ which the Board must 
have taken to heart since the castles received little attention until Watson’s survey in 1748 (NLS MS 
1648 Z.03/28f ‘Report of Castle Tyrrim, Castle Duirt, and the Castle in Island Stalker’, by David 
Watson). 
619
 Roy 1785, p. 386. 
620
 BL Additional Ms. King’s 100, f. 17. Wade’s report of his trip to the Highlands in 1724 to gather 
intelligence for George I. Several copies of Avery’s survey are extant: BL Maps K.Top.50.1., Maps 
K.Top.50.2., and NLS MS 1648 Z.03/21. 
621
 Buisseret 2003. 
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supplies, and strategic sites for establishing military fortifications to safeguard ‘the Security 
of this Coast’.
622
 Surveys of the coast and lochs were commissioned; non-military coastal 
charts were appropriated by the Board of Ordnance and the Privy Council for political 
reference; and marine charts were made for assessing estuarine security and for building 
battery defences in the most effective military location. As well as facilitating the movement 
of the British army, charts were also consulted in strategic planning to assess potential 
enemy movements offshore and to prevent any ‘predatory Landings, which may be 
attempted on any of the different extended Coasts of Scotland’.
623
     
 This chapter will show that maps were crucial instruments of access to the British 
army in eighteenth-century Scotland. Troop movement generated a need for explicit 
cartographical materials—for surveys and descriptions—in order to formalise strategic plans 
and to achieve, for example, Niccoló Machiavelli’s fifteenth-century ambition for a military 
commander to be able to ‘paint out the country through which he must march’.
624
 I examine 
the cartographies of military movement under three headings—topographic maps, coastal 
charts, and road maps—of Scotland between c.1689 and 1815.
625
 An exploration of the 
production and the use of maps to assist the movement of state troops involve a study of 
changing technologies. Specifically, the chapter offers an analysis of the strategic reasons 
that underpinned the shifting application of different mapping technologies in eighteenth-
century Scotland.  
 The chapter is in four sections. The first describes the archive of military movement 
with reference to its geographical distribution and chronology. The next three consider the 
changing types of map—coastal charts and inland waterways, military roads, and 
topographical maps—and the pragmatics of engineering and the ideology of mapping.   
 
 
The Geography, Chronology, and Typology of Maps of Military Movement 
The archive comprises two hundred and two maps primarily concerned with military 
movement.
626
 Not all were produced by military engineers; the archive includes civilian 
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 TNA WO 30/66, f. 143, Lt. General Vyse’s report on the defence of the coast of Scotland, 16 June 
1803.  
623
 TNA WO 30/66, f. 120 verso, a letter from Henry Dundas to the Lord Advocate on the Defence of 
Scotland, 7 March 1797.  
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 Buisseret 2003, p. 120. 
625
 Some of the non-military maps and charts appropriated by the state were surveyed before 1689 but 
used for military purposes after 1689. 
626
 This equates to just under 22% of the archive. It should be noted that when counting the Military 
Survey of Scotland, comprising the fair copy of northern Scotland combined with the original 
protraction of southern Scotland, the original protraction of northern Scotland, and the three 
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maps that were used by the state to acquire geographical knowledge. Figure 6.1 shows the 
contribution the cartography of each subgroup—route or road maps, marine charts and 
inland waterways, and topographic maps—makes to the archive of ‘military movement’ in 
Scotland between 1685 and 1815.
627
  










Figure 6.1 Cartography of military movement by subgroup, 1685–1815 
 
Such a classification offers only a first order rationalisation of map output. Each of 
these three categories is a composite of several military activities: reconnaissance, 
intelligence, marching and encamping, and planning and recording military works—roads 
and bridges—in preparation for military action. The military roads of eighteenth-century 
Scotland (see Fig 6.2) traditionally have been discussed in relation to their building directors: 
Major-General George Wade and Major William Caulfeild.
628
 Whilst this is unavoidable in 
relation to developments in Scotland, by reconsidering military roads in accordance to their 
cartographic depictions, and the maps in relation to their actual functions as they were 
originally documented, three subtypes can be recognised. The first is regional or relatively 
small-scale maps showing either the planning of a route between fortified strongholds or a  
                                                                                                                                          
reductions, each shelfmark has only been counted once rather than each individual sheet or roll 
located at that shelfmark. Currently, there are 87 rolls and 59 sheets of the Military Survey in its 
various forms (before remounting: 113 rolls and 21 sheets).    
627
 An earlier date of 1685 rather than 1689 has been chosen to accommodate Adair’s county maps 
and coastal charts, manuscript copies of which form part of the Board of Ordnance and King’s 
Topographical collections. This date could possibly be even earlier—1682—the year of Adair’s 
commission to map Scotland.  
628
 William Caulfeild is often represented in an altered form, as Caulfield. Bulloch (1931) believes 
him to be the son of Captain Toby Caulfield and grandson of the 1
st
 Viscount Charlemont. But he 
signs himself ‘Caulfeild’ in personal correspondence from his home at Monesse, 24 October 1732 
(NAS RH15/17/25). He will be referred to as Caulfeild throughout. For ‘traditional’ descriptions, see 




Figure 6.2 The distribution of military roads in Scotland, 1689–1815  
 
completed network of routes. The second is records of road building, comprising large-scale 
maps of small sections of roads in the process of being built. The third subtype is maps 
depicting tactical military manoeuvres, either already performed during a campaign or in the 
process of being planned for impending action. 
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 Similarly, discussion of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century coastal charts of 
Scotland have tended to focus on John Adair.
629
 Although Adair’s charts formed a significant 
collection of cartographic reference material believed to be used by government and military 
personnel, the existence of these charts most likely deterred commissions for military 
surveys and drafts of the Scottish coastline. The archive’s charts, however, do form a 
subgroup, an eclectic one made-up of two subtypes: (a) coastal charts covering regional 
extents; and (b) localised marine charts including inland waterways and firths (estuaries) for 
movement and eventually battery defences. 
 Until 1745, the topographical mapping of Scotland was mostly produced by civilian 
map makers and centred on the Lowland counties and the environs of Aberdeen. Military 
topographical maps were few in number. Those in possession of the Board of Ordnance were 
either concentrated around Fort William and Inverness,
630
 or were representations of 
Scotland at scales too small to be of military use beyond general intelligence.
631
 The 1745 
rebellion revealed to the government and to military commanders that their ‘picture’ of 
Scotland was woefully incomplete ‘for the want of a proper Survey of the Country’.
632
 The 
resolve was taken to complete a military survey of Scotland that would afford ‘the best 
means of forming judicious plans of defence’.
633
 Although the ‘Military Survey of Scotland’ 
was made by military engineers, it was never used by the Board of Ordnance for its intended 
purpose.  
 Figure 6.3 shows the number of road and topographical maps and marine charts 
produced by the military engineers of the Board of Ordnance or by civilian map makers in 
the employ of the state, from 1685 to 1815. The graph shows an inconsistent and irregular 
trend in the output of maps associated with military movement.
634
 Some obvious peaks 
correlate to political events in Scotland. The first and second peaks, in 1698 and 1703 
respectively, are slightly misleading. The first relates to a collection of undated manuscript 
coastal charts by John Adair where the sections of the coast depicted were known to have  
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Lemprière’s 1731 map ‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland. The Situation of the several 
Clans and the Number of Men able to bear Arms, as also ye Forts [Fort William, Fort Augustus, and 
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Majesty's command, with the Seats of the most considerable Nobility in the Low Country’, at a scale 
of 1: 411,840 (6.5 miles to an inch).  
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 Roy 1785, p. 385, Roy’s opening address to the Royal Society of London, 16 June 1785. 
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Figure 6.3 Frequency distribution chart of maps of military movement, Scotland 1685–1815 
 
been surveyed between 1686 and 1698, and so are grouped here in the year 1698.
635
 The 
second relates to a manuscript volume of six charts (marked with the Board of Ordnance 
                                                 
635
 Admiralty Library Oa 03 [1–14], reference number MSS 331. Two are dated: [7] part of Galloway, 
1701; [8] the Firth of Clyde with a note ‘The Magnetical Meridian in the year 1686 when Surveyed’. 




 that is a copy of Adair’s Description of the Sea-Coast and Islands of Scotland, 
printed in 1703. 
The third peak, in 1725, can be considered the start of a concerted effort by the 
Hanoverian Government ‘towards Establishing Order’ in Scotland ‘and reducing the 
Highlands to a more due Submission’.
637
 From this time, military engineers were ‘to carry on 
the Roads of Communication between the Garrisons and Barracks in the Highlands’. By 
these roads, soldiers from the loyal Highland Companies could ‘pursue, Seize and Secure 
such Rebells [sic] and attainted Persons as should refuse to submit to the Laws and a due 
Obedience’, and ‘perform all other Services which might contribute to civilize the 
Highlanders; preserve the Peace and Quiet of the Country, and render the Disaffected 
incapable of disturbing the Tranquility’ of Hanoverian rule.
638
 Such activities were to 
increase dramatically during and after the 1745 Jacobite rebellion and in its wake the 
suppression of the Jacobites. This accounts for the fourth peak, from 1740 to 1751. The need 
to know ‘every Corner of the Kingdom’ resolved the state to complete a military 
topographical survey of Scotland that coincided with a systematic expansion of the military 
road system.
639
 A low but steady output of maps depict the road-building activities of the 
engineers from 1749. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, military concerns were 
once again directed towards the coast and its security, and charts were drawn of sites deemed 
expedient for coastal batteries.  
 The three distinct subgroups are discussed below. Although separate in their 
cartographic form, they are united by their common military function—depicting military 
movement—and by the events giving rise to their commission, production and use.  
 
 
Coastal Charts, Firths, and Lochs 
From knowledge of the coast of Scotland to its defence 
John Adair, mathematician and cartographer, was ‘unique among seventeenth-century map-
makers in that his exceptional talent was given expression in the production of both land 
maps and sea charts’.
640
 In 1682, he received a commission from the newly appointed 
Geographer Royal, Sir Robert Sibbald, to produce the coastal charts for his intended 
                                                                                                                                          
the Sea-Coast and Islands of Scotland with Large and Exact Maps, for the Use of Seamen: By John 
Adair, Geographer for the Kingdom. Edinburgh, 1703. 
636
 NLS MS 1651 Z.69/01. 
637
 BL Additional Ms. King’s 100, f. 15, George Wade’s report on the Highlands, 10 November 1724. 
638
 BL Additional Ms. King’s 103, f. 1, Wade’s report, 18 October 1727. 
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 NRAS 3246, Vol. 36, letter number 7, John Forbes to Lord Advocate, 19 February 1756. 
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 Robinson 1959, p. 169.  
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description of Scotland. By August 1692, the Scottish Privy Council recorded that Adair had 
completed ten sea maps and ten county maps (discussed later). Adair’s atlas of the east coast, 
The Description of the Sea-Coast and Islands of Scotland with Large and Exact Maps, was 
published in 1703, the only published volume in a projected series designed to cover the 
whole coastline.
641
 Manuscript copies of the charts included in the Description form part of 
the Board of Ordnance’s collection of maps of Scotland. Now housed in the National Library 
of Scotland,
642
 these charts depict the eastern seaboard, from Holy Island in England to 
Aberdeen (see Fig 6.4 orange ribbon).  
 A further sequence of manuscript charts of sections of the Scottish coast were 
discovered bound at the back of a printed volume of Adair’s Description. The volume came 
to the Hydrographic Office in 1828 as part of the King George III Maritime Collection and 
now forms part of the Admiralty Library deposit.
643
 Six of the charts have Adair’s name at 
the end of the title and they all have an endorsement on the verso, in a different hand. They 
cover parts of the northwest coast and Hebrides, southwest seaboard, northern islands, and 
Aberdeenshire coast (see Fig 6.4 purple ribbons plus Aberdeen). A map in what was the 
King’s Topographical Collection, now at the British Library, completes the highlighted 
coastline in figure 6.4 (green ribbon): Adair’s 1690 map of the ‘Towns (and Adjacent 
Towns) in the High & Low Roads from Aberdeen to Inverness and includes all the Towns 
and Havens on the Sea Coast from Aberdeen to Inverness, and to the Frith of Cromarty’.
644
 
 All the charts with one exception (No. 8, the ‘Sea between Irvin & Air & the Isle of 
Arran’) were drawn in Indian Ink and grey wash. At the time of their making, their content 
was more attuned to navigation than to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the shore 
with a view to developing it for military use. Surveys were confined to the coastline and 
offshore islands, to taking close soundings and anchorages, to recording potential 
navigational hazards such as shoals and rocks, and to a study of tides and tidal streams.
645
 
Land features were mainly restricted to a strip along the coastline (with the exception of the 
roads between Aberdeen and Inverness) and showed hills in the form of mole-hills bearing 
little relation to actual relief, navigational landmarks such as isolated summits, settlements, 
and castles (see Fig 6.5). 
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 Moore 1985; Withers 2002.  
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 NLS MS 1651 Z.69/01. The volume includes a manuscript copy of a hydrographical chart of the 
coast of Scotland first published in 1583 by Nicholay D’Aulphinois (Nicolas de Nicolay). 
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Figure 6.4 Diagram identifying the coastlines covered by John Adair’s surviving manuscript charts: 
orange ribbon represents the NLS collection (MS 1651 Z.69/01); purple represents the Admiralty 
Library collection (Oa 03 [1–14]); and green BL Maps K.Top.48.65 with the High & Low Roads  
between Aberdeen and Inverness. 
 




Figure 6.5 ‘The Frith and River of Tay with all the Rocks Sands Shoals, &c.’ [manuscript copy], by 
John Adair, 1703. MS 1651 Z.69/01 (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the  
National Library of Scotland). 
  
 Adair’s charts—manuscript and printed—were potentially not the only ones 
available to the Board of Ordnance for consultation. In the 1680s, Greenvile Collins—a 
skilled navigator with experience in making draughts of harbours—undertook the first 
comprehensive survey of the coasts of Britain which resulted in eight detailed charts of 
Scottish coasts, published in his Great Britain’s Coasting Pilot of 1693.
646
 In 1730, Mark 
Tiddeman compiled a chart of the west coast of Scotland, from Scarba south of Mull to Cape 
Wrath and including the Outer Hebrides.
647
 The first trigonometrical survey of a British coast 
was that of the Orkney Islands by Murdoch Mackenzie senior, published in 1750 as 
Orcades: or, a Geographic and Hydrographic Survey. On the basis of this protracted but 
accurate survey, the Admiralty commissioned Mackenzie to survey the west coast of Britain 
and all of Ireland.
648
 Unlike seventeenth-century surveys of the French coast, from Dunkirk 
to La Rochelle, which Vauban subsequently supplemented with military information—‘the 
third sheet is an old map made by Lavoye on which I have marked all the batteries in the 
passage, that is the places where they should be built’—there is no evidence that Adair, 
                                                 
646
 See NLS EMS.b.3.24/1–9. 
647
 NLS Adv.MS.16.1.20, dedicated to the ‘Honorable Sr. Charles Wager’. 
648
 Headrick 2000, pp. 113–115. 
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Collins, Tiddeman or Mackenzie’s charts were used by the government for such explicit 
defensive purposes.
649
 The fact that manuscript copies of Adair’s Description carry the stamp 
of the Board of Ordnance does, however, raise conjecture that these civilian maps were 
consulted at times when concerns for the security of Scotland were heightened, and hostile 
landings upon the coast were anticipated. They provided a visual means of access, both by an 
enemy and by the British Navy, and could establish a ‘place of Rendesvous [sic] where they 
[warships] would be most secure’.
650
 
 If the charts were used by the Board in matters of movement and coastal defence, 
and if found sufficient for that purpose, the Board had no recourse to military surveys in their 
stead. This may account for the dearth of military coastal charts of Scotland until 1717, 
1745, and particularly after 1780 when attention turned to specific sections of coastline with 
the intention of building or reinforcing battery defences. A further conjecture is possible; that 
any coastal charts of Scotland made by or in conjunction with the Board of Ordnance were 
deposited with the Admiralty or ‘Navy Board’ or with their representatives at Trinity House 
in Leith. In 1714, a report on the Scottish Harbours was completed by associates of the Navy 
Board who were tasked with ‘taking a Survey of the Shoars [sic] & Bays on both sides of the 
Frith of Forth in North Brittain’; with identifying a site for building, refitting, and repairing 
government ships; and with planning a wet and dry dock for that purpose. The survey was 
undertaken by ‘Capt. John Brown & Mr Gregory deputed by the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, 
Mr John Adair & Mr Ja[mes] Smith recommended by the Earle of Marr, and Capt. O’Brian 
an Engineer and Officer of the Ordnance’ who took ‘a strict & carefull Survey […] & 
prepar’d Draughts of each place’, of the headlands, bays, harbours, rocks, and also took 
soundings, all ‘particularly sett down in a Mapp hereof’. In the accompanying report, the 
surveyors described sites for ‘Four Forts’ to be built at the entrance to the estuary so that it 
‘may be defended from being attack’d or enter’d with an Enemy’s Fleet’.
651
 No survey or 
maps (the report makes reference to ‘No 7’, implying several maps were made) relating to 
this report have been found in the Board of Ordnance or military archives. The report 
confirms, however, that the Board did concern itself with knowing the coast and with matters 
of its defence to prevent enemy movements.
652
 
                                                 
649
 Desbrière 2008, p. 77: ‘la 3e feuille est une vieille carte faite par lavoye sur laquelle j’ay fait 
marquer toutes les batteries du goulet, c’est à dire les endroits où il les faut faire’. 
650
 TNA WO 30/54, f. 88 verso, ‘General Instructions for the Officers of Engineers employed in 
Surveying’, by William Roy, [1785]. 
651
 BL Additional Ms. 31149, ff. 155–159, a report on the Scottish Harbours, 1714, lodged in the 
political papers of Lord Strafford relating to the pacification of the North. 
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 The ‘Four Forts’ were built at North and South Queensferry, on the island of Inchgarvie, and on the 
Rock of Bimar. Plans or views exist for all except Bimar but none drawn in 1714. Queensferry: BL 
Add. Ms 61630 (1709), Add. Ms 50008 B, ff. 9–12 (1783), BL Maps K.Top.49.87.2.b. (n.d.), TNA 
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 When William Roy set out his ‘General Instructions for the Officers of Engineers 
employed in Surveying’, he suggested that for a survey of the coast a ‘Book of general 
miscellaneous remarks’ should be kept. Entries should include: 
every thing that occurs relative to the nature of the Coast; such as, what parts 
of it are accessible, and what not, at what distance from the shore ships of 
war may come to an anchor to cover a debarkation from Boats; and what 
sort of communications there are leading from the Coast to the interior 
country, in case an Enemy had made his landing good.
653
 
In 1803, anticipating Napoleon’s invasion, Lt. Gen. Richard Vyse, Commander of the 
military forces in Scotland, made ‘a very minute examination and inspection of this Coast, 
from Edinburgh […] to Dunglass’. Captain Henry Rudyard, Commander of the Royal 
Engineers in Scotland,
654
 was ordered to repeat the survey and to report his opinion of places 
‘an Enemy could easily make a good landing’. Dunbar was found particularly accessible to 
the enemy due to a number of bays surrounded by high rocks and deep waters which created 
natural safe harbours. In an earlier inspection of the coastline, Rudyard had reported that: 
during the last War, I am informed a very formidable privateer with a small 
squadron anchored near the Town of Dunbar, and sent an armed Brig within 
Musket shot to take soundings at the mouth of the Harbour and Piers, which 
[shows] how accessible the place is to an Enemy’.
655
  
To convey to political and military commanders in London the full significance of his and 
Rudyard’s written reports, Vyse directed the recipients ‘to a Sketch which I have made out 
for your Information’.
656
 Although the sketch has not been found, Vyse expected map and 
text to be read together. 
 At the turn of the eighteenth century, civilian coastal charts provided the Board of 
Ordnance and Government with geographical knowledge of the Scottish seaboard. These 
charts were capable of transmitting to those in power a visual image that could be exploited; 
they provided an opportunity to see and govern from afar. Whether any of the charts were 
deemed adequate or, in reality, even used for political and military strategic planning 
                                                                                                                                          
MPH 1/199/3 (1812); Inchgarvie: BL Maps K.Top.49.87.2.a. (1743), Maps K.Top.49.87.2.b. (n.d.), 
BL Add. Ms 50008 B, ff. 11–12 (1783). 
653
 TNA WO 30/54, f. 88; fair copy at WO 30/115, pp. 180–181, instructions approved and signed by 
the Duke of Richmond, Master-General of the Ordnance, 17 July 1785. 
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 Rudyard took over from Frazer as Chief Engineer in Scotland from 1786 (TNA WO 47/108, July–
Dec 1786).  
655
 TNA WO 30/66, f. 152 verso, copy of Captain Henry Rudyard’s earlier report on Dunbar, dated 22 
August 1794. 
656
 TNA WO 30/66, f. 141, Lt. Genl. Vyse’s report on part of the coast of Scotland, Edinburgh 16 
June 1803.  
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remains open to conjecture. The fact that such maps existed, however, provides an 
explanation why so few military engineers were commissioned by the Board to survey and 
chart the coast. In practice, surveying Scotland’s coastline—and at most very specific, small 
parts of it—only became a priority for engineers in Scotland towards the end of the 
eighteenth century when internal unrest had largely subsided and wars with America and 
France were a greater threat. By this time, more extensive coastal charting was carried out 
under the auspices of the Navy Board at Trinity House.  
    
Inland waterways: firths and lochs 
From at least 1716 the value of Scotland’s inland waterways as an effective means of 
movement, defence, and safe harbour for government ships was recognised by the military 
engineers in Scotland. Movement involved not only troops and stores but building materials. 
Strategic sites for new fortifications, such as the barrack fort of Bernera in Glen Elg which 
was chosen for keeping a military communication with the Isle of Skye and as a show of 
political retribution, was located near to a natural harbour for landing timber for building the 
barracks, as indicated on Bastide’s prospect (see Fig. 6.6).
657
 During the construction of Fort 
George at Ardersier, oak timber cut to make scantlings was delivered by ship to the shore 
below the fort.
658
 Stone quarried near the fort was plied along the Murray Firth then carried 
by cart from the shore to the fosse.
659
 
 In 1724, during his surveillance of the Highlands, Wade recognised that Loch Ness 
formed a judicious means of transporting military provisions and troops between Kiliwhimen 
(later Fort Augustus) and Fort George at Inverness. On first coming to the Highlands, he had 
caused an ‘exact Survey to be taken of the several Lakes and that part of the Country lying 
between Inverness and Fort William, which extends from the East to the West Sea, in order 
to render the Communication more practicable’.
660
 The survey was carried out by Joseph 
Avery in 1725; the map, at a scale of c.1: 71,280 (just over one mile to an inch) included ‘the 
Several Lakes [and] Rivers’, as well as ‘all Roads & Remarkable places contain’d between 
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 Maps of Kiliwhimen show a stone quarry (see NLS MS 1647 Z.03/08a) and that sand was taken 
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along the Murray Firth for several years. In 1755, the Board of Ordnance requested that Admiralty 
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660






Figure 6.6 ‘A Prospect of that Part of the Land and Sea adjacent to ye Barrack to be Built in Glen 
Elg’, to cover the sea crossing across the Sound of Sleat to the Isle of Skye, with an enlargement of 
the inset map, by John Henri Bastide, 1720. MS1647 Z.03/07a (Reproduced by permission of the 
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
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the said two places’.
661
 Loch Ness was found to be ‘Navigable for the Largest Vessells [sic]’, 
the survey showing it to be ‘24 Miles in Length, and a Mile or more in breadth, the Country 
being Mountainous on both sides’ (see Fig 6.7). A ‘small Vessell with Oars and Sails’ was 
therefore commissioned ‘sufficient to carry a Party of 60 or 80 Soldiers, and Provisions for 
the Garrison which will be a means to keep the Communication open between [Fort 
Augustus] and Inverness, and be a safe and ready way of sending Partys [sic] to the Country 
bordering on the said Lake’.
662
 By January 1726, the ship—the Highland Galley—was 









Figure 6.7 ‘An Exact Survey of the Several Lakes, Rivers, and Roads, between Fort William and 
Inverness, Extending from the East to the West Sea, latt. from 57º to 58º’, by [Joseph Avery], 1725, at 
1: 71,280 (1.125 miles to an inch). Maps K.Top.50.1 (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
 
Knowing the geography of Scotland’s inland waterways was also important for the 
strategic defence of loch-side fortifications. The importance of Loch Eil in the defence of 
Fort William, for example, came to light during the Jacobite siege in March 1746. The 
                                                 
661
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location of Fort William was a concern from the outset. Major General Mackay who directed 
its building, expressed his doubts for reusing the site of an old citadel: ‘The situation of the 
old fort did not please me, being commanded from a near hill, but I could not change it, there 
being none else to fit’.
664
 There were two main advantages, however, for Fort William 
remaining where it was: the fort was near a fresh water supply (although not within the 
enceinte itself); and ships carrying stores for the government garrisons could sail up to the 
mouth of the River Nevis and unload their cargo at the sally port which also meant that ships 
could be used to relieve the fort if under siege at any time.
665
 
A survey of Loch Eil was first commissioned in 1716 by Brigadier Lewis Petit who 
was reviewing the defences of Fort William by order of the Board of Ordnance. ‘Ensigne 
J[ohn] Hargrave’, who Petit deemed to be ‘very Capable & deserving of Encouragement’,
666
 
compiled a map showing detailed soundings and currents, the location of Fort William, as 
well as an inset map of part of the west coast of Scotland—one of the few ‘location maps’ 
included on Board of Ordnance maps. The loch itself was shown in plan whilst the 
surrounding hills were drawn in perspective.
667
 In 1717, Hargrave compiled a large-scale 
chart of this survey (see Fig 6.8) at a scale of 1: 8,400 (700 feet to an inch), from Loch 
Linnhe as far south as Ardgour and Loch Eil as far west as the Corpach, showing ‘ye current 
of Annot to ye current of Argour, giving a true account of all ye Towns, Houses, River, 
Rivulets, Woods, Trees, Mountains, Glens, Boggs, Arable ground & Passable roads, As 
likewise ye depth of water & Flowing of ye tide with ye flatts, shoales, Rocks, Sands, & 
safest places for Anchorage in ye Loch’.
668
 
In March 1746 when Fort William was under attack from Jacobite forces, the full 
extent of its disadvantageous position was revealed. On the landward side, the Hanoverian 
garrison was overlooked by four rebel batteries positioned on Cow Hill and Sugar Loaf Hill 
to the south east and east of the fort.
669
 John Elphinstone’s plan shows the situation of these 
batteries (see Fig 6.9). Under almost constant fire—‘about half eleven at night they began to 
fire Shells, & threw by four in the morning 194: six inches shells’—the garrison’s main 
support and safest retreat was by means of a sloop-of-war, the Baltimore, captained by 
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Figure 6.8 Part of ‘A Trace and exact Plan of Fort William scituate on ye Locheale in Lochabor in ye 
Shire of Inverness’, by John Hargrave, 1717 at 1: 8,400 (700 feet to an inch).  
MR 1/492 (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew)  
 
 
Richard How, afloat on Loch Eil.
670
 To counter the siege, the garrison’s commander, Captain 
Caroline Frederick Scott, formed a project of attack that comprised a detachment of soldiers 
with sailors from the Baltimore negotiating by armed boats the shores of the loch to destroy 
Killmady Barns, or the Corpach—a large village to the west of the fort housing a contingent 
of Jacobite rebels. The Baltimore sailed towards the Barns and ‘fired several Shot, & threw 
                                                 
670
 TNA SP 54/30/2 G ‘State Papers Scotland, Series II’. 
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some Coehorn Shells’ to protect the attack force. Although this minor skirmish had little 
effect, Fort William successfully resisted the rebel siege and so a retreat by way of Loch Eil 




Figure 6.9 Part of John Elphinstone’s 1748 ‘Plan of the Ground adjacent to Fort William’ showing 
the batteries set up by the Jacobites in the 1746 siege of the fort and the soundings of Loch Eil.  
Maps K.Top.50.37.1.a. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
 
To the south west of Fort William is the ‘Current of Ardgour’ formed by a small 
peninsula between Loch Eil and Loch Linnhe and the waters flowing into the Irish Sea. In 
1757, Lieutenant Hugh Debbeig of the Corps of Engineers, surveyed this area, taking 
soundings at low water and expressing them in fathoms on his map (see Fig 6.10).
671
 
Debbeig wrote a lengthy report to accompany this map and described the narrow passage 
which:  
makes the Current so rapid that Ships with a leading Gale will run thro’ at 
the rate of 12 Miles in an hour; so that it will be next to impossible for a 
Land Battery placed upon either side to strike a Ship more than once before 
she is out of reach before the Guns could be loaded again. The Passage is so 
deep that Ships of any Burthen may go thro’ with great safety at any time of 
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Tide, there being from 3 to 16 Fathoms depth of Water at lowest Ebb, and 
they may run within 30 Yards of the South Shore. 
His report concluded: ‘As I am not acquainted with the intention of this Work, the above is 
submitted to better judges, who may be informed of the Design of it, without which one 
cannot determine what the Situation is capable of’.
672
 Combined, Debbeig’s plan and report 




Figure 6.10 ‘Plan of the Current of Ardgour’, by Hugh Debbeig, 1757. Plan at 1: 4,800 (400 feet to an 
inch) and sections at 1: 2,400 (200 feet to an inch). Additional MS. 33231 H1  
(Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library)  
 
 Coastal defences were undoubtedly ‘of the utmost consequence to this Coast’.
673
 But 
military establishments along the coast of Scotland needed to be connected to the interior 
and the troops ‘always ready to move, in any Direction’. In conjunction with knowing and 
using the Scottish coastlines, firths and lochs for military movement, the Board of Ordnance 
had to ensure they were connected overland. From the 1720s, military engineers in Scotland 
concerned themselves with ‘opening […] great Road[s], by means of which, the Guns, 
                                                 
672
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Carriages &c can move without the least possibility of delay, in every direction’.
674
 The next 
section examines these ‘great Roads’, the military roads of Scotland. 
 
 
The King’s Roads 
A road system capable of bearing vehicular traffic already existed in parts of Scotland before 
the eighteenth century. When Edward I embarked upon the conquest of Scotland in 1296, his 
army’s baggage trains and siege-engines were transported by road by means of horse-drawn 
carts and ox-wagons as far north as Stirling and Dunfermline.
675
 There were, however, very 
few vehicle roads through the central and western Highlands and, throughout Scotland, many 






Figure 6.11 ‘The Roads between Inversnait, Ruthven of Badenock, Kiliwhiman and Fort William, in 
ye highlands of North Brittain’, by John Dumaresq and John Henri Bastide, 1718. MS 1648 Z.03/13a. 
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
 
 One of the earliest eighteenth-century maps of the ‘Roads […] in ye highlands of 
North Brittain [sic]’ (see Fig 6.11) was surveyed in 1718 by John Dumaresq and John Henri 
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Bastide and drawn by the latter.
677
 As overseers of the four new barrack forts being built in 
the Highlands from 1718,
678
 their concern was to gauge the communications between them, 
from Inversnaid on Loch Lomond to Ruthven of Badenoch via Loch Tay and Blair Athol, 
Kiliwhimen at the southern end of Loch Ness to Fort William. The ‘roads’ at this time were 
unsuitable for artillery or wheeled carriages and this deficiency combined with the 
development of more mobile military strategies gave rise to the planning and building of a 
new road system in Scotland, one that was co-ordinated and mapped by the military 
engineers of the Board of Ordnance. 
 Many of the new roads were built on the route of existing tracks, although some 
were entirely new. From the outset, however, all the military roads were either in, bordering 
on, or leading to points of military importance.
679
 As the eighteenth-century progressed, the 
Board of Ordnance directed more road construction projects that saw a corresponding 
change in the mapping, from relatively small-scale regional plans of entire routes to large-
scale maps of small sections of roads.   
 
Maps of route ways 
Mobility was a strategic priority to both Hanoverian and Jacobite armies. In 1724, when 
Major-General George Wade reconnoitred the Highlands of Scotland, he was made aware of 
the want of roads and the advantages this afforded the rebel Highlanders. He observed:   
the great disadvantages Regular Troops are under when they Engage with 
those who inhabit Mountainous Situations; The Savennes in France, And 
Catalans in Spain, have in all times been Instances of this Truth, The 
Highlands in Scotland are still more impracticable, from the want of Roads, 
Bridges, and from the Excessive Rains that almost Continually fall in these 
parts, which by Nature and constant use become habitual to the Natives, but 
very difficulty Supported by the Regular Troops, They are unacquainted 
with the Passages by which the Mountains are Travers’d, expos’d to 
frequent Ambuscades, and Shot from the Tops of the Hills, which they 
return without Effect.
680
   
From 1725, Wade began planning a road system in the Highlands for securing ‘Peace and 
Tranquility [sic]’. He recommended ‘That a sum be provided, Annually, for making the 
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Roads of Communication and a Salary for the Person Employ’d as Inspector for carrying on 
so necessary a Work’.
681
 The roads (see Fig 6.12), built by Highland Companies under 
Wade’s direction, ran from Fort William to Inverness, Dunkeld to Inverness, Crieff to 






Figure 6.12 Distribution of George Wade’s roads, 1724–1742 
 
Wade usually represented proposed routes in two concurrent forms: map and written 
itinerary, often on the same sheet. His work offered a descriptive geography of parts of the 
Highlands that was truly utilitarian; it was the content of the maps rather than their  
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Figure 6.13 [Sketch and description of the proposed Roads from Callander and Loch Tay to Fort 
William and Appin including details of mileage and of inns], by [George Wade] between 1724 and 
1745. Acc.10497 Wade.58m (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of 
Scotland) 
 
appearance that mattered most. In the case of the geography practiced by Wade and other 
military engineers of the Board of Ordnance, military utility functioned as the structuring 
agent and the principle of inclusion and exclusion in their maps and reports. One such survey 
report described in detail the condition of the route between Callander and Loch Tay to Fort 
William and Appin (see Fig 6.13). Wade’s sketch began at the inn at Kilmahog in Perthshire, 
32 miles from Edinburgh by ‘carte way’ and, thereafter, was split into twelve sections of 
distances varying between one and 9 miles. In total, 42½ miles of track were described. In 
addition to distances, Wade indicated where the track needed minor attention from the road 
engineers—‘4 From this to the 5 is about a long mile, a Flat road and dry easily mended’—
or needed to be completely rebuilt—‘7 from this to the 8 Is a road to be viewed and altered. 
It must come straight down from the Hill by the Houses and Cornland’. The geographical 
description provided by Wade was essentially a very short physical, social, and military 
treatise on the route being mapped. The information provided was pertinent to road 
engineers and also to political commanders who were informed whose land the road or 
‘carte’ passed through. Since this identified whether the landowner was for or against 




at Fort William’, for example, ‘is first the Brea of Glencoe, Then all the way is the 
Brea of Lochaber, All moorish road, may be viewed and markt out by Guides the dryest, 
belonges to McDonald of Glencoe, Then the Brea of Lochaber to McDonald of Koppoch’.
683
 






Figure 6.14 ‘A Map of Part of the Highlands’, by [George Wade], between 1726 and 1737. 
Acc.10497 Wade.58c (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland)  
 
 Methods of survey and access to sources for compilation varied between road 
surveyors. Joseph Avery stated, for example, that his 1727 plan of the Great Glen, from Fort 
William to Inverness, was done by actual survey ‘in which the distances are truly Measur’d 
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& the places truly set’.
685
 In contrast, ‘A Map of Part of the Highlands’ (see Fig 6.14) drawn 
by Wade was not done ‘by actual Survey but laid down on the common computed distances 
of places supposing the miles to be of equal length with the miles round about Fort 
William’.
686
 Wade himself admitted that the map ‘may be erroneous […] Strathfillan & on to 
Sterling ought to be laid down more to the SE’. Despite this, he continued: ‘though this is 
design’d only to give a general idea of so much of the country as is here laid down, yet, 
except what is before mention’d, it is thought to be pretty just’. Proposals to make a new 
road from the barracks at Ruthven to Aberdeen—‘which would have open’d a 
Communication from the East Coast into the Highlands’
687
—were never fulfilled. When 
Avery compiled a map in 1735 of part of the intended route over the Grampians, from 
Ruthven to Braemar, he used extracts from surveys he made for the Duke of Gordon and also 
information from Major Caulfeild.
688
 Rather than supplying a separate report, Avery 
included on the map detailed remarks on the nature of the country and also noted the span of 
each bridge necessary to cross the numerous tributaries (see Fig 6.15). Avery’s distinctive 
style makes it possible to attribute his name to another highly detailed map of the country 
around the Murray and Cromarty Firths.
689
 Unlike the previous planning documents, this 
map provides an overview of the geography of the Shires of Inverness, Sutherland, Ross, 
Nairn, and Elgin abutting the Firths; settlements, topography, and ‘civilian’ roads are drawn 
as they then were, not as they were planned to be.   
 In 1740 supervision of road construction devolved to Major Caulfeild. Coinciding 
with the change of personnel were heightened concerns of a Jacobite rising which prompted 
portrayals of Wade’s network of military roads. Between 1742 and 1746, Richard Cooper, 
Thomas Willdey, and William Edgar all produced maps of the ‘Kings Roads made by His 
Excellency General Wade’.
690
 Military commanders must have found these summaries 
extremely useful, assuming they had access to them. Thomas Willdey’s map was dedicated 
to Lieutenant General Henry Hawley, Commander-in-Chief of the Hanoverian Forces in 
Scotland until 1746.
691
 In 1745 Edgar was commissioned by the Government to map the 
King’s Roads (see Fig 6.16). His ‘Map of Perth-Shire’, dedicated to James Murray, second 
Duke of Atholl, included on the verso a list of ‘Roads of Communication Through The 
Highlands With The Rivers, Bridge and adjacent Villages’, from Stirling to Fort Augustus,  
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Figure 6.15 An extract from ‘A Plan of the Country where the New Intended Road is to be made from 
the Barrack at Ruthven in Badenoth to Invercall in Brae Marr’, by Joseph Avery, 1735. Acc.10497 
Wade.58b (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland) 
  
Ruthven, and Inverness, and from Inverness to Fort Augustus and Fort William, although the 
map itself was limited to Perthshire.
692
 During 1745 and the early part of 1746, Edgar 
continued to draught maps of Aberdeen-shire—‘By order of His Royal Highness the Duke of 
Cumberland’—Argyllshire, Dumbarton-shire, and Inverness-shire, showing the roads and 
lochs with named settlements and the principal mountain ranges.
693
 According to Gough, 
‘Mr. Edgar was a very faithful geographer, and did more shires, but his friends could not find 
his papers after he had accompanied the duke of Cumberland [in] 1745, and died of fatigue 
in the Highlands in the beginning of the year 1746’.
694
 
 In estimating the value of Wade’s roads, it must be remembered that they were built 
for strategic reasons, for improving the speed and ease of troop movements between military 
establishments to counter any insurrection. In this, the Jacobites at least felt their political  
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Figure 6.16 Roads mapped by William Edgar in 1746: BL Maps K.Top.48.56. ‘A Map of the Roads 
of Communication through the Highlands’; Maps K.Top.48.57. [the road between Forfar and 
Aberdeen]; Maps K.Top.48.59. ‘The Course of The Kings Road making betwixt Dumbarton and 
Inverary, (so as to Cross no Ferrys)’; Maps K.Top.48.60.a and b. ‘Inverness with The adjacent 
Country, including Nairn upon the East […] and the Kings Road to Fort William upon the South-
west’. 
 
and military purpose was successful for in September 1745 it was reported that ‘some of [the 




 Ironically, as the ’Forty-Five progressed, the Jacobite army benefited by the 
military roads and the Government troops tried to destroy their own constructions. 
Intelligence from London disclosed ‘an Order from Lord Launsdale for breaking up the 




Records of road building 
Parties of regular troops were employed in building the roads which were ‘render’d both 
practicable and Convenient for the March of Your Majesty’s Forces […] and facilitate their 
assembling in one Body, if Occasion should require’.
697
 Between 1726 and 1737, Highland 
companies constructed 259 miles of road and 40 bridges, mostly on existing tracks, from 
Fort William and Dunkeld to Inverness, Crieff to Dalnacardoch, and Dalwhinnie to Fort 
Augustus by the Corrieyairack. In 1740 supervision of road construction devolved to Major 
William Caulfeild who expected his engineers to be ‘thoroughly acquainted with the Country 
and its several Passes & Rivers’ and ‘every Season make an exact Plan of the Road carried 
on under their Inspection’.
698
  By 1767, Caufeild and his engineers were responsible for 
building about 608 miles of roads with another 223 miles in progress. These included the 
roads from Dumbarton to Inveraray, Stirling to Fort William, and Coupar Angus to Fort 
George at Ardersier by way of Braemar and Tomintoul (see Fig 6.17).
699
  
 1749 saw a substantial deployment of manpower in the Highlands with official 
orders for ‘carrying on the Roads in North Britain’.
700
 Caulfeild, as Inspector of the New 
Roads and Bridges in Scotland, was assisted by four engineers—Harry Gordon, James 
Bramham, George Morrison, and George Campbell—to oversee the men employed in 
building and in repairing the military roads.
701
 One thousand four hundred and thirty 
workmen were formed from five regiments stationed in Scotland at the time: 300 from each 
of Guise’s Regiment (the Warwicks) stationed in Aberdeen, the Royal Welch Fusiliers in 
Montrose, Pulteney’s (Somersets) in Perth, Sachville’s (Lancashire Fusiliers) in Glasgow, 
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and 150 men from Ancram’s (South Wales Borders). A further eighty men from the Welch 






Figure 6.17 Distribution of William Caulfeild’s roads, 1740–1767 
 
The orders for the engineers were specific. Each engineer was given profiles of the 
roads under their direction which included details on its depth and layered structure of the 
road and its required breadth. Caulfeild also advised the engineers on ‘what weight of water 
comes down through those Places where Bridges must be made that they may see the same 
properly made to resist the torrents according to his directions’. Annually, in the winter, 
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Caulfeild provided the Board of Ordnance with an account of the work achieved that year. In 
the report, he specified: 
the number of Officers & Men employed on each Road and for what number 
of Days, together with the length and breadth of work done; the Bridges 
made, with a particular account of their Expence [sic]; the quantity of 
powder used in blowing Mines & the expence of Mining with the waste and 
loss of Tools & Implements in the Service and all other contingencies.  
Maps formed an important part of Caulfeild’s reports. They could, in one graphic 
representation, geographically locate the road, describe its linear orientation, give an 
indication of the topography on either side in case the troops and artillery were forced to 
march off-road, indicate possible sites of ambush, and show how much of the road was built 
and by whom. John Archer’s survey of the road between Kinlochleven and Fort William, for 
example, used a key to identify which parts of the road were built by detachments from 
Colonel Battereau’s, General Guise’s, and Colonel Rich’s Regiments between 1748 and 
1750 (see Fig 6.18). The map accompanied ‘Major Caulfeild’s report of the new Roads made 






Figure 6.18 ‘A Survey of the Road made by the Detatchments of Col. Battereau's, Genl. Guise's, and 
Col. Rich's Regiments between Fort William & King-Loch Levan, 1748 and 1750’, by John Archer, 
1750. Maps K.Top.48.66 [a] with a report at Maps K.Top.48.66 [b]. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the 
British Library) 
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With this in mind, the four engineers under Caulfeild’s command were to 
‘endeavour to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the Country and its several 
Passes & Rivers’ and to provide a description of the landscape represented in writing to 
accompany ‘an exact Plan of the Road carried on under their Inspection and what is wanting 
to compleat [sic] it’. The plan, to be made at the end of every road-building season (May to 
September) was to be given ‘only to the General Officer Comanding [sic] in North Britain & 
to the Board of Ordnance’.
704
 These specific instructions both for content and for circulation 
reflect the value of the maps as state secrets for the eyes of governing authorities alone; they 
were not concerned with communicating information of general interest. 
 Harry Gordon’s ‘Survey of Part of the Road from Sterling [sic] to Fort William’, for 
example, comprised four items.
705
 The first item was a report—Gordon’s ‘Remarks on the 
Country between Callender [Callander] and the Head of Loch Lubnegue [Lubnaig], thro’ 
Which the Kings Road was carried’— in which he detailed the topography, including the 
passes into the Highlands, the hills, lochs and rivers, and vegetation cover: 
The Pass itself is only the Breadth of 12 Foot cut thro the Rock for about 40 
Yards in one Place, on the right Hand in going N. is a very steep shaggy Hill 
covered with wild Oaks on the left is a great Precipice at the Foot of which 
runs the Water of Leny over several Rocks in the Middle forming a beautiful 
Cascade, on the other side of this, is likewise Steep Rocks which Shelf up to 
very near the Top of the Hill; all this I have endeavoured to represent in the 
Plan, to make it more easily conceivable it is done in a sort of Perspective.
706
 
The remaining items were maps of this road compiled between 1749 and 1751. The map 
showing the military road along the Water of Leny and Loch Lubnaig was compiled in 1749 
and presented to the Board in January 1750 along with Gordon’s remarks (see Fig 6.19 
left).
707
 Maps of the continuation of the road northwards, from Loch Dochart at the foot of 
Ben More, past Crianlarich and Tyndrum, to the Bridge of Orchy and Loch Tulla, were 
drawn in 1750 and 1751, representing the road work done by five Companies from each of 
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Figure 6.19 Extracts from ‘A Survey of Part of the Road from Sterling to Fort William’, by Harry 
Gordon: (left) Water of Leny at 1: 7,200; (right) between Crianlarich and Tyndrum at 1: 14,400.  
MR 1/479 (3) and (5), respectively. (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 
 Gordon’s later maps introduced not only more colour but a more dramatic use of 
perspective to support his remarks of ‘the Steepness of the Hills and many precipices’ the 
road-builders had to contend with (see Fig 6.20). In general, his style was consistent: roads 
were coloured buff, rivers and lochs sea-green (verdigris), settlements red (carmine), and 
hill-shading at least in outline in Indian Ink (brown wash used on later maps). He used 
stylistic symbols for areas of woodland and parallel hatching for cultivated land which, when 
in colour, was in yellow with a little red. Gordon favoured the cultivated glens for building 
roads, not only to avoid steep banks which meant that the roads had to be shored-up, but the 
river currents were calmer leading to fewer bridges and less chance of flooding so fewer 
drains across the roads were required. In addition, the valleys were more populated and an 
army on the march could avail themselves of quarters and supplies. One important detail not 
shown on Gordon’s maps, and only occasionally mentioned in his report, was mileages to 





Figure 6.20 ‘Plan of Part of the Road from Perth to Fort George between Braemarr and Corgarff 
Barracks, made by 4 Companys of Col. Holmes's, 2 of Lord George Beauclerk's, and 1 of Lieut.-Gen. 
Skelton's Regiments of Foot, in Summer of 1753’, by Harry Gordon. Drawn on four sheets stuck 
together. Maps K.Top.48.74. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
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‘The March of the Royal Army in Scotland’ 
709
 
One of the distinguishing features of the 1745 Rebellion was the movement undertaken by 
both armies. The Hanoverian army, under the command of Sir John Cope, was to seek out 
and destroy the rebel forces before they could march south and before they could be 
reinforced by other Jacobite clans. Cope and his army marched out of Edinburgh on 18 
August 1745. On 20 September, the Hanoverian army reached Prestonpans, to the east of 
Edinburgh, having marched via Inverness, Banff, and Aberdeen without once engaging the 
Jacobites. Meanwhile, the Jacobite army, lead by Charles Edward Stuart, set out from 
Glenfinnan on 21 August (see Fig 7.1 battlefields in Scotland). The armies were on course to 
meet at the Pass of Corrieyairack—an inhospitable terrain that favoured the Jacobite rather 
than the rigidly drilled Hanoverian army—but inaccurate intelligence received by both 
commanders gave rise to strategies that caused the armies to avoid each other. With Cope 
proceeding north to Inverness, the Jacobites seized the opportunity and headed south, 
marching via Stirling and Edinburgh, reaching Prestonpans on 20 September and then on to 
England.
710
 The ’Forty-Five was considered a very newsworthy event and several maps were 
published of the routes taken by both armies. Figure 6.21 is one example, part of a map of 
Great Britain ‘Wherein are delineated the military Operations in that Island during the years 
1745 and 1746, and even the next Routs of the Pr after the Battle of Culloden until his 
Escape to France’. 
 Until 1746, no known maps were produced of the army on the march, although route 
itineraries were often specified in written orders. In 1726, for example, Wade ordered two 
Companies of Colonel Cadogan’s Regiment to march from Aberdeen to Inverness, a journey 




 From Aberdeen to Inverary [Inverurie] or Kintore 12 Miles 
 To Huntley [sic] or Strabogy [Strathbogie]  12  
 To Keith        6 
 To Elgin      12 
 To Forres        8 
 To Nairn      10 
 To Inverness      10   
Cartographically defined strategies for the army’s deployment came into being with the  
                                                 
709
 TNA MR 1/491, the title to Daniel Paterson’s 1746 map  
710
 Hook and Ross 1995. 
711




Figure 6.21 Part of A General Map of Great Britain, Alexander Baillie sculp., published in London 
c.1747. Maps* 1125.(7.) (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library)  
 
arrival, in January 1746, of the Duke of Cumberland to take command of the Hanoverian 
forces in Scotland. The Duke was considered a ‘great military genius’.
712
 He was an 
exponent of military strategy, borne out by the ‘scientific depictions’ of battlefield 
manoeuvres and deployment of troops preserved in the Cumberland Collection today. Part of 
this includes maps of Cumberland’s 1746 campaign in Scotland, with representations of 
three subtypes of eighteenth-century military movement. The first, maps of the order of 
march (some displaying preliminary battle formations); the second, summaries of the army 
on the march; and the third, records of encampments. 
                                                 
712
 Walpole, quoted in Charteris, p. 246  
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 On 30 January 1746, Cumberland wrote to the Secretary of State, Thomas Pelham-
Holles, first Duke of Newcastle, that the army was to march to the relief of Stirling Castle 
and would set out the next day from Edinburgh for Linlithgow. Cumberland was familiar 
with the more mobile strategies practised by the armies in Europe and chose to adopt light 
infantry tactics in Scotland which 
may appear slow and solemn, yet they are so accurate, that no unnecessary 
time being lost in dressing, or correcting distances, they arrive sooner at 
their object than any other, immediately form, and at the same instant 
proceed in perfect order to the attack.
713
 
A copy of the army’s revised order of battle was enclosed. Cumberland explained his tactical 
changes: ‘I put all the Cavalry in the third Line, because by all accounts the Rebels don’t fear 
that, as they do our Fire, & on that alone I must depend’.
714
 Rethinking a battle formation 
had a direct impact on the order of march.  
 An order of march had different forms of expression: written or cartographic 
representation, sometimes both. In the ‘Marche Route of the Army under H:R:H: the Duke 
of Cumberland, from Aberdeen, Old Meldrum & Strathbogie to Inverness’, from the 6 to 16 
April 1746, each division’s itinerary of march was arranged and listed simultaneously, so too 
were their encampments on a particular day (see Fig 6.22).
715
 In other examples, simple 
pictorial plans were drawn employing rectangular symbols in order to distinguish the 
different divisions.
716
 Such abstractions lacked topographical detail; relative position 
dominated over form. By the time Cumberland reached the battlefield at Culloden in April 
1746, he had perfected an ‘Order of March’ that could ‘swing’ straight into battle formation, 
gaining a time advantage over the Jacobites. A ‘Plan of the Battle of Culloden’ by [?Henry] 
Schultz,
717
 Cumberland’s ‘personal draughtsman’, shows how Cumberland’s army 
manoeuvred into the predetermined order of battle while still on the march (see Fig 6.23).
718
 
This map includes rectangular symbols to distinguish the various units, the pecked lines 
                                                 
713
 Dundas 1788, p. 9.  
714
 TNA SP 54/27/55 A, ff. 211–212. A letter from the Duke of Cumberland, enclosing details for the 
relief of Stirling Castle. 
715
 TNA SP 54/30/6 B ‘State Papers Scotland, Series II’, 5 April 1746. 
716
 RLW 730017, a pen, ink and watercolour plan of the ‘Order of Marches’ before the Battle of 
Culloden. The paper has been folded [to include in a letter, pouch, pocket?]. Another fair copy at 
RLW 730018. 
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 Reference is made to the death of a Henry Schultz in TNA WO 47/34 ‘Minutes, Surveyor-
General’, f. 295 verso, 17 October 1749, but Yolande Hodson notes that ‘The only reference to 
Schultz as draughtsman is given in The Court and City Register for the year 1749 London: Printed 
and sold by J. Barnes et al.’, and elsewhere he is recorded only as ‘Mr Schutz’ or ‘Mr Schulz’ 
(Hodson 1988, pp. 6 and 12).   
718
 RLW 730025 ‘Plan of the Battle of Collodden’ [sic] by [?Henry] Schultz, 1746, showing battle 
preliminary information. 
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indicating their manoeuvres, and provides a rough impression of the surrounding topography 
at an approximate scale of 1: 14,400 (1200 feet to an inch). 
   
 
  
Figure 6.22 ‘Route from Aberdeen to Inverness April 5
th
 1746’. SP 54/30/6 B  




Figure 6.23 Part of a ‘Plan of the Battle of Collodden [Culloden]’, 1746, showing: ‘A – the Army on 
its march in 4 Columns & forming in order of Battle; B (not shown) – The March of the Army in 
Order of Battle’. 730025 (The Royal Collection © 2009,  
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II) 
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General maps summarising the march of Cumberland’s army in northern Scotland 
were compiled by Daniel Paterson and constitute post-war records of events.
719
 Each shows 
military details—the site of engagement at Culloden, lines of movement, and 
encampments—superimposed on a relatively small-scale base map (between one and two 
miles to an inch). One of Paterson’s original maps extends from Cullen in the east to the Isle 
of Skye in the west,
720
 presumably covering the period from the 9 or 10 April when the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions camped at Cullen,
721
 to sometime after 26 May 1746 
when Cumberland set up camp at Fort Augustus.
722
 The map records the encampments 
(Cullen, Elgin, Alves, Nairn, Inverness, Dores, and Fort Augustus) and Culloden battle lines 
in colour whilst the topography is drawn in Indian Ink and grey wash. The route between the 
camps is shown as a road defined by two parallel lines whereas another of Paterson’s maps 
clearly shows the march of the army in four columns.
723
 The camps—at Fochabers, Alves 
between Elgin and Forres, Nairn, and Inverness—on this map are shown forming from and 
into the four columns of march. 
 Laying-out encampments was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General; 
Lieutenant-Colonel David Watson was appointed to this role in Scotland in 1745.
724
 The 
Quartermaster General was expected to reconnoitre and report on the suitability of sites for 
encamping or billeting troops, usually accompanied by a map or sketch of the site and 
arrangement of the camp. Several maps of the encampments during the 1746 campaign 
reside in the Cumberland Collection although it is difficult to tell at what stage they were 
drawn: whether they reflect the planning stage or are records of the camps once they were set 
up. Certainly none was compiled by Watson nor do they include notes referring to the 
advantages (or disadvantages) of the chosen sites. William Eyres, a Practitioner Engineer,
725
 
drew large-scale plans of encampments at Cullen (11 April 1746), Speymouth (12 April), 
Alves (13 April), Nairn (14 April), Dores at the north end of Loch Ness (23 May), and Fort 
Augustus (26 May).
726
 All retain the same style: the topography is drawn in Indian Ink and 
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 TNA MR 1/491 (two copies) and RLW 730022: the ‘March of the Royal Army’ in Scotland. 
720
 TNA MR 1/491 (1) is likely the original and (2) a later, unfinished copy. 
721
 See Figure 6.7 ‘Route from Aberdeen to Inverness April 5
th
 1746’, TNA SP 54/30/6 B. 
722
 RLW 7330047 is a plan of the camp on the 26 May 1746, drawn by William Eyres. 
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 RLW 730022. 
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 Watson was appointed Quartermaster to the troops under General Ligonier in November 1745. He 
was ‘a good deal hurried’ in marking out camps at various locations at a time when there was ‘severe 
Weather for ye Soldiers, but They say They are to be fortified agst [sic] the Cold by additional 
Jackets, & some spirits to be carried alongst wt ‘em’ (NRAS 3246, Vol. 34, letter 96, John Gordon to 
Robert (Robin) Dundas, 16 November 1745). I am grateful to Rachel Hewitt for directing my 
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 TNA WO 54/209, pp. 10–12. 
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 RLW 730012, 730014, 730015, 730016, 730044, and 730047. An unsigned plan of the camp at 
Inverness on 6 May 1746 can be found at RLW 730033.  
 223 
pencil with an occasional river or coastline in buff wash. The formation of the Royal Army 
encampments is shown as diagonally-dissected rectangles, one half coloured in red ink; for 
most of the plans, only the Duke’s headquarters and the ‘Grand Guard’ are labelled, the plan 
of the camp at Cullen also includes text to identify the marches of the first and second 
columns. Another plan of the camp at Speymouth, by Paterson, shows the ‘Rebbells 
Barracks’ west of the Spey which are not included on Eyres’ plan.
727
 Paterson enlarged the 
detail of the camps at Cullen (see Fig 6.24), Nairn, Inverness, Dores, and Fort Augustus in a 
series of insets along the base of his map of the ‘March of the Royal Army in Scotland’.
728
 
He identified the regiments with coloured ink and labels, and the ‘Grand Guards’, although 
the Duke’s residence—in Cullen itself—is not marked in this example. Interestingly, the 
rigid formation of encampments—usually straight parallel lines of regimental units—prior to 
battle were in marked contrast to post-battle encampments. The encampment at Fort 
Augustus (see Fig 6.25), for example, was positioned along the River Tarff, designed for a 
prolonged stay rather than set out in ‘battle ready’ formation where the army units could 




Figure 6.24 An inset of ‘an Exact Plan’ of the Royal Army Camp at Cullen on 11 April 1746, by 
Daniel Paterson, part of his map of the ‘March of the Royal Army in Scotland […] and the Country 
from Cullen to the Isle of Skie’. MR 1/491 (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew)  
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 RLW 730013 for Daniel Paterson’s plan; 730012 for William Eyres. 
728




Figure 6.25 An extract from the ‘Plan of the Camp at Fort Augustus’, by William Eyres, 1746.  
730047 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II) 
  
The ‘King’s Roads’ were planned, built, and mapped for strategic reasons. The 
concern to establish a road network was, initially at least, for military reasons, for the 
movement of infantry, artillery, munitions, and stores. Politically, the roads were a means of 
access, the maps a means of imagining and depicting access from afar in order to impose 
military order. Their continued strategic purpose was highlighted in 1808 when military 
contingencies were being drawn to counter a Napoleonic invasion. The military concern was 
to redeploy troops from Inverness  and Fort George at Ardersier to the south of Scotland and 
to consider strategies for concentrating the forces in the north to protect the Moray Firth. 
 Brigadier General Dirom, Deputy Quarter-Master General in North Britain at the 
time, wrote a report ‘relative to the Routes by which Troops may march’.
729
 To accompany 
the report was a map of the routes—‘enlarged and considerably improved by Major Johnston 
[Assistant QMG], who has taken great pains to make it correct and satisfactory’.
730
 
Unfortunately, the map appears to be lost but the report gives a clear indication of what 
                                                 
729
 TNA WO 30/61, f. 1 of the report, 14 June 1808. 
730
 TNA WO 30/61, doc. 22, letter to accompany the report, 5 October 1808. 
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would have been shown. Three routes—‘distinct and separate from each other’—by which to 
travel south were identified. The first was the ‘principal Military Road leading through the 
Center [sic] of the Highlands’, from Inverness and Fort George by way of Aviemore and 
Dalnacardoch and thence to Perth, Stirling, or to Glasgow. The planned route was by way of 
Wade’s military roads, at least as far as Perth and Stirling. The second route was by another 
of the military roads, from Inverness and Fort George to Grantown, Braemar and thence to 
Perth: one of Caulfeild’s military roads. The third route, ‘through a much lower part of the 
Country’, was by way of Nairn, Fochabers, and Huntly to Aberdeen; in parts, Caulfeild’s 
military road. In conclusion to his report, Dirom stated that ‘With regard to the resources and 
improvement of Scotland, it may be satisfactory to state, that troops may now march 
conveniently through many parts of the Country’.
731
 The roads had been considerably 
improved since Wade and Caulfeild’s time but, this aside, their strategic vision and 
meticulous planning of routes to open up the Highlands cannot be denied.  
 
 
‘Military’ Topographical Maps 
Until 1746, topographical maps in the Board’s possession were either concentrated around 
fortifications,
732
 or were small-scale representations of the country as a whole.
733
 In the 
‘King’s Library’, however, the extensive geographical collection dating from the mid-
sixteenth century included—in addition to manuscript and printed maps and views, and 
military plans and maritime charts—‘topographical ephemera’.
734
 Incorporated in this 
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 Barber 2005, p. 263. The King’s Library was built-up by George III during the sixty years of his 
reign (1760–1820) and has been described as ‘one of the finest libraries ever created by one man’ 
(Miller 1973, p. 125). It was presented to the British Museum by his son and successor, George IV, as 
‘a gift to the British Nation’ and transferred there in 1828. The King’s Geographical and 
Topographical collections became the principal foundations of the British Library’s map collections, 
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category were manuscript maps of the lowlands of Scotland by John Adair and William 
Edgar, and printed maps of North Britain by John Elphinstone with manuscript additions 
showing the routes taken and posts occupied by the King’s Army. Both Edgar and 
Elphinstone’s maps were based on some of Adair’s seventeenth-century surveys. The 
collection also includes what has been described as ‘one of the most important, early and 
outstanding cartographic statements about Scotland’, the Military Survey of Scotland.
735
    
 Adair was commissioned by the Scottish Privy Council in 1681 to complete a series 
of ‘County Maps of Scotland’.
736
 The intention was for his maps to be engraved and 
published but progress was slow and many of his surveys remained in manuscript. The trail 
of Adair’s surviving manuscripts is not always clear. Consequently, knowledge of their 
contemporary use is limited; the extent to which the Board of Ordnance referred to Adair’s 
maps, as with his charts, remains open to conjecture. After his death, his widow Jean 
disposed of many of his manuscripts and, whilst some were acquired by engravers such as 
Richard Cooper, in 1723 thirty-nine printed and manuscript maps were delivered to the 
Barons of the Edinburgh Exchequer Office with claims that these were the complete record 
of Adair’s works left to her.
737
 In April 1764, however, one of Adair’s sons was ‘desired’ by 
the Board of Ordnance to return the ‘Surveys of Scotland […] in his possession […] being 
the property of the Crown and Ordered to be lodged in the Office of Ordnance’.
738
 Today, 
Adair’s maps and charts can be found preserved in the map collections of the National 
Library of Scotland, the Bodleian Library, the British Library, the Admiralty Library, 
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thickness). The manuscript military maps and plans of Scotland within this geographical section 
number c.215. The King’s practice of retaining important eighteenth-century maps and plans referred 
to him by the Board of Ordnance is demonstrated less by maps of Scotland than those of the colonies 
and Europe. See Skelton 1956; Wallis 1973; Barber 1990, 2003 and 2005.  
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 Cash 1907 provides a bibliography of twelve of Adair’s manuscript topographical surveys which 
were deposited in the Sibbald archive along with the Pont and Gordon manuscript maps in 1723. The 
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Figure 6.26 Graphic index of John Adair’s surviving county maps of Scotland, c.1685–1700. (1) BL 
Maps K.Top.48.44 (year: 1685); (2) Maps K.Top.48.43 (1686; believed to be a copy of Pont’s 
‘Galloway’)
740
; (3) Maps K.Top.48.42 (1690); (4) Admiralty Library Oa 03 [12 and 13] (c.1686–
1698); (5) BL Maps K.Top.50.70 (1700); (6) Maps K.Top.48.48.a and b published with 
‘improvements’ (1745). 
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 Moir 1973. 
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 Four of Adair’s manuscript maps of Scotland’s counties, drawn between 1685 and 
about 1700, form part of the King’s Topographic Collection at the British Library.
741
 Two 
more charts of the Rivers Don and Dee in Aberdeenshire are in the Admiralty Library 
collection, the sheets covering the country in the vicinity of Aberdeen.
742
 Figure 6.26 
provides a graphic index of the coverage of these maps. Although the sheet lines imply a 
considerable overlap, this was generally not reflected in Adair’s maps; usually most of the 
detail stopped at the boundaries of the counties given in the map’s title, with only the 
coastline and sometimes the major rivers continuing into adjoining areas. The main 
exception to this was Adair’s 1690 ‘Map of the South part of Scotland containing the Rivers 
Clyde, Forth, &c.’ (sheet 3) which included detail from all the maps of the counties in the 
southern lowlands of Scotland on a large sheet (595 x 480 mm) but, at a scale of about 1: 
275,000, more generalised than the remaining large-scale maps (with scales between 1: 
42,240 and 1: 253,440).
743
 The borders of this map are marked with longitudinal and 
latitudinal gradations with divisions for every one minute and a grid covering the whole 
sheet for every 5 minutes. The ‘Map of Strathearn, Stormount, and Carse of Gourie, with the 
Country about Stirling’ (sheet 5)
744
 appears to be unfinished but otherwise Adair’s maps 
provided general geographic information of use to a mobile army: roads and bridges for 
access; settlements for lodging the troops (especially for officers anxious about their 
comfort) or topography for encampments; forests for firewood; and cultivated areas, lakes 
and tributaries for ensuring the army was well provisioned whilst on campaign. 
Were Adair’s maps, therefore, of use to military commanders in Scotland? Wade 
may have found them so when considering ‘the better Quartering His Majesty’s Infantry in 
the Low Country of Scotland, as well as to secure them against the Insults of the Populace in 
times of a general Dissatisfaction’. He explained that  
The Regiment whose Station is in the South-west part of Scotland may have 
their head Quarters at Glasgow in a Barrack capable of containing 5 
Companys: And the other five may be sent severally to Air [sic], Irwin, 
Hamilton, Dunbarton or any other adjacent Towns for the Protection and 
Support of the Officers of His Majesties Revenue and may be able in a short 
time as Occasion may require to March and joyn the Regiment at their head 
Quarters. The same thing may be done at Edinburgh, Perth or Dundee.
745
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 BL Maps K.Top.48.42, K.Top.48.43, K.Top.48.44, K.Top.50.70, and K.Top.48.65 (‘High & Low 
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 Admiralty Library Oa 03 [sheets 12 and 13]. 
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 BL Additional Ms. King’s 101, ff. 21–22, 31 January 1726.  
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Arguably, Adair’s maps of route ways and settlements in the Lowlands did have a value for 
military purposes, but the lack of corresponding maps for the Highlands created a rationale 




Figure 6.27 ‘A Map of The Firth and River Forth, with Part of The Shires of Lothian Survey’d by Mr 
John Adair F.R.S. And Tweeddale and Eterick-Forrest Survey’d by Will. Edgar’ in 1740. 
Maps K.Top.48.45. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library) 
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 In the 1740s, Adair’s topographical surveys formed the basis of several maps created 
for and used by the state and commanders of the Hanoverian forces in Scotland. William 
Edgar, a county surveyor and self-described architect, first compiled a map that combined 
Adair’s survey of ‘The Firth and River Forth, with Part of The Shires of Lothian’, with his 
own survey of ‘Tweeddale and Eterick-Forrest’ (see Fig 6.27 and Fig 6.28 sheet 1).
746
 
Edgar’s alignment of roads, along with the delineations of physical features and villages, 
were more sketched than precisely surveyed.
747
 In 1743, Edgar compiled two further maps in 
the style of Adair. The first, ‘A New and Correct Map Of Loch-Lomund, with the Country 
Circumjacent’ was constructed because ‘the Maps of the Shires of Scotland composed by 
Hermon Moll are not only deficient but vastly Erroneous in most places’.
748
 The second, ‘A 
[…] Map of Stirling-Shire and Clackmannan-Shire’,
749
 was possibly based on Adair’s 
‘accurate and particular survey’of Clackmannan-shire and part of Stirlingshire which he had 
presented to the Privy Council as a ‘specimen’ of his proposed county maps.
750
 
Figure 6.28 is a graphic index of Edgar’s topographic surveys of the shires that form 
part of the King’s Topographic Collection. Included in the diagram are sheet lines for three 
unfinished, unsigned maps of Argyllshire; two can possibly be attributed to Edgar based on 
similarities in hand-writing styles.
751
 The third, the country between Loch Fyne and Loch 
Lomond,
752
 has no type with which to compare it, and the land height, rather than shown in 
Edgar’s (and Adair’s) characteristic ‘hillock’ style, is represented by hachured lines drawn in 
plan. As all these topographic sheet lines suggest, Edgar’s surveys did little to extend Adair’s 




 In 1744, John Elphinstone entered the Military Branch of the Office of Ordnance as 
a Practitioner Engineer.
754
 Although later responsible for a number of picturesque views of  
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 TNA WO 54/209, pp. 10–12, provides a list of the Military Establishment and their pay as of 
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Figure 6.28 Graphic index of William Edgar’s county maps of Scotland, 1740–1746. (1) BL Maps 
K.Top.48.45; (2) Maps K.Top.49.5.1; (3) Maps K.Top.50.93.1; (4) Maps K.Top.48.47; (5) Maps 
K.Top.50.69; (6) Maps K.Top.50.72.1; (7) Maps K.Top.49.5.2. Unsigned and unfinished (shown with 
pecked sheet lines): (8) Maps K.Top.48.46; (9) Maps K.Top.49.26; (10) Maps K.Top.49.27. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
WO 54/210, pp. 21–25), and was next in line for a promotion to Engineer Extraordinary in 1752 
(TNA WO 54/211, pp. 25–29).  
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Scottish castles and fortresses,
755
 Elphinstone was first acknowledged for providing a 
‘considerable improvement in the map of Scotland’.
756
 Gough described Elphinstone’s New 
and Correct Mercator’s Map of North Britain (see Fig 6.29) as the ‘first attempt to settle the 
geography of Scotland’.
757
 The map—‘carefully laid down from the Latest Surveys and Most 
approved Observations’— included, amongst others, reference to Adair’s charts of the east 
coast from Berwick to Aberdeen, the Clyde and south-west Scotland, and Edgar’s map of 
Peebles-shire and manuscript maps of small parts of the Highlands.
758
 There was, however, 
contemporary criticism of Elphinstone’s map. Thomas Jefferys considered that although 
‘The projection of a land map should certainly be drawn according to the gradual declension 
of the meridians’, Elphinstone’s map ‘being made on Mercator’s projection, which was 
designed merely for sea charts, the whole surface of Scotland is distorted, and the geography 
needlessly confounded’.
759
 In spite of misrepresenting the Great Glen as bent when it was 
known to be straight,
760
 Moir notes that ‘the map is more accurate than the criticisms 
suggest; the longitude is generally a degree too far east, […] not an unusual error at that 
time; latitude on the other hand is remarkably accurate’.
761
  
 Events during and just after the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion were to make the British 
Government acutely sensible of ‘the daily want of proper maps of North Britain’.
762
 In a 
letter of December 1745, General Hawley, on his way to take command of the Government 
troops in Scotland, wrote: ‘I am going in the dark; for Marechal Wade won’t let me have his 
map; he says that his majesty has the only one to fellow it. I could wish it was either copied 
or printed, or that his majesty could please lend it to me’.
763
 The map Hawley alludes to may 
be Lemprière’s 1731 ‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland’ (see Fig 4.3), of which  
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 Moir 1973, p. 86. 
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 Gough 1780, vol.2, p. 586. 
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of Sept. 1. 1746’). Adair and Edgar are identified from a note on the map: ‘As the Geography of this 
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the Alterations are Mr. Adair, Sr. Alexr. Murray of Stanhope, Captn. Bruce, Willm Edgar, Alexr 
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Whole is made’. 
759
 Gough 1780, vol. 2, p. 586. 
760
 George Wade’s map of Scotland—NLS Acc.10497 Wade.58a—shows the Great Glen as a straight 
line, as does Clement Lemprière’s 1731 map of ‘A Description of the Highlands of Scotland’ (see Fig 
4.3), BL Maps K.Top.48.12. and NLS Acc.11104. Map Rol.a.42, which was compiled from 
information collected by Wade during his reconnaissance of the Highlands in 1724.  
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Figure 6.29 A New & Correct Mercator’s Map of North Britain, by John Elphinstone, in 1745.  
Scale c.1: 850,000. Maps K.Top.48.18. (Courtesy of The British Library) 
 
there were two copies.
764
 Another letter, this time from Andrew Mitchell, under-Secretary of 
State for Scotland, to Robert (Robin) Dundas, third Lord Arniston and Solicitor General for 
Scotland, dated 7 November 1745, provides further proof that maps for military purpose 
                                                 
764
 BL Maps K.Top.48.12. and NLS Acc.11104. Map Rol.a.42. 
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were in limited supply: ‘I have procured a copy of a map of the Lothians which will be 
published in a day or two, if you think proper to give it to General Handyside as a present 
from yourself I fancy he will like it, as the Geography of our Country is very little known’.
765
 
He may have been referring to John Adair’s map of the Lothians (see Fig 6.26 sheet 6).
766
 
Printed in 1745 ‘With some improvements by a Gentleman’, the map includes the south-
bound marches and encampments of the Jacobite army in the lead up to the Battle of 
Prestonpans on 21 September 1745.
767
 
 One map used by officers of both armies during the rebellion was Elphinstone’s 
aforementioned Mercator’s Map of North Britain (see Fig 6.29).
768
 Lieutenant-Colonel 
David Watson, Quartermaster-General to the army in Scotland, was responsible for billeting 
the troops and used the map of North Britain to mark the ‘posts proposed to be occupied by 
the regular troops in the Highlands […] with the particular Districts of Each Command’.
769
 
Copies were variously annotated to show the routes of military roads and locations of camps, 
barracks and defensive posts: ‘Red, Quarters of the Marching Regiments & Dragoons; 
Green, Quarters of Ld. Lowdons Highlanders & Ld. John Murrays Additional Companys' 
(see Fig 6.30).
770
 But the map, at a scale of approximately 1: 850,000 (13 miles to an inch), 
was really too small-scale to provide the topographical detail necessary for tactical and 
ordnance decisions required of a military map. The lack, however, of a detailed map of 
Scotland—a military topographical survey—meant that Elphinstone’s map was regularly 
used by army commanders until at least 1750.
771
 
 Elphinstone’s map served another purpose in the aftermath of the uprisings: as a 
post-war record of events that commemorated Hanoverian victories and saw the 
marginalisation and aesthetic subjugation of rebellious Scots. The new version of 
Elphinstone’s map was dedicated to the Earl of Albemarle who succeeded the Duke of 
Cumberland as Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Scotland in 1746.
772
 Albemarle was, by 
all accounts, reluctant to take the command and to stay in Scotland: it was ‘this cursed  
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 NRAS 3246, Vol. 34, f.79.  
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it was a memorial map with no evidentiary record that it was used by Cumberland to plan his route for 
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 John Elphinstone may be responsible for the ‘improvements’; in 1744 he published A New and 
Correct map of the Lothians from Mr. Adair's observations (see NLS EMS.s.738(8)). 
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Figure 6.30 Military roads and camps marked on A New & Correct Mercator’s Map of North Britain, 
by John Elphinstone, in 1745. Scale c.1: 850,000. MPF 1/247 (Courtesy of The National Archives, 
Kew) 
 
country’ in almost every letter he wrote.
773
 Prebble wrote: ‘On the whole he behaved with 
tact and judgement but his views on what should be done to suppress the rebellious spirit of 
the Scots were conventional and matched his general disapproval of the country’.
774
 Such 
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 Prebble 1961, p. 242. Although Albemarle was unhappy at being in Scotland, others were pleased 
about his command. David Watson wrote to Robert (Robin) Dundas: ‘Ld Albemarle is to Command 
which gives me infinite Joy because I am perfectly satisfyd [sic] he will most punctually obey HRH 
[the Duke of Cumberland’s] commands, viz to proceed always in the way he has begun’ (NRAS 3246, 
Vol. 35, letter 34, Fort Augustus, July 1746).  
774
 Prebble 1961, p. 242.  
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conventions included carrying forward Cumberland’s plan of pacification with repairs to 
fortifications and new road building. 
 




Figure 6.31 Marginal scenes from ‘A New Map of North Britain Done by Order of The Right 
Honourable the Earl of Albemarle Commander in Chief of his Majesty’s Forces in Scotland’, by John 
Elphinstone Practitioner Engineer, 1746, at a scale of c.1: 380,160. (Top left) title cartouche, (top 
right) list of the Highland Clans for and against Government, and (bottom) scale.  
Maps K.Top.48.22. (Courtesy of The British Library)     
 
In the top left of the new map, a decorative title cartouche (see Fig 6.31 top left) 
depicting a conjunction of maps and military—a Roman soldier referring to a map, its legend 
listing the King’s roads and the army’s routes, a pair of dividers, shovels, and military 
arms—precedes inset views of Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton and Blackness Castles. 
During the Jacobites’ march south in 1745, the towns of Edinburgh and Stirling fell to the 
rebels but the castles, garrisoned by Hanoverian troops, held out. Other insets include the 
road over the Corrieyairack Pass, a feat of Hanoverian engineering but used to effect by the 
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Jacobites in their surge southwards, and a plan of the Battle of Culloden. Albemarle’s 
aspiration of bringing the leaders of the rebellious clans to Hanoverian justice is reflected in 
the chained figure of a Highland nobleman (possibly Lord George Murray) at the base of a 
list of Clans for and against Government in the ’Forty-Five; his ‘disapproval of the country’ 
reflected by the chained figure of Lord Lovat alongside (see Fig 6.31 top right). The original 
image of Simon, Lord Lovat was both designed and engraved by William Hogarth who 
etched Lovat’s portrait on his way to trial and eventual execution, and it is this image that 
Elphinstone has copied for Albemarle’s map.
775
 Knowing what awaits him, Lovat is busy at 
work upon his memoirs. Hogarth has drawn him in the attitude of ‘enumerating by his 
fingers, the rebel forces—“such a general had so many men,” &c’.
776
 The map’s scale is 
depicted on the side of a tomb on top of which is a jumble of surveying equipment and 
cannonballs, and below a Highland warrior burying a comrade (see Fig 6.31 bottom). At a 
relatively small-scale of c.1: 380,160 (6 miles to an inch), the map remained a summary of 
events rather than an authoritative tool in the prosecution of military action. 
 As Harley pointed out, ‘much military topographical surveying in the mid-eighteenth 
century was inspired by hindsight—after events had demonstrated how better maps would 
have been useful in a particular campaign’.
777
 This was certainly the case in Scotland in the 
wake of the 1745 rebellion. General Hawley was not the only commander to find himself ‘in 
the dark’ for the paucity of adequate maps of Scotland. The Duke of Cumberland and the 
Generals under his command had also found themselves ‘greatly embarassed [sic] for the 
want of a proper Survey of the Country’ during the campaign of 1746.
778
 After the Battle of 
Culloden, John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, was actively involved in Hanoverian 
punitive operations in the Highlands. Charged with the task of hunting down rebels in 
Inverness-shire, Campbell’s only topographical reference was to relevant pages in a well-
worn copy of Blaeu’s 1654 Theatrum orbis terrarum sive Atlas novus.
779
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 Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat (1667–1747) was described as a ‘rogue’s rogue’. As a young man he had 
fought for King William and Mary but betrayed their cause and was outlawed for high treason in 
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 A military survey of Scotland was first conceived by the Quartermaster-General, 
David Watson.
780
 This role required Watson to supply the Duke and his Generals with 
geographical information of Scotland for their planning of the systematic suppression of 
Jacobite loyalists and establishing a military strategy for enforcing the rule of law. In order 
to properly fulfil this duty, Watson had to know Scotland and suggested the military survey 
as a means by which the country could be ‘thoroughly explored and laid open’.
781
 Watson 
was employed as Chief Director of the survey between 1747 and 1755, and William Roy, 
then his assistant, its principal surveyor.
782
  
Although proposed as a military survey with the backing of Government, in its 
production, it was poorly supported by the Board of Ordnance—both financially and with 
personnel. Watson wrote in June 1748 how ‘the Surveying Scheme, […] has given me 
Infinite Pain’.
783
 On the same day, Charles Bush, an ‘Under Minister’ to the Board of 
Ordnance, informed William Skinner, Director of Engineers in North Britain, that ‘the 
Number of Engineers and others intended to have been employ’d under Lt Col. Watson in 
Surveying the Highlands south of the Chain, [was] being reduced’.
784
 For the first two years, 
Roy worked alone on the Survey.
785
 In 1749, John Manson, recently promoted from the 
Drawing Room to Practitioner Engineer, assisted him.
786
 The following year, in 1750, 
Colonel Napier, Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of Cumberland, informed Sir John Ligonier, 
Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, of ‘His Royal Highness having consented to Lieutenant 
Colonel Watson’s having three more Assistants in the Survey he is making of Scotland’. The 
three junior engineers, recent graduates of the Royal Military Academy rather than highly 
experienced engineers were Hugh Debbeig, a Practitioner Engineer employed the previous 
year in surveying the proposed road from Newcastle to Carlisle, and John Williams and 
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 Roy 1785.  
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 Roy 1785, p. 386. According to Smith 1779, image 225, ‘a quarter-master general ‘should be a 
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 BL Additional Ms. 17499, pp. 130–131: a letter from David Watson to William Skinner, 7 June 
1748.  
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 BL Additional Ms. 17499, p. 132: a letter from Charles Bush to William Skinner, 7 June 1748. 
Major William Floyer, based in Edinburgh, was to have been employed on the Survey but was instead 
sent as on overseer of works at Fort Augustus (TNA WO 47/34, f. 61).   
785
 Watson was busy elsewhere in Scotland, assisting General William Skinner with rebuilding the 
Government fortifications destroyed during the 1745 Rebellion (BL Additional Ms. 17499). 
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 TNA WO 47/34, f. 457 verso, 8 December 1749: John Manson’s ‘Memorial’ in application for a 
‘Vacancy on the Home Establishment of a Practitioner Engineer’.  
 239 
William Dundas, both cadets attending to John Muller at the Academy.
787
 A month later, 
[Thomas] Howse left the Academy to join the Survey and, in 1752, David Dundas, at the age 
of fifteen, was also employed as an assistant surveyor in Scotland.
788
 
 The Survey was conducted in two parts. The north of Scotland, including the 
Highlands, was surveyed between 1747 and 1752 and resulted in a ‘protracted copy’ and a 
‘fair copy’ of the composite map.
789
 Between 1752 and 1755, the Lowlands were surveyed 
and a ‘protracted copy’ of the south of Scotland was produced (no fair copy was made).
790
 
Whilst the survey parties were responsible for recording and sketching data in the field, Paul 
Sandby, acknowledged as the ‘father’ of English watercolour art, was the ‘chief Draftsman 
of the fair Plan’.
791
 Two further draughtsmen completed the full compliment of artists: 
Charles Tarrant, whose exceptional cartographic style was highly commended by the Board 
of Ordnance and prolifically displayed in his work for William Skinner,
792
 and John 
Pleydell.
793
 The Survey artists prepared the original protraction using the note- and 
sketchbooks compiled in the field by the surveyors. It formed the basis of the fair copy. 
Differences between the original protraction and fair copy can, in part, be attributed to the 
draughtsmen adding detail from other sources, including any military maps stored at 
Edinburgh Castle at the time.  
 The difference between the fair-drawn map of the north and the original copy of the 
south of Scotland is striking. Figure 6.32 shows Dumbarton and the area directly to the north 
as it is represented in the two copies. The original protractions were drawn in the most part 
in black ink with very few features in colour. The Highlands, or fair copy, abounds with 
colours that reflect the prevailing military colour schemes and conventions: red was used for 
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 NRAS RH1/2/523, p. 2. 
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Figure 6.32 ‘The Military Survey of Scotland’, depicting Dumbarton in the northern ‘Fair Copy’ (left) 




buildings and man-made structures, brown for roads, blue-green for water, green for 
woodland, yellow for cultivated ground, and buff for moorland. Hill features were drawn in 
the emerging style of the time, using hachured lines to indicate the direction of the slope and 
changing tones to differentiate the gradient.
795
 The relatively few symbols are stylised 
representations of trees, tilled fields, moorland, and sands or shoals. Other features such as 
mills and churches were shown sparingly. In its representation, the Military Survey reflected 
the engineers’ Enlightenment understanding that surveying was both a mathematical practice 
and a painterly pursuit, and that surveying had close connections with landscape painting.
796
 
 Notably, the maps were not graduated for latitude and longitude, nor presented with 
a scale statement. Arrowsmith determined their scale as one inch to 1000 yards (1: 36,000) 
which was corroborated by a small map entitled ‘the Great Map, shewing the King’s Road’ 
(see Fig 6.33), drawn by William Roy in 1753, with a manuscript note referring to scale:  
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 ‘The Roy Military Survey’ (1747–1755) on the NLS website 
(http://www.nls.uk/maps/roy/index.html), sheets 19 (‘Protracted Copy’) and 65 (‘Fair Copy’). The 
original maps are held in the British Library at Maps K.Top.48.25-1.a-f. [1.b–c]   
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Figure 6.33 ‘Part of the Reduction from the Great Map, shewing the Kings Road which is express'd 
by a Red Line & the Country Roads by a Brown Line’, by [William Roy], c.1753, at a scale of  
1: 144,000 (12,000 feet to an inch) Maps K.Top.48.64 (Courtesy of the Trustees of the  
British Library) 
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‘The Great Map is 3000 feet to an inch, & the Reduction is ¼ or 12000’.
797
 The former was 
less than the scale recommended by Watson in his instructions: ‘Every Representation must 
be laid down to a particular fixed Scale, […] General sketches of a Country may be laid 
down to a scale of two Inches to a mile’ (1: 31,680).
798
 There is no explanation as to why the 
Military Survey was drawn to a slightly smaller scale than that recommended; it could 
simply be due to a rationalisation of the separate traverses into the collated protraction. 
In 1755, work on the ‘Military Survey of Scotland’ came to an end when the Survey 
personnel were called away to the impending outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756–
1763) between Britain and France.
799
 The outbreak of this War renewed Jacobite hopes of an 
invasion of England and a corresponding uprising in Scotland by Irish and Scottish ‘Rebel’ 
Regiments. In a letter to the Lord Advocate, John Forbes wrote: ‘I am very well Convinced 
That none of them will be very rash to engadge [sic] in anoyr Rebellion, tho’ I should be 
very sorry if this part of the Country (I mean the highlands) be not look’d very well after & 
some Regts kept Constantly among them’. If a rebellion was to arise, Forbes was adamant 
that Watson, due to ‘his knowledge & ability sp[ent] in the manadgement [sic] of affairs in 
Scotland which he has made more his study than any man alive [and] knows every Corner of 
the Kingdom’ should be dispatched back to Scotland, it being possible to ‘Dispense wt his 
service elsewhere’.
800
    
Watson’s knowledge of Scotland came from his surveying activities on behalf of the 
Board of Ordnance (although he was not an Ordnance engineer) as well as his access to the 
Military Survey. We know he used Elphinstone’s Mercator’s map of Scotland to plan army 
posts and troop deployment but the Survey provided him with fresh intelligence of the 
country from which to plan troop dispositions. An encompassing picture of the terrain was 
vital to its effective use. Roy later explained why: ‘The nature of a country will always, in a 
great degree, determine the general principles upon which every war there must be 
conducted […] yet while the ranges of mountains, the long extended valleys, and remarkable 
rivers, continue the same, the reasons of war cannot essentially change’.
801
 Accurately 
mapping the topography and drainage was therefore the principal concern of the engineers. 
Likewise the road network since this was the army’s main source of mobility. Roads, 
however, were depicted with variable accuracy and inconsistently from one sheet to the next. 
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Some roads stopped at the edge of a sheet and failed to continue onto the next, the road south 
west of Culloden for example.
802
 The drawing specification varied as well, sometimes roads 
were shown as two parallel lines, other times just one; some were coloured brown, others a 
dark grey.
803
 Keeping up with Caulfeild’s road building programme must have presented 
particular problems for the surveyors and frequently provoked incorrect delineations. On the 
route between Tomintoul and the River Spey, for example, the Military Survey depicts the 
road crossing at Glenlochy and heading north towards Craiginacash (Creagan a’ Chaise).
804
 
Harry Gordon’s 1754 map of ‘Part of the New Road from Perth to Fort George’ shows the 
road crossing at Croft, upriver and south of Glenlochy, the road then proceeding due west.
805
 
Perhaps the three subsequent reductions of the Military Survey were intended to correct 






Maps were vital tools of access to the British army in Scotland in the eighteenth century. 
Troop movements for the purpose of gathering intelligence, policing the Highlands, and for 
marching to sites of conflict, generated a need for explicit cartographical materials in order 
to formalise strategic plans. Maps were not only prepared in order to plan troop 
deployments, they were also commissioned to record particular events. This was often the 
case after a mobile military campaign such as the ’Forty-Five. The surviving archive 
includes two hundred and two maps primarily concerned with military movement; they form 
22% of the total archive. They also form an eclectic group: both terrestrial and coastal maps 
are included, as are linear and topographical surveys, and maps offering proposals for route 
ways and those that have been used and record troop movements. As a genre of military 
mapping, they define a change in mapping technologies reflecting the change from static 
fortification to more mobile imperatives and the government’s evolving approach to the 
problem of Jacobite insurrection.  
 The maps of military movement are united by their function rather than by their 
physical form and cartographic conventions. However, the cartographic records in the 
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surviving archive do allow some sub-division of this principal group, into: marine charts 
including coastal and inland waterways, road and route maps which form the greater part of 
movement cartography (44%), and topographical maps. When the building of forts failed to 
subdue outbreaks of Jacobite dissent, new measures were enforced that included sending 
military Companies into the Highlands to patrol them. This prompted extensive surveys of 
roads, lochs, and rivers, as well as the construction and mapping of military roads.  
 Scotland’s extensive coastline and inland waterways also offered opportunities for 
rapid and efficient movement of troops and supplies. Most of the coastal charts in the 
surviving archive date from the late seventeenth century and are manuscript copies of John 
Adair’s Description of Scotland’s coast. Although these form, in varying numbers, parts of 
the Board of Ordnance Collection, the King’s Topographical Collection, and the Maritime 
Collection, there are problems confirming that they were ever used by the military or 
political leaders in making decisions concerning Scotland. They are considered in this study 
due to their provenance which indicates that they would have been useful to the Board and 
monarch for reference purposes and were also deemed, by the Board of Ordnance, to belong 
to the state.  
 Wade’s arrival in Scotland in the 1720s was the start of a more concerted effort on 
the part of the military to improve the communications between the military garrisons. 
Wade, but more especially his successor, William Caulfeild, was responsible for mapping 
and constructing a network of roads through the Highlands that opened-up the interior of 
Scotland to the military. Combined with maps of Scotland’s waterways, route and marine 
charts were beginning to form a more comprehensive cartographic picture of Scotland. This 
was, however, still woefully incomplete as events during the ’Forty-Five were to show. 
Topographical maps of Scotland up to this point mainly represented the lowlands. The few 
topographical maps of Scotland, such as Lemprière’s ‘Description of Scotland’ and 
Elphinstone’s Mercator’s Map, were available to only a few (the former, only to Wade and 
the King). Although David Watson, Quartermaster-General made use of Elphinstone’s map 
to mark troop deployments and military posts, its inadequacy of scale prompted Watson to 
suggest that a military survey of Scotland be completed. The Military Survey, described by 
William Roy as ‘rather […] a magnificent military sketch than a very accurate map of a 
country’ was a document of state surveillance and so was not in the public domain, a 
common trait of military mapping at this time.
807
  
 Route maps and topographical surveys helped produce territories of accessibility for 
the control and imposition of social order. They were commissioned by the state as a tool to 
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 Roy 1785, p. 387. 
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facilitate the exercise of political power and warfare. Maps, according to Godlewska, ‘are 
also technology and technology has frequently been used as a rationale for conquest’. 
Indeed, ‘the basis on which technology acquires power over society is the power of those 
whose economic hold over society is the greatest. A technological rationale is the rationale 
of dominance itself’.
808
 Once the information was put on the map, the military constructed 
roads between military establishments, built bridges, launched ships to patrol some of 
Scotland’s extensive inland waterways, established military outposts, deployed troops to 
remote parts of the country, and recorded their political and military presence on maps.  
 In some cases, categories of military movement might be better understood and 
explained with categories from fortification and battle, for example, coastal charts and gun-
battery fortifications; route maps—road and topographical—of armies and their 
encampments with battle plans. Another less useful attribute to this classification, for maps 
of military movement in particular, is that it splits maps, map makers, and military activities 
that are best understood together. For example Joseph Avery’s survey of the Great Glen was 
a reconnaissance, a road map, as well as a survey of an inland waterway; John Adair’s 
coastal charts, county maps, and his route map together were the beginnings of a 
comprehensive picture of Scotland that was of more political use than just military 
movement; and, in the same vein, Robert Johnson’s mapping of the military establishment at 
Cairnburgh Castle resulted in coastal charts of the islands and of Mull.   
 Despite a change in military practices in Scotland, reflected in the inclusion of maps 
of movement with the well-established fortification cartographies, Jacobitism remained a 
threat to British hegemony for the first half of the eighteenth century. Maps of military 
movement can be understood in accordance with maps of military conflict. A common 
culmination of a forced march was battle. Having explored the resources the British state had 
to hand for planning marches and encampments, the next chapter looks at the cartography of 
conflict and the Jacobite campaigns that culminated in battle with the British—Hanoverian—
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Despite attempts towards ‘Establishing Order […] and reducing the Highlands to a more due 
Submission’ through constructing forts and barracks, building roads to improve 
communications between military establishments, and deploying government troops, the 
threat of Jacobitism for the British state continued to be real for more than half a century.
809
 
It came in two forms: internal rebellion and intervention by a foreign power on behalf of the 
Jacobites.
810
 In 1689, 1715, 1719, and in 1745–1746, the operations mounted by Scottish 
supporters of the exiled Stuarts against the Williamite and Hanoverian armies culminated in 
battles (see Fig 7.1).
811
 The study of the maps of several of these battles—Sheriffmuir in 
1715, Glenshiel (1719), Prestonpans (1745), and Falkirk and Culloden (1746)—form the 
focus of this chapter.  
 No maps are known to be extant (or possibly none was ever made) of the first 
Jacobite campaign and the point from which it started, the battle of Killiecrankie on 27 July 
1689. This clash, near Blair Atholl, between the Jacobite troops led by John Graham, 
Viscount Dundee, and William’s Scottish Army under the command of Major General Hugh 
Mackay, is worthy of mention here for two reasons. The first is its similarity to the last 
Jacobite rising, the ’Forty-Five; both witnessed initially encouraging victories. The second 
was the sustained nature of the campaign; the first rising did not end until mid-1691 which 
turned the Government’s attention towards Scotland. Warrants were issued for ‘Brass 
Ordnance & […] Mortar Pieces with all the ammunition Stores and Equipage thereunto 
belonging […] to be transported to Scotland’,
812
 and ‘the Officers of the Ordnance […] 
represented that they had appoynted [sic] Engineers to make Draughts and Estimates of what 
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Figure 7.1 Distribution of battlefields in Scotland 1689–1746 
 
The campaign of 1689 set in motion the Board of Ordnance military mapping of 
Scotland. The campaigns of 1715, 1719, and 1745–1746, and aborted and abandoned risings 
in 1708, 1741, and 1744, acted to sustain the interest of the British Government and the work 
of the military engineers in the pacification of the Highlands until at least the mid-eighteenth 
century.  
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The chapter begins by describing the archive of battle maps before examining the 
Jacobite campaigns in Scotland with a focus on the cartographic illustration of events as 
portrayed in contemporary maps and plans. Such a review addresses questions concerning 
the purpose of battle maps. Why were maps of battles drawn, especially when they 
illustrated a Government defeat? Who were the map makers, with whom did their allegiance 
lie, and to what did the maps signal in terms of notions of utility, propaganda or other 
purpose? When were the maps drawn—before, during, or after an event—and what 
relationship, if any, did this have to their purpose? Questions such as these examine the 
meaning of battle maps beyond the battle itself.  
 
 
The Archive of Battle Maps Described 
The Board of Ordnance archive contains fifty-one maps, plans and sketches of the five 
battles between Jacobite and Hanoverian armies in Scotland from 1715 through 1746.
814
 By 
the eighteenth century, battle maps and plans were a well-established cartographic form of 
military narrative.
815
 For the majority, their authorship can be attributed to draughtsmen on 
the Government side: military engineers such as John Henri Bastide, Dugal Campbell, John 
Elphinstone, William Eyres or Daniel Paterson,
816
 map makers such as Thomas Sandby,
817
 or 
army officers such as Charles Whitefoord a volunteer under Sir John Cope and Joseph Yorke 
Aide-de-Camp to the Duke of Cumberland.
818
 The maps appeared in both manuscript and 
printed form. Maps remained in manuscript when their territorial, strategic, and geographical 
information was too sensitive to be displayed beyond the realms of state government. Printed 
maps emerged to meet the public’s demand for cartographical journalism and news of heroic 
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victories. In either form, however, the cartographical image could as easily reflect the 














































Figure 7.2 Frequency distribution chart and provenance of battle maps, Scotland 1715–1746 
 
 Figure 7.2 illustrates the number of contemporary maps extant for each battle.
820
 
Unlike fortification plans and maps of military movement, the provenance of battle maps is 
more varied. Authorship most often reflects the maps’ current archival location. Battle maps 
by military engineers form part of the Board of Ordnance, the King’s Topographical, and 
‘other’ or ‘private’ collections, such as a copy of Bastide’s ‘Plan of the Field of Battle […] at 
the Pass of Glenshiells’,
821
  and were passed to the manuscripts department of the British 
Library but formerly housed at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire as part of the 
correspondence and papers of John Churchill, 1
st
 Duke of Marlborough and Master-General 
of the Ordnance from 1702–1722. Maps and plans by Whitefoord and Yorke, participants in 
the 1745–1746 campaign, provide useful eyewitness testimony of the deployment of troops 
and the military representation of the same. Their plans of the battle formations for, 
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respectively, Prestonpans and Culloden formed parts of private correspondences and are in 
the manuscripts department of the British Library. The ‘curious and extensive collection of 
William Duke of Cumberland’, formerly ‘The King’s Military Collection’ and now the 
Cumberland Collection housed in the Royal Library at Windsor Castle, contains plans of 
military operations including battles, sieges, and encampments.
822
 Of these, twenty-eight 
manuscript maps and plans relate to battles in Scotland and date, in the main, from the time 
of the Duke of Cumberland’s military campaign in Scotland in 1746. 
Each Jacobite campaign had its own distinctive character and so did the maps of the 
battles fought. The final form of the maps depended on the role they played in the military 
engagements. They vary from simple pictorial plans of battle order lacking both 
topographical detail and scale to perspective plans and maps showing the disposition of the 
opposing armies in relation to the surrounding topography, the whole drawn to scale. The 
tactical movements of armies in their constituent parts—artillery, infantry, and cavalry—
were represented by a style of mapping that had evolved in conjunction with the early 
modern European ‘military revolution’.
823
 Map makers no longer captured the ‘messiness’ of 
conflict, the incoherent engagement between cavalry and infantry, or the chaos, terror and 
disorder of a battle-scene. Instead, the different components of an army were mapped with 
remarkable clarity. Abstract formation-maps became commonplace with the order of battle 
of the opposing armies represented by conventional symbolism, texts used to identify the 
different military units, and an alpha-numeric system keyed in to an ‘Explanation’ to define 
the various phases of a battle. 
Two genres of map are evident: contemporary manuscript accounts of the progress 
of the battles and printed broadsheet maps or ‘news maps’.
824
 The former includes three sub-
types coinciding with events before, during, and after battle: (a) plans showing formal troop 
dispositions; (b) cartographic records of a battle in progress; and, more commonly, (c) maps 
made after the battle, as spatial and temporal records of events. Very few maps in the archive 
fall into the category of printed news maps. Those discussed in the remainder of this chapter 
are by-products of information transmitted by military map makers thought to be present at 
the battles and so form retrospective records. 
A characteristic of the campaigns in Scotland, on either army’s part, is the lack of 
maps portraying evidence of tactical planning of the battle site before engagement. Although 
some written memoranda indicate that ‘scouting’ of enemy positions did take place, there are 
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neither detailed reconnaissance maps of the local terrain nor maps of potential grounds on 
which to stage the battles.
825
 The overall impression is one of hasty decisions and battle sites 
driven by the speed of events rather than the use of maps to strategically select sites for 
battle.  
Although preparatory plans of battle sites were lacking, some plans of formal troop 
dispositions were drawn and distributed in advance of battle. For the Battle of Prestonpans, 
for example, a plan defining Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope’s intended battle formation 
was drawn the evening before battle but on the actual day the plan was not executed given 
the lack of artillery.
826
 The plans of the Hanoverian army formation at the commencement of 
battle were retrospective records of events.
827
 These plans can otherwise be regarded as 
schematic diagrams of the ‘order of battle’, equivalent to the previous chapter’s ‘order of 
march’, and often a well-rehearsed manoeuvre from the latter to the former. There is little 
direct evidence of maps being drawn in the thick of battle. More commonly, a battle’s 
progress was mapped after the event although these records could be neat composites of 
sketches made by an eye-witness to the battle event. Most of the battle maps carry the date of 
the battle rather than a date signifying when a compilation was completed. 
Here, I treat the battle plans chronologically and examine their features as a specific 




The Battle of Sheriffmuir, 13 November 1715 
In 1715, the London Government received warnings of a pending revolt in Scotland.
828
 
Robert Johnson, overseer at Fort William, reported that the garrison was ‘in great danger of 
being surprized [sic] by the Highland Clanns, they being all ready to rise, and they expect the 
Pretender to land every day’.
829 When John Erskine, the sixth Earl of Mar,830 raised the 
Royal standard for the exiled Stuarts at Braemar on the 6 September, a Jacobite army began 
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to form and, as the clans gathered, they successfully manoeuvred against the Government 
garrisons:  
The Laird of Glengary [sic] marched with five hundred men this morning 
from his house att Invergary which place I’m sorry to tell your Lordship he 
has surprised, and carried Lieut. Lauder of the Lord Irwin regiment one 
serjeant & fifteen men prisoners along with him. This my informer says he 
saw, he further says that Capt. of Clanronald had taken a detachment of 
twelve men and a serjeant under the command of Lieut. Gains of the said 
Regiment att Tyreholm Castle one of his own houses. I doubt not that of 
Islandonnan has had the same fate. The Capt. of Clanronald is marched 
already & Sir Donald McDonnald is following him. Locheels march is dayly 
expected. Glenco with two horsemen and six footmen passed this day about 
a mile above this place [Fort William] and its said his men went through the 
mountains. I cannot learn that Appins men are yet march’d.
831
 
A substantial Jacobite force, comprising 6290 Foot and 807 Horse, formed under the 
command of Mar. Their intent was to march south to join other Jacobites on the move in the 
Borders and England. John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll,
832
 gathered a substantially 




 The Battle of Sheriffmuir was fought on Sunday 13 November 1715. There are 
many eye-witness and participant accounts of the battle.
834
 One primary source is a 
contemporary Board of Ordnance plan detailing the engagement of which there are three 
engraved copies.
835
 These plans are unsigned but the Office of Ordnance ‘Register of 
Draughts’ attributes, in 1715, an original ‘Plan of the Battle of Sheriff Muir’ to Col:  
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Figure 7.3 Part of [a plan of the Battle of Sheriffmuir], by [Thomas Lascelles], 1715. Scale 1: 9,600. 
MS 1649 Z.03/45c (other copies MS 1649 Z.03/45a and b) (Reproduced by permission of the  




 Figure 7.3 illustrates one of these plans—the critical southern section of the 
map (or right-hand side) is missing in all three cases
837
—showing the eighteenth-century 
terrain, distinguishing tilled fields from open pastures, ridges of higher ground with the use 
of cross-hatching, and various sizes of settlements by way of three-dimensional houses. East 
is to the top of the map. The missing section would have shown the main battlefield, troop 
deployments, and the progress of battle which, by all accounts, was a confused affair as this 
contemporary ballad implies: 
There’s some say that we wan, some say that they wan, 
some say that nane wan at a’ man; 
But one thing I’m sure, that on Sheriff-muir, 
A battle there was that I sa’ man; 
and we ran, and they ran, and they ran and we ran, 
and we ran, and they ran awa’ man.
838
 
On 12 November 1715, a detachment of Mar’s army was given orders to take 
possession of Dunblane. As they advanced within three miles of the place they received 
news that Argyll’s army had already marched to intercept them and was encamped at 
‘Newtoun’ near Dunblane.
839
 Argyll had previously scouted and reviewed the terrain 
between Stirling and Perth (although no maps appear to have been made) and decided to 
fight the Jacobites on ‘the rising grounds on the other side of Dumblain [sic], where we are 
sure of both provisions and forrage. When we are there where the ground is good, if the 
enemy should advance we can have no better ground to receive them in’.
840
 The right wing 
of Argyll’s army encamped in readiness for battle ‘being under their Armes [sic] and in 
Order of Battle and their Cannon up on the Hill before them’.
841
 Mar’s army gathered near 
Kinbuck and set up camp either side of the road from Dunblane to Perth (see Fig 7.4 position 
B). The following morning, Mar revised his original intention to march towards Dunblane to 
meet Argyll’s army. Instead, he ordered the troops to form into four columns and redirected 
them on to the Muir of Kinbuck (C). 
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Figure 7.4 Extract from the plan of the Battle of Sheriffmuir showing the disposition of the Earl of 
Mar’s army at B: ‘The Rebells who lodged the same Night [12 November] on the Muir of Kinbuck the 
Road between them’; and C: ‘were formed y next Morning in 2 Lines their front towards Dunblan 
[sic], with design to march directly against the Duke’. MS 1649 Z.03/45c (Reproduced by permission 
of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland).  
 
What followed is explained on the left-hand portion of the Ordnance map. Argyll, 
observing Mar’s redeployment, ascended the hill to meet them—‘3 Battallions [sic] and 5 
Squadrons in Order of Battle and the rest on their long March’—in readiness for the 
encounter. The experienced Hanoverian army moved quickly. In response, the Jacobite army 
‘marched up in very great haste which occasioned some confusion’ when ‘their 2
nd
 Line 
turn’d into their 1
st
 and made but one Line, 6 or 7 men deep in some places’.
842
 Argyll, 
taking advantage of the chaos, ordered his right wing to attack the Jacobite army’s left. The 
Jacobites were driven back in a fighting retreat across the River Allan, during which many 
were believed to have drowned. Meanwhile, the right wing of the Jacobite army, formed of 
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Highland clansmen, seeing that the left wing of the Government army had not fully 
deployed, successfully charged, cleaving the Hanoverian line: 
Our Left seeing their Center [sic] peirc’d and their Communication with ye 
Right quite cutt of were obliged to retire, taking their Cannon with’ern ye 
way at ye side of ye Stonehill (as ye prickt lines shew) to Dunblan towards 
Sterling and twice made a halt to form themselves into Order (vide E and F) 
but in vain. 
The Highlanders gave chase to the routed forces, thus losing the opportunity to attack the 
exposed flank of the remaining Hanoverian army.  
Mar with 4000 men established himself on Kippendavie Hill. A natural 
entrenchment, the Jacobites were advantageously positioned but seeing Argyll and his troops 
returning from their pursuit of the Jacobite left wing, Mar, for some inexplicable reason, ‘had 
not the Courage with his Superior Numbers to give Battle to our few haras’d & fatigued 
Troops’. Instead, the remaining Jacobite force, under the cover of darkness, made their 
escape. Argyll, unaware of the Jacobite army’s departure, encamped for a second night near 




The map was (presumably) constructed according to a narrative about the victory 
that reflected the views of the Hanoverian authorities. In compliance with established 
Enlightenment practice, the battle narrative found expression in both cartographic and 
written form, most usefully, for the reader, displayed on the same sheet. Without knowing 
who the draughtsman was—possibly Thomas Lascelles—it is not possible to determine to 
what measure this narrative was derived from personal knowledge, from accounts provided 
from other military authorities involved in the battle, or from eye-witnesses to the event. 
Taking into account the level of topographical detail on the extant sheets, we must assume 
that the map was compiled after the event when there was time to conduct a measured 
military survey of the terrain. This in itself lent authority to the narrative according to 
Enlightenment thinking. If the battlefield was carefully depicted and described, then why 
should the details of the battle be any less accurate and truthful? In this sense, a cartographic 
depiction was no different to a landscape painting: ‘accuracy suggested by detailed 
landscape depiction was frequently used in the art of the period to suggest the truth of the 
ideology lying behind a painting’.
844
 The ideology of the Battle of Sheriffmuir was of heroic 
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victory by the Hanoverian army; the map maker promoted this ideal and reinforced and 
legitimated the government’s victory through mapping. 
The map and text represented the Hanoverian army—‘an inconsiderable Number of 
Men’—as a disciplined, courageous fighting unit, even in retreat able to ‘halt and form 
themselves into Order’. The Jacobite army by contrast, despite being of ‘Superior Number’, 
was described (and no doubt represented) as confused and impulsive, relatively easily routed 
by the King’s army who performed a ‘valorous Push under so many Disadvantages, all ye 
Measures of the Rebells were broke at once the Rebellion crush’d and ye Nations Peace 
resettled to his Graces immortal Glory and Honour’.
845
 There is no indication that the map 
was ever published as a piece of government propaganda although a declaration of victory 
was crucial to the new monarch, George I, and his Government. Sheriffmuir had shown just 
how serious a threat the Jacobites were to the stability of the British state.  
 
 
The Battle of Glenshiel, 10 June 1719 
In 1719, Jacobite and Hanoverian armies again clashed on Scottish soil, at Glenshiel in 
Wester Ross. Philip V of Spain offered assistance in restoring James Stuart to the throne of 
Britain. When the Earls of Marischal and Seaforth landed at Stornoway on the island of 
Lewis in late February, they were accompanied by six companies of Spanish infantry.
846
 
They were joined by Jacobites who had taken refuge in France including Marischal’s 
younger brother, James Keith,
847
 Lord George Murray, and his older brother the Marquess of 
Tullibardine under whose leadership they acrimoniously united. The intention was to unite 
with the Highland clans under Robert Macgregor Campbell—better known as Rob Roy—
and march upon Inverness where they were to take possession of the garrison.
848
 Inverness 
had long been a focus of Jacobite attention; possession of the town was ‘a pass that opens to 
them a fine Country along the East Coast, where they have many Friends in large plentifull 
Towns’.
849
 Major-General Joseph Wightman, commander of the garrison at Inverness, 
received news of a pending rising from several sources loyal to the Crown:  
Soon after the first account of a Landing in Kintail, Collo Clayton hastened 
to Inverness, where having at that time but few troops & receiving 
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intelligence that the Rebells [sic] were in great numbers designing to possess 
themselves of that town, he with great industry summoned in the Country, & 
sett many hands to work to put the Castle in a posture of Defence.
850
 
Tullibardine delayed setting out for Inverness, instead spending time in the 
Highlands recruiting. Support from the clans was not readily forthcoming. Reports reached 
Lord Roxburgh, Principal Secretary of State, that ‘a great number of Men, particularly Lord 
Drummond, Lord Tullibardin [Lord George Murray] & Rob Roy [were] threatening ye 
Country if they don’t rise’.
851
 According to the Edinburgh Evening Courant, Seaforth had 
written a circular with a warning that ‘all his Friends in that Country, [were] to be ready with 
their best Horses, &c. to join him, under pain of Hanging without Mercy’.
852
 The 
Government, on receiving intelligence of the Jacobite preparations, ordered three British 
frigates to search for insurgents among the numerous islets of the west coast of Scotland.
853
 
Rather than wait for the Jacobite army to gather strength and advance on Inverness, 




 With a naval force threatening from the west and Wightman’s army fast approaching 
from the north-east, the Jacobites had little choice but to make a stand and elected to face the 
Hanoverian army at Glen Shiel—‘being straight and narrow, both sides having highland 
rugged hills and a water running betwixt the hills, which is the only level place there’ (see 
Fig 7.5).
855
 Neither army was large. Wightman reported that the ‘Numbers of the 
Highlanders that were engaged were 1640, besides the Spaniards who defended the Pass, and 
500 on the Hills’. His own army comprised only 840 men, ‘not near half the Number of the 
Rebells [sic] we engaged’.
856
 The Jacobite army established their battle positions in the Glen 
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in advance of Wightman who, on arrival, ‘took about an hour to view their situation’ before 






Figure 7.5 An extract from a ‘Plan of the Roads from Fort Augustus to Bernera’ showing the site of 
the Battle of Glenshiel (at the foot of the image, between ‘Glen and ‘Shiel’), by Daniel Paterson, 
1746. Maps K.Top.48.63. (Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Library)   
  
 Four contemporary manuscript maps illustrate the army emplacements, 
redeployments during battle, and the rout of the Jacobite army. Two are Board of Ordnance 
plans, the third manuscript was in the papers of John Churchill, 1
st
 Duke of Marlborough and 
Master-General of the Ordnance from 1702–1722, and the fourth map with the text in 
French, forms part of the Cumberland Collection.
858
 All four are attributed to John Henri 
Bastide who, in March 1718, was draughtsman of the new barracks being built at 
Kiliwhimen, Inversnaid, Ruthven, and Bernera.
859
 He served as a lieutenant in Colonel 
Montagu’s Regiment during the battle and later was Chief Engineer in Amherst’s staff 
during his Louisburg expedition in Canada in 1758.
860
 
 All four maps are almost identical, drawn in Indian Ink and wash. Figure 7.6 is an 
illustration of one of the maps, showing the battle as viewed from the south across the glen. 
The glen, the river running through it, the steep slopes on its southern side, and the lower 
slopes on the north side are all shown in plan, whereas the mountainous peaks on the north  
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Figure 7.6 ‘A Plan of the Field of Battle that was fought on the 10
th
 of Iune 1719, at the Pass of 
Glenshiels in Kintail North Britain with ye Disposition of his Majtys Forces under ye Command of  
Majr. Genl. Wightman, & of those of ye Rebels’, by John Henri Bastide, 1719. Scale 1: 2,400.  
MS 1648 Z.03/22b (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). 
 
side of the glen are shown in perspective. To display the position of the armies and their 
various detachments during the course of the battle, Bastide used an eighteenth-century 
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convention of military cartography: that of symbols, colour, shading, letters and numbers on 
the face of the plan. The alpha-numeric was explained in a key down the right-hand side of 
the maps. Reflecting tactical theory, Bastide retained a distinction between infantry and 
cavalry. For infantry, the rectangles were narrow and varied in length depending on the size 
of the military unit. Unit ‘1’, for example, constituting ‘a Serj
t
 and twelve Granadiers’ is 
depicted as a small square on the map, whereas unit ‘4’—‘Col. Montagu’s Regim
t
.—is a 
long, thin rectangle reflecting the greater number of men (see Fig 7.7). For the infantry 
deployed by horse—the Dragoons—the rectangle is broader (unit 7). Colour was an essential 
aspect of the convention system. The cartographer had to ensure that the locations of the 
different armies were clearly distinguished.
861
 On Bastide’s maps, the British units of 
Wightman’s army were shown in red and the Dragoons in green, the Dutch in blue, and 
Munro and Sutherland’s Highlanders in white (see Fig 7.7). The Jacobite army, its initial 
deployment depicted conventionally with rectangles, was coloured in yellow and grey.     
 
    
 
Figure 7.7 An extract from Bastide’s ‘Plan of the Field of Battle […]  at the Pass of Glenshiels’, 
showing conventions of military cartography. MS 1648 Z.03/22a (Reproduced by permission of the 
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). 
 
Lines of movement across battle maps were shown by dotted lines. One of the 
differences between Bastide’s four maps was the colour and application of these lines. On 
the two Board of Ordnance maps and the Duke of Marlborough’s map, movement was 
indicated by red dotted lines and applied only to the Hanoverian army. The French map 
depicted the movement of both armies by black dotted lines. In representing the movement 
of the Jacobite army and in particular their rout, Bastide broke away from contemporary 
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abstract conventions by using pictorial ‘stick-figures’. Figure 7.8 shows a body of 200 
Highlanders commanded by Seaforth ‘drawn up before the action’ (reference F) on a steep 
rock, with Marischal and ‘200 of the M’Kenzies a little bit below them’.
862
 The Jacobites are 
represented by both grey-filled rectangles and pictorial figures firing towards the Hanoverian 
forces. As the conflict commenced, Colonel Clayton’s Regiment with Hussele’s Dutch 
Auxiliaries marched ‘in line of Battle’ (22) towards the rock where they wheeled to attack 
Seaforth’s men. The Jacobites here were soon beaten: ‘Seaforth and all gave way, and the 
relief not being able to maintain it, returned’.
863
 Bastide showed the rout of the Jacobites (I) 




Figure 7.8 An extract from Bastide’s ‘Plan of the Field of Battle’, showing Seaforth’s Highlanders 
posted on ‘the Rock’, the advance of Clayton’s Regiment and the Dutch Auxiliaries, and the rout of 
the Jacobites. MS 1648 Z.03/22b (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library 
of Scotland). 
  
At the western end of the pass, where the road came close to the river, the Jacobites 
erected a barricade (reference D on Figure 7.9) and just to the north, on rising ground, they 
had thrown up breastworks in a position that commanded the plain and the pass (A and E). 
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These were occupied by the Spanish Regiment to form the Jacobite’s centre. To their right, 
‘Lord George [Murray], Macdougall of Lorn, M’Kenzie of Avoch, 100 of Seaforth’s men, 
and 50 men of detachments’ were posted south of the river, upon steep, rising ground (F). 
Whilst Clayton’s Regiment and the Munro Highlanders advanced against the Jacobite right 
along the south bank, Wightman led his Dragoons and Grenadiers with Coehorn mortars by 
the road on the north bank of the river until they were opposite Lord George Murray’s 
position (F). Grenades were launched into the midst of the Highlanders’ and Spaniards’ 
entrenchments (F and A respectively), depicted on Bastide’s map by solid red trajectories 
and the mortars by small rectangles with circles representing gun-barrels (17 and 18). Before 
long, the Jacobites gave way. To the right, an attempt by a Highland unit (H) to reinforce 
Murray’s men failed and his men began to flee despite ‘Lord George, M’Dougall, and Avoch 
drawing their swords and crying to them to stand’ (I). The Spaniards fared no better, 
eventually abandoning their position to make an ‘orderly retreat without the loss of any of 







Figure 7.9 An extract from Bastide’s ‘Plan of the Field of Battle’, showing the bombardment of the 
Jacobite positions: ‘A’ the Spaniards; ‘F’ Murray’s Highlanders.  
727016 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
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As at Sheriffmuir, a victory for the Hanoverian army was only declared the 
following day when Jacobite expectations of reforming were quashed, ‘there were few or 
none to be had next day except the officers and the few men Lochiel had, with some others, 
and the Spaniards’. The Spanish were left to surrender whilst the remaining Highlanders 
dispersed.
865
 Lord Carpenter, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hanoverian forces, made no 
reprisals in response to the 1719 uprising other than seizing a great quantity of weapons from 
the rebels; defeat was enough for the Jacobites.
866
 Attention did turn, however, towards the 
west coast defences. Andrews Jelfe, overseer of the works in Scotland, was ordered by the 
Board of Ordnance ‘to loose no time in proceeding on the works at Bernera’ in Wester Ross, 
near the Isle of Skye, ‘for keeping a Comunication [sic] with ye same’.
867
 The Board refused 
to continue work on the defences at Inverness on the grounds that they had run out of money. 
An engineer was instead to report on the works completed by Clayton and what else was 




The Hanoverian army had several reasons to commemorate and to publicise its 
success. The first, to act as a deterrent to local insurgents and the second as a warning to 
foreign powers preparing to use the exiled Stuarts as political tools. Battle maps were an 
efficient means of relaying such events to a distant audience. Bastide’s manuscript maps of 
the Battle of Glenshiel had specific destinations and purposes that can be inferred from the 
slight differences in the details. Two of the maps depict Wightman (29), astride a white 
horse, positioned behind the mortars as in figure 7.9, to the image’s right;
869
 two show him 
placed to the side of the mortar battery.
870
 This slight shift in position may imply that the 
latter two maps were commissioned by Wightman himself, showing him ‘leading from the 
front’. One was sent to the Duke of Marlborough, the other to the Board of Ordnance, both 
possibly as part of official reports describing the battle. The third, the French map, could 
have been commissioned as a commemoration of the Hanoverian victory and presented to 
George I, notorious for his reluctance to speak English at Court.
871
 The fourth map, part of 
the Board of Ordnance collection, may have been Bastide’s own copy (possibly the original).  
                                                 
865
 Millar 1885. 
866
 TNA WO 55/346, p. 259, 19 June 1719. 
867
 TNA WO 47/32, p. 261, 23 June 1719 and WO 55/346, p. 366. A self-defensible barrack was to be 
built at Bernera with a capacity for 150 men. 
868
 TNA WO 55/347, pp. 183–189, 25 July 1719, a letter from Lord Carpenter; 4, 7, and 11 August 
1719, letters between the Board of Ordance and Charles Delafaye on behalf of the Lords Justices. 
869
 NLS MS 1648 Z.03/22b and RLW 727016. 
870
 BL Additional Ms. 61343 G and NLS MS 1648 Z.03/22a 
871
 RLW 727016. 
 265 
Bastide’s scenographic depiction of this battle, his use of pictorial and abstract 
symbols was, to my mind, deliberate; this was not a battle map caught in a binary of 
changing cartographic conventions. His combination of depiction and description of the 
strategic manoeuvring of the British army clearly defined, in military cartographic form, the 
dynamic aspects of the operational development of the battle. To the reader of the map, it 
conveyed military order, tactical manoeuvring, and discipline on the part of Wightman’s 
army. In contrast, the Jacobite army displayed, according to the map, panic, disorder, 
desertion, and a lack of leadership, all the consequences of their initial strategic positioning 
lost once the armies engaged. Only the Spanish troops, when abandoning their position, 
made an ‘orderly retreat’. His blend of plan and perspective to represent the battle was an 
effective style with which to narrate the ‘glorious victory’, almost as persuasive as a painting 
whilst remaining truthful to the technology of cartography. An engraved uncoloured plan of 
the battle from an easterly perspective (looking along the valley), also attributed to Bastide, 
was ‘Sold by Peter DuNoyer, Bookseller’ in the Strand in London sometime after the 
battle.
872
 This map may have been the main reference for a near contemporary painting of the 





The Last Jacobite Rebellion, 1745–1746 
The decades following the failure of the 1719 campaign witnessed a decline in the strength 
of Jacobitism despite occurrences of widespread, often violent demonstrations of disaffection 
towards the London Government. In the Highlands, meanwhile, three Russian men-of-war 
and transport ships were seen off the north-west coast. Reports circulated that some of the 
commanding officers were British or Irish and ‘had formerly serv’d in the English Navy, but 
by their Conversation appear’d to be disaffected of Your Majesty’s Government’. Rumours 
of naval stores, iron guns, and small arms being off-loaded from the ships was reported but 
Wade’s attempts to procure further information about the quantity of arms and ammunitions 
came to nothing.
874
 Government plans to establish a military camp at Inverness, to raise six 
Independent Companies of Highlanders, and to deliver by ship from London a large 
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consignment of ordnance stores and arms for use by these Companies, continued, along with 
a programme of fortification and road construction.
875
 
 Jacobitism did survive in several isolated but intensely committed local communities 
and they in turn successfully nurtured a network of communications between Scotland and 
Western Europe.
876
 In 1744, a planned invasion of England by Louis XV of France was 
aborted when the weather conspired against a Jacobite lead assault.
877
 A year and a half 
passed before the threat of a French invasion was raised again. An article in the Scots 
Magazine reported that 
the first Circumstantial account of the young Chevalier’s motions, was the 
following article from Paris. “Paris, July 19. The Pretender’s eldest son put 
to sea, July 14. from Belleisle, in the Elizabeth of 60 guns, provided with a 
large quantity of warlike stores, together with a frigate of 30 guns, in order 
to land in Scotland”.
878
 
The Elizabeth was badly damaged by an encounter with HMS Lion and had to turn back, 
taking with her Charles Edward Stuart’s 700-strong force of professional soldiery and 
virtually all his munitions. The frigate, Du Teillay, continued to Scotland and on the 23 July 
made landfall upon the Isle of Eriskay.
879
 News of a landing on the mainland was slow to 
arrive. On the 17 August, it was reported in the London Gazette that: 
Letters from Edinburgh, of the 11
th
 instant, bring an account, that a French vessel of 
16 or 18 guns had appeared on the West coast of Scotland; which, after having 
cruised for some days off the island of Bara [sic] and Uist, stood in for the coast of 
Lochaber; and had there landed, betwixt the islands of Mull and Sky, several 
persons; one of whom, from the general report, and from several concurring 
circumstances, there is the greatest reason to believe is the Pretender’s son.
880
 
On landing at Moidart, Charles Edward was initially rebuffed by the Jacobites who had 
invited him to invade Scotland, for without French troops and a good supply of arms and 
ammunition the clan chieftains claimed there was no hope of victory. They did eventually 
relent, spurred on by grievances against the Hanoverian order rather than for a desire to 
return the old, Stuart, order. The standard was raised at Glenfinnan, and the clans ‘came out’ 
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 Orders were sent to Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope, Commander-in-Chief of the 
British forces in Scotland, to recall the military parties at work upon the roads, for them to 
rejoin their regiments; arms and ammunition were sent out from Edinburgh to the other 
garrisons; and Edinburgh Castle itself was ordered to be restocked with provisions and was 
reinforced with two companies of Lascelles’ Foot.
882
 From the camp formed at Stirling, Cope 
mustered a field force and marched them via Crieff towards Fort Augustus. At the last 
minute, Cope turned away from engaging the Jacobite forces at the Corrieyairack Pass, 
instead diverting his course to march north to Inverness. This left the Lowlands open to 
Charles Edward and his supporters. The Jacobite army advanced by way of Wade’s roads to 
seize Perth before advancing on Edinburgh where, on 17 September, they took the city but 
not the Castle. From Inverness, Cope marched his army to Aberdeen and from there 




The Battle of Prestonpans, 21 September 1745 
Cope’s army came face-to-face with the Jacobite Highlanders at the Battle of Prestonpans on 
21 September 1745. The battle lasted no more than eight minutes and resulted in a 
resounding defeat for the Hanoverian army.
884
 Several contemporary maps illustrate events, 
their focus the changing deployment of the armies leading up to the point of engagement. 
Three manuscript maps of the battle show the disposition of both armies, from the evening of 
the 20 September to the battle’s commencement on the 21 September, in relation to the 
topography.
885
 Four are manuscript plans of the ‘Order of Battle’.
886
 The remaining two 
maps are printed records of events, or news maps, forming part of the Cumberland 
Collection.
887
 The news maps provide the most complete illustration of events with claims to 
be eyewitness accounts by ‘an Officer of the Army who was present’ and, in another case, by 
‘an Engineer in his Majesty’s Service who was present: done from the only Correct Draught 
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 That relatively so many maps were made of an undisputed government defeat is in 
itself worthy of note. There was a public enquiry into Cope’s handling of the ’Forty-Five 
although he was ultimately acquitted by a court-martial of any major misconduct in the 
campaign and battle. Major General Humphrey Bland, in his Treatise of Military Discipline, 
included an article that may help to explain Cope’s vindication. 
There is not any thing in which an Officer shews the Want of Conduct so 
much, as in suffering himself to be surpriz’d, either upon his post, or in 
marching with a Body of Men under his Command, without being prepared 
to make a proper Defence, and by not having taken the necessary 
Precautions to prevent it. When an Officer has had the Misfortune of being 
Beat, his Honour won’t suffer by it, provided he has done his Duty, and 
acted like a Soldier.
889
 
Martin Margulies’ assessment of the report on the court-marshal proceedings published in 
1749 points to the Board deciding that Cope had done his duty and that he acted the part of 
an honourable soldier. The Board judged ‘That he [Cope] did his Duty as an Officer, both 
before, at, and after the Action: And that his Personal Behaviour was without Reproach. And 
that the Misfortune, on the Day of Action, was owing to the shameful Behaviour of the 
Private Men; and not to any Misconduct or Misbehaviour of Sir John Cope’.
890
  
 Although there is no evidence that any of the contemporary maps of the Battle of 
Prestonpans were presented as evidence at Cope’s court-marshal, other contemporary events 
suggest otherwise. During the subsequent Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), George Sackville 
was accused of disobedience when his cavalry failed to advance at the Battle of Minden. He 
was later forced to resign despite claims that the battle plan was changed and that the orders 
he received were ambiguous. He demanded a court-martial to clear his name and a map 
drawn by William Roy, Captain of Engineers and Assistant Quarter-Master General of the 
British Forces, was submitted as key evidence.
891
 The map included overlapping flaps to 
show the positions of the troops at different stages of battle. For Harley, ‘the cartography of 
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defeat had to be at least as meticulous as that of victory: military scientists would pore over 
these dispositions for years to come’.
892
 If Cope’s ‘obsessive attention to detail’ and the fact 
that even maps of defeat were ‘pored over’ by contemporaries then perhaps it is safe to 
assume that maps of Prestonpans were presented at court to support Cope’s actions. If maps 
were not presented at his court-marshal, they did appear in published accounts of the battle. 
One publication offered the public ‘an enquiry into the conduct of General Cope’ and 
advised the reader ‘now […] to cast his Eye on the Plan of the Battle’.
893
       
The actual battle at Prestonpans happened so quickly that no maps were made during 
the engagement itself; a reasonably rare occurrence in any battle. At least one map maker 
was known to be part of the battle action, however. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Whitefoord, 
a volunteer in Cope’s army, formed part of the small detachment manning the artillery 
mortars and cannon.
894
 He drew two plans of the ‘Order of Battle at Preston-Pans’ but, as 
with the majority of cases, after the battle.
895
 The evening before the battle, Cope’s officers 
met for a council of war to review the Jacobite position and to make plans for the next day.
896
 
Part of these discussions included preparation of schematic diagrams of the army’s future 
battle formation to which category Whitefoord’s ‘Order of Battle intended’ (‘not executed 
for want of Gunners’) falls into.
897
 William Eyres’ ‘Plan of the Battle at Preston-Pans’ (see 
Fig 7.10)—another conventional schematic plan of the battle order—was made after the 
actual event. Eyres noted in his ‘Explanation’ that his information on the numbers of troops 
and the lengths of the battle lines was passed on by ‘many officers, and Country Gentlemen 
who were Spectators’, perhaps implying that Eyres was not actually present at the battle?
898
 
In all the maps, there is a high degree of correlation in retelling the events, with 
perhaps the only discrepancy being the exact position of the Hanoverian army the night 
before the battle—to the immediate north of the marsh and ditches as in Elphinstone’s 
map,
899
 or further back, in front of Warren Park where the Baggage Guard was deployed (see 
Fig 7.12).
900
 From Dunbar, the Hanoverian army marched west, aiming to cross the River 
Esk at Musselburgh. On receiving intelligence that the Jacobites were approaching the same  
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Figure 7.10 ‘A Plan of the Battle at Preston-Pans’ [order of battle and explanation], by William 
Eyres, 1745. 729153 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
 
crossing from the opposite direction, Cope called a halt on open ground to the north of 
Tranent—‘a Plain about a Mile long and somewhat less in breadth’—and deployed his 
troops to face west, towards the on-coming Jacobites (see Fig 7.11 A).
901
 Lord George 
Murray, at the forefront of the Jacobite army, made for the rising ground—the ridge of 
Falside Hill—to the west of Tranent and south of Cope’s position (Rebels 1).
902
 From here, 
the Jacobites observed the Hanoverian army and although Cope redeployed, moving closer 
to Preston House and facing south towards his enemy (B), he made no move to advance from 
which ‘it was judged he intended to be upon the defensive […] and his always Showing an 
inclination to decline the combat was the Greatest fault he Comitted [sic], for every motion 
he made to Shun an Engagement added so much courage to the Princes Army’.
903
 On closer 
inspection, Cope could not have chosen ‘a more advantageous Situation’, for he had the 12 
foot walls of Preston Park and Colonel Gardiner’s House (Bankton Park) to his right or west, 
while his front or southern flank was covered by the Tranent Meadows—a belt of marshes 
and ditches that ran almost due east from Preston (see Fig 7.11).
904
 Falside Hill where the  
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. 1745. By an Officer of the Army Who was 
present. ‘Publish’d according to Act of Parliament Decr. 21
st
 1745 to be had at Christopher Seton 
Engraver in Ordinary to his Majesty at the Golden Head in Suffolk Street Charing Cross’. South is to 
the top of the map. 729156 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
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 1745’ (Anon). Acc.8392 (Reproduced 
by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland).  
 
Realising that their position on Falside Hill left the road to Edinburgh open, Charles 
Edward ordered two Battalions of Atholl’s Brigade to retire westward towards Musselburgh 
to block the bridge. Mistakenly believing that the Jacobites were going to attack his right 
flank, Cope redeployed for a third time to form a west-facing line (C), only for Atholl’s men 
to return and rejoin the main army. At nightfall, Cope made his fourth and final adjustment, 
moving his army further east, facing south across the marsh (D), to be in alignment with the 
Jacobite army redeployed to the east of Tranent (Rebels 2). From here, a ‘Wagon Way’ cut 
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 Believing this was the only point across the marsh, Cope’s men ‘Lay on 
their Arms all night’ in readiness for a Jacobite advance.
907
 But instead, the Jacobite army 
was guided by a local sympathiser well out to the east (see Fig 7.12 P) of the marsh from 
where they turned north (O) past the Hanoverian advanced guard (L) then west (Q) to 
approach the unprotected left flank of Cope’s army (A). 
 In the early hours of 21 September, the Jacobite army ‘advanced regularly to the 
Action’ then formed in two lines on the field of battle. Cope, warned of their advance, 
responded with speed, wheeling his infantry to form a 669-pace line of battle facing east, 
parallel to the advancing Jacobites.
908
 In their haste, the Hanoverian army deployed too far 
north resulting in the armies outflanking each others’ left.
909
 The first line of the Jacobite 
army, composed of Highlanders, outflanked the Hanoverian army by 100 paces (although 
some eye-witnesses said it was nearer 300 paces). Many of Cope’s officers and spectators of 
the battle claimed that ‘As the Rebel Army occupied 769 Paces, without any Interval in their 
Line […] it could not consist of less than 3459 Men’. The second line, comprised of Atholl’s 
men and Lowlanders, accounted for at least 2000 men.
910
 
Action began when Cope’s artillery discharged and at the same time the Dragoons 
opened fire. Contemporary accounts of the battle published in Edinburgh claimed that: 
the Highlanders, before they engaged, pulled off their Bonnets, and made a 
short Ejaculation to Heaven, then run [sic] forward, and received a full Fire; 
but, advancing, discharg’d, and then threw down their Muskets, and drawing 
their Broadswords gave a most frightful and hideous Shout, and rushed most 
furiously on his Majesty’s Forces. 
A considerable part of the Hanoverian army, largely made-up of raw recruits who lacked 
training and experience, broke and fled without engaging in combat. What little training they 
had received had not prepared them for the Highlanders’ unconventional assault. The 
Highlanders ‘carried everything before them; and in about seven or eight Minutes were 
absolute Masters of the Field’.
911
 Figure 7.13 illustrates the rout of the Hanoverian army. The 
draughtsman—‘an Officer of the Army who was present’—managed to portray the dynamics 
of these brief moments of action by using the pictorial figures so popular with Bastide in his  
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 1745, [Anon], showing the 
Hanoverian army in flight. ‘Sold by J. Collyer, at Shakespear’s-Head, in Ludgate Street; and G. 
Woodfall, at the King’s-Arms near Charing-Cross 1745. (Price 1s. plain, 1s. 6d. coloured.)’. 
EMS.s.90a (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland). 
 
maps of Glenshiel, amidst the cartographic formality of conventional rectangular symbols. 
Three possible inferences can be made from this style of depiction. The first, that the officer 
was a Jacobite and just as Bastide had portrayed the chaos and panic of the routed Jacobite 
army at Glenshiel in this way, the officer was intent on a reader forming the same opinion of 
the Hanoverian army—leaderless, disordered, and deserting. The second, that this 
cartographic style—the use of pictorial figures—was a common symbol for a routed army, 
whether an ally or an enemy. Thirdly, as a style, it made for sensationalistic contemporary 
cartographic journalism. News maps of the Battle of Prestonpans may have been a way of 
showing overt support and admiration for the tactical manoeuvring of the Jacobite army, 
encouraged by Scotland’s dissent towards Hanoverian rule.   
 In describing the Battle of Prestonpans, the use of cartographic records has proved 
invaluable. Any variation in the cartographic depiction of events beyond an individual map 
 275 
maker’s artistic style can be attributed to variations in the operational circumstance under 
which battle maps or plans were made.
912
 In the case of Prestonpans, the plans were made as 
retrospective records and any depictive discrepancies can be attributed to the spectators’ 
recounting of what they saw and what they could remember. To eighteenth-century military 
commanders, instructors of the military sciences and their pupils, the ruling elite, and, 
possibly in this case, to a court-marshal board, cartographic descriptions of battles were vital, 
for ‘a literal description without a drawing cannot give a proper idea’ of events.
913
 Roy 
himself argued that ‘from a plan of this kind […] a much truer notion may be obtained […] 
than what, without such assistance, could possibly be conveyed in many words’.
914
   
  
The Battle of Falkirk [Muir], 17 January 1746 
Following their victory at Prestonpans, the Jacobite army marched into England as far as 
Derby. When the expected support from France and an English Jacobite uprising failed to 
materialise, however, the army retreated to Scotland. On 5 January 1746, the Jacobites took 
the town of Stirling. Stirling Castle, having undergone almost continuous refortification 
since the Union, withstood their advance and remained in Hanoverian control under the 
command of Major-General William Blakeney.
915
 In response to the Jacobite siege of the 
castle, a Hanoverian army commanded by Lieutenant-General Hawley marched north, 
stopping at Edinburgh to assemble more troops, before marching north-west towards 
Stirling. Charles Edward, intent on confronting Hawley before he reached Stirling, marched 
a Jacobite force to Plean Muir south-east of the town. The Hanoverian army, meanwhile, 
moved more slowly and late in the afternoon of the 16 January they encamped on low-lying 
ground between Falkirk and Carron Water to the north (see Fig 7.14).
916
  
 Three maps illustrate events, from the evening of the 16 January to the 
commencement of the Battle of Falkirk on the 17 January 1746.
917
 Two of the maps, both by 
William Cuningham an Engineer in Ordinary,
918
 are almost identical; one is shown as figure 
7.14. The only notable difference is the inclusion, on the second map, of a title cartouche and 
a dedication to the Duke of Cumberland (see Fig 7.15). It is likely that this map was drawn at 
a later date than the first (a fair copy), less a commemoration since Falkirk proved to be 
another unmitigated defeat for the Hanoverian army but rather as a record of the army’s  
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Figure 7.14 [A Plan of the Battle of Falkirk, 17 January 1746], by William Cuningham. Scale c.1: 
2,400 with south to the top of the map. MPF 1/350 (Courtesy of The National Archives, Kew) 
 




Figure 7.15 Cartouche from a [Map of the Battle of Falkirk], by William Cuningham, 1746. 
730010 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II). 
 
tactical manoeuvres and sequence of troop deployments in relation to the topography. The 
terrain on which the battle was fought was particularly difficult and was used to great 
advantage by the Jacobites who took the initiative, leaving Plean Muir in the early hours of 
17 January to march to and deploy on commanding ground to the south west of Falkirk, on 
Falkirk Muir, an uneven rolling plateau that dominated the Hanoverian encampment (see Fig 
7.14 O ‘The Rebel Army as they moved up the Hill, and engaged on the highest Ground’). 
The military potential of the upland had already been recognised by the Romans who built a 
stretch of the Antonine Wall along the ridge just to the north of Tamfour and what was 
eventually to be the site chosen by the Jacobites for the battle of Falkirk in 1746 (see fig 
7.16). In introduction to his Military Antiquities, William Roy suggested, rather poignantly 
in this case, that:    
The nature of a country will always, in a great degree, determine the general 
principles upon which every war there must be conducted. In the course of 
many years, a morassy country may be drained; one that was originally 
covered with wood, may be laid open; or an open country may be afterwards 
inclosed [sic]: yet while the ranges of mountains, the long extended valleys, 
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and remarkable rivers, continue the same, the reasons of war cannot 
essentially change. Hence it will appear evident, that what, with regard to 
situation, was an advantageous post when the Romans were carrying on 
their military operations in Britain, must, in all essential respects, continue 
to be a good one now.
919
 
   
 
 
Figure 7.16 Plan shewing [part of] the course of the Roman wall called Grime's Dyke [Antonine 
Wall], by William Roy in 1755. The extract covers the same ground as that shown in William 
Cunningham’s plan (MPF 1/350) but north is to the top of the page here. Plate XXXV, Newman.360 
(Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland).     
 
Mistakenly believing the Jacobites were not intending to engage his army but rather 
to by-pass it and march south to England, Hawley ordered ‘three regiments of dragoons to 
march to the Muir, and take possession of the high ground between them and the rebels: he 
ordered the infantry to follow’.
920
 Hawley’s initial (and rather late) intent was to intercept the 
Jacobite army and force them to engage. John Home, a volunteer with the Hanoverian army, 
wrote that ‘in this conceit […] the conflict happened upon a piece of ground which he 
[Hawley] had never viewed, and was a field of battle exceedingly disadvantageous to his 
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 The Hanoverian army had a steep climb (H) into a strong south-westerly wind and 
driving rain, and the Jacobites, gaining the high ground ahead of the Dragoons, wheeled to 
face east (O) so their backs were to the storm and their right flank protected by a morass. 
Both armies began to form up in two lines, roughly north-south, with a steep scarp defining 
the battlefield on the north side and the marsh to the south. A steep-sided ravine running 
from the scarp summit to the low ground to the south separated the northern flanks of the 
armies but in the centre and south it was open sloping ground (see Fig 7.17).
922
 Curiously, 
the Hanoverian right wing outflanked the Jacobite left which if taken as a deliberate 




Figure 7.17 An extract from a [Map of the Battle of Falkirk], by William Cuningham, showing the 
deployment of the armies at the start of the battle, 17 January 1746. 730010 (The Royal Collection © 
2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
  
If the explanation on the map is to be believed, the Hanoverian army once again 
displayed a high degree of order and discipline in taking up position—‘I Where the 
Dragoons first Form’d’, ‘L The Dragoons as they Engaged’, ‘M The Foot as they were 
form’d when the Dragoons Engag’d’—and the Jacobite army easily routed, ‘S Where 
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Barrells and Ligoniers Regiments pursued the Left of the Rebells [sic] after they were 
broke’.
923
 The latter indicates that Cunningham witnessed the battle, or at least acquired the 
information from a participant in or a spectator to it, and drew his plan after the event despite 
the image’s suggestion of a pre-engagement plan. The maps give no visual indication of the 
following action that took place. As it was, the Dragoon charge failed after a violent 
encounter with the Highlanders: ‘The resistance of the Highlanders was so incredibly 
obstinate, that the English, having been for some time engaged pell-mell with them in their 
ranks, were at length repulsed and forced to retire’.
924
 In their flight, the Dragoons rode over 
a Company of the Glasgow Regiment who then failed to reform in time to defend themselves 
against the Highlanders in pursuit of the retreating Dragoons. The Hanoverian right wing, 
however, held their line against the Jacobites, protected by the ravine, and in the intense 
barrage of musket fire, some Jacobites did take flight. Failing light and bad weather 
discouraged Hawley from seeing this small advantage through to the end and rather than 
going on the offensive, he retreated to his camp at Falkirk then back towards Edinburgh.
925
 
The Jacobites were effectively left in command of the field.  
 The Jacobites claimed a victory and at least one map survives as an important piece 
of propaganda: a ‘Plan of the Victory of Falkirk Muir fought the afternoon of January 16 
1746’.
926
 The plan is little more than an order of battle showing the front line of the 
Hanoverian army and the ‘Kings Army led by the Prince and consisting of Gentlemen of 
Rank from the Highlands’. Importantly, the regimental lines are depicted in relation to the 
topography which proved such a strategic advantage to the Jacobites and a tactical 
disadvantage for Hawley’s army. The Hanoverian army, however, did not see Falkirk as a 
defeat. According to Hawley, they were ‘masters of the field of battle’,
927
 which may in part 
explain the pseudo-commemorative nature of Cunningham’s maps and the misleading nature 
of the information he depicted which failed to describe events during and after battle. The 
fact that his maps were official records of the battle to inform, in this case, the Duke of 
Cumberland but as easily the king or the Board of Ordnance clearly and accurately about the 
events of the battle leant the maps an air of trustworthiness.
928
 In their production, 
Cunningham’s maps were a form of Hanoverian propaganda. A version of his map was 
                                                 
923
 RLW 730010 
924
 Quoted in Duffy 2003, p. 417. 
925
 ‘The evening being excessive rainy, it was thought proper to march the troops to Linlithgow that 
night’ (TNA SP 54/27/29A: a letter from Lt. General Hawley to Secretary Newcastle, 17 January 
1746).  
926
 NLS EMS.s.164, by J. M. 
927
 TNA SP 54/27/29A, a letter from Hawley. 
928
 William Cunningham was an Engineer in Ordinary in the Military Establishment of the Board of 
Ordnance at the time of the ’Forty-Five (TNA WO 54/209, pp. 10–12, March 1745). 
 281 





The Battle of Culloden 16 April 1746 
On the 16
th
 the Duke came up with the rebels a little on the side of 
Inverness—by the way, the battle is not christened yet; I only know that 
neither Prestonpans nor Falkirk are to be godfathers.
930
 
The battle was Culloden. One of the best documented battles, Culloden is also one of the 
best mapped. There are thirty-two maps of the battle in the archive, most of them split 
between the Cumberland Collection and private papers although a few of the latter were 
drawn by Joseph Yorke, Cumberland’s Aide-de-Camp.
931
 The authors and the maps 
themselves give a more precise indication of when they were actually drawn, whether before 
battle as a pre-planned battle order sometimes changed at the last minute, a sketch made 
immediately after the battle, or post-battle records of the event, mostly commemorative but 
at least one displaying a sympathetic end to the ideology of Jacobitism.
932
  
 Chapter 6 has described how, by the time he reached the battlefield at Culloden, 
Cumberland had perfected the Hanoverian army’s ‘Order of March’ to the extent that it 
could ‘swing’ straight into the predetermined order of battle as it marched:
933
 ‘we marched in 
four columns, and by the ruff of a Drum formed instantly in to order of Battle’.
934
 There are a 
number of copies of the Hanoverian battle order, most of them neat copies, but one in 
particular conveys an immediate image of last-minute adjustments which were presumably 
made to take account of the groupings of the enemy forces (see Fig 7.18).
935
 The plan has 
been folded several times as if kept in a pocket or orderly book and has multiple crossings 
out as the troop deployment was revised. Of the few records of the Jacobite army’s order 
most were included on the same sheet as the Hanoverian order but one plan—an order of  
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Figure 7.18 [Planning the] ‘Order of Battle’ [at Culloden] April 16t. 1746. 730019 (The Royal 
Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
 
‘His Royal Highness’ Prince Charles Edward Stuart’s Army—was drawn by a Jacobite and 
included the number of men in each clan or ‘cell’, the Jacobite army totalling 8350 men.
936
 
Two neat copies of this plan replace ‘His R: Highness’ with ‘The Pretender’ thereby 
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indicating a change of authorship.
937
 All these ‘orders of battle’ are devoid of topographical 
detail by which to determine how, if at all, the battlefield landscape was used in deciding the 
strategic positioning of the various army divisions. 
 The earliest surviving map of the battle in action is possibly Joseph Yorke’s ‘Rough 
sketch taken on the spot’.
938
 The sketch was sent with a letter to his father the Lord 
Chancellor Philip Yorke, 1
st
 Earl of Hardwicke, on 18 April 1746. It was then sent on to 
George II: ‘As the inclosed [sic] letter may possibly contain some minute particulars of the 
last Glorious day […] I humbly beg leave to lay it before Your Majesty’s feet […] it is 
accompanied with a rough Sketch of the Action, drawn on the field of Battle’.
939
 Yorke’s 
sketch was basic and included very little in the way of explanation or labels apart from 
‘Cavalry w
th
 Hawley’ and ‘2 Platoons of the Argyle Militia’. His draught did, however, 
include the walled areas between the Jacobite army and the River Nairn—the Culwhiniac 
enclosure—and the Hanoverian cavalry’s breach of it, as well as the disposition of the 
artillery. In front of the Hanoverian army’s left flank, Yorke marked an ‘X’ with a note: 
‘Where the Hottest of the Action was’. An eye-witness account described this action: 
Our forces to the left were drawn up on a rising ground much lower than 
theirs [the Jacobites] [and] stretching beyond their right line with a small 
shallow valley and a bed of a winter stream between them […] We had 
twelve Cannon in front, four at each end, and four in the middle; […] and 
behind the first line our Cohorns [sic] played; tis said the enemy intended to 
wait our attack, but our whole artillery played so briskly on them and galled 
them so terribly, that their right, some say, without order, advanced with a 
great fury in a highland trott in a deep column and in an unsoldier-like 
manner firing without order and moving sideways with their targets and 
broad swords as to stretch out to the length of our left wing; we kept our fire 
till they were near; but not withstanding, they broke the first line of Barrell’s 
Regiment on our left, and being let in, they were flanked by them, and met 
by the second line in front who tis thought by their fire killed several of 
Barrell’s mixed with the enemy.
940
  
 When Cumberland’s army encamped at Inverness in the wake of the Battle of 
Culloden, Yorke noted in his Orderly Book an instruction that ‘All Paper, Letter, 
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Commissions, Maps or Plans taken in the Field of Battle or since, to be brought to H.R.H. 
Qrs. & delivered to Sr. Everard Fawkener’, Cumberland’s private secretary.
941
 This may 
explain why there are substantially more maps of Culloden than any of the other battles and 
why several of these are almost identical, commemorative maps produced by the Duke’s 
personal draughtsmen—[Henry] Schultz, Thomas Sandby, and Dugal Campbell. On 7 May 
1746, the Duke of Montagu, Master General of the Ordnance, wrote to Fawkener that he 
‘had given directions for Mr Dugal Campbell […] to attend His Royal Highness […] there 
are none […] that are so proper to execute his Royal Highness commands as Mr Dugal 
Campbell’.
942
 Campbell compiled a plan of the Battle of Culloden that was remarkably 
similar in design and content to one by Thomas Sandby, Cumberland’s ‘Draughtsman and 
Designer’ (see Fig 4.15 for Sandby’s).
943
 Sandby claimed to have drawn his at Inverness on 
23 April, a week after the battle, which implies that Campbell’s plan is a copy according to 
the date of Montagu’s recommendation to Fawkener. Campbell’s version was engraved and 
published by ‘Authority’ and ‘Sold by M. Overton, in Fleet-Street, and C. Mosley, at the 
Golden-Head, in Hart-Street, the Upper-end of Bow-Street’ (see Fig 7.19). It was advertised 
in the General Advertiser for 2 July 1746 as ‘an exact plan having been transmitted to a 




 By printing and distributing a version of these plans, the government’s intent was to 
celebrate the discipline and order of the King’s Army. An eye-witness to the battle recounted 
how Cumberland’s troops ‘formed in Line of Action according to the Instructions received in 
the Morning, which was done with great Beauty of Discipline and Order’. In contrast, the 
Jacobite commanders, having observed ‘the great Execution […], thought to revenge it by 
making a desperate Attack at once; and immediately like Wildcats their Men came down in 
Swarms upon our Left Wing’.
945
 Comparisons of Cumberland’s military prowess on the 
battlefield and the strategic errors of the Jacobite command became central to the numerous 
printed journals and pictorial accounts of the Battle of Culloden.
946
 In meeting the public’s 
demand for cartographical journalism and news of heroic victories, the maps fulfilled an 
important political function: one of propaganda.
947
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Figure 7.19 Plan of the Battle of Culloden 16 April 1746, by Dugal Campbell. 730027 (The Royal 
Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
 
Both Sandby’s and Campbell’s plans are arguably the most informative and 
authoritative with the inclusion of detailed topographical information—Culloden House, its 
‘Parks’, stone walled cultivated fields and enclosures on the south side of the moor, and 
streams running down to the River Nairn—the strategic positioning of the fighting units, and 
textual information on the compositions of the armies, the numbers killed in action, and an 
alpha-key to explain the dynamics of the plan. Both armies are shown in position when the 
action began, thereafter, the only movements shown in detail are those of the Dragoons: ‘C 
Breaches in the Park Walls made by the Argyleshire Men for the Dragoons to march thro’ 
and ‘D The Dragoons formed in the Rear of the Right Flank of the Rebels, from whence they 
fell upon and pursued them in their Flight’. Sandby’s and Campbell’s plans could, in fact, be 
neat copies of the more ‘scientific depiction’ attributed to [Henry] Schultz, ‘Cumberland’s 
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draughtsman’ (see Fig 7.20).
948
 Schultz’s plan, however, included more preliminary battle 
information: ‘A. The Army on its march in 4 Columns & forming in order of Battle’; ‘B. The 






Figure 7.20 ‘Plan of the Battle of Collodden’, by [?Henry Schultz], 1746. 730025 (The Royal 
Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II).  
 
 Another contemporary map was compiled by Jasper Leigh Jones, a ‘Lieut
t
. 
Fireworker in ye Roy
l
. Train of Artillery’ (see Fig 7.21). As with Schultz’s plan, Jones 
illustrated something of the march of the Hanoverian army prior to battle although he 
showed an obvious interest in the disposition of the artillery. He signified to the artillery 
train to the left of the main military march with labels for ‘Cannon’ and ‘Tumbrells’. His 
depiction of the action was once again focused on the artillery, with little attention paid to 
the Dragoons and their breach of the Culwhiniac enclosures. On the Hanoverian side, he  
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Figure 7.21 ‘A Plan of ye Battle of Colloden between his Majs. Forces Under the Command of his 
Royall Highness the Duke of Cumberland and the Sctt. Rebels April ye 16 1746’, by Jasper Leigh 
Jones, 1746. MS 1648 Z.03/30b (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library of 
Scotland) 
 
showed five groups of two cannon positioned in advance of the front line.
950
 Four further 
cannon and three Coehorn mortars were depicted in a forward position to the south east of 
Culloden Park. These cannon and Coehorns were in fact ‘time-lapsed’ depictions, having 
been brought up from the Hanoverian front line during the battle.
951
 The Jacobite army, 
according to this plan, had two centrally positioned cannon flanked on either side by groups 
of five cannon. Between the armies’ front lines, Jones marked the advance of the Hanoverian 
army as ‘THE ATTACK’ and showed, with apparent scientific accuracy, the trajectory of the 
cannon and mortars.  
On the right of his map, Jones depicted a Royal Navy flotilla in the Moray Firth—
‘The Fleet with Provisions’. Two other map makers also represented the Fleet.  The first, an 
unknown French Officer who compiled, probably before 1748, a ‘Plan exact de la 
disposition des Troupes Ecossoises sous le Commandement de son A.R.P.C. et de Celle des 
Troupes Anglaises’ (see Fig 7.22). The letters ‘A.R.P.C’ stand for ‘Prince Charles Edward 
Stuart’ and the map is dedicated to ‘Sa Majeste tres Chretienne’ (Louis XV) by ‘un Officier  
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Figure 7.22 ‘Plan exact de la disposition des Troupes Ecossoises sous le Commandement de son 
A.R.P.C. et de Celle des Troupes Anglaises a la Bataille de Culloden pres la Ville d’Inverness le 16 
d’avril 1746’, c.1748. Acc.11323 (Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the National Library 
of Scotland). 
 
Francois qui etoit present a la dite Bataille’. Robert Woosnam-Savage suggests that the 
‘Officier’ may have been in the Royal Ecossois or Irish Picquets since the map shows more 
detail than any other of the centre rear of the Jacobite army.
952
 Although the officer has 
shown the disposition of the opposing armies using conventional abstract symbolism and in 
considerable detail—Charles Edward Stuart is shown no less than three times: firstly, in 
advance of the front line; secondly, behind the left flank; and thirdly, behind the right flank 
of the Jacobite army—his representation of the geography was debatable. Margaret Wilkes 
has suggested that the officer’s interpretation of the coastline of the Moray Firth owes more 
to the Firth of Forth and that he may ‘have used an existing map of the Battle of Prestonpans 
as his topographical source’.
953
 Whether this was the case or not, a comparison of Ardersier 
Point (below the ‘MUR’ of ‘MURRAY’) with many of Skinner and Tarrant’s plans of Fort 
George and its environs shows how poor the coastline depiction on this map was. The map’s 
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merit lay in its detailed account of the Jacobite army’s movements—depicted as more 
orderly and tactical than on any other map—and a unique glimpse of the changing 
movements of Charles Edward, possibly in response to the changing intensity of the 
Hanoverian cannonade. How truthful these positions were and, indeed, how truthful the map 
was is questionable if one takes into account the poor geography. At the time of its making, 




Figure 7.23 A Plan of the Battle of Culloden and the Adjacent Country Shewing the Incampment of 
the English Army at Nairn and the March of the Highlanders in Order to Attack Them by Night, by 
[John Finlayson], [c.1748]. 730031 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II). 
 
The second map maker after Jones to show the Navy Fleet was mathematical-
instrument maker John Finlayson who also served as Charles Edward’s engineer and 
commissar and acted as artillery ordnance master in the battle. Finlayson’s map was 
acknowledged by contemporaries as ‘the best plan of the encounter’ (see Fig 7.23).
954
 There 
are four copies in today’s archive, none dated but one has a manuscript note stating ‘January 
the 18
th
 1753. Seized upon John Finllayson. By me N. Carrington’.
955
 They were all 
compiled after 1748; Finlayson’s inclusion of an outline of a fort at Ardersier Point 
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 His cartographic narrative started with the Hanoverian army’s 
encampment at Nairn on 15 April, the Duke’s birthday, and where ‘they say it was a fine 
sight to see the fleet and from ports with provisions sail as our army moved, and cast Anchor 
every night, and brought provisions ashore to our Camp’.
957
 In contrast, Finlayson observed 
that ‘The Highlanders had been without pay, and scarce of provisions for some weeks’. 
Believing the Hanoverian army would be busy celebrating the Duke’s birthday, the 
Jacobites affected a night attack of the camp only to get lost in the mist and fail to 
rendezvous. Finlayson illustrated the Jacobite movements and then, the following day, the 
Duke’s march towards Culloden. The Jacobites had been ‘obliged to fight after a fatiguing 
march, without any refreshment: having had no sleep and but little food the two days and 
nights immediately preceeding [sic]: and wanting numbers of their men, who were disperst 
in the adjacent villages’. As with the French Officer’s map, Finlayson defined the Jacobite 
movements as ‘time-lapsed’ events: ‘B.B. The Highland Army when the Battle began’ then 
‘C.C. The Highland Army as they made the Attack only some breakings in the Line 
occasion’d by the Marshy Ground’. On all accounts, ‘It was but a small number of them (that 
was present) did actually engage, the others being intimidate[d] on seeing those who made 
such a desperate attack, obliged to give way’.
958
 The Jacobite army took flight, some towards 
Inverness and others to the south, towards Ruthven.  
 Finlayson’s decorative cartouche was bound by poignant symbols marking the end 
of Jacobite ideology (see Fig 7.24): a snuffed out candle; a chained lion and broken unicorn 
horn (the Scottish lion rampant coast-of-arms has unicorns as heraldic supporters); and 
broken thistles (symbol of Scotland).
959
 The failure of the ’Forty-Five marked the end of 
Jacobitism as a factor in the political life of Great Britain. The ‘movement’ itself, however, 






This chapter has described and analysed the cartography of conflict. The focus has been the 
fifty-one maps, plans, and sketches of five battles in Scotland between Jacobite and 
Hanoverian forces—namely, Sheriffmuir in 1715, Glenshiel (1719), Prestonpans (1745), and  
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Figure 7.24 The cartouche from A Plan of the Battle of Culloden, by [John Finlayson], [c.1748].  
730031 (The Royal Collection © 2009, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II). 
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Falkirk and Culloden (1746). Rather than organise the cartographic documents according to 
sub-divisions of battle maps—‘order of battle’ and ‘record or memorial maps’—here, 
instead, I have chosen to treat each battle as a discrete event and the material 
chronologically. Such an approach reminds us of the political reason for battle maps beyond 
the battle itself.  
 Even taking into account my individual treatment of the battles, the maps, as a 
collective, display some common characteristics that can be summarised here. They each 
conformed to eighteenth-century conventions of military cartography that relied on the use 
of icons, from a mixture of pictorial and abstract symbols to full scientific abstractions, 
which were familiar to an eighteenth-century audience. These conventions developed to help 
distinguish the different regiments and military units in the field of battle. The most common 
abstract symbolism used on maps of battles in Scotland were unadorned rectangles 
distinguished by size to indicate the relative number of men in each unit, and colour to define 
the various detachments constituting an army. Lines of movement across a field of battle 
were shown by dotted or pecked lines, and cannon and mortar trajectories by solid lines. The 
final form of the maps depended on the role they played in the military engagements. The 
Scottish collection varied from simple pictorial plans of the order of battle, lacking both 
topographical detail and scale, to perspective maps and two-dimensional plans showing the 
changing disposition of the opposing armies relative to the topography and time.  
Maps of the earlier battles formed scenographic renditions of various skirmishes 
between opposing military units. One of the most striking was Bastide’s map of the Battle of 
Glenshiel. This map provided a clear cartographic narrative of events using a system of 
‘time-lapsed’ depictions linked to an alpha-numeric key, from the initial deployment of both 
armies, the individual skirmishes in different parts of the field of battle, to the final rout of 
the Jacobite army, shown effectively with pictorial symbols. By the time of the ’Forty-Five, 
battle maps showed a greater tendency towards abstract symbolism and scientific depiction 
but still with a dependency on text to explain the movement from one stage of battle to the 
next. When the image portrayed by the map maker is compared with the accompanying 
textual narrative of the battle, it becomes clear that the eighteenth-century cartographic 
representation no longer captured the ‘messiness’ of conflict, the chaos and panic, for 
example, that must have ensued after a Highland charge or an entrenchment was breached by 
heavy artillery. The maps, instead, represented neat and systematic redeployments of troops 
over time and space. Nowhere is this more efficiently done—by Hanoverian or by Jacobite 
draughtsmen—than on the battle maps of Culloden. The Duke of Cumberland’s prowess as a 
military tactician was eminently displayed and, on some maps, commemorated. The 
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battlefield was to Cumberland ‘what a chessboard is to a chess player who wants to make 
moves with his pawns, castles and so forth’.
961
     
 Between the first mapped battle and the last, battle maps became increasingly 
familiar to contemporaries because they were published and their cartographic iconography 
remained relatively constant. This was not only in response to the public’s demand for 
cartographic journalism, for ideological depictions of victories to accompany articles 
describing campaigns, maps were also being paraded as a legitimate political tool by both 
Hanoverians and Jacobites. State sponsored mapping commanded an authority and 
engendered a belief in what was being depicted but this was not always a truthful or 
complete representation of what actually happened. This is said, not to make claims that the 
map’s depiction was an illusion, but to highlight the persuasiveness of maps, their power in 
acts of political propaganda. The maps produced by draughtsmen on both sides formed a 
narrative that was guided by the views of the state authority behind their making rather than 
by a direct and honest experience of the event alone. Thus, the Battle of Falkirk, for 
example, was believed to be and was portrayed as a victory by both armies. The most 
effective distribution of government propaganda was to publish maps of the campaigns in 
Scotland. A map of Falkirk—more conclusively a defeat than a victory for the government 
army—was published as a cartographic narrative extolling the tactical manoeuvring of the 
Hanoverian Dragoons and Infantry from their camp north of Falkirk to the battlefield on a 
plateau to the south to stop the supposed southerly advance of the Jacobites. Maps of 
Culloden were published to commemorate Cumberland’s victory, to celebrate his battle 
strategy, and to put an end to the ideology of Jacobitism. Battle map utility can also be 
considered evidentiary as in cases of military court-marshal and pedagogic as part of the 
teaching of military science and history to young officer cadets at the Military Academy at 
Woolwich. Direct evidence that maps of the battles in Scotland were used in either a court-
marshal or as a teaching aid is, however, more inferred than proved. 
 The extant archive of maps of the battles fought in Scotland between 1715 and 1746 
show cartography to be an increasingly popular form of military narrative in the eighteenth 
century. Political and military leaders found them useful to reflect on battlefield tactics and 
as articles of propaganda; the population wanted to believe in the ideology of heroic 
victories. In their production, however, consideration must be taken of the operational 
circumstances under which battle maps were made and how, if at all, this influenced their 
content. Questions of purpose and thus truthfulness need to be kept at the forefront of the 
historical enquiry when analysing maps of military conflict.  
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 In the next chapter I conclude the thesis and reflect on the reconstruction of the 
military landscape of eighteenth-century Scotland. This involves an understanding of the 






































(Re)Constructing the Military Landscape of Scotland, 1689–1815 
 
Introduction 
In 1716, Lewis Petit, military engineer to the Board of Ordnance, surveyed and compiled a 
map of a citadel overshadowing the town of Perth in Scotland
962
 (see Fig 8.1). Perth was 
occupied by the Jacobites and heavily fortified by them with lines of entrenchments during 
the rebellion of 1715. Petit’s map relates to unfulfilled intentions to construct a new fort. 
Although never built, his plan reveals an imagination for a fortress modelled upon the ideal 
city—‘Euclidian form and central planning, with total social control represented in its 
architectural composition’.
963
 Petit’s design for the citadel was composed of a single 
geometrically-pure enceinte, containing parallel rows of barracks forming the perimeter of 
an internal parade ground with ramps of earth radiating out to each of the five bastions. Two 
of the citadel bastions overlooked Perth whilst the remaining three looked out over the 
surrounding countryside. In its depiction, the new citadel was devoted entirely to a military 
presence and in its form and situation it served the double function of defending itself from 
outside attack as well as offering a means from which to subjugate the local populace.  
 Petit’s map of Perth, the citadel, and the purpose behind its commission and 
compilation, brings together the main strands of my thesis which has considered the 
construction of the military landscape—real and imagined—through the institutional 
mapping of Scotland in the eighteenth century. In the introduction to the thesis, I outlined the 
aims of my study which were threefold. The first was concerned to examine military 
mapping in and of Scotland as a national practice, a practice that was co-ordinated by a state 
institution—the Board of Ordnance—and, as such, displayed characteristics of institutional 
rationalisation. The second aim was to explore how changing state imperatives influenced 
cartographic practices (modes) and whether these modes created different kinds of spatial 
knowledge at different times. The final aim was to explore the role of maps in military and 
political activities in Scotland. In this conclusion, the strands of the study are drawn together 
to address each of these aims. This is done in four parts: a summary of chapter findings; a 
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summary of methods and content; a review of cartographic modes; and an assessment of the 
political values of the maps of Scotland. The chapter finishes with a reflection on the 




Figure 8.1 ‘Plan of Perth and Adjacent Places with a projection of a Cittadel’ [copy], by Lewis Petit, 





This thesis has provided a detailed study of the military mapping of Scotland by the Board of 
Ordnance engineers, draughtsmen, and associated surveyors between 1689 and 1815. The 
detailed synthesis of Board of Ordnance material in six repositories resulted in the 
identification of 940 cartographic items—maps, plans, sections, and perspective views—
together with related archival material on the work, nature, and activities of the Board of 
Ordnance. The cartographic records have here been re-constituted as a union archive to 
facilitate their interrogation across these different holdings. This thesis identified three main 
map types in the Board of Ordnance archive: fortification, movement, and battles. It is 
important to identify the principal features of each, and, in final conclusion, reflect upon this 
typology as well as the underlying thematic chronology of the map archive. These maps 
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represent an invaluable resource for considering the place of military mapping as a form of 
geographical knowledge in Enlightenment Scotland.  
  Chapter 2 explained how, by the mid-seventeenth century, most European states 
were increasingly involved in large-scale territorial surveys and how this engendered the 
ascendancy of the military or state surveyor. These military specialists—‘engineers’—were 
often institutionally trained and were taught to bring together work in marine charting, 
regional geographical mapping, land surveying, and topographical surveying to form a new 
and singular practice: ‘mathematical cosmography’, the ‘measured and mimetic reduction of 
the world to paper’.
964
 Faith in the usefulness of mathematical cosmography—the study of 
astronomy, geography, and geodesy—allowed the map to become a leading technology of 
geographical knowledge in the Enlightenment. This was a technology quickly adopted by the 
military and appropriated by government.
965
  
 During the Enlightenment, the military became increasingly ‘map-minded’, and 
mapping more focused on military concerns. General William Roy, principal surveyor of the 
Military Survey of Scotland, recognised this in remarking that 
It becomes the Business, and not the least essential part of the profession of 
Military Men, to observe and consider Countrys in such a manner as to 
acquire, at least a General Knowledge of the principal Positions and Posts, 




Military engineers were sent to Scotland initially to bring order to a rebellious nation. In so 
doing, they helped extend acts of political domination to the intellectual domination of the 
nation. They did this in two ways: firstly, by surveying and mapping the nation, and 
secondly, by opening up a conceptual-territorial space for military expansion and 
government intervention. The actions of Major-General George Wade, Commander-in-Chief 
of the forces in Scotland from 1724, offer a good example of both these ambitions. During 
his initial reconnaissance of the Highlands, he ‘caused an exact Survey to be taken of the 
several Lakes and that part of the Country lying between Inverness and Fort William, which 
extends from the East to the West Sea’ the purpose of which was ‘to render the 
Communication more practicable […] for the March of Your Majesty’s Forces between 
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these Garrisons, and facilitate their assembling in one Body, if Occasion should require’.
967
 
On such maps, the military engineers depicted essential features of military importance: 
forts, castles, and barracks; roads, often with distances marked on and bridges and fords 
identified; relief and areas of marsh; and cultivated land and settlements for provisions for 
the troops.  
 Chapter 3 presented evidence of the rationalisation of state cartography in Britain. 
The structure of the Board of Ordnance—the cartographic co-ordinating body—was 
rationalised to make more effective use of cartographic specialists—the military engineers 
and civilian draughtsmen. In 1683, cartographic practices were first defined in Rules Orders 
and Instruction for the future Government of the Office of the Ordnance; in 1741, the Royal 
Military Academy at Woolwich was constituted to instruct junior cadets in the military 
sciences; in 1787, the Corps of Royal Engineers was officially recognised; and, in 1800, the 
Corps of Military Surveyors and Draughtsmen established. This growth in cartographic 
institutions highlights the growing recognition in the eighteenth century of the power of 
maps and their importance in national governance. The value of a military education, one 
based on formal training rather than experience acquired through length of service, was 
officially recognised in 1741 and, thereafter, engineers were taught military science, 
instructed in methods of survey and compilation, and in the practical use of maps for military 
action. Theoretical lessons using military treatises and the experiential act of surveying and 
drawing developed a national ‘cartographic codification’.  
 Chapter 4 provided an overview of the archive of military maps in relation to 
military activities in Scotland. Fortification cartography was found to dominate the 
representation of military landscapes, accounting for 73% of the archive.
968
 Within this 
category, further sub-division was made according to four main types of Scottish 
fortifications: medieval castles, garrison forts, barrack forts, and coastal gun-batteries. Maps 
of military movement were found to be more diverse in nature, linked by function rather than 
by form. Their further division into route maps, topographical maps, and marine charts 
revealed a continuum rather than sharp division in typology. Together, they formed 22% of 
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 Battle maps accounted for the smallest portion of the archive, only 5%.
970
 
Two genres of map were evident—contemporary manuscript accounts and printed 
broadsheet maps or ‘news maps’—and these may be understood in relation to events before, 
during, and after battle.  
 Chapter 5 offered a detailed exploration of the engineers’ endeavours to codify 
fortification cartography at the compilation and design stage to produce conventions of 
design, scale, and colour that were nationally (and internationally) recognised by military 
and political leaders alike. Some conventions were adopted from continental Europe; for 
example, Vauban’s use of a hierarchical organisation in the representation of forts based on 
the use of different scales. Where maps of Scotland showed particular differences to 
continental practices was in the value of those scales. Colours were used to distinguish the 
different parts of a fortification and the stage of its construction. Certain colours became 
conventional, for example, carmine (red) was used to represent completed masonry 
constructions whereas incomplete or proposed works were washed in gamboge yellow. If we 
return to Petit’s plan of Perth for a moment (see Fig 8.1), we realise that he broke from 
established convention by representing the citadel—a proposed structure—in the graphics 
colours of a completed establishment. If this was deliberate which seems likely given his 
choice of a citadel and its careful positioning overlooking the town, then what was a 
conceptual military presence becomes all the more real. The map, in its representation, 
materialised military power.   
 Maps of military movement, described in chapter 6, were united less in their 
physical form and cartographic conventions than they were by common military function—
depicting military movement or the potential of movement, whether by land, sea, or inland 
waterway. In their representations, these maps conveyed an impression of access to parts of 
Scotland beyond the observers’ view. This feature of maps was exploited by political and 
military personnel in governing and planning a future Scotland.  
Battle maps, described in chapter 7, were familiar to contemporaries and even in the 
relatively short time between the first and last mapped battle—Sheriffmuir in 1715 and 
Culloden in 1746—a recognisable form of cartographic representation became established. 
Glenshiel, in 1719, marked an important transition between the use of a perspective 
projection and the plan. Thereafter, maps of the ’Forty-Five consistently represented the 
battlefield landscape vertically, in two-dimensions, and were frequently drawn to scale. In 
both perspective and plan, abstract symbols were used to distinguish different army units and 
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were linked to an explanation of the battle by an alpha-numeric key. Battle maps were more 
commonly drawn after the event and for various purposes: commemoration; as part of an 
official report; a personal record of events. Maps of the Jacobite-Hanoverian battles had a 
very clear purpose: political propaganda. They are one of the few types of military map to be 
published and circulated beyond military or political eyes. The public, familiar with graphic 
design, knew how to read battle maps but they read what the government wanted them to 
which was not always a reflection of the events themselves.  
 Just as cartographic depictions became more standardised, the military texts required 
to validate and clarify them also conformed to a standard content. They included 
geographical explanations and written topographical descriptions as well as reports on the 
practicalities of a site for construction work and breakdowns of the costs of labour and 
materials. Military conventions required that ‘however exact the map may be as to distances, 
or if ever so highly finished and coloured, without a military itinerary annexed to the map, 
no general can depend on it for his manouvres [sic]’. Maps were, however, acknowledged to 
be of equal value to ‘itineraries’ in that ‘a literal description without a drawing cannot give a 
proper idea of the ground’.
971
 Together, map and text provided the geographical descriptions 
necessary for decision making pertaining to military action. 
 The military maps of Scotland were commissioned by the Board of Ordnance for 
military and political purposes. The maps reflected an institutional style that was established 
through the rationalisation of the organisation and, in particular, a clarification of the 
cartographic role of the military engineers. Just as a corps of engineers—the Ponts et 
Chaussés—were established in France in 1716 and entrusted with the maintenance of the 
highways, and officers of the Génie were responsible for fortifications, and the Ingénieurs-
géographers surveyed for the purpose of topographical mapping,
972
 military engineers 
surveyed and mapped Scotland, constructed forts and roads, and represented military action. 
Unlike France, however, which was mainly mapped in times of peace, the state mapping of 
Scotland responded to threats to British hegemony especially to those posed by Jacobitism.  
 
 
The Archive: a Summary of Method and Content 
The extant Board of Ordnance map archive of Scotland’s eighteenth-century military 
landscape—940 records to date—ranges from crudely-executed reconnaissance sketches, 
unfinished topographical and fortification outlines to large-scale beautifully coloured 
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surveys, bird’s-eye views of medieval castles, and memorials of military action. The maps 
were surveyed and drawn by European—British, French, German, and Dutch—engineers 
and draughtsmen employed by the British state, their commissions co-ordinated by the Board 
of Ordnance. Rules of graphic design were set nationally but were recognised 
internationally, in Europe and America.
973
 In general terms, the maps were drawn to provide 
a geographical military-based description of Scotland whose purpose may be understood as 
an imperative of the British state after the deposition in 1689 of James VII of Scotland and II 
of England by William of Orange and Mary Stuart. This imperative was justified by the 
continued if episodic chronology of Jacobite rebellion in Scotland for the next sixty years, 
then to be replaced between 1778 and 1782 by threats of raids by American and French 
privateers and, finally, concerns of an overseas invasion from France towards the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.  
 Previous studies of the military landscape in Scotland have examined separately 
Scotland’s fortifications, military roads, the Military Survey, and some of the battles.
974
 This 
study has offered, for the first time, a substantive examination of these maps and plans as a 
complete corpus of geographical description. In establishing a preliminary method by which 
to handle such a large and diverse archive, I chose to adopt one heuristic devise, namely 
Harley’s classification of the maps of the American Revolutionary War.
975
  
 Harley’s model provided a means to analyse the military maps of Scotland, to look 
at the relationship between map forms and attributes with the range of military activities 
associated with the same maps. It thus allowed me to categorise the maps according to their 
perceived function in association with the principal realms of eighteenth-century military 
activity—fortification, movement, and battle—and to refine these further into sub-divisions 
pertinent to Scotland’s military cartographic legacy. 
 This study suggests that Harleyian classification is a broadly appropriate method for 
organising and categorising military mapping practices in eighteenth-century Scotland. Maps 
were made for the purpose of fortification, movement, and battle. There are, however, 
problems with the classification or classifying in general. Taxonomic practice such as this 
splits maps, map makers, places, and periods and it is important not to lose sight of their 
connections when interpreting the purpose of mapping and the use of military maps. The 
aims set out in this study could be approached through a different ordering of the material, 
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by map maker, place, or period. This is to recognise the authority the researcher brings to the 




State Imperatives: Changing Cartographic Modes 
Eighteenth-century Scotland was, in military mapping terms, distinguished by periods of 
cartographic practice that resulted in different constructions of space. In the period 1689 to 
1815, several distinct cartographic modes, ‘or ways of acting cartographically’, can be 
recognised in Scotland.
976
 The first, roughly from 1689 to 1724, reflected the state’s need to 
secure its medieval defences, to provide accommodation for an increasing number of troops, 
and to establish a secure military presence in the Highlands. Maps produced and used for this 
purpose were within the same cartographic mode, that of fortification cartography. The 
construction of new fortifications and the restoration of old ones required accurately 
surveyed topographical site plans. Mathematically accurate—scientific—designs for forts, 
fortification, barracks, and buildings rationalised the ways in which works were conceived. 
Plans, sections, and perspective views drawn to large scales enabled an engineer to visualise 
a fortification before building, to check its dimensions, accuracy, and strategic planning, and, 
most importantly for Scotland, fit a design to the situation; most forts in Scotland were 
irregular to account for variations in local topography. Such plans allowed the state to 
measure its capacity to wage a war of attrition in Scotland, to know the quantity of men a 
particular military establishment could hold, how much ammunition they required, how large 
the munitions store needed to be, and, likewise, the storehouse to sustain a fighting unit. In 
this first period, reports written to accompany the maps were less concerned, at least initially, 
with the surrounding geography as they were the capacity and cost of the establishment. As 
the Jacobite cause refused to submit and continued to grow in strength, location became a 
principal priority as the state realised the need to extend communications throughout the 
Highlands.    
 The second period, coincident with substantial military developments, was apparent 
in multiple cartographic modes. The period began in about 1724 and continued until the mid 
1750s. It was a time when the London government was concerned to know more about the 
geography of Scotland, when acts of reconnaissance resulted in relatively small-scale 
topographical maps of the Highlands, when linear surveys were made of proposed and 
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existing military roads, and when large-scale maps of new fortifications schemes and 
military enhancements to old ones were the focus of the military engineers’ attention.  
 Fortification schemes, such as those of Fort Augustus and the two Fort Georges at 
Inverness and Ardersier, reflect the importance of strategic locations. Fort George at 
Inverness, for example, was ‘a place of Importance for preventing the northern Highlanders 
from descending into the Low Country in times of Rebellion’.
977
 Detailed topographical 
mapping of the immediate environs was therefore vital and, as I have shown, was heavily 
relied upon. Once the location of forts was fixed, the main military concern was to connect 
one fort with the other by means of a road system that would allow the rapid assembly in one 
place of large numbers of troops should the need arise. Engineers surveyed and mapped 
existing route ways, noting where they were adequate for troop and artillery use, and where 
not. They then set about extending the military road network throughout the Highlands.   
 Maps of military roads and topographical maps of the lowlands were in existence 
prior to the ’Forty-Five Rebellion. In responding to the rebellion, however, military 
commanders in Scotland had no access to these maps and the few seventeenth-century maps 
known to have been used were woefully inadequate for tactical planning. In the wake of the 
’45—an event that was itself to be represented by a different cartographic mode—engineers 
reviewed and reconstructed the damaged Scottish fortifications and appropriated additional 
medieval castles in the Highlands to use as military outposts. A reconsideration of the 
military policy in dealing with local insurrection, however, culminated in a shift in military 
strategy, from an emphasis on static fortifications to the movement of more mobile units to 
police the Highlands. This led engineers to undertake topographical surveys of more 
extensive areas, culminating in the Military Survey of Scotland between 1747 and 1755. 
Such maps were most useful for identifying strategic locations for military posts but less so 
for identifying lines of communication between them and any corresponding territorial 
hazards—physical or human. In Scotland, therefore, coincident with the Military Survey was 
a road-building programme that gave rise to detailed large-scale linear surveys directing or 
following a military route way. 
 With the responsibility for road construction transferring to the Commissioners for 
Roads and Bridges after 1767 and the threat of a Jacobite revolt long since past, the military 
mapping of Scotland went through a relatively inactive period during the 1770s before once 
again being active in the 1780s. From this time, state imperatives were directed towards the 
coasts and with mapping and erecting coastal batteries to protect shipping, coastal towns, and 
harbours from American pirates, and from the 1790s, the threat of Napoleonic invasion. 
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These concerns witnessed the emergence of two particular cartographic modes: firstly, and 
once again, fortification cartography and, secondly, coastal surveys of the Firth of Clyde and 
Long Hope Sound in Orkney with the purpose of identifying appropriate sites for gun-
batteries. Coastal surveyors used similar technologies as land surveyors, applying methods of 
observation and measurement to create linear, large-scale maps of coastal belts.  
   
 
The Political Significance of Military Maps 
Chapter 2 described and the thesis established that, in the eighteenth century, map making 
was a practical affair concerned with expanding geographical knowledge about the world 
and its representation in graphical and textual form. Additionally, Enlightenment scholars 
considered map making to be empirical and objective, above all, a science. Maps were 
therefore assigned a social-political value in the Enlightenment, one that established 
relationships between the map user (often also its maker), the map, and the territory that was 
mapped. Edney asserts that ‘every reader of a map has both a physical and a cognitive 
relationship to the map, so that […] every map, regardless of its mode, entails an act of 
intellectual appropriation and can potentially serve a more instrumental function’.
978
  
Orders for engineers in Scotland to send their maps to the Board of Ordnance in 
London, for the Board to then ‘pore over’ the artefacts to make political and military 
decisions, entailed both a physical domination of the map and an intellectual domination of 
the territory. A further example of the physical appropriation of maps is offered by orders to 
submit to Sir Everard Fawkener all maps and plans of the Culloden battlefield. In sending 
out such a command, Fawkener was intent on intellectually transposing the territory: detailed 
maps showing the tactical superiority of Cumberland and his Hanoverian army on the field 
of battle were subsequently produced and, in some cases, published to circulate a sense of 
heroic victory. The depiction of the battles between Jacobite and Hanoverian armies was a 
deliberate act to appropriate (and to mislead in some instances) the cognitive relationship 
between map and map reader. The map maker played on the map’s ‘scientific’ nature, 
promoting a rhetoric of accuracy and objectivity by mapping, in detail, the battlefield’s 
surrounding topography and the abstract movements of the army units. But the map’s 
narrative of battle was determined by the power behind its making and was often designed as 
an act of political propaganda rather than an authentic and thorough account of events.      
 Consider, too, John Elphinstone’s printed Mercator’s Map of North Britain which 
was annotated by David Watson in various colours to mark the routes of military roads and 
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locations of camps, barracks, and defensive posts.
979
 For Watson, the map stood in for 
Scotland while he formulated plans for the military to act upon the nation, to establish a 
policing system in the Highlands. In this way, the map was used instrumentally, as were 
most of the fortification plans that resulted in construction projects, the road surveys that saw 
roads built or marched upon, and the close coastal surveys that identified strategic sites for 
gun emplacements. Used instrumentally, the map becomes an expression of authority and 
power of the state over Scotland, the land, and the people and ‘so the surveyor […] replicates 




Both King and Parliament—royal and legislative authorities—ultimately influenced 
the production of military maps. Engineers frequently promoted proposed mapping schemes 
as ‘an Object highly deserving the attention and encouragment [sic] of His Majestys 
Ministers’.
981
 Although the Board had recourse to refer a fortification proposal to the 
monarch, it was parliament who ultimately controlled the state’s fiscal capacity to wage war 
and to defend the nation.
982
 Such control, combined with the Board’s claims of institutional 
poverty, was often to the detriment of a fortification project deemed expedient by an 
engineer. When reporting on the defensive state of Fort William in 1710, Talbot Edwards, 
Second Engineer to the Ordnance, warned the Board that:   
Spareing [sic] Money on Fortifycations Spoyles many a good Designe 
which like Armes or Artillery not truly fortfyed serves only to betray those 
that trust to them, while Strong works (tho chargeable) makes an Enemy pay 
also Deare before they are taken, and gives more time for Reliefe, which is 
the End of all Fortifycations.
983
  
 With so much at stake militarily and financially, there was a case for keeping a 
cartographic record at every stage of a construction programme, whether of a fort or a road. 
When Skinner was directing work on the foundations of Fort George at Ardersier, he was 
instructed by the Board of Ordnance that at all stages he was ‘to keep particular and exact 
Plans and Sections thereof […] to be enter’d in your Diary or Progress Book […] and you 
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are to transmit such book to the Surveyor General’.
984
 Caulfeild expected engineers to submit 
annually plans of the roads being built under their inspection.
985
 So deeply ingrained were 
plans in the military approach to defence that even their absence was noted. When Captain 
Caroline Frederick Scott took command of the Hanoverian garrison during the Jacobite siege 
of Fort William in March 1746, his report began: ‘I must beg the Favour of you to make my 
most humble Apology to His Royal Highness that I have not sent him a Plan of our Fort. 
But, there were so many things to do, and so few work-tools, that I was obliged to bustle 
both night & Day, with one thing or other, which I hope will plead my excuse to His Royal 
Highness’.
986
 Maps, in the eighteenth century, were seen as ‘a socially constructed form of 
knowledge’ that advanced their use as pragmatic and political tools.
987
 
   
 
Limitations and Possibilities 
Whilst the surviving archive of military maps of Scotland in the eighteenth century has 
proved a substantial resource to work with, the fact that it is not complete has created some 
limitations to its study. Without knowing how complete the surviving archive is and what 
form the losses may take—what period they cover, which places, which genres of 
mapping—we can not fully appreciate the significance of the changing mapping 
technologies in Scotland. This study has shown that there were changes in cartographic 
practices that reflected changing political and military policies in dealing with Jacobite 
insurrection and the threat of overseas invasion. What we cannot determine is the full extent 
of these changes, quantitatively at least. The Board of Ordnance minutes and state papers for 
Scotland offer some assistance, for different times and different places, but they are also only 
a partial archive of the workings of the Board and their particular interest in the affairs of 
Scotland. Certainly, maps and reports together provide a fuller picture of institutional 
practices than would otherwise be gleaned from one or either: evidence of absence does not 
equate to absence of evidence in this case. 
 In recovering the meaning of mapping Scotland, this study has necessarily involved 
some inferences about the use of these maps at the time of their making. We make 
assumptions about the use of maps from their appearance and, in this case, categorise them 
accordingly into genres we think reflect the contemporary realities of events in Scotland and 
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the way they were handled. How many were actually used for the purpose for which they 
were designed? I have offered an example in this chapter—Petit’s plan of a citadel above 
Perth— of one map which was not used for pragmatic or political purposes, rather it 
represented an ‘imagined landscape’. How many maps were involved in a political or 
military decision? The surviving archive contains several maps that show the terrain where a 
battle took place, the route the army took to get to the battlefield and, afterwards, to sites for 
encampments. These cartographic records, however, are surely just that—memorials of 
events rather than active players in the decisions that were made at the time. To argue this is 
not to undervalue the map or its influence in military decisions; rather, it is to draw some 
attention to the difficulty of recovering meaning and of knowing which maps were used, who 
used them, and with what outcome. This implies an area for future research that finds more 
evidence of map use.  
 One final ‘limitation’ to mention is the binary between my modern-day assessment 
of the surviving archive of maps and plans compared to what an eighteenth-century 
contemporary assessment would have been. Although every attempt has been made in this 
study to consider the eighteenth-century contemporary value of these maps—politically and 
militarily—this has necessarily been influenced by current thoughts on the study of early 
maps in the history of cartography and, more particularly, the historical study of 
Enlightenment mapping. In support of my comment above, more research could be done on 
this material to extend current thoughts on the actor’s rather than the historian’s perspective 
on the true value of this mapping in and of Scotland.  
Such ‘limitations’ of this study highlight several areas of future research. This study 
has identified important people but has not sought to locate the diaries of individuals to look 
for further commentary on the military cartography of Scotland. Neither has it followed the 
military map makers outside Scotland, either to Europe or to America, to compare their 
subsequent maps and their approach to mapping following their experiences in Scotland. We 
already know, from Roy and Debbeig, that Scotland was a formative and critical period in 
their cartographic education; both made reference to it as demonstrated here by Debbeig: 
When it is known the Memorialist served in Flanders the two last 
Campaigns under His late Royal Highness the Duke, that he was in Bergen-
op-Zome during the Siege, that he had opportunity under the Dukes Passport 
of visiting at his leisure all the Fortified Towns on the Dutch Frontier, that 
he was seven years employed upon the Survey of Scotland (the greatest 
work of this sort ever performed by British Subjects and perhaps for the fine 
Representations of the Country not to equal in the World) that he served in 
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America from the Siege of Louisburg to the End of the War, and came last 
year from Newfoundland; He most humbly hopes his services and 
experience will be deemed sufficient to entitle him to ask the direction of the 
proposed Scheme if it should be adopted.
988
   
 The wider context to individual activity might usefully form the basis to further 
work, even although every effort has been made here to place the Board of Ordnance’s 
activities within Scotland in wider context, in terms of contemporary mapping, conceptual 
and methodological work, and historiography. Even so, another possibility for future study 
would be the close comparison of the archive of military maps of Scotland with a European 
(or American) cartographic archive of the same, or part, period. This might, in part, help 
resolve the limitation of knowing how representative the surviving archive is of the timing 
and the extent of the changing cartographic modes employed in military mapping. Such a 
study would situate (or not) the mapping of Scotland more firmly not just as a European-
wide practice in the eighteenth century but as a practice whose forms, conventions and socio-
political meaning was established through the course of the century in an attempt to put the 
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